

Chapter 4: The crisis management system in the Kantei

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Preface: Did the Cabinet-led overall coordination work?

Following the Great East Japan Earthquake, the government set up the Extreme Disaster Management Headquarters and the Nuclear Disaster Management Headquarters headed by Prime Minister Naoto Kan. In the Kantei (the Prime Minister's official residence), the Emergency Assembly Team was convened under the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management, Tetsuro Ito, and a staff group (usually referred to as the Cabinet Security and Crisis Management Office or "*anki*") of the Assistant Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary (Security and Crisis Management) and related ministries and agency liaisons were in charge of information gathering and communication coordination. During this period, some 100,000 people were deployed in the Self-Defense Forces' disaster deployment, the largest ever scale. The Great East Japan Earthquake and the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident brought to light the importance of and issues in the ability of the government and the Kantei to cope in an emergency, and by extension, the state of national governance.

The Fukushima nuclear accident was the largest national crisis Japan had experienced since the end of World War II, when the United States used nuclear weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan. In a national crisis, the government must create a command tower for crisis response and mobilize the nation's resources to the fullest extent. An important function of the Cabinet from the standpoint of ensuring the unity and integration of administration is to supervise ministries that are divided, but that function must be maximized in times of crisis. However, Japan has a major obstacle to national governance when facing a crisis: a governance mechanism that distributes political power among governmental institutions. It is an attribute of the traditional governance system from prewar Japan, but its character has remained basically unchanged even after the war. Article 66, Paragraph 3 of the Constitution adopts the "shared management principle" as the basic principle of the governance system. In other words, administrative authority belongs to the Cabinet, but the specific administrative work is shared and managed by each ministry.


Nevertheless, since the beginning of the 1990s, the Cabinet-led integration and coordination function has been strengthened. The Administrative Reform Council established by the Ryutaro Hashimoto Administration compiled its final report in December 1997, and expressed its basic position that "under the Constitution of Japan, the Cabinet has a high degree of governance and political function of "overseeing the state", in other words, it is necessary to take seriously the fact that the state is in a position to give comprehensive and strategic direction to the nation, taking into account information

from various administrative departments, and to strengthen the cabinet function.”¹ It is in this context that a crisis management system in the Kantei came to be advocated. As a means of governance in a national crisis, this was intended to fulfill the role of the Cabinet's integrated coordination function for crisis management led by the Kantei, thereby overcoming the so-called “vertical division” that is an inherent risk of the shared management principle.

In the response to the Fukushima nuclear accident, how well did such a government-led crisis response function? What did we learn from it? And ten years on, how are those lessons being applied to prepare for the future?

In this chapter, I will discuss the “lessons” after the Fukushima nuclear accident for the Kantei crisis management system. Of these, we will examine the legal system, organization, human resources, assistance and advisory functions, public relations and communication, and the National Security Council (NSC) related to the Kantei’s crisis management system, and further examine the subsequent Kumamoto Earthquake, heavy rains in Western Japan, and the spread of infection from the new coronavirus (COVID-19). Based on these observations, I would like to posit ten implications for the crisis management system in the Kantei.

This system comprises the heads of the Kantei related to crisis management, namely, the Prime Minister, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Deputy Secretaries of the Cabinet Secretariat in charge of political affairs and administrative work, and the Special Advisor to the Prime Minister, and overlaps somewhat with the Cabinet crisis management supervisory system comprising the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management, the Assistant Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary (Situation Response/Crisis Management) and his staff group (usually referred to as the Situation Response Office or “*jitaishitsu*”), the Information Liaison Office and/or the Kantei Liaison Office or the Kantei Response Office, NSC/National Security Secretariat (NSS) in Cabinet Secretariat, Nuclear Disaster Management Headquarters, Extreme Disaster Management Headquarters, and so on.



¹ Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 1997.

[Figure 1] Flow of initial response
(Source) Cabinet Secretariat homepage,
<https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/fukutyoukanho.html>

1. What was the issue with the Kantei crisis management

The Government Accident Investigation, the National Diet Accident Investigation, and the Independent Accident Investigation have all examined the state of crisis management in the Kantei at the time of the Fukushima nuclear accident.

The Government Accident Investigation proposed a review of the nuclear disaster response manual and the establishment of a mechanism allowing the Nuclear Disaster Management Headquarters to access information while remaining inside government facilities.

The National Diet Accident Investigation called for a radical review of the government's crisis management system, including the establishment of a system capable of acting in times of crisis and the institutional establishment of a unified command and control system.

The Independent Accident Investigation raised issues centering on the risk of micro-management in the Kantei in dealing with the nuclear accident, and the advisory system for political leaders including the fields of science and technology.²

Prehistory: Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake and Tokaimura JCO criticality accident

Before broaching the main theme of “lessons” for Kantei crisis management in the decade following the Fukushima nuclear accident, we need to look back on what was learned from two previous major disasters in Japan: the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake of 1995 and the Tokaimura JCO Criticality Accident of 1999. There is a prehistory to the “post-disaster” history of the last ten years.

Learning the “lessons” imparted there will better help us understand the character of subsequent “learning”.

It was the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake that occurred on January 17, 1995 that greatly changed the crisis management awareness of the Japanese people. However, the National Land Agency, which was said to be in charge of natural disasters at the time, did not have an on-duty watch system, and a private security guard who noticed the fax contacted the home of an Agency officer twenty minutes after the disaster.³ Moreover, it took three days from the disaster to set up an emergency management headquarters. At the time, the accepted principle was that local governments should respond to disasters, and it was not expected that they report the situation at the site to the Kantei.⁴ There was no regular training in crisis management at the Kantei, and even if an emergency occurred, it took at least two hours for the Kantei Response Office to start up, and three or four hours if it was after hours. And as for the Kantei Response Office, staff from the Prime Minister's Office usually gathered in a room they normally used for other purposes.⁵

As one of the lessons of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, a crisis management system was established in the Kantei. Initially, the Emergency Assembly Team Meeting was established, led by the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary (later the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis

² Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident, 2012; Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2012; The National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, 2012.

³ Sankei Shimbun, 2017.

⁴ Noda, 2015, pp. 63–64.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 64–65.

Management), which acted as a meeting for information gathering consisting of bureau-director level executives from the relevant ministries. In addition, the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management was set up with the task of making primary decisions on measures required by the Cabinet in an emergency and conducting a quick comprehensive coordination with the relevant ministries and agencies regarding initial measures. The Cabinet Security and Crisis Management Office was established (later transferred to the Assistant Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary (Security and Crisis Management)). On the hardware side, the Kantei Crisis Management Center was set up on the first basement floor of the Kantei as the central facility for the government's crisis management activities.

The “lessons” after 1.17 were great. Until then, the crisis management system in the Kantei was hardly developed, and it could be said that there was a “room for growth”, but this was also underpinned by the fact that it was part of the process of administrative reform in the 1990s. Moreover, the leadership of Prime Minister Hashimoto and the existence of key persons such as Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Teijiro Furukawa cannot be ignored.⁶ Until then, as for the crisis management function of the Cabinet, informal information analysis and exchange of opinions were conducted by the parties concerned mainly under the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, but Furukawa believed this was not enough. He proposed the establishment of the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management and gained the approval of Prime Minister Hashimoto.

On the other hand, “learning” after 3.11 does not seem to be so substantial. However, as I will mention later, the NSS was installed in 2014. This had a great significance for crisis management at the Kantei.

On the other hand, regarding a nuclear disaster, it was decided to set up a Nuclear Disaster Management Headquarters if the Prime Minister issued a Nuclear Emergency Declaration under the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness enacted on December 17 of the same year the Tokaimura JCO criticality accident that occurred on September 30, 1999. (The first time such headquarters were actually set up was the Great East Japan Earthquake.) After the Tokaimura accident, the Cabinet Security and Crisis Management Office prepared a report summarizing opinions on the government's efforts, and in this report, it proposed the installation of an off-site center, robot development, and improved nuclear disaster training, but although an off-site center was realized, the other proposals were not taken up.⁷ Moreover, after the Fukushima nuclear accident, a “situation room function” at the Kantei, as recommended by the Independent Accident Investigation, and a science and technology evaluation institution (function) that political leaders can utilize have yet to be established.⁸

2. What has changed in the Kantei: Legal system, organization, personnel

Legal system

As pointed out by the Independent Accident Investigation, in the Fukushima nuclear accident, Prime Minister Kan was criticized for “excessive micro management”⁹ and being involved in detailed technical judgments and the information gathering process, raising questions about the nature of prime ministerial leadership in crisis management. The Final Report of the Government Accident Investigation also states “direct intervention in the field by [the prime minister] himself may cause confusion in the field as well as result in incorrect decisions or the loss of important decisions. As

⁶ Furukawa, 2005, p. 8.

