

## The Meaning of *Satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*

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### Preamble

Among many noteworthy terms in Buddhism, *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* (Pāli *sakkāyadiṭṭhi*) is no doubt one of the most important keywords which requires a detailed examination in the contexts of its usage. It was regarded in the Sarvāstivāda system of defilements (*kleśa*) as one of the five false views (*dr̥ṣṭi*).<sup>1</sup>

As is well-known, Vasubandhu gives an etymological explanation to the same word as follows: “Because it perishes (*sīdati*), it is [called] *sat*. *Kāya* means accumulation, collection, and aggregate. It is *satkāya* ‘perishing body (*kāya*)’ because it perishes and at the same time a body, that is, the five appropriative aggregates.”<sup>2</sup>

Before turning to the meaning of *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* (Pāli *sakkāyadiṭṭhi*), it may interest us to refer to traditional Tibetan and Chinese translations and several of modern renderings adopted by contemporary scholars.

Traditional Tibetan rendering: *'jig tshogs la lta ba* (Mvy. Ishihama and Fukuda nos. 1966, 4670/ Sakaki nos. 1955, 4684) reflects the above Vasubandhu’s interpretation of the term *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*, specifically that of *sat*, i.e., “Because it perishes (*sīdati*), it is [called] *sat*.” As will be later seen, this interpretation was criticized by Saṃghabhadra in his *\*Nyāyānusāra* (順正理論) who therein understood *sat-* in the sense of “existing”. Similarly, the Chinese translations include 有身見 “the view of existent body, 身見 “the view of body”, 薩迦耶見 phonetical translation of *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*, but we also see 壞身見 “the view of perishing body” and 破身見 “the view of breaking body”, etc.

On the other hand, modern translations include: “the wrong view of an existing personality,” “the belief in a real personality” (Stcherbatsky 1923: 50, 51), “the view of (the existence of) a real body” (Takasaki 1987: 146), “Self-view” (Dhammajoti 2015: 613), “the view of self” (Cox 1995: 214), “(false) view of individuality” (Conze 1973: 396), “identity-view” (Fuller 2005: 26-28), “personality belief” (Collins 1982: 93-94), “the view that the individual exists” (Gethin 1998: 148), “Persönlichkeitsglaube” (Oldenberg/ Glasenapp 1959: 513), “die ketzerische Ansicht, daß es eine Individualität gebe” (Schmidt 1928, repr. 1991: 353), “the heretical belief in a real personality” (Edgerton, 1953, repr. 1970: 553), “the (heretical) view (or doctrine) of the existence of a personality or individuality” (Monier-Williams 1899, repr. 1982: 1134), “*jiko noshintai wo shūsuru kenkai* 自己の身体を執する見解 [the view clinging to one’s own body]” (Nakamura 1970: 156), etc.

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<sup>1</sup> *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*, *antagrāhadr̥ṣṭi*, *mithyādr̥ṣṭi*, *dr̥ṣṭiparāmarśa*, and *śīlavrataparāmarśa*. See AKBh 281.16-282.11.

<sup>2</sup> AKBh 281.19-20. See also suggestion and explanation in section 3. (3) below.

## 1 *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* (Pāli *sakkāyadiṭṭhi*)

Let us, first, turn to a typical usage<sup>3</sup> of this term found in the SN, which says as follows:

- (1) *Idha bhikkhave assutavā puthujjano ..... rūpam attato samanupassati// rūpavantam vā attānam attani vā rūpam rūpasmim vā attānam// Vedanam// // Saññam// // Saṅkhāre// Viññānam....//* (SN III, p. 46)

“Herein, Monks, the unlearned ordinary men regard body as the self, self as possessed of body, body as being in the self, or self as being in body. [They regard likewise] sensation, representation, volitional actions, and consciousness.”

