Difference in the Conceptions of Self as subject of human rights between the West and Japan
Can Confucian Self be strong enough to exercise the positive liberty in the authoritarian society?

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1. Introduction
Charles Taylor raised the following question:

Can people who imbibe the full Western human rights ethos, which reaches its highest expression in the lone courageous individual fighting against all the forces of social conformity for her rights, ever be good members of a “Confucian” society? ¹

The modern Western discourse of rights involves a certain philosophical view of humans and their society, of which the cornerstone concept is the subjective right².

In this article, I would like to take up the cultural difference about the conception of the Self as subject of human rights between the West and the North East Asia, particularly Japan, in order to explore a plausible means to incorporate the human rights norm, which I believe is universal in nature, into the non-western society such as Japan.

In this regards, I follow the dual distinction of the human rights presented by Taylor, namely human rights as legal language and its underlying philosophical foundation³. I also accept Taylor’s contention that any society has own social moral order in which its member can develop and retain his/her unique identity⁴. I also follow the ecumenical approach articulated by Joseph Chan, which is the idea that universal human rights can and should be justified by different cultures through their own terms and perspectives, expecting that overlapping consensus on the norms of human rights may emerge from those self-searching exercises and mutual dialogue⁵.

My goal in this exploration is to present one plausible approach, based on the existing Japanese way of thought, which may serve as underlying philosophical foundation for the human rights norm in Japanese society.

In advance, I would like to present my propositions as follows.
1) While the Japanese state is relatively liberal, Japanese society is not.
2) Northeast Asian societies, China, Korea and Japan, share the Confucian tradition even though Japan has never been Confucian state in its strict meaning.
3) Every society has own social moral order, embracing its own conception of humans and society, supported and developed in its history and tradition.
4) The Neo-Confucian conception of self, articulated by Tu Weiming as a center of relationship and as a dynamic process of spiritual development\(^6\), is compatible with the modern conception of self as subject of human rights in the West.
5) Likewise, the Japanese modern conception of self can be formulated as compatible with the notion of the subject of human rights although its composition might be different from the other North East Asian societies.
6) The most challenging task for the contemporary Japanese society is to develop and establish the universal value system, compatible with the human rights norm, fully utilizing intellectual resources available in the East Asia and embracing the multicultural liberal principles.

2. Conceptual framework and the topic to be focused

Lam Peng-Er contends as follows\(^7\):

While the Japanese state is relatively liberal, Japanese society is not. Japanese state and society are unlikely to accept the notion that a democratic Japan should embrace distinct, autonomous, and equal Okinawan and Ainu nations within a multicultural country.

Peng-Er highlights the Japanese myth of its ethnic homogeneity and strong group orientation as obstacles and concludes that Japanese society is illiberal in the sense that a majority believes that assimilation is the best approach for foreigners and minorities\(^8\).

I basically agree to his analysis with one reservation that any society can change. As Peng-Er anticipated, one-party dominant system in Japan has finally broken down, following Italy, Sweden, Mexico, India and Taiwan.

However, I also have to admit that considerable number of the Japanese people feel uneasy about the underlying philosophy of human rights originated in the West, particularly its individualistic nature and are reluctant to any attempts of adopting and incorporating this idea into the modern social imaginaries in Japan, although both the government and the people are ready to follow human rights as the legal norms.

Without accepting the principle of equality of individual in dignity and rights, it is difficult to embrace different ethnical groups as equal members of the society.
So, it is apparent that in order for the Japanese society to be able to embrace different nations within a country, we need to change the social imaginaries, currently missing or underdeveloped in the Japanese society.

The social imaginaries, in Taylor’s account, are the common understanding which makes possible common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy.

In the West, the ideas of the modern society were articulated as the theory of Natural Law in the 17th century mainly by Grotius and Locke. This theory is based on certain conception of human being and society, which is that individuals, on their own judgments, voluntarily come to agreement with each other and form society in order to promote mutual benefit. Individuals are supposed to be endowed with natural rights as subject of rights.

