Regaining legitimacy in the context of global governance? UNESCO, Education for All coordination and the Global Monitoring Report

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Abstract   This research note shares insights which resulted from a larger study into the ways in which the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) – during 2010–2014 – used its position as coordinator of the post-Dakar Framework for Action (initiated at the World Education Forum held in 2000 and designed to reinvigorate the Education for All initiative) to help it regain some of the legitimacy it had lost in the preceding decades. The research study focused on the role of both the UNESCO Education for All Follow-up Unit and the production of the Global Monitoring Report (GMR) during the 2000s because they were at the heart of UNESCO's efforts to repair its image and renew its impact in one area of global governance, specifically in the global education policy field. The study's findings were based on an analysis of documents, archives and interviews (*n*=17) with key actors inside and outside UNESCO, including representatives of UNESCO's peer institutions.

Keywords   UNESCO, Education for All, multilateralism, legitimacy, global education policy, Global Monitoring Report

Résumé   *((The French translation of the final edited abstract will be added here later))*

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Introduction

With the deadline for the 2015 Education for All (EFA) goals having passed recently, much analysis and discussion has focused on the extent to which the globally agreed upon targets were achieved.[1] However, scholars have arguably dedicated less attention to asking what EFA

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[1] The six EFA goals (agreed by 164 governments at the World Education Forum held in Dakar, Senegal, in 2000) were (1) to expand early childhood care and education; (2) provide free and compulsory primary

meant for major multilateral institutions[2] such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which committed to fulfilling the goals. This research note shares insights which resulted from a larger study into the ways in which UNESCO – during 2000–2014 – used its position as coordinator of the post-Dakar Framework for Action[3] to help it regain some of the legitimacy it had lost in the preceding decades (Edwards et al. forthcoming).[4] More specifically, the research study focused on the role of both the EFA Follow-up Unit and the production of the Global Monitoring Report (GMR) during the 2000s, because these were at the heart of UNESCO's efforts to repair its image and renew its impact in the global education policy field (Mundy 1999). The study's findings are based on an analysis of literature, documents, archives and interviews (*n*=17) with key actors inside and outside UNESCO, including representatives of UNESCO's peer institutions.[5] Information was primarily gathered between February and September in 2014.

In this research note, we first clarify terminology related to legitimacy and discuss the context and mandate of UNESCO concerning EFA. We then focus on findings related to the sources and impact of the GMR's legitimacy, before discussing UNESCO's EFA leadership efforts. Finally, we consider the importance of assessing performance in relation to expectations and contextual changes when it comes to understanding legitimacy gains in the field of global education policy.

Terminology: legitimacy and impact

Legitimacy in the context of multilateral organisations has commonly been discussed as a function of the extent to which these organisations are democratically managed and controlled (see e.g. Miller 2007). However, the research reported on here was concerned with legitimacy in a socio-political sense, within the field of global education policy, as we sought to understand how UNESCO negotiated its position in relation to other international actors. Specifically, in drawing on the literature about organisational legitimacy, we established a

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education for all; (3) promote learning and skills for young people and adults; (4) increase adult literacy; (5) achieve gender parity; and(6) improve the quality of education (UNESCO 2000).
[2] Multilateral institutions are those institutions formed by three or more countries to work on designated issues.
[3] The *Dakar Framework for Action* (UNESCO 2000) was established as a result of the World Education Forum held in Dakar in 2000 and was designed to reinvigorate the Education for All (EFA) initiative.
[4] This research note shares key findings which are further elaborated and documented in Edwards et al. (forthcoming).
[5] There is a rich and extensive literature on UNESCO's work in the education sector, including many publications by current and former staff of UNESCO and the GMR. A full list of these publications can be found in Appendix A of Edwards et al. (2015).

definition with three interconnected and multi-part components: social acceptability, reputation and status (see Figure 1).

While an organisation can dedicate itself to achieving *socio-political acceptability* by adapting to its context, responding to changing expectations, and invoking or affiliating itself with symbols which possess legitimacy, these actions represent only one aspect of organisational legitimacy. Legitimacy also depends on *reputation* and *status*, with these latter two components being outside the control of the organisation in question. Reputation and status depend on how others receive and perceive the efforts of an organisation, which are measured in relation to efforts of other organisations in the same field of activity. Thus, within the global education policy field, organisations negotiate their social standing through the components of legitimacy as they strive to enhance their social acceptability and compete to influence each other, as well as to influence agreed-upon agendas, problem framing, policy priorities and educational reform at the country level (Jakobi 2009).

