



# History of European Ideas

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: <https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rhei20>

## Taylor and Hobbes on toleration

Takuya Okada

To cite this article: Takuya Okada (2023) Taylor and Hobbes on toleration, History of European Ideas, 49:4, 637-653, DOI: [10.1080/01916599.2022.2080375](https://doi.org/10.1080/01916599.2022.2080375)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/01916599.2022.2080375>



© 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group



Published online: 27 May 2022.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 496



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)

# Taylor and Hobbes on toleration

Takuya Okada

Faculty of Law, Daito Bunka University, Tokyo, Japan

## ABSTRACT

The English Revolution saw fierce controversy over religious toleration. While this controversy was usually associated with parliamentarians and Puritans, major contributions to the debate were also made by a few thinkers from the royalist side: Jeremy Taylor and Thomas Hobbes. Despite their prominence in the toleration debate, however, the intellectual context of the English Revolution in which their distinctive views of toleration were formed remains unclear apart from Hobbes's association with the Independents. Here, I suggest the potential importance of Taylor and Hobbes for understanding each other. While studies of Hobbes and Taylor have developed in relative isolation from each other, I show that their views of toleration have various features in common, and that these features are rarely found in their celebrated predecessor William Chillingworth or in major Puritan tolerationists. In several key respects, moreover, Hobbes and Taylor were more similar than Hobbes and the Independents. This research also helps to clarify the contribution to the toleration controversy at that time by the two leading thinkers. Furthermore, the similarities between Taylor and Hobbes, as shown in this paper, may contribute to better understanding the reception of Hobbes in the Restoration toleration debate.

## KEYWORDS

Jeremy Taylor; Thomas Hobbes; toleration; *Leviathan*; the Independents; William Chillingworth

## Introduction

The English Revolution in the middle of the seventeenth century was characterised by a fierce debate over religious toleration. At that time, this controversy was mainly among parliamentarians and Puritans in particular, who quarrelled over the settlement of the church.<sup>1</sup>

However, important contributions to the debate were also made by a few thinkers from the royalist side. One is Jeremy Taylor, an Episcopalian and chaplain-in-ordinary to Charles I. A great man of letters, Taylor was best known among his contemporaries for his devotional writings, 'the best and steadiest sellers of the century', as the historian John Spurr has put it.<sup>2</sup> Taylor also published in 1647 an influential work in defence of toleration, *Liberty of prophesying*.<sup>3</sup> Another theorist who made a major contribution to the toleration controversy while associating with royalists was Thomas Hobbes. In advocating sovereign power over religion, Hobbes also addressed the issue of toleration and the liberty of conscience in all his works of political philosophy. In particular, in the classic work *Leviathan* (1651), he began to defend a particular type of liberty of conscience. Hobbes might not be properly called a royalist. However, in Paris, where he stayed for most of the 1640s, he became a tutor to Prince Charles and kept in contact with royalist exiles and the Episcopalian Robert Payne.<sup>4</sup> Both Hobbes's *Leviathan* and Taylor's *Liberty of prophesying* had a significant

**CONTACT** Takuya Okada  [okada-t@ic.daito.ac.jp](mailto:okada-t@ic.daito.ac.jp)  Faculty of Law, Daito Bunka University, Tokyo, Japan

© 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group  
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.

influence on the subsequent toleration debate. In the Restoration era, just as Hobbes's ideas in *Leviathan* were adapted and absorbed into mainstream political thinking, Taylor's *Liberty of prophesying*, according to John Coffey, 'became one of the most frequently cited tolerationist works by Anglican and dissenter alike'.<sup>5</sup>

Despite their prominence in the toleration debate, however, the intellectual context of the English Revolution in which their distinctive views of toleration were formed remains poorly understood. Several studies, certainly, have addressed this issue. Collins noted Hobbes's greater deference to conscience and his endorsement of Independency in *Leviathan* and placed them against the background of the rise of Independency at that time and the Blackloist conspiracy of 1649.<sup>6</sup> While there is much truth to this, Collins rarely showed specific correspondences between Hobbes's arguments on toleration and those of his contemporaries, including the Independents, nor did he sufficiently explain the distinctive features of Hobbes's view of toleration in *Leviathan* that were not shared by the Independents. Sommerville showed similarities and differences between Hobbes and contemporary tolerationists as well as Presbyterians, who were opponents of toleration, in detail.<sup>7</sup> However, he did not pay attention to the development of Hobbes's view of toleration from his earlier works to *Leviathan*. Compared with Hobbes's attitude on toleration, much less research has examined Taylor's case for toleration, particularly its intellectual context in the revolutionary years. An important exception is Milton's article, which unearthed some parallels between Taylor and other royalist divines.<sup>8</sup> However, it left unexplained many of Taylor's specific arguments on toleration.

This article attempts to fill the gap in the literature by suggesting the potential importance of Taylor and Hobbes for understanding each other. It reveals various striking common features between Taylor and Hobbes in their treatment of toleration, a commonality that has rarely been recognised.

To date, studies of Taylor and Hobbes have developed in relative isolation from each other. Commentators on Taylor have not mentioned Hobbes in relation to *Liberty of prophesying*.<sup>9</sup> Hobbes scholars have only occasionally touched on Taylor.<sup>10</sup> Among them, Sommerville pointed out some resemblances between Hobbes and Taylor when showing the context of Hobbes's handling of the issue of toleration.<sup>11</sup> However, he treated Taylor only as one of those who made 'the liberal Anglican case' for toleration.<sup>12</sup> This lack of an attempt to relate Taylor to Hobbes might be the result of the difference in their primary preoccupations: Taylor focused on upholding toleration, whereas Hobbes – not necessarily a champion of toleration – was engaged in advocating sovereign power over religious issues.

This article provides a detailed textual analysis of these two authors and reveals for the first time that Taylor's and Hobbes's views of toleration have various common features. The features indicated in this article are rarely found in their contemporaries, such as William Chillingworth, the celebrated predecessor of Taylor and Hobbes, and Puritan tolerationists in the revolutionary years. Although Taylor owed many of his ideas in *Liberty of prophesying* to Chillingworth, he departed from Chillingworth in several important respects, adopting viewpoints found in Hobbes's earlier works on political philosophy. These shared viewpoints also distinguished Taylor and Hobbes from many of the Puritan tolerationists. Similarly, when Hobbes began to defend a kind of liberty of conscience in *Leviathan*, he presented several types of arguments characteristic of Taylor. Moreover, in several key respects, Hobbes and Taylor were more similar than Hobbes and the Independents, a group of Puritans known to have been in proximity to Hobbes with regard to ecclesiastical issues. The similarities between Taylor and Hobbes that were not shared by many of their contemporaries suggest the possibility that the two might have influenced each other.

By showing the potential relevance of Taylor and Hobbes to each other's attitude on toleration, this paper contributes to a greater understanding of the intellectual background of their distinctive views of toleration. This research also clarifies the contribution made by Taylor and Hobbes, two eminent thinkers connected with the royalists, to the toleration controversy dominated by Puritans.

The structure of this paper is as follows. Sections 1 and 2 focus on Taylor's *Liberty of prophesying* and on Hobbes's *Leviathan*, respectively, to show common features between Taylor and Hobbes. To clarify the significance of the similarities, Section 3 takes into account the Independents, considering the relationship among Taylor, Hobbes and the Independents.

## 1. Taylor's liberty of prophesying

While Taylor's *Liberty of prophesying* is a renowned work on toleration, it is often said that in this work, Taylor drew intellectual inspiration from William Chillingworth. Chillingworth, a chief member of the Great Tew circle, an acquaintance of Taylor and Hobbes, and the author of *The religion of Protestants* (1638), is known as a major predecessor of Taylor and Hobbes.<sup>13</sup> Perhaps because of the great resemblance between Chillingworth and Taylor in their outlook on toleration, little discussion has considered how Taylor's case for toleration developed from Chillingworth's. As I will show in this section, however, when Taylor developed his own ideas by building upon Chillingworth's case for toleration in *The religion of Protestants*, he also diverged from Chillingworth in three respects. It was in these respects that Taylor took a position similar to Hobbes's basic treatment of religion, a treatment found not only in *Leviathan* but also in his earlier works of political philosophy. The common features between Taylor and Hobbes, furthermore, distinguished them from many Puritan tolerationists.

