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## The Significance and Roles of *Glocal* Public Philosophy for World Peace

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This paper aims to introduce the idea, significance, and roles of *glocal* public philosophy that I have been developing for the last fifteen years. Because of space constraints, I confine myself to describing only the essence of my work here.\*\*

### I . The Idea and Scope of *Glocal* Public Philosophy

#### 1.1. *The Concept of Public Philosophy and Its Contemporary Task*

I wish to begin by defining the term “public philosophy.”

Although this term began to be used in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, particularly in the English-speaking world, I define it as “the philosophy, in which various public issues such as political legitimacy, social justice, war and peace, environmental problems, public memory etc. are philosophically discussed.” I believe that equivalent concepts can be found in the classics of Western as well as Asian countries. Indeed, its long tradition dates back more than 2,000 years. In Europe, one example is Aristotelian practical philosophy, which was proposed in ancient Greece and which consists of ethics, politics, and rhetoric and has been influential in the Arabian medieval age. Moreover, European world could be regarded as the

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\*\* This paper overlaps partly with Chapters 1, 2 and 6 of my recently published book [Yamawaki 2016].

origin of public philosophy in Western countries [Aristotle 1996; 2000]. In East Asian countries, the Confucian philosophy represented by Confucius and Mencius, which significantly influenced Japanese and Korean public philosophy in the pre-modern era, could be regarded as the origin of East Asian public philosophy. On the other hand, Mahayana Buddhism, which arose in the first century in India and was spread in different forms to China, Japan and Tibet, could be also regarded as another origin of public philosophy in Asian countries. Doubtlessly, these public philosophies had trans-regional, and even cosmopolitan traits.

Since the 19th century, however, public philosophies were transformed from cosmopolitan to nationalistic on a socio-political level. Throwing light on Europe's situation, Kantian public philosophical works such as *What is Enlightenment* and *To Perpetual Peace* (written in the late 18th century) were not intended for a particular nation but for the world citizen [Kant 1964/1985; 1972/1795; 1991]. In this sense, Kant can be called a *cosmopolitan* public philosopher.

The development of public philosophies, however, began to feature increasingly nationalistic traits in Western countries from the 19th century onwards. For example, German philosopher Fichte, who considered himself the genuine successor of Kant's transcendental philosophy, advocated a closed trade state and unification of the German people as one nation in order to resist Napoleon's imperialism. In terms of the public-philosophical concept of the Self, the Kantian *cosmopolitan Self* was replaced in Fichte by a *national Self*, which had to be generated through national education and culture [Fichte 1978/1808]. In this sense, Fichte can be called a father of modern *nationalistic* public philosophers who resisted imperialism.

Indeed, world history since the 19th century has been closely connected with nation-state building and colonialism. The features of nation-state building differed across different Asian countries owing to their own unique context and history. For instance, the Indian nation-state building was combined with the resistance against British colonialism. The Arabian people and African people have another great history about their nation-state building. In contrast, the Japanese nation-state was based on both parliamentary democracy and imperialistic behavior, which caused great damage to Korea as well as China. It was expressed that Indian great poet and philosopher Tagore, who had visited Japan five times from 1916 to 1929, became increasingly disappointed with the imperialistic behavior of the Japanese government and criticized it because it followed modern European colonialism and destroyed the traditional Japanese sense of beauty.

In this regard, even the representative modern liberal public philosopher Fukuzawa Yukichi could not overcome the limitation of a national public philosophy. Although he clearly stated that “there had been only a government and no nation in Japan (日本にはただ政府ありて未だ国民あらず)” and believed that the foundation of the Japanese nation should be realized by educated individuals [Fukuzawa 1963/1872-76], he also intended to establish a state-sovereignty in Japan that would be as strong as that of European powers [Fukuzawa 1973/1875: Chap.10]. From an international perspective, Fukuzawa's public philosophy, as characterized in the slogan he advocated in 1885 after the breakdown of the revolutionary project led by Kim Ok-Kyun (金玉均) in Korea “Let's leave Asia (for Europe脱亜論)” had

very ironic traits, because the Europe of this time knew no substantial public space beyond the limits of each nation-state. Consequently, his thoughts on enlightenment did not offer the Japanese people any critical viewpoint to criticize the colonialist behavior of the Japanese state in China from 1895 and in Korea from 1910 onward. In my view, Japanese people continue to retain this nationalistic morality. Therefore, overcoming the negative legacies of modern history such as colonialism and the limits of nationalistic public philosophy should be a serious task and intergenerational responsibility for the Japanese people.