The modern self, as the autonomous and rational agent, is supposed to take disengaged stance from the world, including its own, and be able to act as sovereign people, formulating the commonly elaborated opinion in the public sphere while managing to make living as independent agent in the market economy.

The concept of human being, self as subject of rights, is the cornerstone idea of the modern social imaginaries in the West.

This modern self is considered as equal in dignity and rights, as formally stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.

It was Masao Maruyama who criticized Japanese intellectual tradition from this Western angle. Maruyama insisted that Japanese society lacks an axial intellectual system comparable to Christianity and the tradition of independent subjects or autonomous minds which can face the objective world and extract concepts from it, which could reach the transcendent level.

I don’t fully agree to Maruyama’s interpretation and would rather consider the different conceptions of self of the West and Japan as representing different position in the same spectrum of modern self.

I would like to illustrate my idea by employing the terms presented by Charles Taylor. In “A Secular Age”, Taylor presents his idea that transformation from the pre-modern, enchanted world to the modern, disenchanted one could be viewed as the shift from porous self to buffered self. In the pre-modern world, meanings are not only in minds, but can reside in things out of minds to which the porous self is open and in a sense, vulnerable while the buffered self can form the ambition of disengaging from things out of minds and of giving its own autonomous order to its life.

In Taylor’s account, the buffered self has developed discipline and self-control and seen
him/herself more and more as an individual, which emerged from the process of Reform\textsuperscript{1,4}.

What distinguishes the West from the others in terms of modernity is that the process was accompanied by the growing sense of uneasiness against church-controlled collective rituals and magic and the secularization in the West has evolved as negation of magic, religious collective rituals which, in my view, can best explain why the Western modern self had to enclose its boundary completely\textsuperscript{1,5}.

On the contrary, in Japan where collective rituals are not considered negatively, porous self did not feel necessary to close itself against the world completely, which might be one of reasons why Japanese people were so easily brainwashed in the pre-war period by imposing certain form of collective discipline because porous self, in its nature, is more vulnerable to intervention from outside world in the form of collective rituals\textsuperscript{1,6}.

So, from the viewpoint of selfhood as ideal types, Japan is defined as the society in which self remains partially porous even after it is institutionally modernized.

In this connection, it should be noted that partially porous self is not necessarily unreflective self.

Apparently, as Michael Sandel commented, completely embedded or porous self can not reflect him/herself and exercise the positive liberty to reform him/her own and society\textsuperscript{1,7}.

However, it seems to me possible for partially embedded and hence partially reflective self to develop and maintain its autonomous power in the society in which individual reflective capacity or freedom of expression is well respected and protected\textsuperscript{1,8}.

If my interpretation is accepted, the Japanese modern self can be described as partially porous and partially buffered self while the Western self is fully buffered as ideal types and by employing this self models, we may make comparison between the West and the Northeast Asia, not as individual-oriented society and group-oriented one, but as different variations of modern self and modern society\textsuperscript{1,9}.

Of course, by presenting this conception of Japanese modern self, I do not intend to refute the generally accepted argument that individualism accompanied with the strong sense of respect and commitment to democracy was not fully developed in the pre-war Japan and it was one of main reasons why Japan has fallen into irrational ultra-nationalism then, but only insist that this paradigm can make it possible to compare different modernities on the same ground, at the level of selfhood\textsuperscript{2,0}.

For instance, a self model presented by Tu Wei-Ming, a center of relationship and dynamic process of spiritual development, can be considered as a sort of partially porous and partially reflective self since he/she is embedded in the human relations while taking responsibility for his/her own spiritual development.
In this framework, modernization at the level of selfhood can be generalized as the movement from the one end, completely embedded self, to the other end, completely buffered self, but as explained above, the point of completely buffered self is not considered as ideal or ultimate. Certain range in the axis can be considered as modern as long as self is sufficiently reflective for maintaining autonomy and confident of own capacity to reform self and society.