Next, it is interesting to refer to Buddhaghosa’s etymological explanation of the concept *sakkāyadiṭṭhi* found in his *Atthasālinī*, commentary on the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*:

- (2) *sakkāyadiṭṭhī ti vijjamānatṭhena sati khandhapañcakasaṅkhāte kāye sayamaṃ vā sati tasmim kāye diṭṭhīti.* (*Atthasālinī*, PTS, E. Müller ed., p. 348)

“The view of *sakkāya* means the view with respect either to the *sat* - in the sense of ‘existing’ - aggregation called “five aggregates” or to the aggregation being of oneself.”<sup>4</sup>

The above explanation clearly shows Buddhaghosa’s understanding of the word *sat* in the sense of “existing” and “being”, which was also shared by the Sarvāstivāda in the following way.

- (3) 薩迦耶見，緣五取蘊計我我所。.... 以五取蘊是實有故。此二十句薩迦耶見，幾我見幾我所見耶。答五我見，謂等隨觀色是我，受想行識是我。十五我所見，謂等隨觀我有色，色是我所，我在色中。我有受想行識，受想行識是我所，我在受想行識中。（『阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論』 \**Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā*, Taishō, vol.27, 36a25-29)

“*Satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* is [the view] which, taking the five appropriative aggregates as its objects, adheres to the self and what belongs to the self. ... It is because the five appropriative aggregates truly exist. [Question]: Of this twenty-alternative view of *satkāya*, what are the views of self and what are the views of those belonging to self? Answer: There are five views of self, that is to say, regarding body as the self, and [regarding] sensation, representation, volitional actions, or consciousness as the self. There are fifteen views of those belonging to self, that is to say, regarding self as

<sup>3</sup> Though rather exceptional, the usage of *satkāya* (Pāli *sakkāya*), which means six outer bases (*ṣaḍ bāhyāyatanāni*) of cognition such as form-and-color, sound, odor, taste, tangible object, and [material and mental] elements, is found in the *Suttanipāta*. See Imanishi 2016.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. La Vallée Poussin 1980, p. 15 (n.2).

possessed of body, body as belonging to the self, or self as being in body, or [regarding] self as possessed of sensation, representation, volitional actions, and consciousness, or [regarding] sensation, representation, volitional actions, and consciousness as belonging to the self, or [regarding] self as being in sensation, representation, volitional actions, and consciousness.”

In the above citation from the \**Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā*, it is to be noted that unlike “body in the self”(attani ... rūpam), etc. found in the above-cited SN, the third alternative regarding the relationship between the self and five aggregates, is depicted as “body as belonging to the self” 色是我所 (*ātmīya*), ...“sensation, representation, volitional actions, and consciousness as belonging to the self” 受想行識是我所. The same depiction of the third alternative is also given by Yaśomitra as follows:

(4) *viṃśati-koṭikā hi satkāya-dr̥ṣṭiḥ paṭhyate. rūpam ātmeti samanupaśyati. rūpavantam ātmānam. ātmīyaṃ rūpam. rūpe ātmeti evaṃ yāvad vijñānaṃ vaktavyam.* (AKVy p. 705.20-22.)

“The view of *satkāya* is [traditionally] spoken of as having twenty alternatives [in the following way]: “One regards body as the self, self as possessed of body, body as belonging to the self, or self as being in body. The explanation of the same type should be applied up to consciousness.”

Based on the above references to the explanation of the contents of *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* transmitted in the Sarvāstivāda tradition, and also in the Theravāda tradition except the division of the higher categories both *ātmadr̥ṣṭi* and *ātmīyadr̥ṣṭi*, which lacks in the latter tradition, we may draw the following diagram:

(5) *viṃśati-koṭikā satkāya-dr̥ṣṭiḥ*:

<i>satkāyadr̥ṣṭi</i>	I. <i>ātmadr̥ṣṭi</i>	<i>rūpam ātmeti samanupaśyati</i>
	II. <i>ātmīyadr̥ṣṭi</i>	-1. <i>rūpavantam ātmānam</i> -2. <i>ātmīyaṃ rūpam/ ātmani rūpam</i> -3. <i>rūpe ātmeti</i>

