2012年2月
Collective Action for Local Commons Management in Rural Yunnan, China: Empirical Evidence and Hypotheses Using Evolutionary Game Theory
LAND ECONOMICS
- 巻
- 88
- 号
- 1
- 開始ページ
- 181
- 終了ページ
- 200
- 記述言語
- 英語
- 掲載種別
- 研究論文(学術雑誌)
- 出版者・発行元
- UNIV WISCONSIN
This paper presents hypotheses regarding collective actions for irrigation management, with the help of evolutionary game theory Data for the analysis were collected by the author from the irrigation system of rural Yunnan, China. An econometric analysis reveals that collective action will be forthcoming in rural communities where few nonfarm job opportunities are provided, the degree of income disparity is quite small, and resource restrictions are moderately problematic. The finding that communities without local government intervention outperform those with intervention supports the proverbial view that external agencies should delegate significant parts of the control rights of common pool resources to immediate stakeholders.
- リンク情報
- ID情報
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- ISSN : 0023-7639
- Web of Science ID : WOS:000299459900011