論文

査読有り
2015年1月

Strategy-proof cost sharing under increasing returns: Improvement of the supremal welfare loss

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
  • Kazuhiko Hashimoto
  • ,
  • Hiroki Saitoh

89
89
開始ページ
101
終了ページ
121
記述言語
英語
掲載種別
研究論文(学術雑誌)
DOI
10.1016/j.geb.2014.12.004
出版者・発行元
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE

We consider a mechanism design problem in economies with increasing returns. We construct a new class of rules, called w-hybrid rules, and characterize them by strategy-proofness, anonymity, envy-freeness, consumer sovereignty, and non-bossiness. We show that w-hybrid rules improve the supremal welfare loss compared with the average cost pricing rule (Moulin, 1999 and Moulin and Shenker, 2001). (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Web of Science ® 被引用回数 : 4

リンク情報
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.12.004
Web of Science
https://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=JSTA_CEL&SrcApp=J_Gate_JST&DestLinkType=FullRecord&KeyUT=WOS:000350924300008&DestApp=WOS_CPL
ID情報
  • DOI : 10.1016/j.geb.2014.12.004
  • ISSN : 0899-8256
  • eISSN : 1090-2473
  • Web of Science ID : WOS:000350924300008

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