2010年3月
Sunk costs of capital and the form of enterprise: Investor-owned firms and worker-owned firms
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics
- ,
- 巻
- 81
- 号
- 1
- 開始ページ
- 77
- 終了ページ
- 104
- 記述言語
- 英語
- 掲載種別
- 研究論文(学術雑誌)
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1467-8292.2009.00406.x
This paper examines implications of sunk costs of capital for efficient forms of enterprise. It is assumed that firm owners and outside traders are asymmetrically informed of venture risks, and that there are sunk costs associated with investment in physical and human capital. We then make an efficiency comparison between investor-owned and worker-owned firms. We find that the firm is efficient when it is owned by the input supplier (the investor or worker) who incurs large sunk costs. This is because such an input supplier can credibly signal to the other input supplier that he in fact has a safe project. An empirical study based on the Japanese manufacturing industry seems to support the theoretical result. Journal compilation. © CIRIEC 2010.
- ID情報
-
- DOI : 10.1111/j.1467-8292.2009.00406.x
- ISSN : 1370-4788
- ISSN : 1467-8292
- SCOPUS ID : 77950813163