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Translated Title :: 日本の西洋離れ - ドイツ・イタリア・ファシズムの手法で

Abstract :: 本文では、近代に打ち勝ったという集団的経験に関する文化的言説がどのように形成されたかが述べられている。世界恐慌による財政的荒廃を特徴とする時代、文民政府に全く不満を持つ多くの民族主義組織が設立され、究極の政治的権威としての天皇の復活が叫ばれるようになった。

治安維持法の制定により、警察は国家を守るという第一の目標を、国家秩序を乱すいかなる企てに対しても、さまざまな報復措置で強制することができるようになった。やがて日本政府は、社会主義や左翼思想の流行に対して弾圧的な政策をとり、反対派に立ち向かった。右翼の活動家と政府の弾圧は、徐々に、しかし執拗に、市民社会の最後の残骸を解体していった。

1931年の満州事変、1933年の国際連盟脱退を経て、国内では海外志向が強まる政策が始まった。日本の政治家や知識人は、このような立場を調整するために、汎アジア主義的な語彙に頼るようになり、満州の占領を説明する必要に迫られたのである。多くの学者やジャーナリストは、アジア大陸における日本の覇権確立を熱狂的に支持した。

アジアをアジア人に」というデマゴギー的なスローガンは、欧米列強をアジアから排除することによって、日本のアジアにおけるリーダーシップを確立することを目的としており、すでに肥沃な土地に落ち込んでいたのである。ファシズムのムードが刷新と調和のイデオロギーを推進し、社会の亀裂をカバーするために文化の精神状態の回復を目指したのである。満州国は、新しい形の主権を生み出す政策のもとで、反植民地ナショナリズムと相互作用するファシスト思想の訓練場となった。

日本政府は、ムツソリーニがファシスト・イタリアで目指したような、やる気はあるが従順な国民を形成しようとし、1937年以降は、ナチス・ドイツの「新企業主義」を踏襲したのである。

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## Japan's Renouncement of the West Using Methods of German-Italian Fascism

07 2020

The concept of 'culturalism' emerged in Japan in the 1910s as a central school of thought covering diverse contexts ranging from Immanuel Kant to Bertrand Russell. Not only a complex ideology in terms of its cognitive aspects it became an ideology of Japan's modern nation-state and the core of an empire-building ideology, meaning 'self-development' and 'self-cultivation' in reaction to enlightenment thought centred around 'civilization.'

Since the first decades of the Meiji Restoration, German philosophy became so influential early on in Japan to interpret an own reality compared to what was to be found in other philosophical schools from the more industrialized nations, notably, the United States, France, and Great Britain.<sup>1</sup> Upfront the beginning of the First World War, Germany and France were confronted by the notion of civilization and culture, two peoples, which differed not in details, but in the basic features of their national identity by a maximum degree of strangeness. Between French intellectuals and their Eurocentric stance guarding the value of 'civilization' versus the nationalist stance of their German counterparts who instead attempted to prove their spiritual superiority, Japanese intellectuals in the 1920s chose the latter.<sup>2</sup>

Regarding Germany as an ideal modern state, without an aristocratic history, their term of 'Culture' emphasized to unify a spirit within the community of a nation *gungmin* rather than a single ethnic group *minjok* and offered a lofty ideal to the Japanese concept of Asia.

Moreover, Germany had changed so much between 1914 and 1919 that the Japanese observers felt that they needed to re-learn the facts about Germany. As a result, lectures from the first interwar decade were usually delivered by Japanese who visited Germany or Europe for work. Evidently Weimar Germany, shaken by war and revolution, remained an engrossing topic among the Japanese. Liberal and left-wing ideologies became popular because of

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ments. While, in German usage, civilization suggested 'something quite useful, but only a value of the second order, namely, something that encompasses only the outside of man, only the surface of human existence.' The German concept of culture referred to spiritual, physical and religious facts, distancing itself from slogans attributed to civilization, such as politics, economics and society. The concept of culture thus summarizes the products of man, the works of art, books and religious and philosophical systems together and thus describes the peculiarity of a people. Until the beginning of the First World War, the difference in meaning intensified to such an extent that in the conceptual usage the opposition manifested between civilization, as the material, external, useful and culture itself as the spiritual, interior and moral. The culmination of this differentiation finally came at the beginning of the outbreak of war in 1914, in which the opposition was sharpened to a perfect contrast, which allowed no exceptions. Thomas Mann and other German intellectuals praised culture, from the perspective of the conservative educated middle classes, as a replacement for 'civilization' and loaded it with the keywords duty, order and justice. The juxtaposition of Germany and France, through the notion of civilization and culture, underscored the maximum degree of strangeness.