⁷ Funabashi, 2014, pp. 11–14.

⁸ Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident, 2012, p. 105, 394.

⁹ Ibid., p. 109.

such, it should be said that the harm is greater.”¹⁰

As a legal change concerning political leadership, in the amended Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness enacted on June 27, 2012, Article 20, Paragraph 3 stipulates that the Prime Minister's directives regarding a nuclear disaster do not cover “matters relating to the content of judgments that the Nuclear Regulation Authority should make to ensure the safety of nuclear facilities based on technical and professional knowledge regarding the affairs under its jurisdiction.” This is because in the process of establishing the Nuclear Regulation Authority (discussed below), LDP Lower House Member Yasuhisa Shiozaki criticized Prime Minister Kan's response to the Fukushima nuclear accident calling it the “Naoto Kan Risk”.¹¹

When the Nuclear Disaster Management Headquarters were expanded under the revised Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness on September 19, 2012, in addition to the Cabinet Secretary, the Environment Minister, the Minister of State for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, and the Nuclear Regulation Authority Chairman were newly appointed as deputy directors of the headquarters.¹² At the time of the Fukushima nuclear accident, the Chief Cabinet Secretary was merely an ordinary member of the Nuclear Disaster Management Headquarters and was not legally in a position to take command of the nuclear accident response.¹³ What is important here is that all ministers became members of the headquarters (in addition to the deputy minister and parliamentary secretary of the Cabinet Office, the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management, etc.). Regarding this point, Kiyotaka Takahashi, the Cabinet Secretariat Councillor for Crisis Management at the time of the Fukushima nuclear accident and later Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management, said, “The fact that all the ministers were legally added to the headquarters was an improvement based on reflections from 3.11”, adding “not only does it mean that all ministries and agencies will naturally be involved when such a serious situation occurs, but it's important for daily preparation and training.”¹⁴

In the context of discussion for founding a “Japanese version of FEMA” (U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency), there was some discussion that the Chief Cabinet Secretary should be granted the authority to issue “directives”, but in *The State of Government Crisis Management Organizations (Final Report)* put together by the Related Deputy Ministers' Meeting on the State of Government Crisis Management Organization on March 30, 2015, it was concluded that this would require careful consideration given that the Prime Minister's powers to command and oversee derive from Cabinet decisions.¹⁵

In addition, with the amended Atomic Energy Basic Act, enacted on June 27, 2012, the Nuclear Disaster Management Council was established in Cabinet on September 19, 2012 as a body to promote nuclear disaster management measures throughout the entire government, the Prime Minister being appointed chair, the Chief Cabinet Secretary (and the Minister of the Environment, Chairman of the Nuclear Regulation Authority) vice-chair, and the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management (and all ministers) appointed as members.

Organization

Regarding the division of roles for government officials involved in crisis management, in the Great East Japan Earthquake, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano was in charge of difficult-to-return

¹⁰ Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2012, p. 424.

¹¹ Kamikawa, 2018, pp. 85–89.

¹² Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2019, pp. 6–8.

¹³ Interview with Yukio Edano, December 10, 2011.

¹⁴ Interview with Kiyotaka Takahashi, November 15, 2019.

¹⁵ Related Deputy Ministers' Meeting on the State of Government Crisis Management Organization, 2015.

evacuees and public relations (crisis communication),¹⁶ Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management Tetsuro Ito and Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Tetsuro Fukuyama (Political Affairs), and Goshi Hosono, Special Advisor to the Prime Minister, took charge of the nuclear accident and the evacuation of residents¹⁷, Assistant Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Tetsuya Nishikawa (Security and Crisis Management), and Special Advisor to the Prime Minister, Manabu Terada took charge of the earthquake and tsunami¹⁸ (another Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary in charge of political affairs changed from Hirohisa Fujii to Yoshito Sengoku on March 17, and Sengoku was in charge of disaster area support¹⁹.) After that, when the Japan-U.S. Joint Coordination Meeting began as a forum for bilateral talks over the Fukushima nuclear accident from March 22nd with the U.S., Hosono effectively served as Japan's top leader²⁰ (chaired by Fukuyama²¹). While it can be said to have been successful in responding to the compound crisis of a natural disaster and a nuclear disaster, initial nuclear accident response work focused as a result around Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management Ito²² on formulating resident evacuation plans, securing safe evacuation locations, and cooperating with the Self-Defense Forces and fire agency.

Today, it is said that the Chief Cabinet Secretary plays the central role in the event of an emergency, and there is a system in place to coordinate and communicate between the top Kantei officers.²³

The Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management and the Cabinet Security and Crisis Management Office engaged in crisis management working under the leadership of these Kantei heads have traditionally been limited in manpower compared to the increase in their workload, and they are also in charge of security.

When the NSC replaced the old Security Council on December 4, 2013 and along with that, the NSS was established on January 7, 2014, the Cabinet Security and Crisis Management Office was reorganized into the Situation Response Office and an Assistant Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary (Situation Response and Crisis Management)²⁴. Only a part of the old Cabinet Security and Crisis Management Office joined the NSS (other staff were a net increase), and the rest of the old Cabinet Security and Crisis Management Office were able to specialize in situation response and crisis management in the Situation Response Office.

¹⁶ Funabashi, 2013, p. 82; Funabashi 2014, p. 243.

¹⁷ Funabashi, 2013, p. 182; Hosono et al., 2012, p. 33.

¹⁸ Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident, 2012, p. 33; Interview with Takahashi Kiyotaka, November 15, 2019; Hosono et al., 2012, p. 33.

¹⁹ Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2011.


²⁰ Isobe, 2019, pp. 192–193.

²¹ Fukuyama, 2012, p. 133.

²² Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident, 2012, p. 112.

²³ Interview with Kiyotaka Takahashi, November 15, 2019.

²⁴ Regarding the NSC see: Chijiwa, 2015.



[Figure 2] Situation response & crisis management organization in the Cabinet Secretariat (Source) Cabinet Secretariat homepage, <https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/fukutyoukanho.html>

If a nuclear disaster occurs and a management headquarters is established, the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management will continue to serve in these headquarters. In addition, following the Fukushima nuclear accident, a system is now in place to set up a Kantei Team (described later) at the secretariat of the Nuclear Disaster Management Headquarters, its deputy head being the Councillor for Crisis Management of the Situation Response Office. In the Related Ministerial Bureau Directors Meeting (Kantei Crisis Management Center²⁵), which is to be newly placed under the Management Headquarters, in addition to the Councillor for Crisis Management of the Situation Response Office being a member, the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management also attends at the request of the chairman (Cabinet Office Director General for Nuclear Disaster Management (see below)²⁶. According to Tetsuya Yamamoto, who served as the Director General for Nuclear Disaster Management in the Cabinet Office from 2017 to 2019, at the meeting of the concerned bureau directors, since “the cooperation of the bureau directors [of the related ministries] cannot be obtained only by the statement of the director general, who is the secretariat in charge of the Cabinet Office's Nuclear Disaster Management,” using some “initiative” and the presence of the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management there, it was thought overall coordination

²⁵ Interview with Tetsuya Yamamoto, November 22, 2019.

²⁶ Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2019, p. 67, 69.

among the related ministries could be expected²⁷, and the leadership of the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management was important even in such situations (it has been pointed out that this is related to the seniority and rank of the director general²⁸). In addition, when a management headquarters other than a Nuclear Disaster Management Headquarters is set up, the Situation Response Office will function as the secretariat together with the Cabinet Office (Disaster Management).