The first feature of Taylor's case for toleration is its nonpartisan nature. While Chillingworth's work promoted toleration, it was mainly a polemical work directed against the Jesuit polemist Edward Knott, and he made clear his position as a champion of the Church of England. Taylor, on the other hand, did not bring his Episcopalian identity to the fore. Instead, he attempted to reach out to a wide range of groups, from Episcopalians to radicals, and he rendered his central ideas relevant to any group that might acquire political power. Whereas Taylor later claimed that he had intended to craft a defence for his Episcopalian brethren and himself, he also admitted to having been accused of allowing too broad a scope for toleration.<sup>14</sup> In *Liberty of prophesying*, indeed, he went so far as to propose the possibility of tolerating even the 'most troublesome and most dislik'd', that is, the Anabaptists and the Catholics.<sup>15</sup> The proposal implied that if these extreme groups were tolerated, it would be easier for Episcopalians and mainstream Puritans to tolerate each other and to seek common ground and peace. Taylor was unusual in his attempt to achieve peace with such a broad religious base.

This ambiguous religious identity and engagement with various audiences was thus a distinctive feature of Taylor not found in Chillingworth. Yet, it was a feature also seen in Hobbes's religious theory, as Parkin has shown.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, in this respect, Taylor and Hobbes were distinct not only from Chillingworth but also from Puritan tolerationists, such as William Walwyn and John Milton, who mainly argued against Presbyterians in defence of the sectarians.<sup>17</sup>

The second way Taylor went further than Chillingworth in defence of toleration involves Taylor's minimalist account of the fundamental articles of faith necessary to obtain salvation. Before Taylor, Chillingworth had already presented the distinction between fundamentals and non-fundamentals to leave room for the salvation of various Christian groups.<sup>18</sup> However, while he explained what was fundamental 'by a general description', he found it impossible to present an exact catalogue of fundamentals because, in his view, this depended on the circumstances.<sup>19</sup> Hobbes also developed this line of argument, distinguishing between 'fundamental points, and superstruction'.<sup>20</sup> Unlike Chillingworth, however, Hobbes specified what was fundamental. In his view, there was only one fundamental article of faith, namely, faith in Jesus Christ.<sup>21</sup> While the similarity between Chillingworth and Hobbes on this point is well known among Hobbes scholars, little attention has been paid to Taylor.<sup>22</sup> In actuality, Taylor argued, similar to Hobbes, that the only point of belief necessary to obtain salvation was 'Jesus Christ crucified', or the creed that 'we believe and are sure that thou are Christ, the Sonne of the living God'.<sup>23</sup> Moreover, almost all of the scriptural passages Taylor cited to support this idea were also cited by Hobbes.<sup>24</sup> Additionally, Hobbes, in *De cive*, and

Taylor handled inferences from this fundamental article in a similar way. While in *The elements* (1640) Hobbes regarded the evident inferences from the fundamental article of faith to be fundamental, he changed his position in the second edition of *De cive* published in January 1647.<sup>25</sup> He now stated that in the New Testament, people were saved ‘on account of this one article alone without the others which are derived as consequences from it.’<sup>26</sup> Likewise, Taylor denied that it was necessary to follow not only the fundamental creed but also inferences from it to attain salvation.<sup>27</sup>

To better understand the significance of the agreement between Taylor and Hobbes regarding the fundamental article of faith, it is useful to observe that, in the midst of the rapid growth of radical and heterodox ideas during the revolutionary years, some Puritans also sought to define the fundamentals of faith. The outcomes of their attempts can be seen in the Blasphemy Ordinance of 1648 and in the second edition of the Humble Proposals in 1652.<sup>28</sup> In general, however, they were also attempts to draw the line at the beliefs considered extreme heresies. Coffey’s research suggests that none of the Puritans, perhaps apart from Baxter, went so far as to indicate that there was a single fundamental article of faith, that is, faith in Jesus Christ.<sup>29</sup> Taylor and Hobbes, then, assumed a striking position even among Puritans. This remarkable similarity perhaps makes it somewhat plausible to claim Hobbes’s influence on *Liberty of prophesying*.

Third, Taylor, unlike Chillingworth, gave prominence to the issue of the limit of toleration and emphasised the role of the state in deciding the acceptable extent of toleration. Although Chillingworth admitted that opinions ‘by which disobedience to authority, or impiety, is taught or licensed’ ‘may justly be punished’, his basic position was that ‘there is no danger to any state from any man’s opinion’.<sup>30</sup> In his view, therefore, the state had little role in deciding the limit of toleration. Instead, he was concerned with the attempt of the state, where rulers took a cynical view of religion as ‘their state-instrument’, ‘to force weak men by the profession of a religion which they believe not’.<sup>31</sup> Like Chillingworth, Taylor opposed the punishment of citizens by the sovereign ‘for not being of his opinion’.<sup>32</sup> However, unlike Chillingworth, he did not advocate the principle that ‘there is no danger to any state from any man’s opinion’. Taylor repeatedly asserted that toleration is only allowed when it is consistent with public peace and the government.<sup>33</sup> For him, toleration is ‘a question of policy’ as opposed to one of religion.<sup>34</sup> Toleration ‘is to be considered upon political grounds, and is just to be admitted or denied as the opinions or toleration of them may consist with the publicke and necessary ends of Government’.<sup>35</sup> This way of setting the limit of toleration might also have been acceptable to Chillingworth, but it remains a fact that Chillingworth regarded the limit of toleration as a side issue. Taylor’s view of toleration as a matter of policy, on the other hand, corresponds well with Hobbes’s predominant concern with sovereign power and peace in his religious theory.<sup>36</sup> Certainly, Taylor did not elaborate much on what this view of toleration as a matter of policy actually involved. Yet, this leaves open the possibility that he might have agreed with Hobbes’s assertion that the sovereign had the right to examine religious doctrines and forbid the teaching of such opinions as the sovereign considered to be inimical to peace.<sup>37</sup>

The relation among Chillingworth, Taylor and Hobbes regarding the limit of toleration is illustrated by their attitudes towards the pretension to conscience. While Chillingworth conceded that seditious people might pretend conscience in defence of their rebellion, he distinguished this from the ‘rightly informed conscience’, which an honest Christian ought to obey rather than ‘the unjust commands of his tyrannous superiors’.<sup>38</sup> Like Chillingworth, Taylor cherished the liberty of conscience.<sup>39</sup> However, he was opposed to civil sovereigns tolerating or complying with those who disobeyed the law because of ‘weak consciences’.<sup>40</sup> In explaining this, Taylor argued, in opposition to Chillingworth, that, from the viewpoint of law, those who only pretend to have weak consciences should be treated the same as those with truly weak consciences because of the invisible nature of a person’s internal thought.<sup>41</sup> Neither type of person, therefore, should be tolerated to retain the coercive power of law over all subjects.<sup>42</sup> For Taylor, ‘a weak conscience signifies nothing in this case, but a dislike of the Law upon a contrary perswasion’.<sup>43</sup> While Taylor’s position on this issue was different from Chillingworth’s, it was close to that of Hobbes.<sup>44</sup> Unlike Chillingworth, Hobbes maintained that disobeying the sovereign because of one’s conscience was not allowed in any

case, a view similar to Taylor's.<sup>45</sup> Collins presents Taylor as 'a critic of civil religion', in contrast to Hobbes.<sup>46</sup> It is true that Taylor was not a proponent of civil religion. Yet, Taylor's view of toleration as a matter of policy and his refusal to comply with weak consciences in defence of law suggests that he was also not the opposite of Hobbes: Taylor's position might well be reconcilable to Hobbes's.

Taylor's way of setting the limit of toleration upon political grounds rendered him distinct not only from Chillingworth but also from Puritan tolerationists. When Puritan tolerationists set the limit of toleration, it was usually based on doctrinal issues unrelated to public peace. To cite two examples, toleration of Catholicism was opposed by the famous tolerationist John Milton partly because, in his view, it was superstitious and idolatrous.<sup>47</sup> The doctrine of the Trinity was also beyond the limit of toleration for conservative tolerationists such as John Owen. Meanwhile, some radical Puritan tolerationists, such as John Goodwin, denied the role of the civil sovereign in religious matters, in contrast to Taylor. When they did so, they usually assumed the peaceful character of sectarians or heretics, without tackling the complicated task of balancing two competing values, toleration and the maintenance of government. For example, just before John Goodwin offered several reasons for toleration, he noted that he assumed sectarians and heretics were 'peaceable in the State, and every waies subject to the Laws, and lawfull power of the Civill magistrate'.<sup>48</sup> In the famous Whitehall Debates, Nathaniel Rich made it clear that the question under discussion concerned people 'walking inoffensive to the civil peace'.<sup>49</sup> Unlike these men, Taylor did not assume that heretics or sectarians were peaceful and argued that the sovereign had a role in deciding the acceptable extent of toleration upon political grounds.