## 2 *sakkāya* (Skt. *satkāya*) or \**sakāya* (*svakāya*) ?

Then, let us proceed to another question whether \**sakāya* (Skt. *svakāya*) was original and has later been changed into the currently well-known form *sakkāya* (Skt. *satkāya*). The problem of this understanding is that no usage of the form \**sakāya* (Skt. *svakāya*) has so far been attested in the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda traditions. However, on the other hand, the form *svakāya* can only be found in a few texts of Mahāyāna tradition such as Nāgārjuna’s *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā-Prajñāpāramitāsūtra* and

Haribhadra's *Abhisamayālaṃkāṛālokā* on the *Aṣṭa*-s unique usage.<sup>5</sup>

Of them, Nāgārjuna's usage is as follows:

- (1) *svakāyadr̥ṣṭivat kleśāḥ kliṣṭe santi na pañcadhā/  
svakāyadr̥ṣṭivat kliṣṭaṃ kleśeṣv api na pañcadhā*// (MMK, 23.5)  
*svakāyo hi nāma rūpādilaṅkaṣaṇasamhātāḥ/ svakāye dr̥ṣṭiḥ svakāyadr̥ṣṭir ātmātmīyā-  
kāragrahaṇapravṛttā*// (PSP, p. 454.10-13).

“As with the view of *svakāya* or ‘one’s own aggregation’, the defilements do not exist in relation to the defiled one [i.e., defiled mind (*citta*)] in any of the five ways. As with the view of *svakāya* or ‘one’s own aggregation’, the defiled one does not also exist in relation to the defilements in any of the five ways. (MMK, 23.5)

*Svakāya*, or ‘one’s own aggregation’, means a collection of the characteristics of body and so forth. *Svakāyadr̥ṣṭi* is a view regarding one’s own aggregation, which comes forth as an apprehension of the aspects of either the self (*ātman*) or what belongs to the self (*ātmīya*).”

The Tibetan and Chinese translations of *svakāyadr̥ṣṭi* in the above usage are *rang (gi) lus (la) lta (ba)* and 「身見」(羅什訳『中論』), 「有身見」(惟淨等訳『大乘中觀積論』). The anonymous commentary on the PSP also glosses the above *svakāyadr̥ṣṭi* as follows: *svakāyadr̥ṣṭiḥ satkāyadr̥ṣṭiḥ* (Yonezawa 2007: 229) in which the author of \**Lakṣaṇatīkā* shows his understanding of Nāgārjuna’s term *svakāyadr̥ṣṭi* as corresponding to the referent of *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*. Although whether Nāgārjuna is the first who, intentionally or not, changed the traditional term *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* to *svakāyadr̥ṣṭi* is unclear, it seems certain that he used the term *svakāyadr̥ṣṭi* as including the contents of both *ātmadr̥ṣṭi* and *ātmīyadr̥ṣṭi* (see MMK XVIII.1-2). In this regard, it may safely be said that *svakāya* “one’s own aggregation” means both *svaḥ kāyaḥ* “one’s own aggregation” (= *ātmā kāyaḥ* = *ahaṃ kāyaḥ*) and *svasya kāyaḥ* “aggregation of one’s own” or “aggregation belongs to oneself” (= *ātmanaḥ kāyaḥ* = *mama kāyaḥ*).

The following explanation of the same concept *svakāyadr̥ṣṭi* by Haribhadra also agrees with the above Nāgārjuna’s usage and intention.

- (2) *ātmātmīyākāreṇa pañca-skandha-darśanaṃ svakāyaḥ* (*sic*, read *svakāyadr̥ṣṭiḥ* as the following Tib.) (AAA, p. 81). Tib.: *bdag dang bdag gi ba'i rnam pas phung po lngar lta ba ni rang gi lus su lta ba'o*// (D Tsha 50a1)

“The view of *svakāya* or ‘one’s own aggregation’ means viewing the five aggregates as having the aspects of either being the self or belonging to the self.”

### 3 Analysis of the Term *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*

<sup>5</sup> For the usage of *svakāyadr̥ṣṭi* in detail, see Saito 2021.