Regarding the level of staff training in the Cabinet crisis management department, it can be said to have been favorably evaluated regarding the response of the Emergency Assembly Team for the Fukushima nuclear accident with the National Diet Accident Investigation regarding the team as being accustomed to emergency response, and coordination between related ministries and agencies promptly.²⁹ According to Kiyotaka Takahashi, former Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management, “the level of initial response has definitely improved during the Heisei Era (1989-2019)”³⁰ and “measures for natural disasters are more sophisticated.”³¹

In addition, in the Fukushima nuclear accident, a point was raised about the usability of the Kantei Crisis Management Center (In fact, in the case of a suspicious ship off Noto Peninsula on March 23, 1999, when the Defense Agency actually used the central command post, a defect was discovered that external phone lines could not call in.³²) Partly because mobile phones cannot be used in the Kantei Crisis Management Center for information protection³³, in the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident, the crisis management command tower was split off from the Crisis Management Center and set up on the fifth floor of the Kantei (Prime Minister Kan and other top Kantei officials left the Crisis Manager Center and used the fifth floor of the Kantei as a command post). On the other hand, information was gathered around the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management³⁴, but he could not always participate in discussions on the fifth floor of the Kantei when the Emergency Assembly Team he was in charge of were chasing after the earthquake and tsunami. Conversely, it seems that the Emergency Assembly Team in the Crisis Management Center could not fully grasp the results of discussions on the fifth floor.³⁵ As a result, a participant said, “If the top political chiefs at the Kantei couldn’t do it, then the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management was called.”³⁶ Because of this inadequate information transmission, evacuation order plans were considered separately on the fifth floor of Kantei and the Crisis Management Center.³⁷ In addition, the top political chiefs at the Kantei independently made arrangements for the power supply vehicles to restore the power supply, an area that the Crisis Management Center was capable of handling and was, in fact, currently addressing.³⁸

Regarding this point, the Prime Minister and the Chief Cabinet Secretary now enter the Crisis Management Center for the initial action in emergency situations and subsequent milestones, and in other cases, staff members from the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management down are to go the fifth floor of the Kantei and explain,³⁹ the establishment of a “situation room function” proposed by the Independent Accident Investigation not yet being installed. However, unlike the

²⁷ Interview with Tetsuya Yamamoto, November 22, 2019.

²⁸ Interview with Nobushige Takamizawa, February 4, 2020.

²⁹ The National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, 2012, p. 296.

³⁰ Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2018.

³¹ Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2018.

³² National Institute for Defense Studies, 2017, p. 184.

³³ Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident, 2012, p. 105.

³⁴ Funabashi, 2013, p. 383.

³⁵ Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2012, p. 369.

³⁶ Isobe, 2019, p. 184.

³⁷ Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident, 2012, p. 190.

³⁸ The National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, 2012, p.327.

³⁹ Interview with Kiyotaka Takahashi, November 15, 2019.

Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), which was supposed to assist the Kantei with a nuclear disaster at the time of the Fukushima nuclear accident but “had no foothold in the Kantei”, a room has subsequently been prepared in advance in the Kantei’s Crisis Management Center for the Nuclear Regulatory Agency and the Cabinet Office (Nuclear Disaster Management) where agency staff can standby, and on-site data can also be sent directly to the Kantei.⁴⁰

The Fukushima nuclear accident also led to a review of the relationship between the national government and local governments regarding crisis management. In the Fukushima nuclear accident, it has been pointed out that there was insufficient cooperation between the Kantei and local governments⁴¹ since not only was the local off-site center damaged, but the Kantei was also not fully aware of the function of the off-site center, so the function of local management headquarters was not restored, and this led to an attitude on the local government side that the state would take the lead in disaster response.

Today, a local management headquarters is to be established at the off-site center in cooperation with the Nuclear Disaster Management Headquarters Secretariat, and a system is in place to dispatch a deputy minister (or parliamentary secretary) of the Cabinet Office as the general manager to coordinate.⁴² Operations have been revised so that the off-site center does not have large powers of delegation, and major judgments regarding the evacuation of residents will be made at the Kantei.⁴³

Furthermore, in recent years, in addition to relevant ministries and agencies, annual disaster management training has been conducted by assembling crisis management officers from prefectures and designated cities, meetings are held with the Cabinet Secretariat, the Cabinet Office (Disaster Management), Metropolitan Tokyo and neighboring prefectures for the case of an earthquake directly under the capital, and central government personnel with experience in crisis management are dispatched as advisors to the heads of city, town and village municipalities.⁴⁴

In addition, the revision of the Disaster Management Basic Plan by the Central Disaster Management Council on March 31, 2015, stipulated the strengthening of cooperation and integrated operations between the Nuclear Disaster Management Headquarters and the Extreme Disaster Management Headquarters. Separating the management headquarters for each situation is rational in dealing with a compound crisis. Since the members of both headquarters are almost the same, holding a joint conference for both headquarters would centralize decision-making. In actual fact, on September 3rd and 4th, 2017, a comprehensive nuclear disaster management drill for the Kyushu Electric Power Genkai Nuclear Power Plant took place with a joint meeting of the Nuclear Disaster Management Headquarters and (in case of an emergency) the Major Disaster Management Headquarters set up in the Cabinet Office (Disaster Management) (an Extreme Disaster Management Headquarters would be set up in the case of a “remarkable and serious emergency disaster”).⁴⁵

Human Resources

Political leadership seems to have a large personal element. In the long-term administration that has followed, not only was crisis management listed as a selling point, but the Prime Minister eventually gained a wealth of experience in crisis management. In fact, under the Kan Administration, the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management changed once, the Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary (Security and Crisis Management) twice, and under the Yoshihiko Noda Administration,

⁴⁰ Ibid; E-mail interview with Tetsuya Yamamoto, June 16, 2020.

⁴¹ Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident, 2012, pp. 157–158.

⁴² Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, n.d.

⁴³ Interview with Tetsuya Yamamoto, November 22, 2019.

⁴⁴ Interview with Kiyotaka Takahashi, November 15, 2019.

⁴⁵ Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2019, pp. 6–8.

both changed once. In the Second Administration of Shinzo Abe, under a single Prime Minister and Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management was replaced four times and the Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary (Security and Crisis Management)/(Situation Response/Crisis Management) was replaced five times.

Looking at personnel policy in the bureaucracy, it is customary that most government employees move to their next post within a period of about two years, but in March 2015, *The State of Government Crisis Management Organizations (Final Report)* pointed out that for the Situation Response Office and the Cabinet Office (Disaster Management) “this tendency is remarkable because although actual staff numbers are not high, the number of staff seconded from other ministries is great,” and as such, “it is difficult for the organization to accumulate expertise in disaster management and crisis management.” According to Nobushige Takamizawa (Director of the Defense Policy Bureau at the Ministry of Defense at the time of the Fukushima nuclear accident), who was the Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary (Situation Response/Crisis Management) from 2013 to 2016, staff have had extended tenures, returned to Japan, made a temporary comeback, or been relocated from public corporations in crisis management measures following the Kumamoto earthquake. In addition, the importance of building a database was recognized, in which the current location of crisis management personnel, those who know the area, are in special fields, and have personal connections and experience is given.⁴⁶ Furthermore, the Cabinet Office (Disaster Management) is establishing a (reserves) register of staff seconded to the Cabinet Office (Disaster Management) from other areas of the Cabinet Office, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport in an effort to secure human resources in the event of a disaster. However, methods for securing personnel to be deployed to each management headquarters secretariat and to the field are still under consideration, including replacement personnel.⁴⁷ It appears that some ministries and agencies actually register personnel involved in the comprehensive nuclear disaster management drill as a “post title” rather than as a “person’s name” for staff who have been seconded to the Cabinet Office (Nuclear Disaster Management).⁴⁸

3. What has changed in the Kantei: Legal system, organization, personnel

It is said that the secretariat of the Nuclear Disaster Management Headquarters (NISA) did not function in the Fukushima nuclear accident.⁴⁹ On the day of the disaster, it took more than two hours from the time TEPCO notified the Kantei of a Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act Article 15 event until the declaration of a nuclear emergency. However, Prime Minister Kan did not fully understand that issuing this declaration was a prerequisite for all accident response (public announcement of areas where emergency measures should be implemented to protect residents, establishment of nuclear disaster management headquarters/secretariat/local management headquarters, etc.), and the people surrounding the Prime Minister, including those in charge of the NISA who were there, did not have basic knowledge about issuing a nuclear emergency declaration, and could not fully explain the meaning to the Prime Minister.⁵⁰ In addition, when the fifth floor of the Kantei, including the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, Banri Kaieda, questioned the Secretariat of the Nuclear Disaster Management Headquarters on March 12 about why a direct vent to outside was not being implemented to lower pressure in the containment vessel, they

⁴⁶ Interview with Nobushige Takamizawa, February 4, 2020.

⁴⁷ Related Deputy Ministers' Meeting on the State of Government Crisis Management Organization, 2015, pp. 6, 14, 17–18.

⁴⁸ Interview with former Deputy Manager of the Cabinet Office (Nuclear Disaster Management), November 29, 2019.

⁴⁹ Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident, 2012, p. 394; Funabashi, 2013, p. 357.