However, Maruyama was right in his thesis that modern nationalism failed to develop in Tokugawa Japan because the society was divided into two classes, the ruling and the ruled.

When it came to the critical question of who was ultimately responsible for national independence, the public at large outside the feudal ruling class was, as the Mito school reveals in typical fashion, excluded from the discussions.

In Maruyama’s account, the fact that the Meiji Restoration was carried out without the active participation of the popular classes had a decisive effect on the character of the Meiji innovations intended to give rise to a modern nation-state.

This task was, in a sense, successfully accomplished by the ruling elites in the pre-war imperial Japan by creating the subtly made up myth or political ideology of Kokutai, in which the Emperor was considered as the Father of the whole Japanese families, an unbroken descent of Amaterasu, the supreme sun-goddess, and combining this myth with the Confucian ethics of absolute loyalty of the children to the parents.

This Shinto Confucianism is not the natural descent of the Confucian schools of the Tokugawa period nor the authentic Shintoism. The Shinto Confucianism was the invention artificially formulated by the Meiji Government as spiritual axis of the new nation-state based on their observation that Japan did not have religious traditions which looked viable as such spiritual axis while the West had the strong religious tradition as the spiritual backbone of the people.

We should recall, in this connection, the insight of Lafcadio Hearn which he expressed when he visited Izumo shrine in 1891 that the reality of Shinto lives not in books nor in rites, nor in commandments, but in the national heart, of which it is the highest emotional religious expression, immortal and ever young.

The Japanese ruling elites subtly utilized the aesthetic attitude of the Japanese ordinary people, which often appears as emotional rather than rational sense of attachment to the social groups which they belong to.

So, what seems to me necessary for now is to articulate the conception of the Japanese
underlying foundation of human rights which embraces the indigenous basis of social norm of the Japanese ordinary people and the principle of liberal multiculturalism.

Before exploring this topic, I would like to briefly trace the Western intellectual history in order to identify the points which I should focus in this project.

Taylor holds as follows:

The modern subject is self-defining, where on previous views the subject is defined in relation to a cosmic order.

Now the shift that occurs in the seventeenth-century revolution is, inter alia, a shift to the modern notion of the self.

The Epicureans and Sceptics achieved a notion of self-definition by withdrawing from the world... By contrast the modern shift to a self-defining subject was bound up with a sense of control over the world – at first intellectual and then technological.

Taylor holds that this shift can be understood as a revolution in the basic categories in which we understand self.

The modern self, in Taylor's account, has the active capacity to shape and fashion our world, natural and social; and it had to be actuated by some drive to human beneficence, which means it had to produce some substitute of agape.

It seems to me that as the concept of modern self has evolved with the growing sense of confidence to grasp and control the world objectively, including humans, in the West, similar development of modern self can be observed in non-Western states such as China, Korea and Japan although their resources, trajectories and the contemporary forms vary from culture to culture.

For instance, the intellectual history of China recently presented by Yuzo Mizoguchi and his colleagues refuted the traditional perception of the Chinese history as persistent continuum of dynasties which was finally turned down in 1911 Revolution (Xinhai Revolution). Instead, they describe the Chinese intellectual history as the process of penetration of Confucian thought into the wider social classes which has eventually prepared for 1911 Revolution. In their new perception, the Chinese history has 4 epochs: the first one was the establishment of the centralized dynasties in Qin and Han Dynasties, the second was the transformation to the meritocratic society based on the imperial examination system (科挙) in Tang and Song dynasties, the third was the development of local communities from late Ming dynasty to Qing dynasty and the fourth was 1911 Revolution. In Mizoguchi’s account, each epoch represents the beginning of new era in which Confucianism penetrates the much wider social classes. Confucianism was established as sole legitimate belief in Qin and Han Dynasties,
widely exercised by bureaucrats for moral training in Song dynasty and disseminated more widely in the local communities in Ming and Qing dynasties. We can observe the growing confidence of the people about their capacity to reform the society on their own behind the Chinese history in which Confucianism has taken a leading role although it did not take the form of disengagement of individuals from hierarchical community in the West.