## The Meaning of *Satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*

What, if it is original, does the concept *satkāya* mean? The following may be called the two typical formulae for representing no-self and non-self tenets in Buddhism, the second of which almost corresponds to the explanation cited under the section 1. (1):

(1) *yaṃ panāniccaṃ dukkhaṃ vipariṇāmadhammaṃ kallaṃ nu tam samanupassitum/ etam mama eso ham asmi eso me attāti//* (SN, II, p. 124)

“But that which is impermanent, painful, changeable by nature, do we well to regard it as: ‘this is mine, I am this, or this is my self’?”

(2) *assutavā puthujjano....rūpam attato samanupassati// rūpavantaṃ vā attānam attani vā rūpaṃ rūpasmin vā attānam aham rūpaṃ mama rūpaṃ ti pariyuṭṭhitatṭhāyī hoti//* (SN, III, p. 3)

“The unlearned ordinary men regard body as the self, self as possessed of body, body as being in the self, or self as being in body. They are possessed by the ideas like ‘I am the body,’ or ‘body is mine.’”

Also noteworthy is that the above two explanations clearly tell us a significant implication found in the Buddha’s teaching of no-self and non-self. That is, the question of self is no other than that of “I” and “mine”; in other words, the matter of “being the self” and “those belonging to the self” corresponds exactly with that of “I am X” and “X is mine” in which ‘X’ represents one of the five aggregates in the Buddhist tradition.

Finally, it may be appropriate to refer here to the well-known Vasubandhu’s interpretation of *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*.

(3) *ātmadr̥ṣṭir ātmīyadr̥ṣṭir vā satkāyadr̥ṣṭih/ sīdatīti sat/ cayaḥ kāyaḥ saṃghātaḥ skandha ity arthaḥ/ sac cāyaṃ kāyaś ceti satkāyaḥ pañcopādānaskandhāḥ/ nityasaṃjñāṃ piṇḍasaṃjñāṃ ca tyājayitum evaṃ dyotitā/ etatpūrvako hi teṣv ātmagrāhaḥ/* (AKBh, p. 281.19-21)

“The view of *satkāya* is either the view of self or the view of those belonging to the self. Because it perishes (*sīdatīti*), it is *sat*. *Kāya* means accumulation, collection, and aggregate. Because it is ‘perishing’ and at the same time an ‘aggregation’, it is *satkāya* ‘perishing aggregation’, that is, the five appropriative aggregates. It was so expressed for the purpose of eliminating both the [wrong] conception of eternity and that of a mass because adherence to the self in regard to those [five aggregates] is preceded by these [wrong conceptions].”

To the above Vasubandhu’s explanation, Saṃghabhadra (衆賢) provided another interpretation of the phrase *satkāya*, while criticizing the former, as follows:

(4) 此見名爲薩迦耶見。有故名薩。聚謂迦耶。即是和合積聚爲義。迦耶即薩名薩

迦耶。即是實有非一爲義。此見執我。然我實無。勿無所緣而起此見。故於見境立以有聲。...經主此中作如是釋。壞故名薩。聚謂迦耶。即是無常和合蘊義。迦耶即薩名薩迦耶。此薩迦耶即五取蘊。爲遮常一想故立此名。要此想爲先方執我故。若爾何用標以薩聲。但迦耶聲足遮常故。則應但立迦耶見名。無法是常而可聚集。何用身上標以壞聲。」 (Taishō, vol. 29, 605c20-606a9)

“This view is called *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*. Because they (five aggregates) exist, they are called *sat* or ‘existing’. *Kāya* means aggregation, that is, collection or accumulation. The *kāya* or ‘aggregation’ itself is *sat* or ‘existing’, hence it is named *satkāya*. It is of real existence and of non-singularity. This view clings to the self (\**ātman*), but in reality the self does not exist. [However,] it is not possible that the view [of the self] arises without having an objective basis. Therefore, the word ‘existing’ is applied to the object of the view. ....

