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Aspects of the Semantics of Logophoricity: Comparison of Malayalam with Yoruba and Japanese

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1 Introduction

Logophoric pronouns are pronouns that characteristically refer to the person whose speech or thought is reported. Since Hagège (1974) and Clements (1975) first examined them in West African languages three decades ago, there have been increasing interests in expressions coding logophoricity, and their grammatical properties (e.g., the grammatical environments logophoric pronouns and other markers occur) have been examined extensively in the literature (see Culy 1994, Huang 2000). This paper focuses on their semantics (Kuno 1976, Sells 1987, Safir 2004a, b, Oshima to appear a, b). I first establish two major semantic properties of logophoric pronouns on the basis of data from Japanese and Yoruba. I will then show that Malayalam reflexive *taan* has those properties, but in slightly different ways. I will argue that the differences can be captured by parameterizing two constraint proposed.1

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1 This paper goes back to the term paper that I wrote in 1987 for K. P. Mohanan’s Structure of Malayalam class at Stanford University, which I took with my classmate Tara Mohanan. This paper would have never existed without the Mohanan family; it grew as I kept asking Mo and Tara questions at their home, while Amu was playing (and waiting) around us. I would also like to thank Desola Amos and Femi Opadji for Yoruba data. An earlier, unpublished version of this paper has often been cited as Matsumoto (1990), whose contents are summarized in Kay (1992). In the present version I have included discussions of related works published after 1990, but my basic claims remain the same.

In one class Mohanan once proclaimed that the initial footnote of a paper should say “all of the remaining errors found in this paper should be attributed to my teachers, because they educated me.” So, Mo, should I say that here?
2. Semantic properties of logophoric pronouns

In many West African languages such as Ewe and Abe certain pronouns are used in the complement clause of the verbs of speech and mental activities to refer to the “logophoric individual” whose speech or thought is represented. An example from Yoruba is given in (1) (see Bamgbose 1966, Adesola 2005).

(1) ọ̀ ń fí ọ̀ ń ụn fè è ọ̀
He say he/self like go
‘He said that he wanted to go.’

In this language the pronoun ọun is used in the complement of the verb of speech or thought to refer to the person whose speech or belief is represented. The pronoun ọ (for third person singular), often called a weak pronoun or a clitic pronoun (Pulleyblank 1986), is interpreted in a complementary fashion in this context.

It has also been suggested that long-distance reflexives in languages such as Japanese, Chinese and Icelandic also have logophoric properties. Take Japanese reflexive pronoun zibun, whose discourse properties have been discussed much in the literature (Kuno 1972, 1978, 1986a, Kameyama 1984, Iida 1996, etc.). Unlike Yoruba ọun, Japanese zibun can have as an antecedent not just the subject of the verb of speech or thought, but any subject (or some other argument in some cases), as in (2).

(2) Zyon wa Taro ga zibun o hihan shitato itta.
John Top Taro Nom self Acc criticize did Comp said.
‘John said that Taro criticized him/himself.’

It has been argued that zibun entails that the antecedent’s “point of view” is taken in the discourse, at least in its long-distance use (e.g., Kuno 1978). This has been related to logophoricity (e.g., Kuno 1978, Sells 1987), though some have doubted real connection (Culy 1997).

In this paper, I argue that logophoric pronouns (including “point-of-view reflexives”) tend to have the following two properties—properties that they share with the first person pronouns: they represent 1) the primary deictic center, and 2) the source of identification. I will show that differences among languages can be captured by parameterizing constraints coming from these properties.

2.1 Logophoric Individual as the Primary Deictic Center

Events that are linguistically described can have a deictic center or the
location from which events are observed, which I call PIVOT, after Sells (1987). One obvious PIVOT is the location of the speaker at the time of utterance, described by the adverb here, which I call the primary PIVOT (P-PIVOT). PIVOT can be placed on someone other than the first-person speaker, in which case I will use the term the secondary PIVOT (S-PIVOT).

The uses of deictic expressions crucially involves PIVOT, though the way they make reference to it differs from expression to expression. For example, in its basic use the verb come requires that the speaker or the hearer be at the goal of motion at the time of utterance or at the time of motion event; go requires the speaker not be present at the goal of motion at the time of utterance but not at the time of the motion event (Fillmore 1997). Due to these restrictions the goal of go cannot be where P-PIVOT is, but that of come can, as shown in (3).