Norbert Elias: Über den Prozess der Zivilisation. Soziogenetische und psychogenetische Untersuchung. Erster Band: Wandlungen des Verhaltens in den westlichen Oberschichten des Abendlandes. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp 1976.

Jörg Fisch: Zivilisation, Kultur. In: Zivilisation, Kultur. In: Otto Brunner u. a. eds.: Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland. Bd. 7, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta 1992, S. 740.

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1 Although over one hundred and eighty professors were brought from the West to teach in the modern universities, the ideology of Japan's modern nation-state emerged from an underlying criticism of Western civilization centering on Britain and France.

González Valles: Historia de la filosofía japonesa, Madrid: Tecnos, 2000, p.197

2 In French as well as English usage at the time, civilization generally referred to the pride and importance of one's nation regarding the 'progress of the West and of humanity.' The term described a process of political, economic, religious, technical, moral and social facts, referring to the attitude and behaviour of a person, no matter what his achieve-

this appreciation for German culture. Scholars and students alike read Marxist literature in its German original, which became very fashionable in the elite universities from the mid-1920s onwards. One other reason for this was the fact that Japanese translations of these publications were often censored by the government.<sup>3</sup> FUKUDA Tokuzo (1874-1930) of the Tokyo College of Commerce, who had studied under Karl Bücher (1847-1930) and Lujo Brentano (1844-1931) in Munich, introduced socialist thoughts from Europe and the book *Binbo monogatari* 'The Story of the Poor' by KAWAKAMI Hajime (1879-1946) of Kyoto University became a bestseller and his students studied Marxism enthusiastically.<sup>4</sup>

In December 1918 a group called *Shinjin-kai* 'New Man Society', formed by students of YOSHINO Sakuzō (1878-1933), professor at Tokyo Imperial University, became the core of the radical student movement in the 1920s.<sup>5</sup> Yoshino fed in a period of major upheaval the escalating popular demand for political rights and participation, by stressing the three concepts of racialism, democracy, and socialism, coordinated through an element of freedom.

World War I, the tumultuous decisions made at Versailles, the Russian Revolution, the May Fourth Movement in China, widespread aspirations for the self-determination of peoples, the Rice Riots in Japan, all these and other developments set concerned Japanese to thinking about future directions and questioning established norms.<sup>6</sup>

However, none of the supporters of Taishō Democracy, including Yoshino Sakuzō, was willing to challenge imperial sovereignty, and they all professed

belief in the National Essence. They were reluctant and unable to overcome the concept of imperial sovereignty and replace it with the concept of popular sovereignty *minshu shugi*, that is essential in most democratic states.

### Police Enforcement at Home

The Peace Preservation Law was enacted in 1925 and with its amendment in 1928, police could enforce the primary goal to protect the state with a range of retaliatory measures against any attempt to disrupt national order. After the 1931 Manchurian Incident, when Japan also withdrew from the League of Nations, and began to expose its oversea ambitions more and more explicitly, the artist community and intellectuals unfolded against the background of rising militarism. Soon they were confronted by the Japanese government with a repressive policy towards socialism and the popularity of leftist ideas. Despite the popular discourse of the avant-garde art movement among intellectuals, students and industrial workers, repressed from the start, the Leftist movements never became a major political force or could threaten the imperial system.<sup>7</sup>

Politically, Communists and Anarchists remained only dissidents on the fringes of society, but their cultural patterns of social behaviour and attitudes were perceived as a growing threat to social stability. With all the suppressed leftist political ideas and organizations, the by far largest portion of censored publications dealt with erotic topics, with the female body as a metaphor for the state's anxiety about upholding public morality.<sup>8</sup> This brought, as in moral regulation movements in the West, social agencies from left and right together, to get involved in the contested process of expanding controls over public morals. This process was advocated by a police force, that was centralized under an interior ministry, and held a wide-range of responsibilities, as for san-

3 Garon Sheldon: *State and Labor in Modern Japan*, Berkeley University of California Press, 1987

4 Gail Lee Bernstein: *Japanese Marxist: a portrait of Kawakami Hajime, 1879-1946*, Harvard University, 1990

5 Yoshino, a foremost democratic theorist in the Taisho and early Showa Eras, famously debated a month earlier on November 23 with the *Rōninkai* Society of Ronin, a right-wing group descended from the *Koku-ryūkai* Amur River Society. Followed by the founding of similar organizations in other universities, intellectual diversity was its hallmark, focusing on Lincoln, Rousseau, Marx, Lenin, the anarchist Kropotkin, and the Communist Rosa Luxemburg. The influence of English social democracy was strong, natural in light of the group's commitment to parliamentary democracy and pacifism, tendencies characteristic of twentieth-century English socialism.