Indeed it is important to recognize that each different consciousness of modern history adopts a different stance on the *intergenerational responsibility for the positive, as well as negative, legacy of the past*. What is required for us is the new trans-national public philosophy on history that is characterized by how it considers modern history not only from *positive viewpoints* such as emancipation of peoples from oppression and the building of constitutional state, but also from *negative viewpoints* such as arrogance of cultural imperialism, barbarous acts of modern sovereign states, suppression of one people by other people, and religious intolerance etc. This new task makes efforts to eliminate such negative elements in history as far as possible.

### 1.2. *Glocal Public Philosophy and Its Ontology*

Based upon the above-described viewpoint, I would like to present the idea of *glocal public philosophy as my coinage* to overcome the limits of national public philosophy.

In fact, the adjective “local” means “existing in or belonging to the area where you live, or to the area you are talking about” (see Cobuild Advanced Learner’s English Dictionary, New Digital Edition). This word is a derivative of *locus* which means “the place of activity.” Therefore, the *glocal public philosophy can be defined as a trans-national public philosophy, which deals with global issues not from nowhere but from somewhere that is locally characterized*. What is important is the correlation between the globality of issues and the historically, as well as culturally, characterized localities in which each human being lives. The global and local viewpoints are seen as interdependent, and public values and particularity of thinking are then viewed as hardly separable.

To reinforce this program more philosophically, however, a *new theory of Self, Others and Public World* is needed. It is important for a *glocal public philosophy* to develop a comprehensive ontological foundation in order not to fall into any ethnocentrism, closed nationalism and irresponsible rootless globalism.

Based upon this idea, I introduced the concept of *Multidimensional Self*. This includes both the *Cosmopolitan Self* and the *Locally Situated Particular Self*. This *Multidimensional Self* understands himself or herself, without losing its cosmopolitan dimension of the Self, in a multidimensional way; understands *Others* who live in various cultural as well as historical contexts; and understands the *Public World* where each individual lives in a multidimensional way. I would like to expound this.

The concept of the *Cosmopolitan Self as a dimension of Multidimensional Self* has a long tradition with roots extending to the Stoics, Christianity, and Kant (as mentioned in the first section) in Western countries. It is also associated with the consciousness of 天 (Ten) in

Neo-Confucianism, as well as God in Islamic Philosophy. The Cosmopolitan Self understands himself or herself as a member of the Earth; i.e., a cosmos in which all of humankind lives. The Cosmopolitan Self also understands his or her existence in universalistic terms.

Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that this notion of the Cosmopolitan Self must be combined with other public dimensions of understanding the Self, which are characterized by cultural-historical differences or particularities. Specifically, the Self and the world in which he or she lives possesses a unique history depending upon the identity of the person in question; for example, contemporary Japanese, Korean, Chinese, Indian, Arabian, American, African, French, German, and so on. This individual holds the mental responsibility for his or her past and must make efforts to understand Others who live in different cultures and histories. In this respect, *the universalistic viewpoint of the Cosmopolitan Self and the multicultural viewpoint of the Particular Self should not oppose but complement each other*. It should be noted that local governments, workplaces, places of worship, schools, universities, and other associations or communities also belong to the public world, which is constituted not only by citizens of the nation but also by the people who do not belong to the nation. Moreover, multiple understandings of the Self and Others would play a critical role in enabling people to communicate with one another in these various public worlds.

