論文

査読有り
2009年9月

Imitative Learning in Tullock Contests: Does Overdissipation Prevail in the Long Run?

JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT
  • Hiroyuki Sano

165
3
開始ページ
365
終了ページ
383
記述言語
英語
掲載種別
研究論文(学術雑誌)
DOI
10.1628/093245609789472014
出版者・発行元
J C B MOHR

This paper investigates a long-run equilibrium of the Tullock contest using an evolutionary game-theoretic approach. The finite-population evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) yields overdissipation of rent when there are increasing returns to expenditure. However, imitative behavior, considered to be a source of the evolutionary dynamics behind the ESS, is implausible because individual rationality is not always satisfied. In this paper, we attempt to specify such implicit imitative behavior and construct explicit evolutionary dynamics. Under our plausible imitation rule, we show that full dissipation may prevail in the long run as long as there are increasing returns. (JEL: D 72, C 73)

Web of Science ® 被引用回数 : 1

リンク情報
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1628/093245609789472014
Web of Science
https://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=JSTA_CEL&SrcApp=J_Gate_JST&DestLinkType=FullRecord&KeyUT=WOS:000270760500001&DestApp=WOS_CPL

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