Sakuzo Yoshino: *Fascism in Japan*, in *Contemporary Japan*, vol. I, no. 2, September 1932 - the same year that Mussolini's article 'The Doctrine of Fascism' was published.

Henry DeWitt Smith: *Japan's First Student Radicals*, Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press, 1972

6 A student of Yoshino during these years was Rōyama Masamichi, who later would become a professor of political science at Tokyo Imperial University and in the 1930s a founder of the Shōwa Kenkyūkai Shōwa Research Association, the brain trust to Prince Konoe Fumimaro.

7 With around 4000 prosecutions between 1928 and 1934, suspected of communist ideology and even at peak times less than 1000 members of the Japanese Communist Party, revolution was no real threat. See: Elise K. Tipton: *Japanese Police State: Tokko in Interwar Japan*, I&A Black, 2013, p.34

8 Surely not representing all urban women, the modern girls inspired a popular culture of ero, guro 'eroticism and grotesquerie', against the constraints of standard aesthetic, moral, and legal codes. Japan developed a significant publication industry devoted to the discussion of sexuality with writers like Tanizaki Jun'ichirō (1886-1965), Akutagawa Ryūnosuke (1892-1927), Kawabata Yasunari (1899-1972), and Satō Haruo (1892-1964), who enabled their readers to indulge in erotic urges, ordinarily suppressed by social ethics, with magazines as *Hentai shiryō* 'Perverse Material', 1926, *Kāma shasutōra*, 1927, *Kishō* 'Strange Book', 1928 and *Gurotesuku* 'Grotesque', 1928.

itation and health, traffic, firefighting, peace preservation and being an agent of public moral regulation.<sup>9</sup> Police intervention in Japanese social life implied tasks of moral guidance as the remedy for national peace and nurturer of the people.

Exemplified in the controls of the cafés, the social role of the modern Japanese police, was representing the state's response to social developments of modernity.<sup>10</sup>

The supervisory and preventive role of the police was executed by the wide legislative power of issuing ordinances having the force of laws, performing judicial functions in certain cases, and punishing particular types of legal violations, which left police substantively outside the control of justiciable law.

With the attempted assassination of Emperor Hirohito on 8 January 1932, by Korean independence activist Lee Bong-chang (1900-1932), and the assassination of the Prime Minister INUKAI Tsuyoshi (1855-1932) on 15 May 1932, the end of democratic politics in the country was marked.<sup>11</sup> Followed by the enforcement of the 'Peace Preservation Law' *Chian Iji Hō* of 1925 by the thought police *Tokkō*, the

periodic arrests continued during the 1930s, reaching a peak in 1933, and a total of over 70,000 arrests for alleged violations of the law between 1928 and 1941. By blending politics and ethics together, the law was targeted to hold any political opposition and any form of dissent liable in aim of altering the *kokutai*, the national body.<sup>12</sup> Specifically enforced against socialism and communism, not only revolutionary activities but also, student discussions, meetings, propaganda and even cafés were put under close police scrutiny. With 1933 the infiltration of communist activities and permanent arrests of their leaders, was successful and virtually obliterated the communist party JCP.<sup>13</sup> Censorship and bans of newspapers, magazines and books climbed steep from 1931 on, and drove legal leftist publications out of business by 1935, including cultural organizations.<sup>14</sup>

Many progressive artists were unable to hold respectable jobs due the threats of police oppression and political mind control. The possibility of being arrested and imprisoned at any time were accompanied by social pressures of friends and families, which put an end to the relatively free production of literature and art enjoyed during the Taishō era.