It must be emphasized that the *glocal* philosophy based upon this ontology clearly contrasts the notorious concept of “clash of civilizations” by Samuel Huntington [Huntington 1996] and a cultural relativism that has no interest in normative ethics, the relationship between the diversity of cultures and trans-cultural public values. What is very important here are our efforts to make the mutual understanding of the diversity of cultures in the world compatible with trans-cultural public values such as world peace, human rights, environmental preservation and so on, which give the preconditions for human beings in any cultures to lead good lives. In this regards, it criticizes any ethnocentrism that denies such trans-cultural public values. In sum, the *glocal* public philosophy holds the view that the understanding of human beings cannot be separated from the different cultural contexts in which each individual lives and merely because of that, both cross-cultural dialog and trans-cultural public values should be promoted.

## II. *Glocal* Education and Ethics

Now, I wish to present an ideal education and ethics for the 21<sup>st</sup> century from the viewpoint of *glocal* public philosophy.

### *2.1. From the Education for the Nation to the Education for the Glocal Citizen*

Looking back at the history of the philosophy on education, different types of educational philosophies have been developed since ancient times, with Plato and Isokrates in Europe, Mencius and Xun-Zi in China etc. As Fichte’s famous *Addresses to the German Nation* [Fichte 1978/1808] and Fukuzawa’s famous *An Encouragement of Learning*

[Fukuzawa 1963/1872-76] shows, it became characteristic of the ideal of public philosophy to cultivate an ideal nation since the 19<sup>th</sup> century. In my view, this was inevitable to develop equal nations in modern nation states that had been emancipated from feudal hierarchies. However, this age has ended and now is the right time to change the ideal of education from education for the nation to education for the *glocal* citizen in order to counter both closed nationalism and homogeneous or rootless globalism.

*Glocal* education aims at cultivating the *glocal consciousness* of students or citizens, with significant importance to each particular public world or place where each individual lives and acts on the one hand. In this education, different from the homogenous or Anglo-America centric global education, the diversity of cultures and histories must be respected and understood to the greatest possible extent. Moreover, it makes the students or citizens consider current global issues such as war and peace, justice and injustice, poverty and well-being, human rights and its violation, environmental problems etc. seriously. *Glocal* education should make efforts to create what John Dewey once called Great Community in the contemporary world. According to Dewey, the ideas of liberty, equality and solidarity that were advanced in the French Revolution, must be innovated by the *Great Community* among the public in the Great Society. He thought that the local activity of the public and its networks would become more and more important to establish the Great Community [Dewey 1954/1927]. This idea of Great community advocated 90 years ago must be now rebuilt by trans-national *glocal* education, which also means that trans-national democracy in the sense of “the mode of associated living” is the main actor in the public world [Dewey 1997/1917].

To reinforce this idea, I would like next to apply the above described ontology to this *glocal* education. I start now from the viewpoint that each human being lives under his or her contingent conditions in the world. More specifically, saying, each individual cannot choose the body with which he or she is born. No one can also choose the cultural and historical circumstances into which he or she is born. In this regard, it seems that the human being is not free but pre-determined by nature. This fact, however, is only half a truth. In contrast to other animals, the human being is capable of making his or her living as he or she wants. The human being is also capable of transforming the given world into a better one. In this respect, human beings can become free from fates and misfortunes, and I call such a creative dimension of the human being the *Becoming Self*.

In view of the history of philosophy, one might think that this idea of a *Becoming Self* is reminiscent of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Minds* [Hegel 1952/1807]. However, there is a distinction between them. The *Becoming Self* in *glocal* public philosophy always makes efforts to change its mind for the better, and consequently, always understands itself as a *finite being* who can never reach “Absolute Knowledge” as Hegel assumed [ibid. VIII pp.549-564]. In this regard, the *Becoming Self* must be also called the *Dialogical and Responsible Self*, who is always ready for dialog with Others living in different cultural and historical situations.