⁵⁰ The National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, 2012, p. 302, 306.

did not explain the situation.⁵¹ They were also unable to make a proposal to the fifth floor of the Kantei about setting evacuation areas after March 11.⁵²

Therefore, under the Act to Establish a Nuclear Regulation Authority enacted on June 20, 2012, the Nuclear Regulation Authority that took over the functions of the former NISA and the Cabinet Office's Nuclear Safety Commission on September 19 of the same year, and its secretariat, the Nuclear Regulatory Agency, was newly established as an external agency of the Ministry of the Environment, the agency to serve as the secretariat of the Nuclear Disaster Management Headquarters. In addition, on October 14, 2014, the Order for Organization of the Cabinet Office was revised, and a Cabinet Office Director General for Nuclear Disaster Management responsible for centralizing overall coordination with related ministries and agencies for nuclear disaster management during normal times and in emergencies, and a staff group (Cabinet Office (Nuclear Disaster Management)) were established to serve the secretariat function of the Nuclear Disaster Management Headquarters together with the Nuclear Regulatory Agency. The establishment of the Nuclear Regulatory Agency and a Cabinet Office Director General for Nuclear Disaster Management is recognized by the Cabinet crisis management department as "a very big thing".⁵³

At the Nuclear Disaster Management Headquarters Secretariat, the Cabinet Office (Nuclear Disaster Management) is in charge of establishing and operating the headquarters, and the Nuclear Regulatory Agency provides specialist and technical knowledge.⁵⁴ Originally, when the Nuclear Regulatory Agency was inaugurated, the staff of the Nuclear Regulation Authority was concurrently assigned to the Cabinet Office (Nuclear Disaster Management), but according to Tetsuya Yamamoto, a former Cabinet Office Director General for Nuclear Disaster Management, it was decided to separate the two and establish a dedicated organization for a director general in the Cabinet Office because Kasumigaseki (Japan's Whitehall) felt that it was "very uncomfortable" that a regulatory agency called the Nuclear Regulatory Agency fulfilled the overall coordination function between related ministries.⁵⁵

It has been pointed out that in the Fukushima nuclear accident, there was insufficient coordination between NISA and the Kantei (the Emergency Assembly Team). For example, information on the plant was originally to be collected by the secretariat of the Nuclear Disaster Management Headquarters at the Emergency Response Center (ERC) of the NISA, transmitted to the NISA staff dispatched to the Kantei's Response Office and shared with the Kantei. However, because NISA's executives were dealing with the secretariat of the Nuclear Disaster Management Headquarters and the fifth floor of the Kantei, it was not possible to have the executives stay with the Emergency Assembly Team.⁵⁶

Today, there is a system in place where the Nuclear Disaster Management Headquarters Secretariat has not only a "Nuclear Regulatory Agency ERC Team" led by a councillor from the Nuclear Regulatory Agency, but also a Kantei Team led by the Cabinet Office Director General for Nuclear Disaster Management.⁵⁷ However, the Kantei Team consists of 20-30 liaison officers, and the core of the secretariat is the ERC Team, which consists of 100-200 people.⁵⁸ In addition, when advanced coordination by relevant ministries and agencies is required under the Nuclear Disaster Management Headquarters, the Cabinet Office Director General for Nuclear Disaster Management is to hold the

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 310.

⁵² Ibid., p. 321.

⁵³ Interview with Kiyotaka Takahashi, November 15, 2019.

⁵⁴ Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, n.d.


⁵⁵ Interview with Tetsuya Yamamoto, November 22, 2019.

⁵⁶ The National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, 2012, p. 296.

⁵⁷ Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, n.d.

⁵⁸ Interview with Tetsuya Yamamoto, November 22, 2019.

afore-mentioned related bureau directors meeting separately from the secretariat and coordinate overall.⁵⁹ Furthermore, the Nuclear Regulation Authority reports on the situation directly to the Nuclear Disaster Management Headquarters, if necessary, providing a redundant mechanism.⁶⁰



[Figure 3] Crisis management system in nuclear emergencies
 (Source) *White Paper on Disaster Management 2019*,
http://www.bousai.go.jp/en/documentation/white_paper/2019.html

Liaisons are to be dispatched to each of the two secretariats (the Nuclear Regulatory Agency ERC and the Cabinet Office (for Disaster Management)) and information sharing networks are to be mutually introduced to centralize information collection as well as to direct and coordinate local operational organizations and unify rescue and life-saving activities, and support for victims.⁶¹ In September 2017, the nuclear disaster management drill for the Kyushu Electric Power Genkai Nuclear Power Plant tested not only the joint meeting between the task force headquarters but also integrated operations at the secretariat level.⁶² Additionally, bearing in mind rapid decision-making by unifying the initial response at the Kantei, in a decision by the Nuclear Disaster Management Council Secretary Meeting on October 19, 2012, the Nuclear Disaster Response Manual saw strengthening the secretariat system in the Nuclear Disaster Management Headquarters to support the Kantei's decision-making, and ensuring quick information gathering and decision-making at the Kantei as a lesson from the Fukushima nuclear accident. As Kiyotaka Takahashi, former Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management and also a Cabinet Secretariat Councillor for Crisis Management at the time of the Fukushima nuclear accident, said, "What was the most troublesome thing when actually dealing with 3.11 was that there wasn't any kind of 'manual' ", so he regards this

⁵⁹ Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2019, pp. 69–70.

⁶⁰ Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, n.d.

⁶¹ Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2015.

⁶² Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2019, pp. 6–8.

as an important point of improvement⁶³, and the manual has been revised almost every year thereafter.

Moreover, the Nuclear Disaster Management Headquarters Secretariat Kantei Team is to have an operational response team (consisting of personnel seconded from the Self-Defense Forces, police, fire agency, etc.⁶⁴) in charge of liaison with ministries with operational organizations.⁶⁵

On the other hand, it was pointed out that the role of the Nuclear Safety Commission and Cabinet Secretariat advisors remained unclear in terms of science and technology assistance and advisory functions to top members of the Kantei in the accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant,⁶⁶ the Independent Accident Investigation recommending the establishment of a science and technology evaluation organization (function). On July 7, 2011, a proposal made by the NSC and Intelligence Subcommittee of the Democratic Party's Diplomacy and National Security Investigation Committee, which was the ruling party at the time, also posited the establishment of a “science and technology advisory group” in the NSC.⁶⁷

Regarding this, the Nuclear Regulatory Agency currently plays this role in nuclear disaster management.⁶⁸ According to Shunichi Tanaka, who chaired the Nuclear Regulation Authority from 2012 to 2017, the assistance and advisory functions in terms of science and technology related to nuclear disasters have been improved through the development of monitoring posts.⁶⁹

4. Public relations and communication

Regarding crisis communication by the officials at the Kantei, Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano held a daily press conference in the Fukushima nuclear accident, as described above, and on Twitter, the hash tag “#edano_nero” [Edano, get some sleep] was added generating quite a response.⁷⁰ However, the expression “have no immediate effect” that Edano and others used repeatedly in explaining the effects of radiation on the human body at press conferences was controversial among listeners because of its ambiguity.⁷¹ Regarding the expression “event like an explosion” that was used by Edano at the press conference following the hydrogen explosion in the Unit 1 reactor building on March 12, Edano was forced to come up with this himself and not a nuclear expert.⁷²

Acknowledging the difficulty of crisis communication, which uses many technical terms that are not familiar to the general public, the Independent Accident Investigation called for the coordination of public relations systems between departments and the timely and appropriate dissemination of necessary information in order for the government to win trust as an information provider responding to public anxiety about a nuclear accident.⁷³

Even today, especially after the establishment of the Nuclear Disaster Management Headquarters, since the government is responsible for responding to nuclear disasters, it is a general rule that the

⁶³ Interview with Kiyotaka Takahashi, November 15, 2019.

⁶⁴ Interview with Tetsuya Yamamoto, November 22, 2019.

⁶⁵ Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2019, p. 176.

⁶⁶ Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident, 2012, p. 310, 312; Funabashi, 2013, p. 193, 357; Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2012, p. 62.

⁶⁷ Democratic Party of Japan, Diplomacy and National Security Investigation Committee, NSC and Intelligence Subcommittee, 2011.

⁶⁸ Interview with Kiyotaka Takahashi, November 15, 2019.

⁶⁹ Interview with Shunichi Tanaka, November 20, 2019.

⁷⁰ Funabashi, 2013, pp. 154-157.

⁷¹ Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident, 2012, p. 126.

⁷² Fukuyama, 2012, p. 79.

⁷³ Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident, 2012, pp. 144–145.