Thus, in *Liberty of prophesying*, Taylor had several viewpoints or arguments common to Hobbes but different from Chillingworth or Puritan tolerationists. The next section shows that a similar point can be made about Hobbes's *Leviathan* in relation to *Liberty of prophesying*.

## 2. Hobbes's *Leviathan*

In *Leviathan*, Hobbes revealed a new aspect of his ecclesiology by defending liberty of conscience from ecclesiastical authority where the civil sovereign was not concerned. This section argues that, in doing so, Hobbes often used the type of argument presented by Taylor. Hobbes's complex attitude towards the issue of conscience has been hotly debated among Hobbes scholars from various viewpoints.<sup>50</sup> This article focuses on Hobbes's greater deference to free conscience in *Leviathan*, a point noted by Tuck and Collins.<sup>51</sup> It attempts to contribute to Hobbes scholarship by drawing attention to the similarity between Hobbes's new case for liberty of conscience in *Leviathan* and Taylor's argument. Although the resemblance between Hobbes and Taylor has been briefly handled by Sommerville, he treated Taylor only as one of the liberal Anglicans and failed to identify Hobbes's greater deference to conscience in *Leviathan*.<sup>52</sup>

The first thing to note is that just as Taylor defended the liberty of interpreting the Scriptures in *Liberty of prophesying*, so in *Leviathan* Hobbes began to defend a particular kind of liberty of conscience, that is, the right of individual Christians to make their own judgments and to interpret the Scriptures free from the constraints of ecclesiastical authority when it lacked the support of the civil sovereign. In *De cive*, Hobbes maintained that under heathen kings, Christians 'must follow some Church of Christians' in spiritual matters.<sup>53</sup> In *Leviathan*, by contrast, Hobbes asserted that, in the primitive church, even when the apostles and elders of the church gathered and determined their common interpretation of the Scriptures, they 'took not from the People the liberty to read, and Interpret them to themselves'.<sup>54</sup> His famous endorsement in Chapter 47 of 'the Independency of the Primitive Christians' can be seen as part of his defence of individual judgment.<sup>55</sup>

In defending this specific type of liberty of conscience in *Leviathan*, Hobbes expressed opinions close to those of Taylor on several occasions. These occasions ranged from excommunication, the opposition to creating new articles of faith other than the fundamental, the treatment of the Anti-



Trinitarians, and the defence of natural reason and individual judgment to Hobbes's endorsement of Independency.

Let me begin by considering excommunication. In *De cive*, Hobbes had already indicated that excommunication concerned action.<sup>56</sup> However, he did not show whether it also dealt with errors in opinion. Moreover, because in *De cive* Hobbes focused on the Christian state, where the church is identical to the state, he did not discuss excommunication as the punishment of church only without regard to the state. Taylor elaborated on the issues not addressed in *De cive*. He distinguished the task of church governors from that of princes in dealing with false opinions and assigned excommunication to the former.<sup>57</sup> He also argued that judgments regarding errors should 'be made by estimate and proportion of the opinion to a good or a bad life respectively' and 'never but to secure piety, and a holy life'.<sup>58</sup> In *Leviathan*, Hobbes began to show a concern similar to Taylor's. He now dealt with excommunication in the primitive church, that is, a church without the assistance of civil power. At that time, excommunication 'was used only for a correction of manners, not of errors in opinion'.<sup>59</sup> Moreover, while Taylor did not clarify what 'a good life' constituted, for Hobbes, the meaning of 'manners' was clear: 'the rule of Manners' was the law of the sovereign.<sup>60</sup> For Hobbes, Christians are not liable to excommunication, as long as they are obedient to the sovereign.<sup>61</sup>

Hobbes also took a position similar to that of Taylor in *Leviathan* by launching an attack on the installation of new articles of faith. In *De cive*, Hobbes was already cynical about so-called articles of faith other than faith in Jesus Christ, asserting that they actually concerned power or profit.<sup>62</sup> However, he did not go so far as to denounce the establishment of such articles. On the other hand, Taylor was adamantly opposed to setting up new articles of faith.<sup>63</sup> He argued, among other things, that they would become 'instruments of separating and dividing Communion' and that their imposition would compel a Christian to disobedience 'because hee cannot without doing violence to his conscience believe them'.<sup>64</sup> In *Leviathan*, Hobbes began to criticise the creation of new articles of faith in a way similar to Taylor. In discussing excommunication in the primitive church, Hobbes maintained that ecclesiastics were advised 'not to make new Articles of Faith, by determining every small controversie, which oblige men to a needlesse burthen of Conscience, or provoke them to break the union of the Church'.<sup>65</sup> When Hobbes and Taylor opposed new articles of faith, they assumed that the sole fundamental article of faith was faith in Jesus Christ, a striking position, as mentioned before. As a result, their opposition seemed to imply support of a broad church comprising all peaceful Christians in the state.

The opposition to installing new articles of faith was, for Taylor, related to his conciliatory attitude toward the Anti-Trinitarians. While he himself approved the content of the creed added in the Council of Nicaea, he still regarded the Council as the first occasion of the restriction of the original Christian liberty.<sup>66</sup> From this viewpoint, he called into question the decision of the Council to enlarge the fundamental creed necessary for salvation.<sup>67</sup> Actually, in his view, participants in the Council did not mean to add any new articles of faith but only to offer 'a further Explication' of the fundamental creed.<sup>68</sup> In *The elements*, Hobbes treated the Anti-Trinitarians in a more conventional way. When he expounded on the fundamental article of faith, he suggested that it would exclude the Anti-Trinitarians: In citing some proof-texts for the fundamental article, he took the trouble to note that they were 'against the new sect of Arians'.<sup>69</sup> In *Leviathan*, however, Hobbes began to present his peculiar idea about the Trinity.<sup>70</sup> This suggests that, like Taylor, Hobbes, in *Leviathan*, did not deny salvation to those who do not support the conventional notion of the Trinity. Such a charitable treatment of the Anti-Trinitarians was quite unusual at that time, though in the 1650s, radical tolerationists such as Roger Williams and Sir Henry Vane junior opposed the attempt to suppress Anti-Trinitarianism in the Humble Proposals.<sup>71</sup>

Among the similarities between Taylor and Hobbes in *Leviathan*, perhaps the most significant involves the defence of natural reason and individual judgment. As mentioned before, in *Leviathan*, Hobbes began to defend the right of individual Christians to interpret the Scriptures. The defence of natural reason or individual judgment itself was certainly common among tolerationists. For

William Walwyn, 'the submission of the mind is the most ignoble slavery'.<sup>72</sup> John Milton also denounced blindly following the guidance of the clergy, saying that it is no better than holding a heresy to embrace a true opinion 'only because his Pastor says so, or the Assembly so determines, without knowing other reason'.<sup>73</sup> Similarly, for John Goodwin, a faith based on the teaching of other people without sufficient personal rational enquiry was a 'dead faith'.<sup>74</sup> However, as will be shown below, Taylor advocated natural reason in a particular way, and it was this type of argument, in turn, that would be adopted in *Leviathan*.

Taylor's argument about natural reason drew on that of Chillingworth about the relationship between reason and authority. Against the emphasis that his adversary Knott placed on the authority of the Catholic church, Chillingworth argued that even when people followed authority, they could not but follow their own reasons.<sup>75</sup> He stated, in particular, that Knott's book itself taught readers to 'make use of their reason for the choice of their religion', because 'the very writing and publishing whereof supposes this for certain, that the readers are to be judges whether his reasons which he brings be strong and convincing'.<sup>76</sup>

While Chillingworth touched on the relationship between reason and authority in passing, Taylor devoted one chapter of his work to upholding and analysing the role of natural reason in religious matters.<sup>77</sup> In this chapter, Taylor offered a generalised version of Chillingworth's argument. When Taylor argued in a manner similar to Chillingworth that natural reason had priority over authority, he made it clear that individual judgment took precedence not only over the authority of the Catholic church but also over any ecclesiastical authority. Additionally, Taylor broadened the scope of Chillingworth's argument that writing makes readers the judge of the reasoning of the author.<sup>78</sup> In view of so many religious claims, Taylor asserted,

it concernes every wise man to consider which is the best argument, which proposition relies upon the truest grounds: & if this were not his only way, why doe men dispute and urge arguments, why do they cite Councils & Fathers? ... If we must judge, then we must use our reason; if we must not judge, why doe they produce evidence?<sup>79</sup>

In other words, Taylor established the principle that when people present arguments and evidence, this very act implies admitting the audience as their judge.