The *Public World* in which each human being lives differs from the concept of the “Life World” in phenomenological philosophy and sociology [Schütz 1974/1932] in several aspects. First, it is conceived as the world of *various public values* such as peace, justice,

human rights, environmental preservation, etc. Second, it includes *public bads or evils*, such as war, violence, injustice, violation of human rights, environmental destruction, and even natural disasters. Regardless, the *Public World* contains both *public values* to be realized and *public bads or evils* to be eliminated. It is of great importance for the *glocal* public philosophy that *each Self* tries to address such public values and bads or evils from their own situation in cooperation with *Others*. Thus, the ontology of Self, Others, and Public World in *glocal* education requires a *normative understanding* of Self, Others, and Public World, which leads us the idea of *glocal* ethics.

## 2.2. *The Horizon of Glocal Ethics*

The *trans-national glocal ethics* should first develop, not only in contrast with the notorious Samuel Huntington's concept of "clash of civilizations" [Huntington 1996] but also a cultural relativism that has no interest in normative ethics, the relationship between the diversity of cultures and trans-cultural public values. What is very important there are our efforts to make the mutual understanding of the diversity of cultures in the world compatible with trans-cultural public values such as peace, human rights including human securities. Indeed, there is very different kind of cultures and religions in the world. However, it is wrong to abandon attempt to understand them, let alone to agitate the clash of civilization. In fact, it is not the civilization but the ignorance that clashes with one another as Eiji Hattori always emphasizes it [UNESCO 2006]. The new ethics excludes any cultural imperialism that assumes that one culture surpasses other cultures, as could be observed in Hegel's work.

This ethical thinking about cultures necessarily relates to the new *glocal ethics about history*. It was a great mistake to assume that the history had ended with the end of the Cold War as Francis Fukuyama thought with reference to Hegel once [Fukuyama 2006]. On the contrary, we entered a new historical stage in which various conflicts caused by the historical events in the past became manifested and required to be solved. This is the chief reason why we need a new ethics of history, which requires the dialog between the past, present and future, as E.H. Carr advocated [Carr 1964/1961]. Nevertheless, the new *glocal* ethics for the 21<sup>st</sup> century cannot override the quasi-Hegelian progressive viewpoint clearly found in Carr, who appeared to have believed in the progress of world history. Ideology such as "Cunning of Reason" (*List der Vernunft*) by Hegel [Hegel 1970/1840] or "Historical Necessity" from Marxism can no longer be adopted to explain history. Instead, non-Eurocentric plural viewpoints have to be taken into consideration. The new *glocal* ethics of history is characterized such that it considers modern history not only from positive viewpoints such as emancipation of people from suppression and building of a constitutional state, but also from negative viewpoints such as the arrogance of cultural imperialism, barbarous acts of modern sovereign states, suppression of one group of people by another, and religious intolerance and makes efforts to eliminate such negative elements from history to the greatest extent possible.

In this regard, I wish to emphasize the concept of *trans-national public memory*. The public memory of negative viewpoints includes the memory of wars, starvations, political oppression, arrogance of cultural imperialism, environmental destruction, barbarous acts of

modern sovereign states, suppression of one group of people by another, religious intolerance etc. The memory of positive viewpoints includes the memory of peace, well-being of people, emancipation of people from oppression, the building of constitutional state etc. These memories must be shared and discussed at a trans-national level.

In terms of the public future that should be created in corporation with others, I wish to rehabilitate the notion of public (or common) good that is predominantly treated from a perspective of institutions encompassing material objects and systems. Public good includes not only moral good, but also social goods. As the founders of the ethics of public good, Thomas Aquinas and Friedrich Schleiermacher should be mentioned. Aquinas regarded “society” (in Latin *societas*) as human activity with the aim of realizing “the good life, including material welfare.” In his doctrine of goods, Schleiermacher investigated “a totality of goods, which results from the organization and institutionalization of reason,” and cited scientific communities, states, voluntary social organizations and churches as concrete examples [Schleiermacher 2002/1812-17].