I would like to take up another example presented by Taylor. Taylor contrasts Theravada Buddhism with the Western modern discourse of human rights and democracy. According to Taylor, in Thailand, there were several attempts to reinterpret the majority religion, Theravada Buddhism, in the nineteen century, which were described by the Sri Lankan anthropologist, Gananath Obeyesekere, as a “protestant Buddhism”. One of major facets of this reform movement is to return to the original core of Buddhist teaching, about the unavoidability of suffering, the illusion of the self, and the goal of Nibbana, which tries to separate the search for enlightenment from the seeking of merit through ritual, being very critical of the whole metaphysical structure of belief that has developed in mainstream Buddhism about heavens, hell, gods, and demons, which plays a large part in popular belief.

Taylor summarizes the two major principles in this reform movement which have created a basis for democratic society and human rights as follows.

   The first is the notion, central to Buddhism, that ultimately each individual must take responsibility for his or her own Enlightenment. The second is a new application of the doctrine of nonviolence, which is now seen to call for a respect for the autonomy of each person, demanding in effect a minimal use of coercion in human affairs.

Taylor concludes that while both democracy and human rights have been furthered along with the exclusive humanism stressing incompatible importance of human agent in the West, convergence on a polity of defense of human rights and democratic development in Thailand took the different path, but came to the same norms.

However, there are certain common aspects in the above-mentioned cases. Tu Wei-Ming holds as follows.

   The full development of human rights requires their ability to creatively transform the Enlightenment mentality into a thoroughly digested cultural tradition of their own, this, in turn, is predicated on their capacity to creatively mobilize indigenous social capital and cultural assets for the task.
confidence of capacity to reform self and society on their own accompanied with the
sense of responsibility for self development and respect for autonomy of each individual,
which is apparently the underlying foundation of modern self as subject of human
rights.
Now, I would like to turn to the Japanese case.

3. Exploration of Japanese underlying foundation for human rights
The preceding argument indicates that in order to formulate the Japanese underlying
foundation of human rights, it is necessary to explore the seed concepts in the Japanese
intellectual history of the ordinary people which can be utilized as basis for the sense of
individual responsibility and respect for her/his autonomy.

For this end, I would like to look into the early Meiji period in which the concept of
human rights was introduced to the Japanese society for the first time.
Fukuzawa Yukichi, the most influential intellectual leader then, introduced human
rights as ‘KEN RI TSUU GI(権理通義)’ or ‘KEN RI(権理)’

Fukuzawa explained ‘KEN RI TSUU GI(権理通義)’ as the great justice(大義) that people should respect life,
preserve property and care for honor.
Although Fukuzawa was a severe critic of Confucianism, he tried to utilize the
Confucian terms and their connotations which were widely disseminated and accepted
by the Japanese people then.
In Fukuzawa’s account, human rights means the great justice or public justice beyond
private principle and that’s why he employed the term ‘RI(理)’, which is considered as
ultimate principle beyond Heaven and Earth, but also exists in each individual thing,
according to the philosophy of the Chu His school.
‘KEN(権)’ originally means measure and is interpreted as proper response in events
occurring along with us.
‘GI(義)’ means justice.
The fact that ‘GI(義)’ and ‘RI(理)’ were so widely accepted as the social norms also
reminds us of another term ‘GIRI(義理)’, originally the Chinese term consisting of
‘GI(義)’ and ‘RI(理)’, meaning righteous way of life, which had been popularized,
acquiring quite different meanings in Tokugawa period and remained as influential
social norm among the ordinary people through the Meiji period until quite recently.
In order to explore this term, it is worth looking into “the Chrysanthemum and the
SWORD” by Ruth Benedict as the starting point and the following studies, mainly
the works of Ryōen Minamoto, the most prominent scholar on the Japanese
intellectual history.
Benedict described ‘GIRI’ as the moral norm which has no possible English equivalent and of all the strange categories of moral obligations which anthropologists find in the culture of the world. Benedict asserted that it (GIRI) is a Japanese category and it is not possible to understand their courses of action without taking it into account.