Keeping the national police force on duty, from 1933 on the Peace Preservation Law was also applied to people without any communist relationship, by revising it from a criminal law to an administrative law of prevention and surveillance.<sup>15</sup> With less than ten percent prosecutions of all arrested violators the law marked a shift in governmental prewar control, putting the police in charge as moral authorities, leaving the courts off duty. After arrest, the suspects were detained indefinitely and subjected to frequent interrogations, interrupted by regular lectures and physical violence. As public figures, they were asked to articulate in writing their conversed beliefs on a variety of political and social issues, in order to be

9 The ideal of Japanese police organisation was envisioned by its founder, Kawaji Toshiyoshi, and derived from the French and German constitutional model. See: Elise K. Tipton: *Japanese Police State: Tokko in Interwar Japan*, A&C Black, 2013

10 By 1935 the Home Ministry decided to issue a national policy to unify regulation of cafés and bars, to prohibit certain makeup and clothing, and ban students nationwide. In the night of February 15, 1938, the police in Tokyo arrested more than 2,000 students and minors and two days later another 5,000 at parks, entertainment venues and even department stores, to give them and their educators a warning. A total of 7 032 males and 341 females were arrested.

Elise Tipton: *Rectifying Public Morals in Interwar Japan*, *Crime, History & Sociétés*, 2001, vol 5 no 2 pp.138-148

In 1926 the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Keishicho made 645 arrests in cafés and bars throughout the city.

Elise Tipton: *Rectifying Public Morals in Interwar Japan*, *Crime, Histoire & Sociétés / Crime, History & Societies* 2001, vol. 5, n° 2, p.134

11 Lee was posthumously honoured by the government of the Republic of Korea with the Order of Merit for National Foundation in 1962, and a commemorative postage stamp in 1992.

Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi was shot by eleven young naval officers in his residence, while his son Inukai Takeru was watching a sumo wrestling match with Charlie Chaplin, which probably saved both their lives. The young activists recognised the political potential of mass culture in their original assassination plan, which had included killing the English film star who had arrived in Japan on May 14, 1932. In Court Lieutenant Koga Seishi told his plan: 'Chaplin is a popular figure in the United States and the darling of the capitalist class. We believed that killing him would cause a war with America, and thus we could kill two birds with a single stone.'

Inukai was Chinese revolutionist Sun Yat-sen's close Japanese friend and had deep friendship with China. However, because he was to cline to peacefully settle the consequences of the former September 18 Incident, fundamentalists of the soldiers hated him and assassinated him. From then on the Eagle Wing was even stronger in Japan, and eventually led to Great war.

Rudolf V. A. Janssens: 'What Future for Japan?' *U.S. Wartime Planning for the Postwar Era, 1942-1945*, Rodopi, 1995, p.108

12 The term *Kokutai*, literally means 'national body,' and encompasses an ideological construction of a community, a set of standards, unifying the Japanese people as a nation under the eternal sovereign of the emperor. Envisioned as a timeless and boundless entity, the individual citizen had to give himself or herself over to a larger whole.

13 The last central committee member Satomi Hakamada was captured in March 1935.

The arrest of elementary school teacher in Nagano prefecture in 1933 marks this beginning.

14 Making people involved in the creative arts even more vulnerable to intimidation, arrest, and imprisonment.

15 The thought police had also agents in Peking, Shanghai, Harbin, Berlin, London, New York, and Chicago.

either released or interrogated further. If they appeared repentant enough, in the event of a trial, they were sentenced to house arrest and asked to sign a pledge endorsed by a family member that the convict would not break the law again and bow to national interest. This was known as *tenkō*, the ideological reversal of belief, which instead of punishment, was part a control mechanism to maintain social integrity. A wider audience in mind, this kind of cultural reorientation signalled the public in an educational manner, the demise of anti-government ideology proclaimed by former radicals, now supporting the state. Rare were those who, like the communist leader KURAHARA Korehito (1902-1999), who was in 1925 a correspondent for the magazine *Miyako Shimbun* in the Soviet Union and after his return joined the Pan-Japanese Federation for Proletarian Art in 1928. Kurahara refused the proffered compromise and was imprisoned from 1932 to 1940 for his involvement in the proletarian literary movement.

Contemporary artists were aware how imprisonment of members of the proletarian art movement began with the amendment of the Peace Preservation Law in 1928.<sup>16</sup> After avoiding more and more their revolutionary allusions, from 1934 to early 1940, fewer artists were imprisoned, but instead philosophers, critics, and novelists, close to the artistic milieu, considered to be communist sympathizers were arrested.

