論文

査読有り
2016年4月

Strategy-proof rules for an excludable public good

SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE
  • Kazuhiko Hashimoto
  • ,
  • Hiroki Saitoh

46
4
開始ページ
749
終了ページ
766
記述言語
英語
掲載種別
研究論文(学術雑誌)
DOI
10.1007/s00355-015-0933-0
出版者・発行元
SPRINGER

We consider a mechanism design problem for the provision of a binary excludable public good. We characterize the augmented serial rules (Ohseto, Econ Theory 26:589-606 2005) by strategy-proofness, envy-freeness, and access independence. This result is the positive answer to the first open question posed by Ohseto (Econ Theory 26:589-606, 2005). We also show that, in addition to the augmented serial rules, there exists a rule satisfying strategy-proofness, symmetry, access independence, and non-bossiness. This result is the negative answer to the second open question posed by Ohseto (Econ Theory 26:589-606, 2005).

Web of Science ® 被引用回数 : 1

リンク情報
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0933-0
Web of Science
https://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=JSTA_CEL&SrcApp=J_Gate_JST&DestLinkType=FullRecord&KeyUT=WOS:000373998300002&DestApp=WOS_CPL
ID情報
  • DOI : 10.1007/s00355-015-0933-0
  • ISSN : 0176-1714
  • eISSN : 1432-217X
  • Web of Science ID : WOS:000373998300002

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