(3) John {came/#went} here.

The situation is more complicated when come and go appear in the complement clause of a verb of speech (Ohye 1980), as in (4).

(4) John says that Susan once {came/went} to him.

In the event described by the complement clause, the person described as reporting the event, in this case, John, functions as S-PIVOT. The verb come allows the goal to be where this S-PIVOT is, as shown in (4). The verb go, in contrast, cannot be used in reference to S-PIVOT. If it were, P-PIVOT could be at the goal of go, as long as S-PIVOT is not located there. However, go cannot be used in such a case, as shown in (5).

(5) John said that his daughter once {came/#went} here from where he was at that time.

Other PIVOT-sensitive expressions include demonstratives like this and that. English demonstratives are always used in reference to the location of the first-person speaker at the time of utterance (P-PIVOT). Consider the phrases on this side of and on that side of.

(6) There is a cat on {this/that} side of John.

These expressions crucially involve three participants: an object whose location is indicated (e.g. a cat above), called FIGURE; an object or place in reference to which the location of FIGURE is described (e.g. John above), called GROUND; and finally, the syntactically unexpressed first-person speaker, from whose point of observation the choice of this and that is determined. This first-person speaker must be distinct from the GROUND, since the GROUND provides the dividing line between the this side and the that side, which must lie at some distance from the speaker. For this reason
the speaker cannot be the GROUND, as shown in (7a). In addition, it is logically impossible that the speaker is on the far side of the GROUND, seen from the speaker. Therefore it cannot be the FIGURE of on that side of, as shown in (7b).

(7) a. #There is a cat on that side of me.
   b. #I am now on that side of the river. (with the deictic reading of that)

This means that the GROUND of on this/that side of is P-PIVOT-incompatible, and so is the FIGURE of on that side of.

Demonstratives like this and that are not interpreted in reference to S-PIVOT (except in free indirect speech). In the following sentence, the point of observation can only be P-PIVOT; it cannot be interpreted with respect to the S-PIVOT, John.

(8) John didn’t know that there was a cat on that side of Bill.

It has been argued that some logophoric pronouns, like Japanese zibun, function as deictic center (Kuno 1976, 1986a, Sells 1987, Iida 1996). I argue that logophoric pronouns in general tend to be sensitive to the constraint in (9).

(9) P-PIVOT constraint: Logophoric pronouns is treated as P-PIVOT, and therefore they must be compatible with P-PIVOT requirement of other expressions.

I will illustrate this constraint by Japanese zibun. (The following is what I take to be a more accurate account of Japanese data than is usually given in the literature. Some of the data given have been known since Kuno 1972.)

First, consider the iku ‘go’/kuru ‘come’ contrast with respect to zibun. In the complement clause in (10), Taro is only an S-PIVOT, and therefore he can be at the goal of kuru but also of iku.

(10) Taro wa boku no ko ga kare no tokoro ni {itta/kita} to iu.
   Taro Top I Gen child Nom he Gen place Go went/came Comp say
   ‘Taro says that my child {went/came} to him,’

However, if zibun is used, Taro is treated as P-PIVOT. Therefore he can be at the goal of kuru only, as in (11); the goal of iku is P-PIVOT-incompatible, and therefore this verb is ruled out if the referent of zibun is at the goal.

(11) Taro wa boku no kodomo ga zibun no tokoro ni {*itta/kita} to itta.
   Taro Top I Gen childNom self Gen place Go went/came said
   ‘Taro said that my child {went/came} to him,’

Other evidence comes from the use of kotira/atira gawa ‘this/that side’. Note the contrast in (12).
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(12) a. *Zyon_i wa [kawa no atira gawa ni zibun_i ga iru] to itte iru.
   John Top river Gen that side Loc self Nom exist Comp say Asp
   ‘John_i says that he_i is on the other side of the river.’

   b. Zyon_i wa [{*zibun/kare_i} no atira gawa ni
      John Top {self/he} Gen that side Loc
      neko ga iru] no o sir-anai.
      cat Nom exist Nmlz Acc know-Neg
      ‘John_i does not know that there is a cat on that side of him_i.’