The *sūtrakāra* [i.e., Vasubandhu], on the other hand, gives the following explanation: ‘Because it perishes (*sīdati*), it is [called] *sat*. *Kāya* means accumulation, that is, collection of impermanent aggregates. *Kāya* is *sat* or “perishable”, hence it is named *satkāya* or “aggregation to be perished”. This *satkāya* is the five appropriative aggregates (*pañcopādānaskandhāḥ*). This expression is used in order to dismiss the ideations of permanence and unity, because there must be, first, these ideations before he or she clings to the self.’

If so, what is the use of qualifying [*kāya*] by the label *sat* [in the sense of “perishable”], for the word *kāya* alone suffices to dismiss the ideation of permanence? Thus, it should be simply designated *kāyadr̥ṣṭi*. There is no element (*dharma*) that is permanent and at the same time capable of being accumulated. What is, then, the use of qualifying *kāya* by the label [*sat* which allegedly means] ‘perishable’?”

In the above explanation, at least two points are to be noted. First, unlike the Sarvāstivāda’s traditional interpretation of *sat* as “existing” or “being”, Vasubandhu took the same word in the sense of “perishing” and he explains the Buddha’s intension to be the elimination of a misconception of the five aggregates as being eternal and a mass. Second, according to Vasubandhu, *kāya* means accumulation (*caya*), collection (*saṃghāta*), and aggregate (*skandha*). Judging also from his explanation of the meaning and intention of the term *satkāya*, *kāya* therein refers to the five aggregates separately or collectively. Third, despite his deviation from the Sarvāstivāda tradition in interpreting the first member of the compound *sat-kāya*, he follows the latter’s tradition when he takes the term *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* as composed of both *ātmadr̥ṣṭi* and *ātmīyadr̥ṣṭi*.

#### 4 Further Investigation

Then, what does the concept *satkāya* (Pāli *sakkāya*) mean if it is original, in other words, if it has been transmitted without any substantial change? Of the five wrong views as prescribed in the Sarvāstivāda tradition, the other four wrong views except *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*,

viz. *antagrāhadr̥ṣṭi*, *mithyādr̥ṣṭi*, *dr̥ṣṭiparāmarśa*, and *śīlavrataparāmarśa* are rather clear in meaning and the reasons why they were put in the list of “wrong” views are also understandable. On the other hand, even if the word *sat-* is taken in the sense of either “existing/being” or “perishing”, the above question of what the concept *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* means and why it should be counted as a “wrong” view still remains unsolved. If the Sarvāstivāda as well as Vasubandhu’s understanding of *satkāya* as “existing aggregation” and “perishing aggregation” respectively are correct, why then the view (*dr̥ṣṭi*) of either “existing aggregation” or “perishing one” should be called “wrong”? The answer, according to them, is that the view is wrong because ordinary people take one of the five aggregates, existing or perishing, as being the self or belonging to the self.

If such is the case, is it not appropriate to understand that the first member *sat* of the compound *sat-kāya* originally refers to the very relation between aggregates, or aggregation (*kāya*) of these aggregates, and the wrongly imagined self? Is it not more appropriate to take *sat-* as indicating this relation, i.e., “being” or “belonging to” the self although the word “self” (*ātman*) itself, whether in nominative or genitive form, is merely implied by the compound?

Then, the compound *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* may remind us of the well-known Sāṃkhya term *sat-kārya-vāda* or “the doctrine of the actual existence of an effect (in its cause)” (Monier-Williams). In his commentary on the SK, Māṭhara explains the phrase *sat kāryam* (SK 9d) as *pradhāne mahādādi kāryam astīti* or “an effect, the great (i.e., *buddhi* ‘intellect’) and so forth, exists in its primary matter (i.e., *prakṛti* ‘the original matter’).”<sup>6</sup> Here also, though the word *kāraṇa* or “cause” is omitted, it may be said that the omitted word is easily understood or the word is therein implicitly mentioned.