Chief Cabinet Secretary holds press conferences as the government spokesman (however, in the event of a nuclear emergency, it is expected that the prime minister will issue the declaration in the form of a press conference, which has also been carried out in the Nuclear Emergency Management Drill).⁷⁴

In this regard, during the term of Kiyotaka Takahashi as Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management (2016-2019) and in the context of reducing the burden on the Chief Cabinet Secretary, a proposal was considered where the Chief Cabinet Secretary was in charge of public relations to some extent, but the Cabinet Public Relations Secretary or Assistant Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary (Situation Response/Crisis Management) assisted him and the relevant ministries and agencies would handle their own individual cases. Takahashi said the intention here was to avoid a situation where “things would be delayed if the Chief Cabinet Secretary wasn’t there for decisions he was involved in, or the PR timing would be drawn out and delayed.” However, he said, “there are stories that a PR Secretary can handle, and stories that require the Chief Cabinet Secretary as a politician,” so it remained unresolved.⁷⁵ At present, after a press conference by the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Nuclear Regulatory Agency will explain the technical and specialized contents by setting up a public relations officer in a conference room at the Agency.⁷⁶

Additionally, in the Fukushima nuclear accident, the Kantei reported discomfort about the fact that Councillor Koichiro Nakamura said “There is a possibility of core meltdown” at a NISA press conference on March 12, the officer in charge being replaced in what was rumored to essentially be a dismissal and it also being pointed out that this led to widespread skepticism among the public regarding the government’s PR.⁷⁷

Regarding this point, from the standpoint of carrying out government crisis communication using “one voice”, after April 25, joint press conferences started being held at the government and TEPCO Integrated Management Headquarters by NISA, the Nuclear Safety Commission, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology and TEPCO.⁷⁸ In addition, following the Great East Japan Earthquake, the off-site center became less important from the perspective of creating one-voice in crisis communication.⁷⁹

5. NSC: Safety and Security

The NSC's predecessor, the Security Council, was not convened in the Great East Japan Earthquake. This is because it was said that the Security Council was not in charge of natural disasters⁸⁰ (based on the Basic Act on Disaster Countermeasures response to natural disasters comes under the jurisdiction of the Central Disaster Management Council). However, there was criticism from the opposition parties and others on not convening the Security Council following the Great East Japan Earthquake.⁸¹ Thinking existed, for example, that with 100,000 Self-Defense Forces mobilized, the Security Council should have been held as an opportunity for the Chief of the Joint Staff, who is the highest-ranking Self-Defense Forces officer and who assists the Defense Minister in the operation of the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces to express his opinions before the relevant

⁷⁴ Email interview with Tetsuya Yamamoto, January 16, 2020.

⁷⁵ Interview with Kiyotaka Takahashi, November 15, 2019.

⁷⁶ Interview with Tetsuya Yamamoto, November 22, 2019.

⁷⁷ Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident, 2012, pp. 123–126.

⁷⁸ Hosono et al., 2012, p. 136

⁷⁹ Naoya Sekiya, an associate professor at the University of Tokyo, informed me of this point.

⁸⁰ House of Representatives, 1986.

⁸¹ Question asked by Hiroyuki Arai at the 177th House of Councilors Special Committee proceedings no. 3 on Government Development Assistance, 2011, March 24; Question asked by Takashi Uto at the 177th House of Councilors Special Committee proceedings no.3, 2011, March 31.


ministers as a “related person” prescribed under the Security Council Establishment Act. The convening/non-convening of the Security Council itself is the subject of political debate here.

The establishment of the NSC in December 2013 was mainly due to national security demands such as China's military strengthening and marine advancement, as well as a response to North Korea's foreign policy brinkmanship. The hostage incident in Algeria on January 16, 2013, where an Islamic armed force killed nine Japanese nationals at a natural gas refining plant, also accelerated the momentum for its establishment.⁸² When the NSC was established, disasters in the order of the Great East Japan Earthquake were to be deliberated at the NSC's Emergency Situations Minister Meeting (comprising the Prime Minister, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, and ministers designated in advance according to the type of situation). In addition to the Prime Minister and Chief Cabinet Secretary, for example, it is believed that in addition to the Minister of State for Disaster Management, others who may also attend the emergency situation minister meeting include the Minister of State for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, the Minister of Environment, the Minister of Defense, the Chairman of the National Public Safety Commission, and the Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications, other interested parties starting with the Joint Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management, and the Chair of the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NSS will serve as the secretariat). And discussions will be held at this venue, including “whether there is a vacuum”, that is, “whether there is a problem in terms of national security”.⁸³ In fact, when the Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake occurred on September 6, 2018, reconnaissance aircraft from a neighboring country flew in, and the Air Self-Defense Force are said to have taken anti-air space invasion measures⁸⁴, reminding us once again of the importance of securing response capabilities for compound disasters comprising a natural disaster and national defense.

⁸² Yomiuri Shimbun, 2013.

⁸³ Interview with Kiyotaka Takahashi, November 15, 2019.

⁸⁴ Sankei Shimbun, 2018.



[Figure 4] Organization of National Security Council

(Source) *Defense White Paper*, 2019

https://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/wp2019/pdf/DOJ2019_2-1-3.pdf

Regarding the relationship between the NSC/NSS and the Cabinet’s crisis management and Situation Response Room, coordination between the NSS Secretary General and the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management, the concurrent assignment of the Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary (Situation Response/Crisis Management) as a Deputy Secretary General of the NSS, and coordination between the NSS No. 3 Policy Group and the Situation Response Office all contribute to unified operations.⁸⁵

The Cabinet Secretariat, which includes the NSS and the Cabinet’s crisis management department, also acts as a contact point with the U.S., which is an ally in times of crisis. In the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (2015 Guidelines) formulated on April 27, 2015, Japan-U.S. cooperation in dealing with large-scale disasters in Japan is called for, and it is assumed that activities at the time will be coordinated through an Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM), and as part of this, representatives on the Japanese side from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense and the Cabinet Secretariat will participate in the Alliance Coordination Group (ACG) of directors, section managers, and officers in charge (representatives from the NSC will participate on the U.S. side).⁸⁶ In fact, as a backdrop to the formation of the Japan-U.S. Joint Coordination Meeting at the time of the Fukushima nuclear accident, questions were raised by surrounding persons of the Prime Minister and the Chief Cabinet Secretary and the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, John Roos about the multidimensional nature of relations between Japan and the U.S. side, and it was proposed that

⁸⁵ Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2013.

⁸⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.

the Kantei take the leadership in bringing them all together.⁸⁷

6. Subsequent crisis management: major earthquakes, floods, infectious diseases

Next, let us consider the Kumamoto Earthquake, heavy rainfalls in western Japan, and COVID-19 as case studies for the crisis management system at the Kantei following the Fukushima nuclear accident. Certainly, these cases have different attributes to a nuclear disaster, but some suggestions may be obtained.

1) Kumamoto Earthquake

In the Kumamoto Earthquake that occurred at 1:25 on April 16, 2016 (the foreshock was 21:26 on the 14th) and caused 50 deaths, the Kantei Response Office was set up at 21:31 on the 14th, and the Emergency Assembly Team was convened and the Major Disaster Management Headquarters was set up at 22:10. Also, in contrast to the Security Council not being convened after the Great East Japan Earthquake, a NSC 4-Minister Meeting (Prime Minister, Chief Cabinet Secretary, Foreign Minister, Defense Minister) was held on April 21 regarding the response of the Self-Defense Forces in the case of Kumamoto Earthquake.⁸⁸ Then on April 23, a site visit by Prime Minister Abe was conducted.

In the Kumamoto Earthquake, a Cabinet Office Information Advance Team including councillors from the relevant ministries was dispatched to the Kumamoto Prefectural Office from April 14. They were also known as the “K9”, and they said they had results like, “when someone at the director-general level goes to the ministry to inform them of local needs, the ministry will firmly accept the request and things will move very smoothly.”⁸⁹ The former Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry executive involved in this said, “I came home totally convinced that unless we have actual onsite experience [at 3.11], we can't adjust or set up a system.”⁹⁰ On April 16th, the Procurement and Transportation Team was set up at the Major Disaster Management Headquarters, and related ministries and agencies gathered to carry out centralized coordination as well as procure and transport materials without waiting for requests from the disaster area. So-called “push-type” material support was implemented. This push-type goods support is based on the amended Basic Act on Disaster Management, which was enacted on June 27, 2012, following the Great East Japan Earthquake.⁹¹

In addition, as the Major Disaster Management Headquarters unified their intentions regarding emergency measures by the whole government, a Victim Life Support Team headed by the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary was set up on April 17, consisting of administrative vice-ministers, as a practical command tower to implement the measures decided there. On the following 18th, the Liaison and Coordination Group was set up under the same team, which consisted of directors and section chiefs from related ministries and agencies, and was operated by the Cabinet Secretariat. Group meetings were held in the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary's office at the Cabinet Secretariat almost every day for about a month, the Minister of State for Disaster Management also joining halfway through. Confirmation of issues and response statuses at related ministries and agencies, identification of new issues and examination/instructions for additional countermeasures were carried out in real time with a sense of immediacy, and is said to have supported prompt information sharing, adjustment, and judgment by the government.⁹² Actions by the related ministries and agencies were also quick, and some say that the system built by the government during the Great East Japan

⁸⁷ Isobe, 2019, pp. 95–97.

