Jan, 2015
Strategy-proof cost sharing under increasing returns: Improvement of the supremal welfare loss
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
- ,
- Volume
- 89
- Number
- 89
- First page
- 101
- Last page
- 121
- Language
- English
- Publishing type
- Research paper (scientific journal)
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.geb.2014.12.004
- Publisher
- ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
We consider a mechanism design problem in economies with increasing returns. We construct a new class of rules, called w-hybrid rules, and characterize them by strategy-proofness, anonymity, envy-freeness, consumer sovereignty, and non-bossiness. We show that w-hybrid rules improve the supremal welfare loss compared with the average cost pricing rule (Moulin, 1999 and Moulin and Shenker, 2001). (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
- Link information
- ID information
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- DOI : 10.1016/j.geb.2014.12.004
- ISSN : 0899-8256
- eISSN : 1090-2473
- Web of Science ID : WOS:000350924300008