   Zibun is excluded in (12) because the referents of zibun are at the P-PIVOT-
   incompatible locations.

   Such P-PIVOT-sensitivity is not limited to the complement of the verbs of
   speech or thought. Zibun has to respect the P-PIVOT constraint even when it
   has an intra-clause antecedent, as shown in (13).

(13) Zyon_i wa sibaraku ima no {kare/*zibun_i} no atira-gawa ni ita.
   John Top for.a.while now Gen he/self Gen that-side Loc was
   ‘For a while, John was on that side of him (=his position) now.’

   Relevance of P-PIVOT to logophoric pronouns in West African languages
   has not been well-explored (Huang 2000). Culy (1997) even claims that
   logophoric pronouns in these language do not represent “point of view”
   unlike Japanese. In fact, Yoruba ôun is also sensitive to the P-PIVOT
   constraint. (14) shows that the referent of ôun cannot be at the goal of the
   verb lo ‘go’; the nonlogophoric ô creates no problem. (See below for the
   circumstances under which ô is used in complement clauses.)

(14) Jónù ko rántí pé Olú lọ sí ihí tí {ô/#ôun} wà
   John Neg remember Comp Olu go at city Rel he/self exist
   ‘John does not remember that Olu went to the city where he was.’

2.2 Logophoric individual as the Source of Identification

Second, consider the notion of the source of identification. The first person
speaker is usually the source of expressions used to describe an entity.
Consider the sentences in (15).

(15) a. Judah kneeled to a minister of Egypt.

   b. Judah kneeled to his brother Joseph.

   In a situation a speaker can say (15a), s/he can choose to use (15b) if s/he
   believes or knows that the minister of Egypt that Judah kneeled to was his
   own (younger) brother Joseph. Note that such a description is possible
   irrespective of the belief/knowledge on the part of the referent of the
pronoun *his* (Judah). (15b) can be used even when Judah did not know the identity of the minister, as in the Joseph Story in the Old Testament.

The first person pronoun is different in this respect. The first-person pronoun refers to the speaker himself/herself, whose description/identification is reflected in the wordings of the utterance. Therefore whenever this pronoun is used, it refers to the person that its referent identifies as himself/herself. If the referent of the first person pronoun did not know/believe that the minister is his/her own brother, s/he would not (or could not) say (16b).

(16) a. I kneeled to a minister of Egypt.
   b. I kneeled to my brother Joseph.

Things are a little more complicated, however, since what one says can be different from what one believes or knows. Suppose someone, say Abraham, has a wife named Sarah, but for some reason he wants to hide the fact she is his wife, and tells a lie, as in (17).

(17) Abraham: “Sarah is my sister.”

Here *my sister* does not reflect his belief. He has *presented* or described Sarah as his sister to the hearer (he wants the hearer to believe so). This means that *my* in (17), or the first person pronoun in general, can be more accurately regarded as referring to the person who its referent (speaker) presents as identical with himself/herself.

Logophoric pronoun, I claim, can be similar to the first-person pronoun in this respect: logophoric pronouns tend to be sensitive to the constraint in (18).

(18) Self-identification Constraint: A logophoric pronoun must represent a person whom its referent a) believes to be himself/herself, or b) verbally presents as identical with himself/herself.

Note the use of disjunction in this constraint. I will show that logophoric pronouns can differ in the contexts in which belief or presentation counts.²

A claim similar to this one has been independently made by Safir (2004a, b). Based on Adesola’s (2005) observation concerning Yoruba *ðun* in a complement of a verb of thought, Safir claims that logophoric pronouns are interpreted under the *de se* reading, or “self-conscious self-reference on the part of a reported speaker.” The present claim differs from his in that possible discrepancy between what one believes and what one says is recognized.

Yoruba pronoun *ðun* is sensitive to a version of Self-identification

² The disjunction here is reminiscent of Sells’ (1987) distinction between SOURCE (speech source) and SELF (“mind” reported) as elements of logophoricity.
Constraint. First, consider (19).

(19) Júdàl {sɔ/rɔ} (wí)pé ðunl pàdë àbúrò {(#)òunl/rèl}.
   Judah say/think that self meet sibling self/his
   ‘Judah says/thinks that he met his brother.’