Used in different tenets and contexts, the two compounds, *sat-kāya-* and *sat-kārya-*, are similar in their usage of *sat-*. Just as Māṭhara and Gauḍapāda rightly took the *kārikā* phrase *sat kāryam*, which corresponds to *sat-kārya-* of *sat-kārya-vāda*, as *pradhāne* (viz. *kāraṇe*) *asti kāryam*, the Buddhist phrase *sat-kāya* may suitably be understood as meaning both *ātmāsti kāyaḥ* and *ātmano ’sti kāyaḥ*. Taking into consideration the almost fixed contents of *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*, i.e., both *ātmadr̥ṣṭi* and *ātmīyadr̥ṣṭi*, the above understanding can more fittingly be confirmed than the traditional prescription of *sat* as “really existent” found in both Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda schools or “perishing” by Vasubandhu. Giving different interpretations to the first member *sat-*, they equally took it as referring to the nature of *kāya* rather than as referring to the relation of *kāya* to the self (*ātman*) or “I” (*aham*). It seems to me that we have long been puzzled by the traditional, but rather dogmatic and stereotyped, understanding of the term *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*.

I agree with Buddhaghosa inasmuch as *sat-* of the compound *sat-kāya* means “existing [*kāya*]” or “[*kāya*] being [of oneself]”. However, based on the above consideration, it appears more likely that the adjective *sat-*, “existing” or “being”, therein refers to the relation of *kāya* to the self or “I”. In this sense, I also agree with Vasubandhu

<sup>6</sup> Māṭhara-v, p. 13.13-14. Cf. Gauḍapāda-v, p. 10.18: *pradhāne mahādādi liṅgam asti*.

in his understanding of *kāya* in the sense of aggregates or aggregation in a collective usage, i.e. the aggregation (*kāya*) of five aggregates (*skandha*) (though the latter implication refers only to the ordinary people’s wrong conception of a mass (*piṇḍa*) of five aggregates).

Then, the final question may be why the phrase in question was so named and not *ātmadr̥ṣṭi*, *ātmātmīyadr̥ṣṭi*, *ātmakāyadr̥ṣṭi*, or *matkāyadr̥ṣṭi*, putting aside the difference in meaning between *kāya* and *skandha*. This may be the reason why, if the above hypothesis discussed under section 2 is correct, Nāgārjuna changed the first member of the compound from *sat-* to *sva-* in order to make the meaning of the phrase clearer.

However, although I do not agree with the traditional understanding of the phrase found in the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda traditions, the form *sat-kāya* probably best reflects the original philosophical standpoint of the Buddha’s teaching. That is, the Buddha’s teaching method usually consists in making appeal to categories understandable through our daily experience such as the five aggregates or eighteen factors of consciousness, and trying to make the practitioners understand their universal nature, viz. changeability, painfulness, and lack of both being the self and belonging to the self.

In this context, the reason for the phrase *sat-kāya* may be explained as follows: First, just as the six aggregates of consciousness such as eye-consciousness, etc., so the teaching of the five aggregates was adopted in order to make the disciples understand that all *dharmas* (elements) are neither the self nor belonging to the self. Second, the disciples then could understand that the Buddha’s teaching of the five aggregates is closely related to the negation of the self, whether direct reference to the word *ātman* is made or not. Third, the usage of the present participle *sat* in the sense of either “being” or “existing” makes sense when the implicit word *ātmā* or *ātmanaḥ* is supplemented.

## Conclusion

From the above discussion, we may draw the following conclusions: First, the question of whether, as Childers and Nakamura pointed out, *\*sakāya* (Skt. *svakāya*) was the original form which was later changed into the well-known *sakkāya* (Skt. *satkāya*) has yet to be confirmed by textual sources.

Second, as far as our present knowledge goes, *sakkāya* (Skt. *satkāya*) is the only form which can be attested in the traditional schools of Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda as well as by Vasubandhu.

Third, in this connection, as pointed out in my previous paper (Saito 2021), it is interesting to note that the usage of *svakāya* can be found only in a few texts of Mahāyāna tradition such as Nāgārjuna’s *Mūlamadhyamakārikā*, the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā-Prajñāpāramitāsūtra* and Haribhadra’s *Abhisamayālaṅkāralokā* on the *Aṣṭa*’s unique usage.