This research note first reports on *legitimacy* (as defined here), and second, considers the *impacts* (or lack thereof) of UNESCO's efforts around legitimacy, specifically in relation to EFA during 2000–2014. However, while we primarily discuss the impacts of UNESCO's actions on the organisation itself, other scholars have examined the potential impacts of EFA monitoring on education policy more generally (e.g. Post 2015).

Socio-political Acceptability:
Adapts to context; Responds to changing values/ expectations; Uses symbols

Status:
Prominence of relative position, as determined by others; Deferential behaviour of peers

Reputation:
Prestige from performance; Relative success; Perception of quality

Figure 1   Organisational legitimacy in the field of global education policy
Source: Adapted from Edwards et al. (forthcoming)

Context and mandate

Numerous publications have addressed the Cold War politics which affected UNESCO during the 1970s and 1980s and which had an impact on its perceived legitimacy (see Appendix A in Edwards et al. forthcoming). Despite UNESCO's efforts in the 1990s to improve its effectiveness and reputation, and recover its status, after the initial agreement on EFA at the 1990 World Conference on Education for All in Jomtien, Thailand, there was a "lack of sustained follow-up or monitoring mechanisms" by UNESCO to ensure that progress was made on the agreed-upon goals (Limage 2012). By the end of the 1990s, there was general consensus among observers in the global education policy field that UNESCO still needed to take significant action to address its weaknesses (e.g., insufficient EFA leadership and the overly philosophical, politicised and financially constrained nature of its operations) and to recuperate its status (Jones 1999; Mundy 1999; Rose 2003).

The purpose of the World Education Forum held in April 2000, in Dakar, Senegal was to reinvigorate the EFA initiative. UNESCO surprised the World Bank – considered *the* most dominant multilateral organisation working in education in the 1990s – by being awarded the mandate to provide leadership on EFA (Daniel 2010; Packer 2007). The resulting *Dakar Framework for Action* stated that: (1) "a global initiative" should be launched "aimed at developing the strategies and mobilizing the resources needed to provide effective support to national efforts" (UNESCO 2000, p. 9); (2) UNESCO had a mandate to coordinate EFA partners and ensure collaborative momentum through high-level meetings which would serve as a "lever for political commitment and technical and financial resource mobilization" (ibid., p. 10); and, crucially for the focus of this research, (3) UNESCO was charged with monitoring "progress towards EFA goals and strategies at the national, regional and international levels" (ibid., p. 9). On this last point, it was also stated that UNESCO should produce a "monitoring report" which would feed into its EFA coordinating work more generally (ibid., p. 10). These were the expectations against which UNESCO's legitimacy would be judged going forward.

The Global Monitoring Report: sources of legitimacy

Following the World Education Forum in Dakar, and unknown to most, UNESCO produced the first monitoring report on EFA in October 2001 (UNESCO 2001a). The problem,

however, was that it was not looked upon favourably by the High-Level Group (HLG) which UNESCO coordinated and whose job it was to encourage political and financial commitments for EFA. The monitoring report was seen as brief and unsubstantial, with its 51 pages of summary primarily related to progress on EFA indicators and resources mobilised. This prompted the HLG to call explicitly for an "authoritative, analytical, annual EFA Monitoring Report" (UNESCO 2001b, p. 29), which would report on country-level progress towards EFA goals as well as on advances made by the international community to support EFA.

Subsequently, in 2002, the name of the report was changed to the EFA Global Monitoring Report (GMR).[6] From this point onwards, the report was directed by a series of highly respected academics and was supported by a robust team of staff which ranged in size from 12 to 26 people. Significant funding was also received from donors (with the total number of donors peaking at 17 in 2014, although the GMR already had at least 10 donors from 2006 onwards). The GMR also received advice from an international advisory board and it worked with the EFA Observatory at the UNESCO Institute of Statistics (Packer 2007). The themes addressed by the GMR – which grew tremendously in size with 525 pages in the 2010 report – first related to the EFA goals themselves (e.g., gender, education quality, literacy, early childhood education), while in later years (after 2008) focusing on topics of relevance to the times (e.g., inequality and governance, marginalised populations, conflict and education, youth and skills, teaching and learning).