⁸⁸ Prime Minister Office, Government of Japan, n.d.

⁸⁹ Interview with Kiyotaka Takahashi, November 15, 2019.

⁹⁰ Interview with former executive of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, February 27, 2020.

⁹¹ Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2016, pp. 8–9.

⁹² Initial Response Inspection Team for the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake, 2016, p. 3, pp. 20–21.

Earthquake worked.⁹³ Takahashi, who became the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management after the Kumamoto Earthquake, said, “In the beginning of [the Heisei Era], the emphasis was on rescue activities in collaboration with operational ministries [sic] such as the police, the fire agency, the Self-Defense Forces, and the Japan Coast Guard. Since Kumamoto, efforts such as supplies and provision of information to the victims are starting to move including all ministries and agencies.”⁹⁴

Furthermore, in the Kumamoto Earthquake, the Japan-U.S. alliance coordination mechanism was utilized, and the first U.S. disaster relief support in line with the 2015 Guidelines was established. The integrated task force of the Self-Defense Forces, organized to respond to the earthquake, established a Japan-U.S. Joint Coordination Center in the field, and cooperated in transporting daily necessities by the MV-22 Osprey and Self-Defense Forces personnel by the transport aircraft C-130.⁹⁵

On the other hand, it is said that since the Kumamoto Earthquake occurred immediately after the annual spring personnel change in the central government, the response from the Situation Response Office was inadequate. Therefore, a manual has subsequently been provided in advance to those moving to the Situation Response Office, with thorough training conducted immediately after the transfer.⁹⁶

2) Heavy rains in West Japan

263 people were killed by the heavy rains that hit Western Japan from June 28th to July 8th, 2018. The government had held disaster warning meetings for the related ministries and agencies on an intermittent basis from July 2, the Kantei Liaison Office being set up at 13:58 on the 6th, and a meeting of ministers from the related ministries and agencies held on the 7th. At the relevant ministerial meeting, the Kantei Liaison Office was upgraded to the Kantei Response Office at 10:20 on the same day. Furthermore, at 8 o'clock on July 8, the Major Disaster Management Headquarters was set up. After July 11, a site visit by Prime Minister Abe took place.

As in the case of the Kumamoto Earthquake, even in the case of heavy rains in Western Japan, a Cabinet Office Information Advance Team was dispatched to the field (Hiroshima Prefectural Office, Okayama Prefectural Office, Ehime Prefectural Office) (after July 7), and a Victims Life Support Team was set up (July 9). Push-type goods support was implemented (on July 10, an Emergency Supplies Procurement and Transportation Team was established under the Disaster Victims Life Support Team).⁹⁷

In terms of crisis communication, the Meteorological Agency held an extraordinary press conference on July 2. It is unusual for the Japan Meteorological Agency to hold a press conference other than for disasters such as an earthquake or typhoon, but there were also scenes where the forecaster called directly on residents to evacuate.⁹⁸

3) COVID-19

COVID-19, which was confirmed to have occurred in Wuhan, China at the end of 2019, spread to all parts of the world including Japan in 2020.

On January 16th, the Japanese government established an Information Liaison Office at the Kantei Crisis Management Center (upgraded to the Kantei Response Office on the 26th) and dispatched the

⁹³ Kojima, 2018, p. 72.

⁹⁴ Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2018.

⁹⁵ Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2016; Ministry of Defense, 2016.

⁹⁶ Interview with Kiyotaka Takahashi, November 15, 2019.

⁹⁷ Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2019.

⁹⁸ Asahi Shimbun, 2019.

first charter flight to return Japanese residents in Wuhan to Japan on the 28th. On the 30th, the COVID-19 Management Headquarters headed by the Prime Minister and the COVID-19 Management Headquarters Secretary Meeting chaired by the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management were set up to respond.⁹⁹ Furthermore, on the 31st, the first NSC Emergency Situations Minister Meeting was held.¹⁰⁰ At the Headquarters, which was convened on February 12, NSS proposed a flexible entry refusal system that could promptly take port call and landing measures if target areas and passenger ships, etc. were reported to the Management Headquarters and made public without having to go through cabinet deliberations each time, which was approved.¹⁰¹

However, according to reports, the Prime Minister changed to a top-down decision-making method because of criticism of a cruise ship that suffered mass infection and an insufficiently aggressive basic government policy announced on February 25.¹⁰²

On February 27, the Prime Minister requested all primary, junior and senior high schools as well as special needs schools be closed at once without prior consultation with the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. The Prime Minister also announced on March 5 that he would strengthen immigration restrictions from China and South Korea, and on the 10th, based on the application of Item 14, Paragraph 1, Article 5 of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act it was decided by the NSC and Cabinet to expand the target area of the restricted entry scheme to include parts of South Korea, Iran and Italy, and all areas of San Marino.¹⁰³ On the 13th, the Revised Act on Special Measures for Pandemic Influenza and Other Infectious Diseases Preparedness and Response was enacted, and the Prime Minister was able to issue an Emergency Declaration with restrictions on private rights. The Prime Minister himself attended press conferences on February 29 and March 14. Top-down responses continued including the decision to postpone the Tokyo Olympic Games, scheduled for 2020, via a telephone conference between Prime Minister Abe and Thomas Bach, President of the International Olympic Committee on March 24. The Government Management Headquarters was set up on the 26th.

Then, at the COVID-19 Management Headquarters Meeting held on April the 7th, the Prime Minister announced a state of emergency and the situation entered a new phase. The distinctive point here is the fact that both preventing the spread of infection and maintaining economic activity were important issues as symbolized by the appointment of Yasutoshi Nishimura, the Minister of State for Economic Revitalization, along with Katsunobu Kato, the Minister of Health, Labor and Welfare, to be in charge of countermeasures for COVID-19. Concerning the above dilemma, coordination had to take place between decisions made at the Kantei level and each of the 47 prefectural governors, each with their own circumstances. Furthermore, compared to other countries, unlike the lockdowns seen in the U.S. and Europe or the management of personal information by the state using a tracking alert application as in China, the Act on Special Measures for Pandemic Influenza and Other Infectious Diseases Preparedness and Response scheme's approach insisted on "self-restraint" and respect for the protection of privacy.

On April 1st, the Economic Group was established in the NSS, the Secretariat being required to become actively involved in COVID-19 countermeasures.¹⁰⁴ Originally, the NSS was supposed to work closely with the Situation Response Office, and was to respond to a wide range of national

⁹⁹ Prime Minister Office, Government of Japan, 2020a; Prime Minister Office, Government of Japan, 2020b. Regarding the Japanese Government's response to COVID-19 see: Independent Investigation Commission on the Japanese Government's response to COVID-19, 2020.

¹⁰⁰ Prime Minister Office, Government of Japan, 2020b.

¹⁰¹ Prime Minister Office, Government of Japan, 2020c.

¹⁰² Yomiuri Shimbun, 2020.

¹⁰³ Prime Minister Office, Government of Japan, 2020c, pp. 1–2.

¹⁰⁴ Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2020.

security issues not limited to diplomacy and defense, but if the NSS is involved in the details of COVID-19 countermeasures, this will create certain issues including manpower issues and questions of how to align this with the NSS's original mission, such as the formulation of national security strategies from a medium- to long-term perspective spanning the purvey of multiple ministries, as well as how to demarcate with the Situation Response Office that is originally responsible for crisis management operations.

7. Improving the crisis management system at the Kantei: Ten implications

While “lessons” from the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident led to various advances in “preparedness” in the crisis management system at the Kantei as we have seen, several issues suggested by case studies conducted after the accident remain.

First is the nature of the prime minister’s leadership. Looking at ideal leadership by the prime minister in a crisis, which is said to be largely dependent on the individual, it is most likely required that not only should the prime minister acquire crisis management skills under normal circumstances by participating himself in drills,¹⁰⁵ but there should also be agreement amongst his followers beforehand on the basics of what actions and decisions are going to be required of the leader during a crisis. Especially now that manuals for dealing with nuclear disasters have become quite thorough, it should probably be kept in mind that political decisions will be required from the heads of government, especially the prime minister, when a situation not covered by the manual occurs.