In (19), ðun is acceptable only if Judah in fact believes/knows that he met his brother when a verb of thought is used, and only if Judah in fact says so when a verb of speech is used. Under the Joseph/Judah scenario in which he did not know it and did not say so, ðun is not acceptable (the judgement given in parentheses in (19) indicates the acceptability in the intended scenario). The nonlogophoric rè (the genitive form of ó) creates no problem.

An important feature of Yoruba ðun is that when it occurs in the complement of a verb of speech, it is what is presented, and not what is believed, that counts. This can be shown in the sentences like (20).

(20) Abraham said that his wife Sarah was his sister.

I consider two major readings of this sentence. In one case, Abraham said that he had married his own sister. In the other case, he lied (the Abraham/Sarah scenario above). Most importantly, in the lying scenario, his wife matches his belief, but not what he said (i.e., what he presented as his belief); his sister does not match his belief but matches what he presented as his belief.\(^5\)

Yoruba expresses this situation in the following way.

(21) Ábúràámól sò (wí)pé ábúró {ðunl/#rèl} ni iyàwó {(#)òunl/(r)rèl}.
   Abraham say Comp sibling self/his Cop wife self/his
   ‘Abraham, says that his, wife is his, sister.’

In (21), in the Abraham/Sarah scenario ‘his’ in ‘his wife’ cannot be ðun but ‘his’ in ‘his sister’ must, suggesting that ðun represents what the speaker presents and not what s/he in fact believes. (If Abraham said “my wife is my sister,” then both must be ðun.)

Irrelevance of John’s belief in the speech complement can also be shown in the situation like the following (McCawley 1970).

(22) a. John: “I didn’t kiss Mary.”
   b. John says that he didn’t kiss the girl that he kissed.

In reporting the utterance like (22a), the first-person speaker can say (22b) if s/he believes that Mary is in fact the person John kissed. Now, there are two

\(^5\) Another reading is that he had a recognition problem (he mistook his wife to be his sister). I will ignore this reading to avoid unnecessary complication.
major situations in which (22b) might be used. In one case John has a memory problem: he somehow believes that he didn’t kiss Mary, and he said so. In this case, the phrase the girl that he kissed neither reflects John’s belief about the girl nor does it match his verbal presentation of her. In the other case he is telling a lie: he in fact believes (or knows) he kissed Mary but he says to the contrary. In this case, the phrase does match his belief, but not his verbal presentation.

The Yoruba version of (22b) is given in (23).

(23) Jónù, so (wí)pé ṣẹ̀n, ṣẹ̀-pádè ọmọbírin tí Ọ̀un/Ọ̀un ọmọbírin tí Ọ̀un/Ọ̀un

John say that self Neg-meet girl that self/he meet

‘John says that he didn’t meet the girl that he, met.’

Here, ṣ is good but Ọ̀un is not. Most importantly, Ọ̀un is unacceptable both in the memory problem scenario and the lying scenario, suggesting that Ọ̀un must match the described speaker’s verbal presentation. (One informant said that (23) might be interpreted as John saying that he does not feel like he in fact met the girl, a reading compatible with the constraint above.)

So, in Yoruba, Ọ̀un must refer to the person whom its referent (as a speaker) presents as identical with himself/herself when used in the complement of a verb of speech, and to the person whom its referent believes to be identical with himself/herself when used in the complement of a verb of thought (as in (19)).

Not all logophoric pronouns are sensitive to this constraint. Consider Japanese zibun in (24).

(24) a. Yuda, wa zibun no ootooto ni hizamaduita.

Judah Top self Gen younger.brother Dat kneeled

‘Judah kneeled to his younger brother.’

b. Zyon wa [PRO, [zibun ga kisu sita] hito ni

John Top self Nom kiss did person Dat
kisu shinakatta to (itte/omotte) iro
kiss didn’t do Comp say/think Asp

‘John, says/thinks that he, didn’t kiss the girl that he, kissed.’

Unlike Ọ̀un, Japanese zibun is fully acceptable in (24a) under the Joseph/Judah scenario. It is also fully acceptable in (24b), both in the memory problem scenario and the lying scenario with with itte ‘say’. These observations clearly run counter to Oshima’s (to appear b) claim that Japanese zibun is interpreted in the de se reading.4

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4Oshima’s claim is based on the following sentence.