In fear of the deterioration of public morals which could weaken the national body, police control of moral increased and filed new restrictive regulations on cafés and arrests on immoral behaviour and strict regulations on dance halls were issued.

By 1935 the Home Ministry decided to issue a national policy to unify regulation of cafés and bars, to prohibit certain makeup and clothing, and ban students nationwide. With the progress of war after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 all energies were put in mobilising the entire country to secure public support, giving way to bureaucratic decision-making under the control of militarist authority in 1936.<sup>17</sup> In the night of February 15, 1938, the police

in Tokyo arrested more than 2,000 students and minors and two days later another 5,000 at parks, entertainment venues and even department stores, to give them and their educators a warning.<sup>18</sup>

When in the 1930s, Japan became a militarized state, the military was willing to overcome the politicians, and assassinations as well as attempted coup d'états happened frequently, women were commonly treated as minors, and the society became strongly patriarchal again. Japanese women were supposed to be the fighters of the home front, active for the sake of the empire and to organize them, the government initiated female associations, e.g. the Greater Japan Women's Association.<sup>19</sup> Initiated by the military, this organization assembled all women from the age of 20 and prepared the mass of Japanese females for the war ideology.

Most scholars and journalists gave their enthusiastic support to the establishment of Japanese hegemony over the Asian continent, and only a few writers have taken exception to this view during the tumultuous events of the 1930s. Japanese intellectuals turned out as passive supporters of government policy, and indeed the new culturalism of 1930s proposed that Japan was appointed to lead the world to a higher level of cultural synthesis that surpassed the Western modernism itself.<sup>20</sup> No less than business leaders and government officials, liberal and moderate leftist intellectuals, following the China Incident of 1937, cooperated with the army either to further their own interests or because they were sincerely patriotic.<sup>21</sup>

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duress and brutality. There were no camps for political prisoners but hundreds were tortured and some dozens died in custody. Throughout the war police arrested suspects to prevent a Red uprising, suppressing any communist tendencies.

See Elise Tipton: *Rectifying Public Morals in Interwar Japan*, *Crime, Historie & Sociétés*, 2001, vol 5 no 2

18 A total of 7 032 males and 341 females. Elise Tipton: *Rectifying Public Morals in Interwar Japan*, *Crime, Historie & Sociétés*, 2001, vol 5 no 2 pp. 138-148

19 In 1926 the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Keishicho made 645 arrests in cafés and bars throughout the city. Elise Tipton: *Rectifying Public Morals in Interwar Japan*, *Crime, Histoire & Sociétés / Crime, History & Societies* 2001, vol. 5, n° 2, p.134

20 Ueno Chizuko: *Nationalism and Gender*, *Trans Pacific*, 2004, p.17

21 Tetsuo Najita: *Japan's Revolt against the West*, in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi ed.: *Modern Japanese Thought*, New York Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.208

22 James B. Crowley: *Modern East Asia: Essays in Interpretation*, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Press, 1970

16 The law was enacted in 1925 and its primary goal was to protect the state with a range of retaliatory measures against any attempt to overthrow or abolish the capitalist economy.

17 Analysing Japan as a police state can be described in relative numbers of police officials, which do not differ in percentage of the population from Berlin, Paris, or New York. Police did hold people frequently in custody without formal charges, infringing civil rights and applying

## Vision of Pan-Asia

Greatly influenced by Friedrich Hegel's notion of dialectics and the evolutionary theories proposed by Charles Darwin (1809-1882) and Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), OKAKURA Tenshin (1863-1913) was made an icon of Pan-Asian thought, as his writings were popularized and reprinted during the 1930s and 1940s. Claiming in his influential book entitled 'The Ideals of the East' in its famous opening sentence that 'Asia is one,' Okakura's proclamation of Asian unity appeared to provide ideological support for the Japanese war effort that claimed to liberate colonized fellow Asians to establish the 'Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere' *Dai To-A kyōei ken*.<sup>22</sup> Okakura saw Japan as the 'exhibition hall' of all of these Asian civilizations and viewed the cross-cultural encounters of Eastern and Western history, causing an evolution in both artistic cultures.

He gained some distance from the common effort of the time to escape Asia, but as being familiar with Western civilisation he would build his alternative concept upon ideas of European modes but different in the promotion of peace and beauty. In this first form of Pan-Asianism Okakura emphasized Asian commonalities in the vast philosophical dimension as a Civilizational Discourse, which did not present East and West as inherently hostile to one another. This nonviolent approach of accomplishing awareness and recognition in the West was in stark contrast to the Japanese chauvinist interpretation of Pan-Asianism that would increasingly begin to take hold in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War.