Second, concentration of work on a small number of managers can be considered an issue. In particular, since in the event of an emergency, the Chief Cabinet Secretary plays a central role in a system where the heads of the Kantei involved in crisis management deal with it in a unified manner, tasks can be expected to converge on him. It cannot be said that no doubts remain as to whether the Chief Cabinet Secretary, who is extremely busy, will be further overwhelmed by crisis communication such as press conferences. For example, it may be possible to narrow down or clarify the division of duties by examining whether the press conferences could have been done by someone other than the Chief Cabinet Secretary in past cases.¹⁰⁶

Connected to this is the issue of how to delineate the roles of political affairs and administrative affairs for government officials involved in crisis management. At the time of the Fukushima nuclear accident, when top government officials gathered over the TEPCO withdrawal issue, it was not the government leaders who said, “This is where TEPCO must hold out,” but Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management Ito.¹⁰⁷

Koichi Isobe (Chapter 6 author), who was the director of the Defense Plans and Policy Department (J-5) of the Joint Staff at the time of the Fukushima nuclear accident, said, “I think it needs to be clarified what we are going to do when we reach the stage where political decisions cannot be made with the authority given to the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management.”¹⁰⁸ Isobe also noted the need to prescribe in advance the participation in the ACG of top Kantei political brains, witness the case of Goshi Hosono, Special Advisor to the Prime Minister, who for all intents and purposes headed the Japan-U.S. Joint Coordination Meeting at the time of the Fukushima nuclear accident.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁵ Isobe, 2019, p. 255.

¹⁰⁶ Interview with Nobushige Takamizawa, February 4, 2020.

¹⁰⁷ Funabashi, 2013, pp. 316–317.

¹⁰⁸ Isobe, 2019, p. 192.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 192–193.

Third is cooperation between the Kantei and the nuclear operators. Regarding this point, the final report of the Government Accident Investigation states “it is not appropriate for the government and the Kantei to intervene in field responses in the form of spearheading from the outset.”¹¹⁰ However, it is also true that given the recognition of the risk of a steam explosion, decisions like the water drop into the Unit 3 fuel pool by Self-Defense Forces helicopter on March 17 could not be made by the nuclear operator, but had to be the government or the Kantei.¹¹¹ The postponement of the planned power outage by TEPCO, which was scheduled for the morning of March 14, also reflects the intent of the Kantei in consideration of patients receiving medical treatment at home using artificial respirators.¹¹² Regarding cooperation between the Kantei and the nuclear power companies, the Independent Accident Investigation viewed the establishment of the Integrated Management Headquarters by the government and TEPCO on March 15 as having greatly shortened the information transmission route and promoted rapid collection and sharing of information.¹¹³ However, the Independent Accident Investigation also points out that it is not necessarily clear whether the legal grounds for establishing the Integrated Management Headquarters were covered by the right of instruction of the prime minister’ (as head of the Nuclear Disaster Management Headquarters) in Paragraph 2, Article 20 of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness.¹¹⁴

While on the one hand there is a tendency to regard the Integrated Management Headquarters as a special case at the time, the point should not be forgotten, as Dr. Charles Casto, who was dispatched to Japan by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) at the time and cooperated with the accident response, points out, “dialogue within the government alone was not enough”.¹¹⁵ Regarding the way information is shared between the Kantei and the nuclear operators, it is necessary to assume that political leadership will be required beyond the technical and specialist capabilities of the Nuclear Regulation Authority.

Further regarding the relationship between the Kantei and the nuclear operators, the Prime Minister is to issue instructions based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness in the “exceptional situation of an emergency”,¹¹⁶ but according to Tetsuya Yamamoto, former Cabinet Office Director General for Nuclear Disaster Management, the prime minister's instructions are “the last resort”, and the government's on-site response should in principle be “not too much intervention by politicians”, but the Nuclear Regulation Authority should do this from a purely technical perspective, and the primary responsibility for dealing with a nuclear accident lies solely with the nuclear operators, establishing something along the lines of an integrated management headquarters not being considered.¹¹⁷ The Nuclear Regulation Authority’s standpoint shows a similar awareness.¹¹⁸ As regards TEPCO's perception, on the other hand, a company executive remarks, “In the end, we can only focus our advance [preventative] efforts so that such difficult things never happen again.” “Of course, even if we’re taking action after the fact, we have to put in place a route within the scope of accident response that will allow us to put an end to the accident without placing the lives of our workers at risk.”¹¹⁹ Prime Minister Kan, who understood that TEPCO was about to withdraw at the time of the Fukushima nuclear accident, rode roughshod into the TEPCO

¹¹⁰ Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2012, p. 374.

¹¹¹ Funabashi, 2013, p. 409, 415.

¹¹² Fukuyama, 2012, pp. 96–101, 185.

¹¹³ Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident, 2012, p. 106.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

¹¹⁵ Interview with Charles Casto, August 26, 2019.

¹¹⁶ Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, n.d.

¹¹⁷ Interview with Tetsuya Yamamoto, November 22, 2019.

¹¹⁸ Interview with Shunichi Tanaka, November 20, 2019.

¹¹⁹ Interview with executive of TEPCO, November 27, 2019.

headquarters early in the morning of March 15, saying, “You’re all involved. Please put your lives on the line.”¹²⁰ Who will ultimately order to put the operators’ life on the line is still undetermined ten years on.

Fourth is the Kantei “situation room function”. Whereas the Kantei Crisis Management Center is a working room where staff from each ministry talk with each other, the function of the situation room is to allow political leaders to make quiet decisions based on selected information and options together with the staff in charge and other specialist staff.¹²¹ A section of the Kantei Crisis Management Center has already been prepared in advance for staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Agency and the Cabinet Office (for Nuclear Disaster Management), but regardless of what the administration or situation, it is necessary to continuously study how to build a good hardware system that is easy to use in crisis management including the connection between the Center and the fifth floor of the Kantei.

Fifth, there is a difference in capability and experience between the center (Kantei) and local governments. This makes it difficult for the center (Kantei) and local governments to cooperate smoothly. Local government does not have the same structure as the central Emergency Assembly Team.¹²² In this regard, it is expected that local governments’ crisis management capabilities can be improved through training, meetings, staff secondment etc., all of which have been implemented following the Fukushima nuclear accident.

Sixth is the smooth transition from an initial response system led by the Kantei to a permanent response system by the departments in charge. In order to prepare for emergency situations where the crisis management system of the Kantei may go into force at any time, operations are to be gradually transferred to the Cabinet Office etc. as the situation calms down. Yamamoto points out that the issue of “how to pass the baton” from the Emergency Assembly Team to the relevant directors at the Nuclear Disaster Management Headquarters is a problem. Regarding this point, tests were also conducted at the Nuclear Power Disaster Management Drill for Kyushu Electric Power Genkai Nuclear Power Plant and the Chugoku Electric Power Shimane Nuclear Power Plant on November 8-10, 2019, but Yamamoto remarked, they haven’t “been able to train to the point where the chips are down, so they need to improve training under severe conditions,” adding, “what should be given priority in the case of a compound disaster?”¹²³

Seventh is preparation for “a yet to be experienced crisis”. Former Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management Takahashi noted, “[...] Despite being prepared for various situations including a catastrophic disaster in the capital, a large-scale cyber attack, and a pandemic of new influenza, they’ll be difficult to deal with.”¹²⁴ “How to deal with a situation we haven’t dealt with before? I think it’ll be up to the whole department, not just the crisis manager and staff, but the prime minister too,” says Takahashi.¹²⁵ In crisis management, the use of imagination, as well as the preparation of manuals is necessary.

Eighth is the personnel policy for crisis management staff. In addition to extending the term of office of staff in the Situation Response Office recommended after the Kumamoto Earthquake, as well as the creation of a database, preparing incoming officers, and the expansion of a registration system for staff seconded to the Cabinet Office (Disaster Management) as proposed in the final report of *The State of the Government’s Crisis Management Organization* in March 2015, it will be necessary for relevant ministries and agencies to consider how to secure personnel, carry out post rotation

¹²⁰ Kan, 2012, p. 115.

¹²¹ Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident, 2012, p. 394.

¹²² Interview with Kiyotaka Takahashi, November 15, 2019.

¹²³ Interview with Tetsuya Yamamoto, November 22, 2019.

¹²⁴ Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2018.

¹²⁵ Interview with Kiyotaka Takahashi, November 15, 2019.

simulations, and rotate personnel differently from normal times.