Building on this foundation, the GMR not only met the expectations placed upon it but did so in a way that was viewed positively by many observers in the global education policy field. Data collected for this study through interviews and documents point to three contributing factors which bolstered the perceived legitimacy of the GMR.

(1) *Organisational context*. While the GMR is housed within UNESCO's headquarters in Paris, and is part of UNESCO's overall administrative procedures, rules and regulations (including financial control, contracts processing and recruitment of personnel), the GMR also enjoys strategic freedom (e.g., with regard to how it spends its funds) and editorial independence (i.e., it does not need approval from the education sector or from the Director-General for the report's content) (Education for Change 2014).

(2) *Latitude in hiring practices*. As recalled by John Daniel (2010), former Assistant Director-General for Education: "Director-General Matsuura made no attempt to interfere with the management of [the GMR] by appointing people to it for political purposes. This meant that we could appoint a series of outstanding leaders to direct the EFA-GMR: Chris Colclough; Nick Burnett; and Kevin Watkins" (ibid., p. 42). According to numerous interviewees, these directors were credible across the global education policy field and were respected by UNESCO's peer institutions, including the

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[6] The first report to be published under this series label was entitled *Education for All: Is the world on track?* (UNESCO 2002).

World Bank (INT6).[7] Notably, these directors had strong academic credentials and they were also experienced at bridging research and policy (INT5). By hiring on merit, the GMR was able to ensure it had quality human resource inputs, which are necessary to produce quality analytic outputs.

(3) *Excellent reputation.* The reputation of the GMR stems from at least three factors: its trusted statistics (data submitted by countries are vetted); its quality production (which makes it "authoritative and attractive", Preston 2010, p. 61); and its incisive analysis (described as a "cogent analysis of data, clarity of presentation, and an astute focus on crucial issues", Schweisfurth 2010, p. 59).

Thanks to the above characteristics – and to the significant investment in human resources (e.g., over USD 2 million in 2009) afforded through donor contributions – the report was broadly seen as effective, in that it met, and perhaps exceeded, the expectations established in Dakar and further clarified by the HLG in 2001. In other words, by accomplishing its task in a high quality way, the GMR earned a good reputation and was accorded status (which contributed to its legitimacy).

The Global Monitoring Report: impacts of legitimacy

As a result of its legitimacy, the GMR was able to have an impact on the global education policy field. It is important to highlight the various forms of its impact, because doing so will facilitate further discussion in this research note on UNESCO's overall changes in legitimacy in the post-Dakar context. There are three aspects of the GMR's impact which stand out.

(1) *Relied upon by UNESCO and other actors in the global education policy field.* For example, UNESCO's Director-General Koichiro Matsuura, in office 1999–2009, used the GMR to prepare his speeches, and the EFA Working Group[8] and High-Level Group (HLG) used it in their work to ground discussions around progress towards EFA goals. Elsewhere, transnational civil society,[9] peer international organisations, academics, and, to a lesser extent, national non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and policymakers used the GMR to inform their advocacy and activity.

(2) *Effects on agendas in the global education policy field.* Michele Schweisfurth (2010) wrote that the GMRs "reflect (and therefore help to set) agendas in terms of which themes and issues are at the forefront of development cooperation and national policy concern, and they pull together convincing evidence as to why these themes demand attention" (ibid., p. 59). Some themes covered by the GMRs which have garnered significant attention include early childhood education, primary education, adult

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[7] In this research note, we refer to our 17 interviewees as INT1–INT17.

[8] Also known as the Technical Working Group (TWG).

[9] Antoni Verger and Mario Novelli note that "'civil society' is a very broad and contested category", including a variety of "organizations such as international and local NGOs, trade unions, community-based organizations, grassroots movements, independent research institutes, etc." (Verger and Novelli 2012, p. 3). For our purposes, building on this definition, transnational civil society refers to those aforementioned actors who work in or across multiple countries.

literacy, gender equality, educational quality, educational governance and international cooperation (Limage 2012).