In the unstable age of globalization today, the ethics of public or common good must include the public bad or evil, which I wish to call the public bad or evil *negative public values*, while I call the public or common good *positive public values*. Therefore, I formulate this dimension of ethics as that of positive public values and negative values.

It is a very important task to develop this type of ethics on the trans-national level. We can regard world peace, human rights, world cultural or natural heritage, world health, and human securities etc. as trans-national positive values. On the other hand we can regard wars, terrorism, political oppression, starvation, contagious disease, environmental destruction etc. as trans-national negative values. Regarding the concept of “social capital” in terms of the value of network [Putnam 1993], we must judge whether a value is positive or negative value on a case-by-case basis. Generally, the social capital that contributes to the trans-national positive value mentioned above can be seen as positive value as well, and the social capital of mafia, terrorists etc. can be seen as negative values.

In this regard, I use a remarkable report by the United Nations Development Programme. According to it, trans-national public values consists of “natural global commons,” such as the ozone layer, atmosphere and climate, “human-made global commons,” such as norms and principles accepted worldwide (e.g. universal human rights) and scientific knowledge, the internet etc. and “global policy outcomes,” including peace, health, and stable financial markets [Kaul, et. al. 1999].

Trans-national negative values include the depletion of the ozone layer and increased levels of radiation, the risk of global warming, violation of human rights, injustice, lack of equal rights, exclusion and inequality of information access, wars and conflict, epidemics, and financial crises, among others. In addition, the weapons of massive destruction must be regarded as trans-national negative values. Opinions would be divided on whether the nuclear power plants that caused public evils in Fukushima recently should be considered as a positive value or negative value, although my personal view is that it is a negative one.

### III. *Wa*, *Jihi* (Karuna), and Ubuntu as *Glocal* Public Values for the World Peace

Given the viewpoint of positive public values, we have a responsibility to globally adopt a *positive legacy of cultural resources*. Using or studying cultural resources as very important public goods must not be confined to particular people or nations, but made accessible worldwide. Within limited space, I would like to take up *Wa, Jihi and Ubuntu as glocal values* for world peace.

The famous Preamble to UNESCO's Constitution drafted in 1946 declares, "Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed." In light of this statement, I wish to first introduce a new concept of *Wa*(和, 輪) as a *glocal public value from Japan, as well as Northeast Asian countries*, for a culture of world peace.

According to *Zuo zhuan* (春秋左氏伝), one of the Chinese Historical Classics, *Wa*(和) harmonizes various flavors such as hot, sour, sweet, salty, bitter as well as the various ingredients required to cook delicious soup, while *Doh*(同) gathers only one flavor or ingredient. The analogy of the relationship between the king and the subject can be used to understand this. *Doh* (同) is the attitude of a yes-man subject who obeys his/her king blindly or uncritically. In contrast, *Wa* is an attitude of the subject who expresses willingness to point out the wrong or the unjust in the king's thought and to attempt to change them into right or just things. Only based on such relationships guided by *Wa*, can people live peacefully and the conflicts among various peoples vanish(*Zuo zhuan* 昭公20).

In Japanese tradition, *Wa* (和) has been used to symbolize harmony and peace since the time of *Shōtoku Taishi* (聖徳太子 c. 574-622). Shotoku Taishi advanced a Constitution comprising 17 Articles, and Article 1 declares that *Wa* (*Harmony*) must be valued.

According to Nakamura Hajime, Shōtoku Taishi was strongly influenced by Buddhism, particularly by the idea of "benevolence and compassion." Contesting the narrow interpretation that Shōtoku Taishi's Constitution was nothing but compliance with governmental officials, Nakamura interprets it as ethics applicable for all Japanese rulers. *Wa* represents a principle of harmonious activity; not only within a group but also among various groups. Noting the similarity of *Shōtoku* to *Asoka* in India, Nakamura regards Article 17 as the beginning of the democratic mindset in Japanese history. Although Article 2 states, "one should not disobey orders," he rejects its interpretation as an order to obey but instead regards it a principle for creating harmonious human relationships in each group. He also rejects the interpretation that *Wa* in Article 1 denies argumentation and individuality. On the contrary, he considers that it respects each individual in each group [Nakamura 1998: 89ff.].