An first utopian illustration of a combination of nationalism and imperialism can be found in the ideas of the anti-Western polity called *Koryo* nation in 1920. Established by a group of far-right Japanese Asianists, in alliance with nativist Korean elites in the Jiandao region between Manchuria and Korea, which had been the heartland of the ancient Koguryo state (formed in the 2nd century BCE). *Koryo* was at its time more of an ideological than a practical endeavour. But with some spiritual and ultra-nationalist societies involved, its importance lies in its role as a precursor for the Japanese controlled

state of Manchukuo (1932-1945).<sup>23</sup> In its constitution, Confucianism was to be the national religion, property was to be owned collectively, the system of governance was to be without exertion (*Wu Wei*) and citizenship was to be equal without discrimination on the basis of ethnicity or race, which prefigured some of the theoretically radical ideas that were implemented later in the puppet state of Manchukuo.<sup>24</sup>

Pan-Asianism after the Teisho period rested on two contending conceptions of Asian regionalism, of which both fed and resisted the nascent imperialism of that nation. First it was the concept to create an alliance among Asian nations, within the narrower geographical and cultural confines of East Asia and also adhering to the requirements of modern nation-state nationalisms. The embodiment of a solidarity-oriented, non-dominating role Japan's, by reviving Eastern ethics *jingi dotoku*, would challenge Western oppression and form the basis of an Asian union. This idea of 'the same letters, the same race', that connoted some sort of an inherent cultural bond among East Asian, yellowed-skinned races, had already been established in Japan's intellectual discourse by the late nineteenth century within Japan's public life.<sup>25</sup> This kind of Pan-Asianism envisioned a strong China as partner of Japan's national interest and together opposing the West.

The spiritual crisis that many intellectuals perceived as pervasive of Japanese society since the 1920s was sparked by the disorienting political atmosphere that followed WWI and that gave way to the rising of ultranationalism in Japan. In the course of the 1930s, the feeling of national tensions and international uncertainties intensified strongly. Japan was deeply involved in an imperialist war on the Asian mainland and increasingly isolated diplomatically.

23 Groups such as the Morality Society (founded in 1918), Society for the Great Unity of World Religions (1915), Black Dragon society (1901), and the Dao Yuan (1916), pre-existed the Japanese invasion. In 1932 they already had memberships measured in the millions

24 Prasenjit Duara: *The Discourse of Civilization and Pan-Asianism*, Journal of World History, Vol. 12, No. 1, University of Hawai'i Press, 2001

25 Konoe Atsumaro (1863-1905), educated at Bonn and Leipzig in the theory of constitutional government, called for an alliance of equals between China and Japan when he asserted his views in a controversial 1898 article entitled 'Let Nations of the Same Race Unite and Discuss Chinese Questions.'

Konoe Atsumaro: *Dōjinshū Dōmei fu Shina Mondai Kenkyūno Hitsuyo, Let Nations of the Same Race Unite Themselves and Discuss Chinese Questions (original translation)*, *Taiyo*, January 20, 1898

22 However, he did not write 'The Ideals of the East' as political propaganda to justify Japanese aggression. Instead he wrote it for Westerners as an exposition of Japan's aesthetic heritage.

Okakura Kakuzō: *The Ideals of the East with Special Reference to the Art of Japan*, London J. Murray, 1903, p.1

At the domestic level, right-wing activism and official repression gradually, but relentlessly, dismantled the last remnants of civil society. With varying degrees of conformity and participation in official policy, the ranks of intellectuals from a once broad ideological spectrum were increasingly reduced in the following years. In a large number they endorsed Japanism, sanctions for authoritarian rule, and expansionist policies in the name of the Japanese spirit, the emperor, and the 'National Essence' *kokutai*.<sup>26</sup>

When the Great Depression hit the world in the early 1930's, it did not affect Japan as strongly as other industrialized countries in the West. After the value of Japanese exports dropped in the beginning, from 1932 on the economy recovered under the policy of Finance Minister KOREKIYO Takahashi (1854-1936), achieving growth and a modest inflation.<sup>27</sup>

