論文

査読有り
2020年1月

(A)symmetric information bubbles: Experimental evidence

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
  • Yasushi Asako
  • ,
  • Yukihiko Funaki
  • ,
  • Kozo Ueda
  • ,
  • Nobuyuki Uto

110
開始ページ
103744
終了ページ
103744
記述言語
掲載種別
研究論文(学術雑誌)
DOI
10.1016/j.jedc.2019.103744
出版者・発行元
Elsevier BV

Asymmetric information has explained the existence of a bubble in extant theoretical models. This study experimentally analyzes traders’ choices with and without asymmetric information based on the riding-bubble model. We show that traders tend to hold a bubble asset for longer, thereby expanding the bubble in a market with symmetric, rather than asymmetric, information. However, when traders are more experienced, the size of the bubble decreases, in which case bubbles do not arise with symmetric information. By contrast, the size of the bubble is stable in a market with asymmetric information.

リンク情報
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2019.103744

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