論文

査読有り
2016年10月

Optimal Emission Tax with Endogenous Location Choice of Duopolistic Firms

ENVIRONMENTAL & RESOURCE ECONOMICS
  • Masako Ikefuji
  • ,
  • Jun-ichi Itaya
  • ,
  • Makoto Okamura

65
2
開始ページ
463
終了ページ
485
記述言語
英語
掲載種別
研究論文(学術雑誌)
DOI
10.1007/s10640-015-9914-0
出版者・発行元
SPRINGER

This study explores an optimal (pre-committed or ex-ante) environmental tax policy in a three-stage game in which polluting firms strategically choose the location of their plants after the government has chosen the optimal emission tax rate. We show not only that the optimal emission tax is non-decreasing with the declining cost of relocation (e.g., setup or fixed costs), or else, the progress of globalization but also that the firms may move back their relocated plants to the home country, causing the resulting welfare to decline. As a consequence, the domestic welfare varies in a non-monotonic way. We also show that such a counterintuitive non-monotonic relationship does not arise under time-consistent (ex-post) emission taxes.

Web of Science ® 被引用回数 : 11

リンク情報
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-015-9914-0
Web of Science
https://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=JSTA_CEL&SrcApp=J_Gate_JST&DestLinkType=FullRecord&KeyUT=WOS:000384471900007&DestApp=WOS_CPL
ID情報
  • DOI : 10.1007/s10640-015-9914-0
  • ISSN : 0924-6460
  • eISSN : 1573-1502
  • Web of Science ID : WOS:000384471900007

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