Inspired by her work, intensive studies have been conducted by Japanese scholars on ‘GIRI’ since then, including the ones of Minamoto.

Although some of characteristics identified by Bendict as unique Japanese natures have already faded away, such as absolute loyalty to the Emperor, duty to one’s parents, terror of not repaying one’s moral debts, we can still observe the persistent Nostalgia among the Japanese people toward ‘GIRI’ and ‘NINJO’ and it seems to me useful to examine its connotations in order to identify the spiritual heritage of the ordinary Japanese people which may be utilized as resource for formulating Japanese underlying foundation for human rights.

Benedict presented two distinct categories of ‘GIRI’, one called as ‘giri to the world’, one’s obligation to repay to one’s fellows and another called as ‘giri to one’s name’, the duty of keeping one’s name and reputation unspotted by imputation.

Inspired by Benedict’s study, Minamoto thoroughly examined the Japanese intellectual history and identified the origin and its diversification process of ‘GIRI’.

In Minamoto’s account, the term ‘GIRI’ did not exist in Japan before it was introduced from China in 9th century although the social norm which was later formalized as ‘GIRI’ did exist since time out of mind.

Minamoto holds that the origin of this de facto social norm of ‘GIRI’ was the natural human response to another person’s kindness and could be found in any relatively closed and stable communities in which human relation can sustain for long period without unexpected interruption and in this sense, ‘GIRI’ is not specifically Japanese. Minamoto also insists that another type of the de facto social norm of ‘GIRI’, deviation from the above mentioned original type of ‘GIRI’, emerged in the late Sengoku or Warring states period, from late 1400’s until early 1600’s, which he called the human response to another person’s trust. Minamoto supposed that this second type of ‘GIRI’ was developed among warriors who were struggling to survive in the unstable and highly competitive circumstance by counting on those whom they trusted. Minamoto stressed that this type of ‘GIRI’ was developed between relatively equal warriors as personal principle. It was also accompanied with the sense of empathy or NINJO.

Minamoto, then, identified the third type of de facto social norm of ‘GIRI’, the sense of obligation of keeping one’s name and reputation, which can also take the form of ‘IJI’.
地(pride). This third type of ‘GIRI’ is also deviation from the former two ‘GIRI’s, created by the sense of fear of losing face in closed small communities or personal human relations by not responding to others’ trust and kindness\textsuperscript{47}. These de-facto social norms of ‘GIRI’ were acknowledged as the term ‘GIRI’, adapting the Confucian concept at the early Tokugawa period\textsuperscript{48}.

However, when Tokugawa regime, centralized feudal system with seclusion policy, was gradually established, these norms could not be preserved in their original forms. As objective ethical code was gradually introduced and established, the original norms of GIRI based on personal trust and empathy(NINJO), which were not supposed to contradict each other, had been transformed to the formal code in which GIRI was considered as obligation to repay to on and contradictory to NINJO as Benedict described.

However, the emotional attachment to the original forms of GIRI, compatible with NINJO, has survived as Nostalgia among the ordinary people until quite recently in Japan\textsuperscript{49} and functioned as the underlying foundation of social norm.

The genuine defect of this social norm is that it is particularistic, based on personal and emotional attachment to rather small social groups which the person believes he/she belongs to, and hence has no universal or transcendental dimension\textsuperscript{50}.

The persistency of the Japanese belief of its ethnic homogeneity and strong group orientation apparently stems from the nature of this Japanese social norm\textsuperscript{51}.

However, the globalization and the accompanying multicultural liberal norms and standards, embodied in the international human rights regime, has been finally penetrating into and transforming the way of thinking of the Japanese people, particularly their perception of viewing Japan as homogenous society, which was the central schema of the Shinto Confucianism.