(3) *Enhanced credibility of the global education policy field.* The GMR contributed to the credibility of this field by helping to keep the focus on all six EFA goals (as opposed to the two education goals specified in the Millennium Development Goals),[10] thereby defending the range of issues which were seen as central within this field. It also lent credibility through its systematic and evidence-based reporting of progress towards widely agreed-upon goals.

Having addressed the sources and impacts of the GMR's legitimacy, we now discuss these issues in relation to UNESCO's EFA leadership more generally.

UNESCO's Education for all leadership: coordination mechanisms and organisational challenges

Certainly, the mandate given to UNESCO at Dakar to coordinate development partners in subsequent years represented a vote of confidence by Member States which imbued the organisation (or at least the Director-General and the EFA Follow-up Unit) with a sense of purpose and a keen focus. The question was whether UNESCO could continue to meet expectations in the next 15 years. To that end, UNESCO's primary EFA coordination mechanisms were the HLG and a Technical Working Group (TWG). The TWG served its purpose as a site of information exchange for the participants (representatives of government bodies, bi/multilateral organisations and civil society), but it was seen as less effective in filling its guidance mandate – that is, to provide inputs to the HLG which could facilitate action and progress towards EFA. As one example, the 2004 meeting of the TWG suggested that the HLG should, among other things, address such vague issues as "the forthcoming United Nations review of the [Millennium Development Goals] MDGs", "positive progress [on EFA] since Dakar", and "the wider dimensions of equity in education" (UNESCO 2004, p. 24).

While the TWG was not known for producing specific suggestions for the HLG, this latter group was also not seen as being very influential, for a number of reasons. These reasons included the impression that HLG meetings were not well structured, there was changing membership, and political actors at the highest level did not participate (e.g., lower-level government staff rather than heads of state attended meetings). These issues made it

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[10] Eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were formulated at the United Nations Millennium Summit held in 2000. They aimed to (1) eradicate poverty and hunger; (2) achieve universal primary education; (3) promote gender equality and empower women; (4) reduce child mortality; (5) improve maternal health; (6) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; (7) ensure environmental sustainability; and (8) develop a global partnership for development (UN 2000).

difficult for substantive dialogue to occur, let alone for global political commitment to materialise. The HLG's resulting communiqués thus did not have the gravity expected of them, and, moreover, the influence of these communiqués was limited even within the United Nations system because of a lack of clear connection between the HLG and this broader entity.

At the country level, UNESCO worked with governments to elaborate plans for achieving EFA; however, problems arose in this area, too. A key issue was that UNESCO's support was seen as insufficient, and its plans as too philosophical, particularly in contrast to the assistance being provided at the time (circa 2002) by the World Bank, which had established what some saw as a competing endeavour – the Fast Track Initiative (FTI).[11] The FTI provided funding for EFA to those countries which developed plans for its achievement. Notably, the World Bank directly "involved government systems, budget support … and [built] government capacity to plan", as opposed to planning taking place outside of governmental processes, as was the case with UNESCO's support (INT6).

As a result – and in the face of gathering momentum around the FTI and the MDGs – in 2003 an internal evaluation was ordered by UNESCO's Executive Board. The Board wanted a better definition of "UNESCO's coordination role for EFA and the actual functioning of the Education Sector" (Limage 2007, p. 463). This evaluation marked the beginning of a cycle which was repeated during the ensuing 10 years. The cycle began with a lack of confidence, frustration with performance or outright controversy (e.g., about misappropriation of funds), followed by turnover in senior leadership, an evaluation (either internal or external), and then restructuring of the education sector generally and the EFA coordination mechanisms specifically.[12] As evidence of this trend, it is interesting to consider that during 2004–2006 alone the following transpired:

- *2004:* The new (American) Assistant Director-General of Education ordered an evaluation of the education sector by an American firm (conducted in 2005, with results released in 2006).
- *2006, January:* The released evaluation was critical of education sector management and UNESCO's country-level EFA support, and it noted a "lack of rigour and professionalism" in EFA support planning (Limage 2007, p. 461).

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[11] The Education for All FTI was launched in 2002 to encourage low-income countries to reach the Millennium Development Goal of achieving universal primary education. The World Bank played an integral part in FTI's conception and implementation. Over 30 donor agencies support the programme, including UNESCO and UNICEF. In 2012, FTI changed its name to Global Partnership for Education (GPE) and underwent an elaborate restructuring that entailed inclusion of civil society members on the its Board of Directors. GPE currently partners with 60 developing nations. For more information, see http://www.globalpartnership.org/ [accessed 18 May 2017].

