論文

査読有り
2003年6月

Exit from rent-seeking contests

JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW
  • JI Itaya
  • ,
  • H Sano

54
2
開始ページ
218
終了ページ
228
記述言語
英語
掲載種別
研究論文(学術雑誌)
出版者・発行元
BLACKWELL PUBL LTD

The object of this paper is to investigate the long-run behaviour of rent-seekers in a situation where they incur negative expected payoffs due to increasing returns to rent-seeking expenditures. To this end, we embed the one-shot rent-seeking game presented by Tullock (1980) in the war-of-attrition framework. In this multi-period setting, each player not only determines his or her rent-seeking expenditure but also chooses a mixed strategy on whether to stay in or exit from rent-seeking competition in each period. JEL Classification Numbers: D72, C72, L12.

Web of Science ® 被引用回数 : 2

リンク情報
Web of Science
https://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=JSTA_CEL&SrcApp=J_Gate_JST&DestLinkType=FullRecord&KeyUT=WOS:000183521000006&DestApp=WOS_CPL

エクスポート
BibTeX RIS