Corresponding to this, *Wa* in Japanese as an intransitive verb (*yawaragu*, 和らぐ, *naomu*, 和む) means "soften," "ease," "thaw," "moderate," "relax," "melt," etc. *Wa* as a transitive verb (*yawarageru*, 和らげる) means "soften," "cushion," "ease," "mitigate," "melt," and even "disarm." Furthermore, *Wa* as an adjective (*nagoyaga*, 和やか) means "harmonious," "friendly," "serene," etc. Thus, *Wa* in Japanese verbs and adjectives suggests peace in the minds of each individual. *Wa* in this sense could contribute to the creation of a conception

of a caring and sharing society.

*Wa*, when written as 輪 in Japanese, means a *circle*, which can be used to express the solidarity of the people. When used as a verb, it can mean “mitigating” (和らげる) the mind and body of suffering people. Therefore, I would like to orient the concept of *Wa toward transnational solidarity* (連帯の輪) *for suffering people* on the basis of public ethics and *glocal* ontology described above.

As described earlier, the public ethics in the sense used in this paper consists of duty, virtue and public values/negative values and the *glocal* ontology consists of our *multi-dimensional, dialogical, and becoming understanding of the Self, Others and Public World*. When we think about the trans-national solidarity for world peace and human rights in view of contemporary world, however, *public reason is not enough*. I mean that other capacities such as *public compassion and public imagination must be added to public reason* and strengthened by our idea of trans-national public ethics and *glocal* ontology.

Indeed, public values such as peace, justice, and human rights must be not only recognized by reason, but also felt and perceived at the level of sympathy; Negative values, which cause suffering worldwide must be understood on the level of compassion rather than reason. In this regard, Schopenhauer’s ethics of solidarity based upon compassion among people is very inspiring.

Unlike Nietzsche who advocated *Zarathustra* to escape from nihilism and expressed contempt for the secular world, Schopenhauer advocated solidarity based on compassion to overcome the sorrowful world. He even regarded it as the same as the love for one’s neighbors in the sense of Christianity [Schopenhauer 1972/1858: Vol.4, §66-67], while he seemed to be influenced by the Buddhist idea of *compassion* (慈悲) that Nakamura Hajime paid much importance to in his understanding of *Wa*.

According to Nakamura, realizing the truth in Buddhism means the realization of the true Self in relationship to the Others, which leads to mutual aid. The principle of action used to realize this truth is *Jihi* (慈悲 Karuna), which means both friendship and deep compassion [Nakamura 2010/1955]. This principle must be understood as universal love and peace among people independent of any religion or nation. Social institutions must follow this principle as far as possible. Pointing out the historical fact that there was no death penalty in the *Heian Period* (平安時代794-1192), he criticized the policy of severe punishment [Nakamura 2004: 174ff.]. Nakamura rejected any sectionalism in Buddhism and insisted that any religion must be relativized. All statesmen and people should learn from *Asoka* (263-232 B.C) in India who despite being a Buddhist practitioner himself, supported freedom of faith, preached the peaceful co-existence of all religions, and even advocated cooperation among them in order to realize truth and peace both in the world and in mind (*nirvana*) [Nakamura 1985: Chap.7-12]. Nakamura emphasized the cosmopolitan character of Buddhism and with the concept of a world-federation [ibid.: Chap.13].

Certainly, the value of compassion becomes more and more important given the tragic events of September 11 in 2001, March 11 in 2011, the refugee problem in Syria in 2015, and war and terrorism worldwide. In such catastrophic situations, we certainly require *trans-national solidarity based on the compassion*. Thus, *Wa* as solidarity based upon compassion strengthens our idea of trans-national public ethics and our *glocal* ontology,

which consists of the multi-dimensional, dialogical and becoming Self in opposition to one-dimensional, dogmatic and inflexible Self.