(i) Zyon wa [zibun ga boku o tasuke-ta] to omotte i-ru.

John Top self Nom I Acc help-Pst Comp think Asp-NPst
3. Malayalam *taan*

In this section I show that a Malayalam reflexive *taan* has properties similar to Japanese *zibun* and Yoruba *òun*.

3.1. A Previous Analysis: Syntactic Conditions

Malayalam has two reflexives *taan* and *swa*- (Mohanan 1982a). *taan* is a Dravidian reflexive that is shared by other Dravidian languages, while *swa*- is Sanskrit in origin. In this paper I will focus on *taan*, and refer to *swa*- only in passing for comparison, since the former is the one that has logophoric properties. Some dialectal differences are known as to the use of *taan* as a reflexive (Asher & Kumani 1997). In this paper I will examine this reflexive as used by the two major speakers I consulted—K. P. Mohanan and Tara Mohanan.

The syntactic conditions of *taan* have been discussed by Mohanan (1982a,b), Asher & Kumani (1997), and Jayaseelan (1999a, b). In Mohanan’s analysis of his own dialect, *taan* must satisfy the following conditions.

(25) a. C-commanding Subjecthood Condition: *taan* must be bound by a c-commanding subject.

b. Disjoint Reference Condition (Anti-Locality Condition): *taan* must be free in the minimal NP or S that contains it.

These are supported by the following sentences. (26a) shows that *taan* (as an argument of a verb) must be free in the S that contains it, while (26b) shows that it can have an antecedent within the minimal clause if it is an NP contained in an NP. Note that the antecedent does not have to be the subject of the verbs of speech or thought, like Japanese but unlike Yoruba, as long

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*John thinks that he helped me.*

He claims that this sentence is not acceptable when amnestic John happened to read in his biography that someone called John helped the speaker without knowing that he is in fact himself. If this is the case it appears to be due to the nature of the complement of the verb of believing, which appears to favor *de se* interpretation. The following sentence, in which *yonda* ‘read’ is used instead, can be naturally interpreted in the non *de se* reading.

(ii) Zyon wa [zibun ga kanozyo o tasuketa] koto o yonda.

John Top self Nom she Acc helped Comp Acc read

‘John read that he helped her.’

The present analysis is at odds with Oshima’s claim that *kare* ‘he’, if used in place of *zibun* in (i), does not have *de se* reading, since. My judgement, however, is that *kare* in this position cannot be have the upper subject as an antecedent in any reading, the judgement shared by Kuno (1986).
as the conditions above are satisfied, as shown in (26c).

(26) a. jooṇi [mekki, janne₃, j ṭulli] eṇṇa parāṇnu.
    John Mary self.Acc pinched Comp said
    ‘John said that Mary pinched him/*herself.’

    b. jooṇi meeriye, jante₄, j wiṭṭi wecc̆u umma weccu.
    John Mary.Acc self.Gen house.Loc at kiss placed
    ‘John kissed Mary at his/*her house.’

    c. ṛaajaaw ᵐeethanne₃, j ṭanne₄, j ṭan naa ṭi ṭaadhik’k’unna [aa]ḷḷi eṉṉɘ paraɲɲu.
    king.Nom self.Acc worship-Rel person.Acc saw
    ‘King saw a person who worships self, *j.’

There are certain counterexamples to the subjecthood condition, however (see Mohanan 1982, Jayaseelan 1999). (27) are examples, in which ṭaan can have a non-subject antecedent that represent the source of the thought represented in the clause that contains it, though acceptability according to speakers.

(27) a. %Moohanante abhiprayatṭīl tanne kuiṭṭi dhiṟan-aanə
    Mohanan.Gen opinion.Loc self.Gen child brave.one-Cop
    ‘In Mohanan’s opinion, his child is brave.’

    b. %[tannte kuiṭṭi k’ə praiso kitṭyamə joone saṇṭoosippiccu]
    ‘That his child won the prize made John happy.’

These examples suggest that Malayalam ṭaan is logophoric. In fact Jayaseelan (1999b) claims that ṭaan can sometimes have an antecedent outside the sentence that contains it, and claims that such uses are logophoric in nature. In this paper, I claim that even sentence-bound, “normal” uses of this reflexive has the semantic properties of logophoric pronouns seen above.