[12] See Edwards et al. (2015) for more on the restructuring of the EFA coordination architecture during 2011–2015.

- *2006, July:* Many developing Member States asked UNESCO for a more credible EFA global action plan; UNESCO's Board was again concerned about progress and leadership around EFA (particularly in relation to other development trends), and thus the creation of another EFA coordination plan was mandated.
- *2006, July:* UNESCO restructuring affected EFA coordination; moreover, many ambassadors questioned the transparency of the restructuring.
- *2006:* UNESCO staff were surprised by the announcement of restructuring – the third restructuring in six years – which decreased their own confidence (Limage 2007).[13]

Thus, like the GMR office, UNESCO's EFA leadership was constrained by its organisational context. However, despite the efforts described above to improve functioning, observers noted that the reforms were unable to address systemic issues (e.g., lack of accountability, bureaucratisation, centralisation, politicisation and lack of qualified senior staff) (Limage 2010; Stern 2010). Moreover, the cycle described took place while UNESCO suffered from a restricted budget (in the absence of contributions from the United States, which had been paid during 2003–2011 when it was a full, fee-paying member, and which had represented 22 per cent of UNESCO's budget, but which were again discontinued after UNESCO recognised Palestine as a member in October 2011), and while there was no clear idea of the overarching vision or purpose of the organisation (Stern 2010).[14] On this latter point, it has been noted that, as of 2010 – following the election in 2009 of a new UNESCO Director-General – not only were regional and country offices "unclear in their roles [and] weak in their relevance and effectiveness", but there was also a continuing identity dilemma within UNESCO regarding whether it was attempting to be an intellectual leader or a hands-on development partner (Limage 2012, p. 6). Amidst these uncertainties, the EFA coordination team itself experienced upheaval. In addition to being reorganised multiple times, team staff decreased from 10 in 2004 to 3–4 in 2014.

Ultimately, then, it is not surprising that observers from other international organisations and development institutions have not judged UNESCO's performance on EFA entirely positively. According to one interviewee with extensive experience in a range of bilateral, multilateral and international NGOs,

> "With one or two shining exceptions, they have not provided the sort of intellectual leadership that many people would expect UNESCO, as the leading UN agency on education, to provide. They have not been able … to recruit the best of the thinkers in the world on education. … It's a challenge for any big organization. But I think

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[13] For further details on how this cycle played out in subsequent years, see Appendix C in Edwards et al. (2015).

[14] Alluding to Cold War politics, the United States had withdrawn from UNESCO once before in 1984 after claims that it was "poorly managed, provided little functional value and had steadily engaged in issues which were beyond the scope of its constitutional mandate" (Mundy 1999, p. 42).

UNESCO is particularly bureaucratic, by all accounts, … particularly dominated … by internal micro-politics." (INT10)

The importance of expectations and relative performance for organisational legitimacy

At the World Education Forum held in Dakar, UNESCO had high expectations placed upon it, expectations which went beyond the work of the TWG and HLG. It was expected that UNESCO would, first, successfully sustain the sense of momentum felt among forum participants; second, successfully coordinate and lead its peers in the field of global education policy as these stakeholders contributed various resources to the EFA effort; and, third, successfully motivate and support countries to develop and implement plans to achieve EFA. While interviewees in the research study suggested that these expectations were too much for a single organisation, especially one like UNESCO which faced significant internal challenges, it was nevertheless these expectations which UNESCO assumed in the post-Dakar context. The implication is that it is these expectations against which international actors judged UNESCO in the ensuing years.

However, what should also be highlighted are subsequent changes to the broader field of global education policy which have challenged UNESCO's legitimacy in relation to its peers. The most prominent example was the World Bank's creation of the FTI in 2002, which attracted the attention and resources of donors, and which arguably outshone UNESCO's efforts to make progress on EFA. Additional reasons for the positive perception and relative success of the FTI include its link to the more general MDGs (the FTI was focused on achieving MDG2, i.e., universal primary education), the fact that it was seen as one of the first concrete efforts to materialise the agreement made in Dakar that "no countries seriously committed to [EFA] will be thwarted in their achievement of this goal by a lack of resources" (UNESCO 2000, p. 3), and the reality that the FTI was predominantly managed by the World Bank, which was seen as more effective and was accorded higher standing, especially amongst donors.[15] Also affecting UNESCO's ability to coordinate was a lack of partnership with other peer institutions that had united to convene the World Education Forum in Dakar. Indeed, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) moved away from education altogether, while the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) narrowed its focus to girls' education.