The symbolic moment for this transformation was the adoption of the resolution asking the government to recognize the Ainu people as an indigenous group by the Japanese Diet in June 2008, influenced by the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People adopted at the United Nations General Assembly in Sept. 2007.

Johan Galtung, founder of the discipline of peace and conflict studies, also observed that the younger generations in Japan tend to see other Asians as equals while the older generations still retain their hierarchical perception\textsuperscript{52}.

In order to further these development, it is worth looking at the Japanese intellectual history and tying to identify the resources which can strengthen the positive attitude.
Minamoto referred to some Japanese pioneers who tried to develop the concept of ‘GIRI’ as universal ethics, including Tōju Nakae and Sōseki Natsume.

Tōju Nakae insisted that the true understanding of kō (孝) (filial piety) leads to a perception of man’s identity with the universe and referred to ‘GIRI’ as righteous way of life originated from the universe.

Sōseki Natsume also used ‘GIRI to the Heaven’, implicating his sense of noble obligation for his genuine profession, when he explained his passionate desire to quit teacher and become novelist to his old friend, Kyoshi Takahama, poet. Minamoto commented that Natsume’s ‘GIRI’ was not ‘GIRI’ in the traditional Japanese sense, but beyond it.

Unfortunately, the social environment of their age could not allow them to fully develop their inspiration, but the recent global diffusion of multiculturalism as a new framework has been creating more favorable environment for such endeavors.

In this connection, I would like to point out the possible role which Confucianism may play.

Tu Wei-Ming explained about the East Asian social norm as follows.

The sense that one is obliged to, and responsible for, an ever-expanding network of human relatedness may not be a constraint on one’s independence and autonomy. On the contrary, since personal dignity is predicated on one’s ability not only to establish oneself but also to take care of others, one’s level of independence and autonomy is measurable in terms of the degree to which one fulfills obligations and discharges responsibilities to family, community, state, the world, and Heaven. The psychological mechanism reflected in the fear of losing face in public, which is often accompanied by a profound sense of personal guilt, is deduced from this.

Apparently, the sense of personal dignity embedded in the human relatedness can be compatible with liberal multiculturalism if it embraces the universal and transcendental dimension such as Heaven.

In this connection, Minamoto holds that the major difference between ‘GIRI’ of Chinese Confucians and ‘GIRI’ of the ordinary non-Confucian Japanese people is that the latter has no transcendental dimension beyond the ethics of personal relations.

So, universal or transcendental nature of “GIRI” of Confucianism, through Neo-Confucianism developed and advocated by contemporary scholars such as Tu Wei-Ming, may provide the Japanese people with the conceptual impetus for transforming their traditional particularistic ethics of ‘GIRI’ to more universal and open social norm.
In conclusion, I would like to refer to Heidegger’s view of time presented by Charles Taylor.\textsuperscript{6}

Heidegger's time is lived time, organized by a sense of the past as the source of a given situation, and the future as what my action must co-determine.

I fully agree to Taylor’s account that the future is what our action could determine with our past as resources.

So, my answer to my own initial question, Can Confucian Self be strong enough to exercise the positive liberty in the authoritarian society ?, is Yes, we can, provided that we succeed in formulating our own underlying philosophical foundation for human rights, fully utilizing intellectual resources available in the East Asia and embracing the multicultural liberal principles.

\begin{quotation}
\textsuperscript{3} “The notion of (subjective) rights both serves to define certain legal powers and also provides the master image for a philosophy of human nature, of individuals and their societies”, C. Taylor, “Conditions of an unforced consensus on human rights”, p.127.
\textsuperscript{5} Joseph Chan contrasted the ecumenical approach with the fundamentalist approach, which is that there are universal values and moral principles that can justify human rights to all reasonable persons. Joseph Chan, A Confucian perspective on human rights for contemporary China, in Joanne R.Bauer and Daniel A. Bell eds., \textit{The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights}.
\textsuperscript{6} Tu Wei-Ming, \textit{Confucian Thought: Selfhood As Creative Transformation}, State University of New York, 1985,p.113.
\textsuperscript{10} C. Taylor, \textit{A Secular Age}, pp.159-211.
\textsuperscript{11} Taylor explained the meaning of subjective right as something which the possessor, subject of right, can and ought to act on to put it into effect. C. Taylor, \textit{Sources of the Self}.
\end{quotation}
The Making of the Modern Society


