2015年7月
One-Sided Games in a War of Attrition
B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
- 巻
- 15
- 号
- 2
- 開始ページ
- 313
- 終了ページ
- 331
- 記述言語
- 英語
- 掲載種別
- 研究論文(学術雑誌)
- DOI
- 10.1515/bejte-2014-0078
- 出版者・発行元
- WALTER DE GRUYTER GMBH
This study develops a war-of-attrition model with the asymmetric feature that one player can be defeated by the other but not vice versa; that is, only one player has an exogenous probability of being forced to capitulate. With complete information, the equilibria are almost identical to the canonical war-of-attrition model. On the other hand, with incomplete information on a player's robustness, a war where both players fight for some duration emerges. Moreover, a player who is never defeated may capitulate in equilibrium, and this player will give in earlier if the other player's fighting costs are greater.
- リンク情報
-
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2014-0078
- Web of Science
- https://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=JSTA_CEL&SrcApp=J_Gate_JST&DestLinkType=FullRecord&KeyUT=WOS:000355634400007&DestApp=WOS_CPL
- URL
- http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejte.2015.15.issue-2/bejte-2014-0078/bejte-2014-0078.xml
- ID情報
-
- DOI : 10.1515/bejte-2014-0078
- ISSN : 1935-1704
- Web of Science ID : WOS:000355634400007