In addition, *Wa* could include the dimension of *Wakai* (reconciliation, 和解), if *Wa* can function as an ethically softening power and contribute to global peace. *Wakai* as restorative justice, which is realized through apologize and forgiveness, renews the concept of *Wa* as a trans-national value and brings about peaceful cooperation among the people beyond the boundary of nations toward the realization of co-happiness worldwide.

It would be too optimistic, however, to think that we could engage with the logic of *Wa* without regard to the history of the past. Regrettably, the history of humankind has not been oriented by the idea of *Wa*, which recognizes cultural differences such as languages, religions, and social customs. On the contrary, humans misunderstand each other, becomes involved in conflicts with one another, and even making wars. Therefore, we definitely need the second key-concept of *Wakai* (和解) that means *reconciliation and restorative justice*.

Indeed, we should understand the concept *Wa* not only as *Harmony in Diversity and Differences* but also as *Peace based upon Reconciliation* (和解). In fact, when we look up the word *Wa* (和) in the Japanese-English dictionary, we can find English equivalents such as “peace,” “harmony,” and even sometimes “reconciliation” [NEW SUNRISE *Japanese-English Dictionary* 1993 Obunsha, Tokyo]. We should utilize these translations for re-conceptualizing a *Wa* that embraces all such meanings as a transversal value on the global level.

In this regard, we need the idea of *restorative justice*. This idea is in contrast with the “retaliatory or retributive justice” such as “take eye for eye, tooth for tooth.” This means that *restorative justice* aims not at revenge but instead at apology and forgiveness. It requires us to admit the undeniable historical facts and errors of the past, and to commemorate it in the present, and to have the strong will required to overcome the negative legacy of the past and to construct common values in the future [De-Gruchy 2002]. It must be pointed out that this concept of restorative justice is closely related to the South African value *Ubuntu* that means *humanity towards others* and exerted much influence on Nelson Mandela.

According to M. B. Ramose, a famous South-African public philosopher, *Ubuntu* is the root of not only South-African but the whole of African philosophy. *Ubuntu* as a lifestyle aims at cosmic harmonious living against the fragmentation of being and has therefore dynamic and becoming traits in a constantly unstable world. “African religion, politics, and laws must be anchored upon the understanding of the cosmos of as the continual strife for harmony. ---And this is the basis for consensus as the distinctive feature of *ubuntu* philosophical praxis. Peace through the concrete realization of justice is the fundamental *ubuntu* philosophy. Justice without peace is the negation of strife toward cosmic harmony. But peace without justice is the dislocation of *ubuntu* from the cosmic order.” [Ramose 2003]

In my view, this idea is an important *glocal* public value from Africa that can correspond to *Wa* and *Jihi* (*Compassion*), albeit with some nuances. I pray for the realization of world peace through the mutual understanding of these *glocal* public values.

## Appendix: Contribution of *Glocal* Public Philosophy to the Cooperation among Religions

Lastly, I wish to mention shortly how *glocal* public philosophy can contribute to cooperation among religions.

In my view, it is wrong and misleading to exclude the religious dimension from the public world as the *laicite* in France reveals, provided that a religion has no ambition to take a political power and oppresses any other religions. As I emphasized above, *glocal* public philosophy attaches much importance to trans-national values in the public world. Therefore, it always makes efforts to evoke these values that various religions have in common despite the differences in their doctrines. It recommends that every religion should respect others to promote trans-national public values such as peace, human rights, and human well-being, and eliminate trans-national negative values such as war, terrorism, violation of human rights, and poverty. In this regard, the above-described *Wa*, *Jihi* (*Compassion*), and *Ubuntu* can be seen as trans-religious spirituality. I hope that the *glocal* public philosophy can mediate every peace-loving religion with another and contribute to the cooperation of different religions for the realization of world peace.

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