Forth, although in a simple way we may render the term *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* into “the view of self”, it literally means “the [false] view of aggregation as being or belonging to [the self]” in which the present participle *sat* is used in the sense of both being (*vin pa*, 是) and existing (*yod pa*, 有・在). Therein, “belonging to the self” (*ātmanaḥ sat*) means that



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an aggregate exists as belonging to the self. (See also the following diagram II.) This understanding of *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* coincides with both *ātmadr̥ṣṭi* and *ātmīyadr̥ṣṭi*.

*sva-kāya* = *svaḥ kāyaḥ* + *svasya kāyaḥ* (*kāya*=*skandha*)  
*sat-kāya* (= *sat-skandha*) = I.[*ātmā*] *asti kāyaḥ* + II.[*ātmano*] *ṣṭi kāyaḥ*  
(I.*ātmadr̥ṣṭi* + II.*ātmīyadr̥ṣṭi*)

- I. *skandha ātmāsti* (蘊是我)
- II-1. *skandhavān ātmāsti* (我有蘊)
- II-2. *ātmany asti skandhaḥ* (蘊在我)
- II-3. *skandha ātmāsti* (我在蘊)<sup>7</sup>

### Abbreviations

AAA: *Abhisamayālaṃkāṛālokā*. U. Wogihara ed., *Abhisamayālaṃkāṛālokā Prajñā-pāramitāvyākhyā: The Work of Haribhadra*, Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 1932; repr. Tokyo: Sankibo Buddhist Book Store, 1973.

AKBh: *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. P. Pradhan ed., *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu*, Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1967.

AKVy: *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*. U. Wogihara ed., *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: The Work of Yaśomitra*, Tokyo: Sankibo Buddhist Book Store, 1936.

*Māthara-v*: *Māthara-vṛtti* on Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. Vishnu Prasad Sharma ed., *Sāṃkhyakārikā Mātharavṛttisahitā*. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 296 (No. 56). Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1970; Repr. 1994.

*Gauḍapāda-bh*: *Gauḍapāda-bhāṣya* on Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. Har Dutt Sharma ed., *Śrīmad-Īśvarakṛṣṇapraṇītāḥ Sa-Gauḍapādabhāṣyāḥ Sāṃkhyakārikāḥ*. Poona: The Oriental Book Agency, 1933.

*Aṣṭa*: *Aṣṭasāhasrikā-Prajñāpāramitāsūtra*. P. L. Vaidya ed., *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñā-pāramitā*, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 4, 1960.

D: Tibetan tripiṭaka, sDe dge edition.

MMK: *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* by Nāgārjuna. Ye Shaoyong ed., *Zhonglunsong (Mūlamadhyamakakārikā)*, Shanghai: Zhongxi Book Company, 2011.

Mvy: *Mahāvvyutpatti*. See Ishihama and Fukuda 1989, and Sakaki 1916.

P: Tibetan tripiṭaka, Peking edition.

PSP: *Mūlamadhyamaka-vṛtti-Prasannapadā* by Candrakīrti. L. de la Vallée Poussin ed., *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (Mādhyamikasūtras) de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti*, Bibliotheca Buddhica, IV. St. Pétersbourg: Académie impériale des sciences, 1903-1913.

PTS: Pali Text Society.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. 見色是我、色異我、我在色、色在我 (雜阿含經, Taishō, vol.2, 11b) ; 見色是神、見神有色、見神中有色、見色中有神 (中阿含經, Taishō, vol.1, 788a).

- SK: *Sāṃkhyakārikā* by Īśvarakṛṣṇa. See *Māthara-v* and *Gauḍapāda-bh.*  
SN: *Samyuttanikāya*. M. Léon Feer ed., *Samyutta-nikāya of the Sutta-piṭaka*, London: Pali Text Society, 1884 ~ (vol. III 1890).  
Taishō: Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō (Taishō tripiṭaka) 大正新脩大藏經.

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