Ninth is the enhancement of science and technology assistance and advisory functions for the Kantei. Yasuhisa Shiozaki, a member of the Lower House, who led the establishment of the National Diet Accident Investigation and was involved in the establishment of the Nuclear Regulation Authority, points out the problem of “politics that don’t believe science is in control”.¹²⁶ Top members of the Kantei have pointed out with regard to crisis management that there are issues regarding usability, such as the fact that specialists do not have a coherent view, even when it comes to assistance and advisory functions in terms of science and technology.¹²⁷ On the other hand, in the case of the U.S., for example, there are posts with assistance and advisory functions such as the Assistant to the President for science and technology, and since a highly qualified scientist with academic networks is appointed to serve as the director of the Science and Technology Policy Bureau, they can explain the scientific and technological awareness of the crisis and proposals for countermeasures to the President independently of the cabinet based on the various opinions of experts (it is well known that this contributed to the White House’s decision-making on pandemic measures as well as the Fukushima nuclear accident).¹²⁸ This type of science and technology assistance and advisory function on crisis management for the Kantei would be convenient for leaders at the Kantei and serve as a hub for expert networks,¹²⁹ and at the same time, in terms of crisis communication, it is hoped that this key post would be filled by an expert authority who would gain the trust of the public. In addition, science and technology assistance and advisory functions on crisis management for the Kantei should not be limited to nuclear power, but also include AI (artificial intelligence) and so-called “new domains” such as space, cybernetics, and electromagnetic waves, it being preferable to have human resources who support the National Security Strategy from a science and technology perspective.¹³⁰ Long-term human resource development in the field of science and technology bearing these things in mind will be an issue for the future.

The tenth task is to improve crisis communication, that is, smooth communication between the government and the people in a national crisis, backed by a high degree of expertise. For example, the Nuclear Regulation Authority has a scientific and technical assistance function for leaders at the Kantei in the event of a nuclear disaster, but to date there has been no clear decision about the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulation Authority holding a press conference during a nuclear disaster. However, nuclear disaster response is an extremely specialized field, and although it is natural that the Nuclear Regulatory Authority will play a role in crisis communication, there is also the view that it would be better to clarify that role publicly.¹³¹ However, just as the Japan Meteorological Agency exerted its crisis communication function during the heavy rains in Western Japan, there is room for consideration as to whether the Nuclear Regulation Authority should also have an advanced crisis communication function. At such a time, although a joint press conference with the Chief Cabinet Secretary and the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulation Authority has not so far been envisaged,¹³² whether this is possible (it is not legally prohibited¹³³) should be looked into from the point of view of the government speaking with one voice while paying attention all the while to the independence of the Nuclear Regulation Authority as an Article 3 Committee under the National Government Organization Act. In addition, physical relocation from office spaces to press conference venues is considered to be a time loss in times of crisis, so it will be necessary to devise measures such as

¹²⁶ Interview with Yasuhisa Shiozaki, March 17, 2020.

¹²⁷ Interview with Kiyotaka Takahashi, November 15, 2019.

¹²⁸ Interview with Shunsuke Kondō, March 10, 2020.

¹²⁹ Interview with Nobushige Takamizawa, February 4, 2020.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Interview with Shunichi Tanaka, November 20, 2019.

¹³² Email interview with Tetsuya Yamamoto, January 16, 2020.

¹³³ Ibid.

introducing online meeting tools to prevent this loss of time.¹³⁴

In a national crisis, not only crisis management but national governance is also essential

If a severe accident such as the Fukushima nuclear accident occurs again in the future, the Kantei crisis management system will respond as follows. First, at the Kantei Crisis Management Center, under the supervision of the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management, the Emergency Assembly Team and the Situation Response Office will deal with the initial response (after that, as the situation transits, it will be transferred to the Cabinet Office (Nuclear Disaster Management)). If it is found that the accident is difficult to deal with in the Kantei Response Office set up in the Kantei's Crisis Management Center, the NSC Emergency Situation Minister Meeting will be held in the Kantei, and a Nuclear Disaster Management Headquarters will be established. The Prime Minister will decide on important matters regarding the response to the situation, and leaders at the Kantei involved in crisis management will respond in a unified manner centered on the Chief Cabinet Secretary. If cooperation with the U.S. is required, the Cabinet Secretariat will send a representative to the ACG.

The Cabinet Office (Nuclear Disaster Management) and the Nuclear Regulatory Agency will serve as the secretariat for the task force, and the relevant directors' meetings etc. will assist as necessary. If other management headquarters have been set up in a compound crisis such as the Fukushima nuclear accident, response will be centralized at the headquarters and secretariat level (the Situation Response Office and the Cabinet Office (Nuclear Disaster Management) perform the secretariat functions). Through the Management Headquarters Secretariat, cooperation with local operational organizations will be supported and cooperation with local governments and nuclear operators will be achieved via the local management headquarters.

As mentioned at the outset, Japan has adopted the principle of shared management based on Article 66, Paragraph 3 of the Constitution as the basic principle for its governing mechanism. For example, debate on establishing a Japanese version of FEMA saw a negative conclusion drawn in the final report of *The State of the Government's Crisis Management Organization* in March 2015, but the report states, "Depending on the content of disasters and accidents, etc., each ministry and agency with operational units (the Police Agency, Fire and Disaster Management Agency, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, Japan Coast Guard, Ministry of Defense), the Nuclear Regulation Authority, and each ministry with disaster management related departments, *are to share the response in each of their respective jurisdictions...*" (author's emphasis).¹³⁵ On the other hand, as the report states here, "Regarding crisis management response in the government, (..) [Under the control of the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management], the Cabinet Secretariat (Situation Response/Crisis Management) and the Cabinet Office (Disaster Management) are to carry out overall coordination from the perspective of the entire government," so by the Kantei taking the lead in dealing with the initial response to crisis in a cross-ministerial manner, the Kantei's crisis management system can be said to be a device that mitigates the crisis management risk of the late 19th to the early 20th Century Meiji legacy of the shared management principle in government. It can be said that this seeks to do the best possible within the framework of the current constitution and its lack of emergency clauses.

Be that as it may, in the event of a national crisis, governance and leadership are required that differ greatly from those in normal times. Following the Great East Japan Earthquake, Prime Minister Kan sounded out on March the 18th the then leader of the opposition LDP, Sadakazu Tanigaki, about forming a coalition government. This attempt failed,¹³⁶ but in a national crisis, with of course comprehensive coordination between the related ministries and agencies centering on the NSC, it

¹³⁴ Interview with Nobushige Takamizawa, February 4, 2020.

¹³⁵ Related Deputy Ministers' Meeting on the State of Government Crisis Management Organization, 2015, p. 1.

¹³⁶ Kan, 2012, pp. 135–137.

may be necessary to go beyond and temporarily shelve political parties' conflicts of interest to form a national unity cabinet along the lines of the distinguished British leader Winston Churchill during World War II, especially in the political circumstances of a "divided diet," that opposition parties control the House of Councillors.

In the Fukushima nuclear accident, Japanese "civil-military" leaders such as Prime Minister Kan and Ryoichi Oriki, Chief of the Joint Staff, were frightened that Japanese sovereignty might be threatened by foreign powers if Japan itself was unable to overcome this national crisis.¹³⁷ I mentioned earlier that, even after ten years, the answer as to who should order to put the operators' lives on the line in the extreme situation of a nuclear disaster still eludes us, but leaving it all up "to the throw of a dice" as at the end of World War II should never be repeated, not only in terms of national crisis management but also in terms of national governance.

Summary

The Kantei's crisis management system, in which the Kantei mainly takes charge of the initial response to the crisis across ministries and agencies, has only been in place since the mid-1990s. The Fukushima nuclear disaster provided many lessons for the Kantei's crisis management system, which only had such a short history and grew from the actual experience of dealing with the situation.

From the "lessons" advances in the "preparedness" at the level of the Kantei's crisis management system via the legal system, organization, human resources, assistant and advisory functions, public relations and communication, and NSC review are to be commended.

On the other hand, as can be seen from the case studies after the Fukushima nuclear accident, issues remain that harbor "risk" including the prime minister's leadership style, the concentration of work on a small number of officers, the demarcation of roles between senior Kantei political officers and administrative officers, coordination between the Kantei and the nuclear power operators, the Kantei's "situation room function", the gap in capabilities between the Kantei and local government, transition from the initial response system, preparedness for "yet to be experienced crises", personnel policies for crisis management staff, enhancement of the scientific and technical advisory support function at the Kantei for crisis management, and the nature of crisis communication by the Kantei.

In Japan, the principle of sharing management based on Article 66, Paragraph 3 of the Constitution has been adopted as the basic principle of the governing mechanism. However, in the event of a national crisis, governance and leadership that are very different from those in normal times are required. It can be said that the crisis management system in the Kantei is a device that mitigates the risk of the shared management principle in crisis management by taking a system in which the Kantei plays a central role in initial actions in a crisis across ministries. As a way of governance and leadership in a national crisis, it is still a challenge to fulfill the integrated coordination function of the Cabinet for crisis management at the lead of the Kantei, thereby overcoming the so-called "vertical division of administration" which is also a risk of the shared management principle.

[Appendix]

The contents of this article are the views of the author alone and do not represent the views of the institution to which the author currently belongs or has previously belonged to.

¹³⁷ Ibid., pp. 112–113, Isobe, 2018, p.126.

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