論文

査読有り
2016年7月

Legislative Term Limits and Government Spending: Theory and Evidence from the United States

B E JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS & POLICY
  • Yasushi Asako
  • ,
  • Tetsuya Matsubayashi
  • ,
  • Michiko Ueda

16
3
開始ページ
1501
終了ページ
1538
記述言語
英語
掲載種別
研究論文(学術雑誌)
DOI
10.1515/bejeap-2015-0216
出版者・発行元
WALTER DE GRUYTER GMBH

What are the fiscal consequences of legislative term limits? To answer this question, we first develop a legislative bargaining model that describes negotiations over the allocation of distributive projects among legislators with different levels of seniority. Building on several predictions from the model, we develop two hypotheses for empirical testing. First, the adoption of term limits that results in a larger reduction in the variance of seniority within a legislature increases the amount of government spending. Second, legislatures that adopt stricter term limits increase the amount of government spending, while legislatures that adopt moderate term limits show no change in the amount. We provide evidence for these hypotheses using panel data for 49 US state legislatures between 1980 and 2010.


リンク情報
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2015-0216
Web of Science
https://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=JSTA_CEL&SrcApp=J_Gate_JST&DestLinkType=FullRecord&KeyUT=WOS:000387124500010&DestApp=WOS_CPL
URL
https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejeap.2016.16.issue-3/bejeap-2015-0216/bejeap-2015-0216.xml

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