This was one of the main arguments Hobbes adopted in *Leviathan* when he began to prove the right of individuals to interpret the Scriptures where the civil sovereign was not concerned. Previously, in *De cive*, Hobbes noted that the advocates of papal authority, by ordering their opponents to read the Scriptures to acknowledge this authority, implicitly admitted that the right of scriptural interpretation belonged to each individual.<sup>80</sup> This argument seemed to presuppose the principle presented by Taylor, but it was implicit. In discussing this, moreover, Hobbes was mainly concerned with establishing the authority of the sovereign to interpret the Scriptures.<sup>81</sup> In *Leviathan*, on the other hand, he began to discuss the case where the civil sovereign was not involved, that is, before the sovereign became a Christian.<sup>82</sup> In this case, where the Bible is not made law by the civil sovereign, he admitted that the right of scriptural interpretation belonged to individuals.<sup>83</sup> In proving this, he formulated the principle established by Taylor: 'Generally, in all cases of the world, hee that pretendeth any prooffe, maketh Judge of his prooffe him to whom he addresseth his speech'.<sup>84</sup>

In *Leviathan*, Hobbes thus promoted individual judgment about religious matters in a way similar to Taylor. Moreover, Hobbes incorporated this insight into his unique scriptural interpretation. He referred to Acts 17:2-5, in which St. Paul tried to prove to the Jews at Thessalonica that Jesus was the Christ mentioned in the Bible, which some came to believe but others did not.<sup>85</sup> For Hobbes, this event showed that the Jewish audience was the 'Judge of what S. Paul alledged out of Scriptures'.<sup>86</sup> Part of Hobbes's point here was that St. Paul was a teacher 'without any Legall Commission' or power to compel others, reflecting his repeated distinction between command and counsel.<sup>87</sup> However, Hobbes also elaborated upon the nature of persuasion, as opposed to command, introducing the notion of the judge. If St. Paul was the judge, Hobbes asked, 'What needed he to quote any places to prove his doctrine? It had been enough to have said, I find it so in Scripture,



that is to say, in your Laws, of which I am Interpreter, as sent by Christ'.<sup>88</sup> St. Paul was an apostle, but even his word, Hobbes said, was subject to the judgment of the audience.

Hobbes further argued that this was the case not only with St. Paul but also with Jesus Christ himself. Hobbes referred to the command of Christ to 'Search the Scriptures' in John 5:39, a scriptural passage often cited to promote individual judgment in the toleration controversy.<sup>89</sup> He again made a similar inference: 'If hee [Christ] had not meant they should Interpret them, hee would not have bidden them take thence the proof of his being the Christ: he would either have Interpreted them himselfe, or referred them to the Interpretation of the Priests'.<sup>90</sup> As his reference to the 'Priests' suggests, Hobbes was trying to defend individual judgment against clerical authority. He implied that individual Christians could judge and, in some cases, reject even the interpretation made by Jesus Christ, the most authoritative figure in Christianity.

This defence of individual liberty based on the words of the apostles and Christ was unusual against the background of the tolerationist argument of that time. One of the standard ways of promoting toleration was to emphasise human fallibility.<sup>91</sup> For example, John Goodwin repeatedly capitalised the terms 'certain' and 'certainly' to emphasise that his opponents lacked certain knowledge about religious matters in *Hagiomastix*, one of his main works advocating toleration.<sup>92</sup> Taylor devoted several chapters to showing the fallibility or uncertainty of principal ecclesiastical authorities such as tradition, the Pope, and the Church Fathers.<sup>93</sup> This detailed argument proving human fallibility was the main basis for his argument for 'the authority of reason', that is, the supremacy of individual judgment over ecclesiastical authority.<sup>94</sup> However, tolerationists usually did not elaborate on the case of preachers with undoubtedly true divine authority, such as Christ and the apostles. What Hobbes did in *Leviathan*, on the other hand, was to suggest that even such people, when they did not have the backing of the authority of the civil sovereign, granted the audience the right to disagree with their true scriptural interpretation and reasoning.

In addition to the defence of natural reason, the similarities between Taylor and Hobbes in the way Hobbes argues in *Leviathan* can also be observed in his argument for the endorsement of Independency in Chapter 47. Though much ink has been spilled on this endorsement,<sup>95</sup> this article draws attention to a neglected aspect: the affinity between its rationale and Taylor's argument. One example of this similarity can be found in the second reason put forward for Hobbes's endorsement. He vindicated the judgment of individuals on religious matters and placed it above that of 'any other man', including the clergy.<sup>96</sup> Hobbes wrote: 'It is unreasonable in them, who teach there is such danger in every little Errour, to require of a man endued with Reason of his own, to follow the Reason of any other man, or of the most voices of many other men; Which is little better, then to venture his Salvation at crosse and pile'.<sup>97</sup> Taylor similarly stated that concerning judgments on religious matters, 'any man may be better trusted for himselfe then any man can be for another. For in this case his own interest is most concerned'.<sup>98</sup>

Another example of similarity concerns Hobbes's historical outlook, preceding his endorsement of Independency, on the gradual loss of the original Christian liberty in accordance with the increase in ecclesiastical authority.<sup>99</sup> This type of historical outlook was also shared by Taylor. He found the liberty of scriptural interpretation in the primitive church. In his opinion, the council of Nicaea was the first occasion where this liberty was restricted.<sup>100</sup> After that, Christian liberty was further restricted as new articles of faith were created. Although the gradual deterioration of religious liberty was also outlined by other tolerationists in the revolutionary years, they often paid attention to civil authority, in particular to Christian Emperors.<sup>101</sup> Hobbes and Taylor, on the other hand, were mainly concerned with clerical oppression.

The detailed textual examination of Taylor's *Liberty of prophesying* and Hobbes's *Leviathan* has thus shown several notable resemblances between Taylor and Hobbes not found among many of their contemporary tolerationists. So far, however, one religious group whose position resembles both Taylor's and Hobbes's has not been taken into proper consideration: the Independents.

Then, the next section considers the relationship among Taylor, Hobbes and the Independents to clarify the significance of the similarities between Taylor and Hobbes.

### 3. Taylor, Hobbes and the Independents

Both Taylor and Hobbes wrote their pieces at the time of the rise of the army and the Independents. Taylor published *Liberty of prophesying* in the middle of 1647, when the king had a negotiation with the army led by the Independents and sectarians. The army began to advocate liberty of conscience in *A declaration from Sir Thomas Fairfax and the army*, published in the middle of June 1647. While *A declaration* did not deny the previous proposal of the Presbyterian settlement, it demanded that those who dissented from the established church on conscientious grounds should be exempt from civil penalties as long as they were peaceful.<sup>102</sup> Then, on about 23 July, the army proposed to the king and his advisers an ambitious scheme known as the Heads of the Proposals. The proposed terms, composed in close consultation with a group of leading Independents, were significantly different from the earlier ones offered by the parliament and were characterised by support for liberty of conscience, although this term itself was not used.<sup>103</sup> No mention was made of the parliamentary settlement of the church government. Bishops and all other ecclesiastics were denied coercive power. The Book of Common Prayer was permitted but was not to be imposed. Attendance at church was no longer mandatory. This proposed scheme, according to Woolrych, 'would have left Anglicans, Presbyterians, Independents, and even sectaries free to worship according to their consciences'.<sup>104</sup> In addition to the support of the liberty of conscience, this scheme was relatively generous to the Episcopalians, admitting bishops and the Book of Common Prayer as long as they did not infringe on the liberty of conscience through coercive means.<sup>105</sup> Such a proposal would have appealed to Taylor, who was known to be in London in August.<sup>106</sup> Indeed, when the king consulted the clergy on the issue of toleration that month, Taylor, a chaplain to King Charles, was one of those whose opinion was elicited.<sup>107</sup> The clergy advised the king that a Christian king may tolerate religious activities outside the established church and leave them unpunished in times of emergency, which matched Taylor's view.