3.2 Logophoric properties of ṭaan

3.2.1 Deixis

Malayalam ṭaan has the P-PIVOT constraint as a necessary condition. Malayalam has several P-PIVOT-sensitive expressions. The P-PIVOT constraint above predicts that unacceptability occurs when ṭaan conflicts with the P-PIVOT compatibility requirement of other expressions.

An example can be seen in the verbs waṟuka ‘come’ and pookuka ⁵

⁵ In Yoruba and some other West-African languages the source argument of the verb ‘hear’ can be an antecedent of a logophoric pronoun (see Culy 1994). This is not (easily) possible in Malayalam.

(28) jooŋiwiẹ {waŋu/*pooyi}
     John here came/went
     ‘John came/*went here.’

As can be seen from (28), the Goal argument of waŋu can be P-PIVOT, while that of pooyu cannot. Consider now (29).

(29) [tanɛ, kaŋan {waŋu/*pooyu}] kʊtɪkɑleyum jooŋ, karayippiccu.
     self see-ing come-Rel/go-Rel children.Acc John cry.Caus.Pst
     ‘John made the children who {came/*went} to see him cry.’

In (29), the referent of taan cannot be at the goal of pooyu, which is P-PIVOT incompatible, as predicted by the P-PIVOT constraint.

Another kind of PIVOT-sensitive expression in Malayalam is the verbs of giving koṭukku and tɑruku (Mohanam 1983, Asher & Kumari 1997), which are similar to Japanese verbs of giving ageru and kureru (see Kuno 1986a). koṭukku requires its recipient (Dative Object) argument to be the third person, whereas there is no restriction on the agent (Subject). tɑruku, in contrast, requires the recipient argument to be the first or the second person, while there is no restriction on the subject. These are seen in the following examples.

(30) a. ḷan/ii/jooŋ meerik’k’erox pʊstɑkɑm {kɔtuţtu/*tɑŋu}.
     I/Y John Mary.Dat1 book gave_{to3}/gave_{to1,2}
     ‘I/Y John gave a book to Mary.’

     b. ii/meeri enik’k’erox pʊstɑkɑm {*kɔtuţtu / tɑŋu}.
     you/Mary I.Dat1 book gave_{to3}/gave_{to1,2}
     ‘You/Mary gave a book to me.’

     c. ḷan/meeri ćeɪak’k’erox pʊstɑkɑm {*kɔtuţtu / tɑŋu}.
     I/Mary you.Dat1 book gave_{to3}/gave_{to1,2}
     ‘I/Mary gave a book to you.’

Thus, the recipient argument of koṭukku is P-PIVOT-incompatible. (The agent argument of tɑruku is P-PIVOT-incompatible except when the recipient argument is the second person, but I will not discuss this here.)

Now consider the following.

(31) a. jooŋ [meer i tɑník’k’əi] {kɔtuțtu / tɑŋu}
     John Mary self.Dat1 gave_{to3}-Rel/gave_{to1,2}-Rel
     kaaras rippeyar ceytu.
     car-Acc repair did
     ‘John repaired the bicycle that Mary gave to him.’
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b. jooŋ [meeri Ŕaŋk’과학] puṭakam {*kọtụtụ/taŋnu} ᐕparaŋŋu.  
John Mary self.Dat book gave3e gave1,2 Comp say-Past  
‘John said that Mary gave a book to him.’

(31a, b) show that taan cannot occur as the recipient argument of kotụkkuka, but can occur as the same argument of taruka (the regular third person pronoun awen̄s behaves in the opposite way). This is predicted if taan behaves as the P-PIVOT.

The next pair of P-PIVOT-sensitive expressions in Malayalam to be discussed is i-ppurattɔ ‘on this side of’ and a-ppurattɔ ‘on that side of’. As in English and Japanese equivalents, the GROUND argument of these expressions are P-PIVOT-incompatible, so is the FIGURE of a-ppurattɔ, as shown in (32).

(32) a. {jooŋnte/*ente} i-ppurattɔ puccay-untɔ.  
‘There is a cat on this side of {John/*me}.’

b. {jooŋ/*jaan} ᐕaŋiyuntɔ a-ppuratt-ane.  
John/I river-Gen that-side-is  
‘{John is/*I am} on that side of the river.’