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[15] At the same time, as interviewees pointed out, the creation of the FTI by the World Bank represented, according to some, a common-sense division of labour between the World Bank and UNESCO. The World Bank has expertise in finance and already had relationships with Ministers of Finance in countries which were struggling to meet the development goals.

Ultimately, then, UNESCO arguably took on more than it could individually handle with the EFA mandate. The size of the task, coupled with UNESCO's internal challenges, leads to the conclusion that such an organisation is unlikely to be able to address the root issues of social legitimacy (i.e., quality of performance compared to expectations) without drawing on the resources, influence and expertise of peer institutions, something which UNESCO was hesitant to do. Yet this was, as the literature on organisational legitimacy points out (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975), UNESCO's most promising alternative avenue to pursue, given that it could not alter the structure and expectations embedded in the field of global education policy.

These obstacles were not experienced by the GMR. Indeed, since the GMR was an independent entity housed within a multilateral organisation, financially supported by outside organisations (mostly with funding from bilateral donors), well-staffed, and exempt from the internal politics of UNESCO, its experience was the opposite to that of UNESCO's EFA leadership generally. Due to its privileged position, the GMR was able to meet and perhaps surpass its own expectations as a report which would monitor and assess the world's progress towards the EFA goals. Indeed, it went beyond simply monitoring progress to also impacting the work of UNESCO and others.

However, it should be noted that, in spite of the GMR's commendable performance, it had its own flaws. Two examples pertain to data timeliness and data completeness. Separately, those donors who supported the GMR could at times influence the production and content of the report by lending their staff to this group. Relatedly, hiring processes and decisions have lacked transparency, while an evaluation conducted in 2014 also highlighted the informal nature of the GMR's governance as a weakness (Education for Change 2014). Moreover, although not part of its mandate, some observers note the absence of any formal mechanism for including the GMR in national policy discussions.

Conclusion

In the end, the GMR was a new player with no competition from other similar reports, and for which realistic expectations were held. UNESCO, meanwhile, confronted a daunting EFA mandate in addition to dealing with internal challenges, a history of unmet expectations, and uncooperative peer institutions who were pursuing their own (at times, competing) initiatives. Taken together, these factors explain the different ways in which the GMR specifically, and UNESCO's EFA leadership generally, were perceived in terms of organisational legitimacy.

In future, it seems that UNESCO may continue to face significant challenges, if it does not address some of the issues highlighted here, and if peer institutions do not work collaboratively on the Education 2030 Framework for Action, agreed to in late 2015 by 1,600 participants at the World Education Forum in Incheon, South Korea (UNESCO 2015). This Framework details seven new education targets which will be tracked by a new "Global Education Monitoring Report" (GEM Report). More broadly, these targets all fall under one of the 17 new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) which were also agreed upon in 2015 and which replace the MDGs. Specifically, SDG4 aims to "ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all" (UN 2015).

Although the GEM Report has a difficult task ahead with its new mandate to monitor the seven targets (and numerous indicators) under SDG4, UNESCO's general position is again even less enviable. This is because the Education 2030 Framework for Action contains a vision for realisation with multiple tensions. While UNESCO "will continue in its mandated role to lead and coordinate the Education 2030 agenda" (UNESCO 2015, p. 26), the Framework also states that realising SDG4 "requires a 'whole of government' approach to education" and that "governments should establish […] procedures to drive, coordinate and stimulate interventions for education development" (ibid., p. 25). Furthermore, the Framework also states that civil society organisations, teachers, private sector actors, the research community, youth, and – of course – the multilateral co-conveners of the 2015 World Education Forum in South Korea will work together to achieve the new agenda. The distance between the expectations of UNESCO, its capacity to meet these expectations, and its ability to coordinate various actors (as opposed to competing or working on niche issues in isolation) is greater now than it was under the EFA mandate. Thus, while there are no easy solutions to propose, we hope that the research reported on here serves to provide insights which may be useful in the years to come.

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