The correspondence between Taylor and the Independents does not mean, however, that Taylor wrote it with the king's negotiation with the army at that time in mind. The annotation 'June 28' on the engraved title page of Thomason's copy indicates that the publication date was not later than June. This means that, at the time of writing *Liberty of prophesying*, Taylor was unlikely to be informed of *A declaration* and certainly did not know about the Heads of the Proposals. It seems, rather, that in this piece for toleration, Taylor happened to reach a position close to the religious settlement proposed by the army without being aware of it. Given his later comment that *Liberty of prophesying* was meant to defend him and his Episcopalian companions against persecution, he might have judged that the church settlement suggested in this work was the best option available for defeated royalists.<sup>108</sup> In *Liberty of prophesying*, Taylor might also have intended to condemn the Directory of Public Worship as an attempt to impose articles of faith and restrain liberty of conscience, just as Taylor's work in 1646 criticised the decision in the Directory to abolish the form of set liturgy.<sup>109</sup>

Like Taylor, Hobbes in *Leviathan* took a position close to the Independents. Whereas Collins has emphasised the resemblances between Hobbes in *Leviathan* and the Independents, this paper also takes into consideration Taylor.<sup>110</sup> The Independents at the time advocated both free conscience within a narrow theological spectrum and a national religious settlement supported by the coercive means of the civil sovereign.<sup>111</sup> Thus, both Hobbes and the Independents supported the right of the sovereign over religious affairs and at the same time argued for liberty of conscience against clericalism. Indeed, Hobbes might find little problem with the Heads of the Proposals of 1647. They denied ecclesiastics, including bishops, coercive power. They only set down the general principle of liberty of conscience without elaborating on knotty and specific issues, such as the treatment of the fundamentals and the doctrine of the Trinity. The Head of the Proposals, therefore, might have been compatible with the ecclesiastical scheme proposed in *Leviathan*.

In general, therefore, both Taylor and Hobbes in *Leviathan* showed notable resemblances to the Independents on ecclesiastical issues. However, in detail, the position of Hobbes was closer to that of Taylor than that of the Independents on three accounts, especially when the church settlement of Oliver Cromwell in the 1650s is considered.<sup>112</sup>

The first point concerns the motive for supporting the religious authority of the sovereign. The Independents were concerned with maintaining 'a unified, orthodox polity'.<sup>113</sup> Hobbes, on the other hand, did not share such a concern, presenting various heretical views in *Leviathan*. Hobbes advocated the sovereign right over religious matters because, in his view, religion was relevant to public peace. On this issue, Taylor sided with Hobbes and regarded toleration as a matter of policy.

The second involves articles of faith other than faith in Jesus Christ. When the Independents supported liberty of conscience, they were mainly defending the godly orthodox Protestants, opposing heretical views at that time. The leading Independent John Owen, for example, placed anti-Trinitarianism beyond the limit of toleration.<sup>114</sup> In the second edition of the Humble Proposals in 1652 in particular, the Independents, including Owen, attempted to set the fundamentals in Trinitarian terms.<sup>115</sup> Hobbes and Taylor, on the other hand, were opposed to creating any new articles of faith other than faith in Jesus Christ.<sup>116</sup> They also suggested that salvation was open to those who do not adhere to the traditional notion of the Trinity.

The third concerns the attitude towards the Episcopalians. Cromwell and the Independents sought to establish a nation of godly orthodox Protestants, and in doing so, banned the use of the Book of Common Prayer and episcopacy. In *Leviathan*, Hobbes was certainly opposed to episcopacy *de jure divino*.<sup>117</sup> However, unlike the ecclesiastical government under Cromwell, he was open to episcopacy as long as it did not undermine the supremacy of the civil sovereign over religious matters. Additionally, the prohibition of the Book of Common Prayer did not sit well with Hobbes's endorsement of the Independency of individual Christians to follow 'every man as he liketh best'.<sup>118</sup> When Taylor advocated toleration and peace, he envisioned a broad church encompassing Episcopalians, Puritans, sectarians, and perhaps peaceful Catholics, an ecclesiastical vision resembling that endorsed in *Leviathan*.

The similarity between Hobbes's ecclesiology and that of the Independents has been well-known. Yet, the analysis in this section has shown that the resemblance between Taylor and Hobbes is as significant, not to say more, as that between Hobbes and the Independents. Indeed, the common features found in Taylor and Hobbes that are not shared by many of their contemporaries suggest the interesting, though rather speculative, possibility that the two might have influenced each other. Circumstantial evidence corroborating this view is, admittedly, weak. Little evidence is available that shows that they read each other's works, and neither Hobbes nor Taylor mentioned the other in their works. Yet, the fact also remains that their works were well known in the royalist circle and that Hobbes and Taylor had common acquaintances, such as Henry Hammond and John Bramhall.

## Conclusion

Taylor and Hobbes are both exceptional thinkers who contributed significantly to the toleration controversy during the revolutionary years while belonging, in a broad sense, to the royalist side. Despite their importance in the toleration controversy, however, few attempts have been made to explore the background of their distinctive positions on toleration apart from Hobbes's association with the Independents. I have suggested the potential relevance of Taylor and Hobbes to each other's view of toleration. To prove this, I have shown for the first time that they have various common features in their outlook on toleration and that many of these features are not found in Chillingworth or in Puritan tolerationists in the revolutionary years. I have also argued that Taylor and Hobbes in *Leviathan* were more similar in their attitude towards toleration than Hobbes and the Independents regarding matters such as the treatment of the Episcopalians and the reason for supporting the religious authority of the sovereign. This research therefore clarifies not only the

intellectual context of Taylor and Hobbes but also the contribution of these two leading thinkers who were linked with the royalists to the toleration controversy conducted mainly among Puritans.

Finally, similarities between Taylor and Hobbes, as shown in this paper, may help in better understanding the prominence of Hobbesian ideas in the Restoration toleration debate. Hobbes scholars have shown that despite the heavy criticism *Leviathan* received, central features of Hobbes's view of toleration became mainstream in the Restoration era.<sup>119</sup> This peculiar aspect of the Restoration toleration controversy might reflect various resemblances between Hobbes's *Leviathan* and Taylor's *Liberty of prophesying*.<sup>120</sup> Given that both Anglicans and Dissenters appealed to Taylor's work in the Restoration toleration debate, it is not surprising that they would have also found Hobbes's work useful.<sup>121</sup>

## Notes

1. For an overview of this debate, see Carolyn Polizzotto, 'Liberty of Conscience and the Whitehall Debates 1648-9', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 26 (1975): 69-82; John Coffey, 'Puritanism and Liberty Revisited: The Case for Toleration in the English Revolution', *The Historical Journal* 41, no. 4 (1998): 961-85; John Coffey, 'The Toleration Controversy during the English Revolution', in *Religion in Revolutionary England*, ed. Christopher Durston and Judith D. Maltby (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), 42-68. See also W. K. Jordan, *The Development of Religious Toleration in England*, vol. 3 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1938); William Haller, *Liberty and Reformation in the Puritan Revolution* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963).
2. Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, John Spurr, 'Jeremy Taylor'.
3. Jeremy Taylor, *Theologia Eklektike. A Discourse of the Liberty of Prophesying* (London, 1647).
4. Noel Malcolm, 'A Summary Biography of Hobbes', in *Aspects of Hobbes* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 18-20.
5. See Coffey, 'The Toleration Controversy', 61. For Hobbes, see Jon Parkin, *Taming the Leviathan: The Reception of the Political and Religious Ideas of Thomas Hobbes in England, 1640-1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Jeffrey Collins, *In the Shadow of Leviathan: John Locke and the Politics of Conscience* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020).
6. Jeffrey Collins, *The Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 123-58; 'Thomas Hobbes and the Blackloist Conspiracy of 1649', *The Historical Journal* 45, no. 2 (2002), 305-31.
7. J. P. Sommerville, *Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), 148-56; 'Hobbes and Toleration', in *A Companion to Hobbes*, ed. Marcus P. Adams (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2021), 319-22.
8. Anthony Milton, 'Coping with Alternatives: Religious Liberty in Royalist Thought 1642-7', in *Insular Christianity. Alternative Models of the Church in Britain and Ireland, C.1570-C.1700*, ed. Robert Armstrong and Tadhg Ó hAnnracháin (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), 157-61.
9. W. K. Jordan, *The Development of Religious Toleration in England*, vol. 4 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1940), 378-409; Charles James Stranks, *The Life and Writings of Jeremy Taylor* (London: S.P.C.K, 1952), 70-87; Henry Trevor Hughes, *The Piety of Jeremy Taylor* (London: Macmillan, 1960), 23-30; Frank Livingstone Huntley, *Jeremy Taylor and the Great Rebellion: A Study of His Mind and Temper in Controversy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1970), 34-55; Milton, 'Coping with Alternatives', 157-61.
10. Sommerville, *Thomas Hobbes*, 150, 153, 155; Collins, *In the Shadow of Leviathan*, 59-60; Teresa M. Bejan, *Mere Civility: Disagreement and the Limits of Toleration* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017), 39-43, 92; Jon Parkin, *Science, Religion, and Politics in Restoration England: Richard Cumberland's De Legibus Naturae* (Woodbridge: Royal Historical Society, 1999), 64-6, 151.
11. Sommerville, *Thomas Hobbes*, 150-5.
12. *Ibid.*, 150.
13. For Taylor and Chillingworth, see Jordan, *The Development of Religious Toleration*, 4: 387; Stranks, *The Life and Writings*, 84; Hughes, *The Piety of Jeremy Taylor*, 23, 30; Huntley, *Jeremy Taylor and the Great Rebellion*, 54.