17 This comment by Michael Sandel, Harvard University, was addressed to my question if there is any difference in the conception of self between the West and East Asia, particularly Japan at the International Conference on Public Philosophy at Chiba University on March 20-21, 2009.

18 Tatsuo Inoue, University of Tokyo, called it “partially embedded and partially reflective self” at the same International Conference.

19 Regarding this argument on culturally different ideal types of modern self, I would like to stress that culture and tradition is not static state but dynamic process.


29 C. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, p.27.

30 Yuzo Mizoguchi, Tomohisa Ikeda, Tsuyoshi Kojima, *Chinese intellectual history* (Chuugoku shiou shi)(中国思想史), University of Tokyo Publishing Company,
2007.

31 C. Taylor, Conditions of an unforced consensus on human rights, p.133.
36 Hiroshi Watanabe, “They are almost the same as the ancient three dynasties”, in Tu Wei-Ming ed., Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity, Harvard University Press, 1997, pp.129-131.
37 “There are some with whom we may study in common, but we shall find them unable to go along with us to principles. Perhaps we may go on with them to principles, but we shall find them unable to get established in those along with us. Or if we may get so established along with them, we shall find them unable to weigh occurring events along with us.” Analects IX:29.
38 ‘To see what is right and not to do it is want of courage’ Analects II:24.
39 Ruth Benedict (1887-1948) was an American anthropologist. She has received Ph.D in anthropology from Columbia University in 1923 and was assigned to the study of Japan in 1944 by the Office of War Information.
40 Ryōen Minamoto (1920~), Professor Emeritus Tohoku University Japan, has studied and published seminal books about the Japanese intellectual history of the Tokugawa period (1603-1867). He has also developed the study of GIRI and NINJO. Chūō-Kouron sha, 1969. GIRI, Sansei do, 1996. Pls also refer Donald Keene, Characteristic Responses to Confucianism in Tokugawa Literature, in Peter Nosco ed., Confucianism and Tokugawa Culture, University of Hawai’I Press, 1997, pp.122-123.
42 Ian Buruma, forward to the Mariner Books Edition, in R. Benedict, the Chrysanthemum and the SWORD, p.xii.
43 NINJO (人情) is human feeling, particularly a sense of caring for others.
44 “On (恩) is obligations passively incurred such as ko on, On received from the Emperor and oya on, On received from parents”. R. Benedict, “the Chrysanthemum and the SWORD”, p.116.
45 R. Benedict, the Chrysanthemum and the SWORD, p.134.
47 R. Minamoto, “GIRI and NINJO”, pp.60-64.
50 “He (Masao Maruyama) questioned whether the particularism of Japan, its tendency to concentrate loyalty on particular groups and their leaders, form the


53 Tōju Nakae(1608-1648) abandoned his post as retainer to his feudal lord to look after her ailing mother in his native village without his lord’s permission. Then, he developed his own philosophy, influenced by the philosophy of Wang Yang-Ming, dedicated to teaching and became known as the sage of Ōmi province in which he lived. Beatrice Bodart-Bailey, Confucianism in Japan, in Brian Carr and Indira Mahalingam eds., Companion Encyclopedia of Asian Philosophy, Routledge, 1997, p.741.

54 Sōseki Natsume (1867-1916), the most influential novelist in the Meiji era.


59 Tu Wei-Ming, Confucian Tradition in East Asian Modernity, p.8

60 R. Minamoto, GIRI, pp.28-34.