Now consider (33), in which taan is not acceptable, as predicted.

(33) a. {[jooŋnte/*tante} i-ppurattɔ puccay-untɛŋŋɔ]  
jooŋŋɔ, ariyilla  
John.Dat know.Neg  
‘John doesn’t know that there is a cat on this side of him.’

b. *[taan, ᐕaŋiyuntɔ a-ppuratt-ane ɛŋŋɔ ] jooŋŋi paraŋŋu.  
self river-Gen that-side-is Comp John said  
‘John said that he was on the that side of the river.’

I formulated the P-PIVOT constraint as a condition on a logophoric pronoun, rather than its antecedent. This claim is based on the following observation.

(34) jooŋ tante, ammayu te ko ɐŋiyuntɔ a-ppurattɔ nilkkunu.  
John self-Gen mother with river-Gen that-side standing  
‘John is standing with his mother on the other side of the river.’

In (34), the antecedent of taan appears where P-PIVOT cannot appear.
3.2.2 Self-identification

The following constraint for Malayalam ṯaan.

(35) ṯaan must represent a person whom its referent believes to be himself/herself, or, in the complement of a verb of speech, a person whom its referent presents as identical with himself/herself.

This analysis is supported by the following observations.

(36) iidipus, {(#)ṭante/swanṭam,} ammaye kalyaṇam kaziccū
   Oedipus self.Gen/self.Gen mother marriage did
   ‘Oedipus, married his, mother.’

In (36) ṭante is acceptable only if Oedipus knew/believed that he had married his own mother; it is unacceptable in the scenario in which Oedipus, as in a Greek myth, did not know the identity of his wife.

Malayalam differs from Yoruba in that the referent’s belief counts in all contexts, including the complement of a verb of speech. Consider the following sentence, in the Abraham/Sarah scenario above.

(37) awan, [ṭante,bhaarya saara ṭante, sahoodari aapṣa] enppa (nuṇa) paraprppa
   he self’s wife Sarah self’s sister Cop Comp lie said
   ‘He, said (lied) that his, wife Sarah was his, sister.’

In (37) ṭante can be used both for ‘his (wife)’ and ‘his (sister)’ in this scenario, suggesting that both the speaker’s knowledge/belief and his/her presentation count in the speech complement clause.

This is also confirmed by the following sentence.

(38) jooṇ, [PRO, iṭicca] kuttīye aṭiccilla] enppa paraprppa
   John self hit.Rel child.Acc hit.Neg Comp said
   ‘John, said that he, did not hit the girl that he, hit.’

Ṭaan in (38) is judged as acceptable in the lying scenario, but as unacceptable or almost unacceptable in the memory problem scenario, where ṯaan does not refer to the person whom John believes himself to be.

When the matrix verb of (38) above is changed to a verb that represents belief, the lying interpretation is no longer possible, and so (39) is unacceptable.

(39) #jooṇ, [PRO, iṭicca] kuttīye aṭiccilla] enppa wisawsikkunnu
   John self hit-Rel child.Acc hit-Neg Comp believe
   ‘John, believes that he, did not hit the girl that he, hit.’

One consequence of both P-PIVOT constraint and the Self-identification
constraint is that the referent has consciousness, and consequently, is a living person (cf. the first person pronoun always refer to a living person). This prediction is borne out, as shown in (40). The use of a pronoun *awan* in contrast creates no problem.

> [(40)](jooñi [\{*tañi/awañi\} leekhananniluute maranattinu seesam] John self/he writings-through death-Gen after influuens ceytta) vidwaanmaar wali prasiddhi neeti influence did-Rel scholars through fame gained) ‘John, became famous through the scholars that he, influenced after his death through his writings.’

### 4. Concluding Remarks

In this paper, I argued that logophoric pronouns tend to respect 1) P-PIVOT constraint and 2) Self-identification Constraint. Logophoric pronouns in the three languages examined vary in a) whether they respect one or both of these conditions, and b) in which contexts belief (as opposed to verbal presentation) counts in self-identification. The three languages examined do not exhaust the logical possibilities that this parameterization allows. Examination of other languages might reveal examples of remaining possibilities.

### References


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