For similarities between Hobbes and Chillingworth, see Paul J. Johnson, 'Hobbes's Anglican Doctrine of Salvation', in *Thomas Hobbes in His Time*, ed. Ralph Ross et al (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974), 102-25; Sommerville, *Thomas Hobbes*, 109-11, 146-8, 152; Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. Noel Malcolm (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2012), 1: 45. For the text of *Leviathan*, references are given for the chapter and page number in the first 1651 edition; however, for Malcolm's introduction, which is the first volume of this edition, references are given for the volume and page number in Malcolm's edition.

For the Great Tew circle, see Sommerville, *Thomas Hobbes*, 11-2; Hugh Trevor-Roper, 'The Great Tew Circle', in *Catholics, Anglicans and Puritans: Seventeenth Century Essays* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1987), 166-230.

14. Jeremy Taylor, *Simbolon Ethiko-Polemikon, or, a Collection of Polemical and Moral Discourses* (London, 1657), sig. [A4v].
15. Taylor, *Liberty of Prophesying*, 222.
16. Jon Parkin, 'Hobbes and the Future of Religion', in *Hobbes on Politics and Religion*, ed. Laurens van Apeldoorn and Robin Douglass (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 184-201; *Taming the Leviathan*, 101.
17. William Walwyn, *Tolleration Justified* (1646) in William Walwyn, *The Writings of William Walwyn*, ed. Jack R. McMichael and Barbara Taft (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989), 155-72; John Milton, *Areopagitica* (1644) in John Milton, *Complete Prose Works of John Milton*, ed. Ernest Sirluck, vol. 2 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), 493, 511, 539.
18. William Chillingworth, *The Religion of Protestants, a Safe Way to Salvation* (1638), in *The Works of William Chillingworth*, 3 vols., vols. 1-2 (Oxford: University Press, 1838), 1: 281-345. This distinction can be further traced back to the age of the Reformation. See Bernard J. Verkamp, *The Indifferent Mean: Adiaphorism in the English Reformation to 1554* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1977).
19. Chillingworth, *The Religion*, 1: 321-2. See Robert Orr, *Reason and Authority: The Thought of William Chillingworth* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 92-4.
20. Thomas Hobbes, *The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic*, ed. Ferdinand Tönnies (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1969), 2:6:7. References are to part, chapter, and section.
21. Hobbes, *The Elements*, 2:6:6-8; Thomas Hobbes, *De Cive: The Latin Version Entitled in the First Edition Elementorum Philosophiæ Sectio Tertia De Cive, and in Later Editions Elementa Philosophica De Cive*, ed. Howard Warrender (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 18:6-10; *Leviathan*, Ch. 43, 324-7. References to *De cive* are given to chapter and section.
22. See Johnson, 'Hobbes's Anglican Doctrine', 102-25; Sommerville, *Thomas Hobbes*, 146-8.
23. Taylor, *Liberty of Prophesying*, 6-7.
24. *Ibid.* Matt. 16:19 (correctly Matt. 16:16), John 11:27, 1 John 4:2, John 20:31, Acts 8:37, Rom. 10:8-9 are all in Hobbes, *The Elements*, 2:6:7, and 1 Cor. 2:2 is in *ibid.*, 2.6.9. The only scriptural verse Taylor quoted but Hobbes did not was 1 John 4:15: 'Whosoever shall confess that Jesus is the Son of God, God dwelleth in him, and he in God'. However, Hobbes cited a similar passage in 1 John 5:1: 'Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ is born of God'. Note that while in *The elements* Hobbes does not mention the end of the gospels in citing John 20:31, he does in *De cive*, 18:6, as Taylor does. In *De cive*, on the other hand, Hobbes does not mention 1 Cor. 2:2 or Rom. 10:8-9.
25. Hobbes, *The Elements*, 2:6:6.
26. Hobbes, *De Cive*, 18:6.
27. Taylor, *Liberty of Prophesying*, 9, 12-3.
28. Sarah Mortimer, *Reason and Religion in the English Revolution: The Challenge of Socinianism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 185-99.
29. John Coffey, 'A Ticklish Business: Defining Heresy and Orthodoxy in the Puritan Revolution', in *Heresy, Literature and Politics in Early Modern English Culture*, ed. David Loewenstein and John Marshall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 115-29.
30. Chillingworth, *The Religion*, 2: 248.
31. *Ibid.* Against such an attempt, Chillingworth argued, true Christians should 'with all courage oppose themselves', but they should not resist it by 'opposing violence against it'. *Ibid.*, 2: 248-9.
32. Taylor, *Liberty of Prophesying*, 215.
33. *Ibid.*, sig. b2r, pp. 215, 246-8, 253-5, 260.
34. *Ibid.*, 215. See also *ibid.*, 260.
35. *Ibid.*, 215.
36. Note that when Hobbes advocated sovereign power, he did not necessarily aim to suppress heresies, as contemporary Presbyterians did. For Hobbes's treatment of heresy over his career, see Jeffrey Collins, 'Thomas Hobbes, Heresy, and the Theological Project of *Leviathan*', *Hobbes Studies* 26, no. 1 (2013), 6-33.
37. Hobbes, *De Cive*, 6:11; 17:28
38. Chillingworth, *The Religion*, 2: 267.
39. See Taylor, *Liberty of Prophesying*, 215, 265, for example.
40. *Ibid.*, 217-20.
41. *Ibid.*, 217-8.
42. *Ibid.*, 218.
43. *Ibid.*
44. See also Sommerville, *Thomas Hobbes*, 155; J. P. Sommerville, '*Leviathan* and Its Anglican Context', in *The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes's Leviathan*, ed. Patricia Springborg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 364, for this.
45. For Hobbes, the type of opinion held also by Chillingworth that 'subjects commit sin in obeying a command of their Prince which seems to them unjust' is erroneous as well as seditious. Hobbes, *De Cive*, 12:2. I refer to the



following translated version: Thomas Hobbes, *On the Citizen*, ed. and trans. Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

46. Collins, *In the Shadow*, 59.
47. Milton, *Areopagitica*, 565; Andrew Hadfield, 'Milton and Catholicism', in *Milton and Toleration*, ed. Sharon Achinstein and Elizabeth Sauer (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 189-90.
48. John Goodwin, *M. S. To A. S. With a Plea for Libertie of Conscience* (London, 1644), 54.
49. William Sir Clarke, *Puritanism and Liberty: Being the Army Debates (1647-9) from the Clarke Manuscripts with Supplementary Documents*, ed. A. S. P. Woodhouse (London: Dent, 1986), 149. See also Polizzotto, 'Liberty of Conscience', 71-2. Croope also notes this conditional. Anon [J. Croope], *Panarmonia, or, the Agreement of the People Revived* (1659), 24.
50. For several of these, see Mark Hanin, 'Thomas Hobbes's Theory of Conscience', *History of Political Thought* 33, no. 1 (2012): 55-85; Johan Tralau, 'Hobbes Contra Liberty of Conscience', *Political Theory* 39, no. 1 (2011): 55-84; Franck Lessay, 'Tolerance as a Dimension of Hobbes's Absolutism', in *Hobbes on Politics and Religion*, ed. Laurens van Apeldoorn and Robin Douglass (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 63-78; Guido Frilli, 'Hobbes's Genealogy of Private Conscience', *European Journal of Philosophy* 28, no. 3 (2020): 755-69.
51. Richard Tuck, 'Hobbes, Conscience, and Christianity', in *The Oxford Handbook of Hobbes*, ed. Al P. Martinich and Kinch Hoekstra (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 493-7; Jeffrey Collins, 'All the Wars of Christendom: Hobbes's Theory of Religious Conflict', in *Hobbes on Politics and Religion*, ed. Laurens van Apeldoorn and Robin Douglass (Oxford: Oxford University press, 2018), 229-31; Collins, *The Allegiance*, 123-30.
52. Sommerville, *Thomas Hobbes*, 150-5.
53. Hobbes, *De Cive*, 18:13.
54. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Ch. 42, 281. Tuck, 'Hobbes, Conscience', 496, 498; Sommerville, *Thomas Hobbes*, 126-7.
55. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Ch. 47, 385.
56. Hobbes, *De Cive*, 17:25.
57. Taylor, *Liberty of Prophesying*, 210-13.
58. *Ibid.*, 211. Taylor was also opposed to the use of corporeal punishment on the excommunicate. *Ibid.*, 211, 213.
59. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Ch. 42, 277. There is no argument corresponding to this in *De cive*. Hobbes, *De Cive*, 17:26.
60. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Ch. 42, 279.
61. *Ibid.*
62. Hobbes, *De Cive*, 18:14.
63. See Taylor, *Liberty of Prophesying*, 11-6, 43, 51-4, 265, for example.
64. *Ibid.*, 265. When Chillingworth derided the Catholic church as 'the greatest schismatics', he made a similar point. In the eyes of Chillingworth, the Catholic church rendered 'the way to heaven narrower, the yoke of Christ heavier, the differences of faith greater, the conditions of ecclesiastical communion harder and stricter, than they were made at the beginning by Christ and his apostles'. Chillingworth, *The Religion*, 1: 405.
65. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Ch. 42, 278.
66. Taylor, *Liberty of Prophesying*, 43.
67. *Ibid.*, 46-7.
68. *Ibid.*, 56.
69. Hobbes, *The Elements*, 2:6:6. In the corresponding part in *De cive*, Hobbes did not indicate his opinion on this issue. Hobbes, *De Cive*, 18:9-10.
70. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Ch. 42, 267-8. See Arash Abizadeh, 'Hobbes's Conventionalist Theology, the Trinity, and God as an Artificial Person by Fiction', *The Historical Journal* 60, no. 4 (2017): 929-33; Mortimer, *Reason and Religion*, 155-7, for Hobbes's treatment of the Trinity in *Leviathan*.
71. Mortimer, *Reason and Religion*, 199-203.
72. Walwyn, *Tolleration Justified*, 163.
73. Milton, *Areopagitica*, 543.
74. John Goodwin, *The Divine Authority of the Scriptures Asserted* (London, 1648), sig. a3r.
75. Chillingworth, *The Religion*, 1: 236-9.
76. *Ibid.*, 1: 239.
77. Taylor, *Liberty of Prophesying*, 165-71. For a detailed analysis of his notion of reason, see John D. Schaeffer, 'Tropical Latitude: Prophecy, Orality, and the Rhetoric of Tolerance in Jeremy Taylor's "the Liberty of Prophesying"', *Studies in Philology* 101, no. 4 (2004): 460-7.
78. Taylor, *Liberty of Prophesying*, 170.
79. *Ibid.*
80. Hobbes, *De Cive*, 17:27.
81. *Ibid.*
82. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Ch. 42, 280.
83. *Ibid.*
84. *Ibid.*



85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid. For the distinction between command and counsel, see, for example, Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Ch. 25, 131-2.
88. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Ch. 42, 280.
89. Ibid., 281.
90. Ibid.
91. See John Coffey, *Persecution and Toleration in Protestant England, 1558–1689* (Harlow: Longman, 2000), 64-6, for the importance of human fallibility in the case for toleration.
92. John Goodwin, *Hagiomastix, or the Scourge of the Saints Displayed in His Colours of Ignorance & Blood* (London, 1647), 27-35.
93. Taylor, *Liberty of Prophesying*, 83-164.
94. Ibid., 165.
95. See Richard Tuck, 'The "Christian Atheism" of Thomas Hobbes', in *Atheism from the Reformation to the Enlightenment*, ed. Michael Hunter and David Wootton, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 126-9; Collins, *The Allegiance*, 128-58; Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 1: 61-5; Teresa M. Bejan, 'Difference without Disagreement: Rethinking Hobbes on "Independency" and Toleration', *The Review of Politics* 78, no. 1 (2016): 1-25; Arash Abizadeh, 'Publicity, Privacy, and Religious Toleration in Hobbes's *Leviathan*', *Modern Intellectual History* 10, no. 02 (2013): 261-91.
96. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Ch. 47, 385.
97. Ibid. See *ibid.*, Ch. 46, 378, for similar reasoning.
98. Taylor, *Liberty of Prophesying*, 165. Henry Robinson also makes a similar point. 'Since my salvation ought to be more deare unto my selfe then to any else ... I shall easier acknowledge my destruction to be from my selfe'. Henry Robinson, *Liberty of Conscience, or, the Sole Means to Obtaine Peace and Truth* (1643), 40.
99. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Ch. 47, 384-5.
100. Taylor, *Liberty of Prophesying*, 43.
101. See, for example, J. Croope, *Conscience-Oppression: Or, a Complaint of Wrong Done to the People's Rights* (London, 1657), 3-4; Henry Stubbe, *An Essay in Defence of the Good Old Cause* (London, 1659), 60-98.
102. William Sir Clarke, *Puritanism and Liberty: Being the Army Debates (1647-9) from the Clarke Manuscripts with Supplementary Documents*, ed. A. S. P. Woodhouse (London, 1951), 409; Austin Woolrych, *Britain in Revolution, 1625–1660* (Oxford: 1992, 2002), 371-2.
103. Samuel Rawson Gardiner, *The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, 1625-1660*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906), 321. See also Ian Gentles, *The New Model Army in England, Ireland and Scotland, 1645–1653* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 183-4.
104. Woolrych, *Britain in Revolution*, 376.
105. Gardiner, *The Constitutional Documents*, 321.
106. Stranks, *Life and Writings*, 72.
107. Ibid., 72-3.
108. Taylor, *Simbolon Ethiko-Polemikon*, sig. [A4v].
109. Jeremy Taylor, *A Discourse concerning Prayer Ex Tempore, or, by Pretence of the Spirit*, (1646). See Anthony Milton, 'Coping with Alternatives', 157, 160, for a different interpretation.
110. Collins, *The Allegiance*.
111. Collins, *The Allegiance*, 102-7; Blair Worden, 'Toleration and the Protectorate', in *God's Instruments: Political Conduct in the England of Oliver Cromwell* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 63-90; Abizadeh, 'Publicity, Privacy', 289-90. Collins calls this type of Independents magisterial Independents, whereas Coffey calls them 'conservative tolerationists'. See Coffey, 'The Toleration Controversy', 48-53.
112. For this settlement, see Jeffrey Collins, 'The Church Settlement of Oliver Cromwell', *History* 87, no. 285 (2002): 18-40.
113. Collins, *The Allegiance*, 102.
114. John Coffey, 'John Owen on Toleration in the Puritan Revolution', in *The Ashgate Research Companion to John Owen's Theology*, ed. K. Kavic and M. Jones (New York: Ashgate, 2012), 232, 40; Mortimer, *Reason and Religion*, 194-5.
115. John Owen, *Proposals for the Furtherance and Propagation of the Gospel in This Nation* (London, 1652), 5-21. See also Collins, 'The Church Settlement', 24-5; Coffey, 'A Ticklish Business', 119-20.
116. See also Boleslaw Z. Kabala, 'The Return of the Intolerant Hobbes', *History of European Ideas* 45, no. 6 (2019): 785-802, for a discussion of Hobbes and the second edition of the Humble Proposals.
117. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Ch. 47, 382.
118. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Ch. 47, 385.
119. Parkin, *Taming the Leviathan*; Collins, *In the Shadow*.
120. It may also be relevant that, apart from Hobbes, few major controversialists on toleration in the English Revolution seem to have paid much attention to the issue of political order and public peace. When Restoration

writers addressed the relationship between toleration and political order, they might have found it difficult to find a more suitable precursor in the revolutionary years than Hobbes.

121. Milton, 'Coping with Alternatives', 160; Coffey, 'The Toleration Controversy', 61.

## Acknowledgements

For their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article, I would like to thank Roger Crisp, Jacob Chatterjee, Jon Parkin, Kei Hiruta, Noel Malcolm, Koji Yamamoto, Genji Yasuhira, the anonymous reviewers, and participants in the EHS workshop at the University of Amsterdam on 25th February 2019 and in Historians' Workshop at the University of Tokyo on 25th October 2019. This work was made possible by my appointment to a JSPS Overseas Research Fellowship held at the University of Oxford between 2017-2019, and was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 19K23177 and 21K13234.

## Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

## Bibliography

- Abizadeh, Arash. 'Hobbes's Conventionalist Theology, the Trinity, and God as an Artificial Person by Fiction'. *The Historical Journal* 60, no. 4 (2017): 915-41.
- Abizadeh, Arash. 'Publicity, Privacy, and Religious Toleration in Hobbes's *Leviathan*'. *Modern Intellectual History* 10, no. 02 (2013): 261-91.
- Bejan, Teresa M. 'Difference without Disagreement: Rethinking Hobbes on "Independency" and Toleration'. *The Review of Politics* 78, no. 1 (2016): 1-25.
- Bejan, Teresa M. *Mere Civility: Disagreement and the Limits of Toleration*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017.
- Chillingworth, William. *The Works of William Chillingworth*. 3 vols. Vol. 1-2, Oxford: University Press, 1838.
- Clarke, William Sir. *Puritanism and Liberty: Being the Army Debates (1647-9) from the Clarke Manuscripts with Supplementary Documents*. Edited by A. S. P. Woodhouse. 3rd ed. London: Dent, 1986.
- Coffey, John. 'John Owen on Toleration in the Puritan Revolution'. In *The Ashgate Research Companion to John Owen's Theology*, edited by K. Kapic and M. Jones, 227-48. New York: Ashgate, 2012.
- Coffey, John. *Persecution and Toleration in Protestant England, 1558-1689*. Harlow: Longman, 2000.
- Coffey, John. 'Puritanism and Liberty Revisited: The Case for Toleration in the English Revolution'. *The Historical Journal* 41, no. 4 (1998): 961-85.
- Coffey, John. 'A Ticklish Business: Defining Heresy and Orthodoxy in the Puritan Revolution'. In *Heresy, Literature and Politics in Early Modern English Culture*, edited by David Loewenstein and John Marshall, 108-36. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Coffey, John. 'The Toleration Controversy during the English Revolution'. In *Religion in Revolutionary England*, edited by Christopher Durston and Judith D. Maltby, 42-68. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006.
- Collins, Jeffrey. 'All the Wars of Christendom: Hobbes's Theory of Religious Conflict'. In *Hobbes on Politics and Religion*, edited by Laurens van Apeldoorn and Robin Douglass, 219-38. Oxford: Oxford University press, 2018.
- Collins, Jeffrey. *The Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Collins, Jeffrey. 'The Church Settlement of Oliver Cromwell'. *History* 87, no. 285 (2002): 18-40.
- Collins, Jeffrey. *In the Shadow of Leviathan: John Locke and the Politics of Conscience*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020.
- Croope, J. *Conscience-Oppression: Or, a Complaint of Wrong Done to the People's Rights*. London, 1657.
- Croope, J. *Panarmonia, or, the Agreement of the People Revived*. 1659.
- Frilli, Guido. 'Hobbes's Genealogy of Private Conscience'. *European Journal of Philosophy* 28, no. 3 (2020): 755-69.
- Gardiner, Samuel Rawson. *The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, 1625-1660*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906.
- Gentles, Ian *The New Model Army in England, Ireland and Scotland, 1645-1653*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992.
- Goodwin, John. *The Divine Authority of the Scriptures Asserted*. London, 1648.
- Goodwin, John. *Hagiomastix, or the Scourge of the Saints Displayed in His Colours of Ignorance & Blood*. London, 1647.
- Goodwin, John. M. S. To A. S. *With a Plea for Libertie of Conscience*. London, 1644.
- Hadfield, Andrew. 'Milton and Catholicism'. In *Milton and Toleration*, edited by Sharon Achinstein and Elizabeth Sauer, 186-200. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Haller, William. *Liberty and Reformation in the Puritan Revolution*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963.

- Hanin, Mark. 'Thomas Hobbes's Theory of Conscience'. *History of Political Thought* 33, no. 1 (2012): 55-85.
- Hobbes, Thomas. *De Cive: The Latin Version Entitled in the First Edition Elementorum Philosophiæ Sectio Tertia De Cive, and in Later Editions Elementa Philosophica De Cive*. Edited by Howard Warrender. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983.
- Hobbes, Thomas. *Leviathan*. Edited by Noel Malcolm. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2012.
- Hobbes, Thomas. *The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic*. Edited by Ferdinand Tönnies. London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1969.
- Hobbes, Thomas. *On the Citizen*. Edited and translated by Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Hughes, Henry Trevor. *The Piety of Jeremy Taylor*. London: Macmillan, 1960.
- Huntley, Frank Livingstone. *Jeremy Taylor and the Great Rebellion: A Study of His Mind and Temper in Controversy*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1970.
- Johnson, Paul J. 'Hobbes's Anglican Doctrine of Salvation'. In *Thomas Hobbes in His Time*, edited by Ralph Ross et al. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974.
- Jordan, W. K. *The Development of Religious Toleration in England*. Vol. 3, London: Allen and Unwin, 1938.
- Jordan, W. K. *The Development of Religious Toleration in England*. Vol. 4, London: Allen and Unwin, 1940.
- Kabala, Boleslaw Z. 'The Return of the Intolerant Hobbes'. *History of European Ideas* 45, no. 6 (2019): 785-802.
- Lessay, Franck. 'Tolerance as a Dimension of Hobbes's Absolutism'. In *Hobbes on Politics and Religion*, edited by Laurens van Apeldoorn and Robin Douglass. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
- Malcolm, Noel. 'A Summary Biography of Hobbes'. In *Aspects of Hobbes*, 1-26. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Milton, Anthony. 'Coping with Alternatives: Religious Liberty in Royalist Thought 1642-7'. In *Insular Christianity. Alternative Models of the Church in Britain and Ireland, C.1570-C.1700*, edited by Robert Armstrong and Tadhg Ó hAnnracháin, 149-69. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013.
- Milton, John. *Complete Prose Works of John Milton*. Edited by Ernest Sirluck. Vol. 2, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959.
- Mortimer, Sarah. *Reason and Religion in the English Revolution: The Challenge of Socinianism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Orr, Robert. *Reason and Authority: The Thought of William Chillingworth*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967.
- Owen, John. *Proposals for the Furtherance and Propagation of the Gospel in This Nation*. London, 1652.
- Parkin, Jon. 'Hobbes and the Future of Religion'. In *Hobbes on Politics and Religion*, edited by Laurens van Apeldoorn and Robin Douglass. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
- Parkin, Jon. *Science, Religion, and Politics in Restoration England: Richard Cumberland's De Legibus Naturae*. Woodbridge: Royal Historical Society, 1999.
- Parkin, Jon. *Taming the Leviathan: The Reception of the Political and Religious Ideas of Thomas Hobbes in England, 1640-1700*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Polizzotto, Carolyn. 'Liberty of Conscience and the Whitehall Debates 1648-9'. *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 26 (1975): 69-82.
- Robinson, Henry. *Liberty of Conscience, or, the Sole Means to Obtaine Peace and Truth*. 1643.
- Schaeffer, John D. 'Tropical Latitude: Prophecy, Orality, and the Rhetoric of Tolerance in Jeremy Taylor's "the Liberty of Prophesying"'. *Studies in Philology* 101, no. 4 (2004): 454-70.
- Sommerville, Johann. 'Hobbes and Toleration.' In *A Companion to Hobbes*, edited by Marcus P. Adams, 318-31. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2021.
- Sommerville, Johann. 'Leviathan and Its Anglican Context'. In *The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes's Leviathan*, edited by Patricia Springborg, 358-74. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Sommerville, Johann. *Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context*. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992.
- Stranks, Charles James. *The Life and Writings of Jeremy Taylor*. London: S.P.C.K, 1952.
- Stubbe, Henry. *An Essay in Defence of the Good Old Cause*. London, 1659.
- Taylor, Jeremy. *Simbolon Ethiko-Polemikon, or, a Collection of Polemical and Moral Discourses*. London, 1657.
- Taylor, Jeremy. *Theologia Eklektike. A Discourse of the Liberty of Prophesying*. London, 1647.
- Taylor, Jeremy. *A Discourse concerning Prayer Ex Tempore, or, by Pretence of the Spirit*. 1646.
- Tralau, Johan. 'Hobbes Contra Liberty of Conscience'. *Political Theory* 39, no. 1 (2011): 58-84.
- Trevor-Roper, Hugh. 'The Great Tew Circle'. In *Catholics, Anglicans and Puritans: Seventeenth Century Essays*, 166-230. London: Secker and Warburg, 1987.
- Tuck, Richard. 'The "Christian Atheism" of Thomas Hobbes', in *Atheism from the Reformation to the Enlightenment*, edited by Michael Hunter and David Wootton, 111-30. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
- Tuck, Richard. 'Hobbes, Conscience, and Christianity'. In *The Oxford Handbook of Hobbes*, edited by Al P. Martinich and Kinch Hoekstra, 481-500. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.
- Verkamp, Bernard J. *The Indifferent Mean: Adiaphorism in the English Reformation to 1554*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1977.

- Walwyn, William. *The Writings of William Walwyn*. Edited by Jack R. McMichael and Barbara Taft. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989.
- Woolrych, Austin. *Britain in Revolution, 1625-1660*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Worden, Blair. 'Toleration and the Protectorate'. In *God's Instruments: Political Conduct in the England of Oliver Cromwell*, 63-90. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.