### An Incident Abroad

In the mist of the worldwide depression, the invasion of Manchuria in September 1931 by the Japanese Kwantung Army would allow the military's dominance of the government continue to grow on mainland Japan. The intrusion, initiated by a faked explosion close to a railway line owned by Japan's South Manchuria Railway near Mukden, performed by the Kwantung Army, generated beside the militaristic, political issue, a multitude of economic aspects and a mass migration to develop the new colony.<sup>28</sup> By December, the Kwantung Army had taken over

much of southern Manchuria and by the end of 1932, all of Manchuria was in Japanese control and the Kwantung Army had created the new nation of Manchukuo out of the conquered territory.<sup>29</sup>

On the other hand, with the Manchurian Incident a weak China made place for a growing preoccupation that called for Japan to take on a leadership role in building a new Asia.<sup>30</sup> However, a common understanding of Japan's civilizational leadership was a consensus across ideological barriers, growing since the victorious war against Russia.

Pan-Asianism had long been in existence before the Manchurian Incident. But it was further ideologized, when Japan had to argue its invasion, breaking existing international arrangements, while still lacking its own philosophical framework of foreign policy. In an attempt to reconcile its position, Japan's diplomatic elite increasingly came to rely on Pan-Asianist vocabulary, as they faced the task to explain the appropriation of Manchuria. What started with the unauthorized initiative of Pan-Asianist Colonel ISHIWARA Kanji (1889-1949) as a practical application to turn the central power structure at home, became Japan's official policy to legitimize the crusade in Asia.<sup>31</sup>

The Pan-Asian subject proved an acceptable argument to explain the case to the Japanese public opinion, which, cheered by the media, emphatically supported the insubordination, and praising the 'courage' of the Kwantung Army. In order to disseminating Imperial Japanese values to the rest of Asia, the concept provided a foreign policy framework convincing enough even for Japan's liberal internationalist elites. At this very moment Pan-Asianism provided a loose sense of cohesion for an otherwise uncoordinated political decision-making apparatus

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26 In intellectual circles, the oppression of all liberal and progressive scholars, exemplified by the expulsion of jurists Takigawa Yukitori of Kyoto Imperial University in 1933 and Minobe Tatsukichi of Tokyo Imperial University in 1935 from institutional and public life, signalled defeat even for the most modest academic freedoms. However, the idea of the *Kokutai* was useful only in Japan, and contributed nothing whatever to the development of political ideas anywhere else in the world, even when imperial Japan tried to export it to its colonies.

27 Korekiyo Takahashi (1854-1936), a central fundraiser in the Western countries during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), was assassinated by a group of militarists on February 26, 1936.

28 A small quantity of dynamite detonated on September 18, 1931 close to a railway line near Mukden. Despite the weakness of the explosion, the Imperial Japanese Army, accusing Chinese dissidents of the act, responded, without formal approval by the Japanese government, with a full invasion of Manchuria. Six months later Japan established its puppet state of Manchukuo. In response to the refusal to recognize Manchukuo, in March 1933 Japan withdrew from the League of Nations. See David Bergamini: *Japan's Imperial Conspiracy*, 1971

During the trip back to Japan from Geneva, Islam expert Wakabayashi Han explained to Isogai Rensuke, a lieutenant colonel in the Japanese army the benefits that attention to the Muslim world could bring to Japan's East Asian policy. After talking in Tokyo with Army Minister Araki Sadao the Japanese army began to implement a pan-Asianist Islam policy in China, cooperating with Muslim nationalities against the Western colonial presence.

See Cemil Aydin: *Japan's Pan-Asianism and the Legitimacy of Imperial World Order, 1931-1945*, in *Japan Focus* Volume 6 issue 3, 2008

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29 In an unstable peace between Japan and China, Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists and Chinese communists fought each other over the next four years.

30 The belief that the Japanese Empire had an active role to play in transforming China and other Asian nations in the image of Japan had its roots in the first ultranationalist organizations, such as Kokuryu-kai Amur River-Society, established in 1901.

31 Beside Colonels Ishiwaro Kanji, other makers of this operation were General Itagaki Seishirō, with support of Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijirō and Foreign Minister Shidehara.

When he was sent to the German Reich as a military attaché in 1922, Ishiwaro served in Berlin and Munich until 1925, completing studies in military history and strategy. Ishiwaro was therefore considered an expert on modern military strategy on his return to Japan. On 18 September 1931, a bomb destroyed a railway embankment of the Japanese-controlled South Manchuria Railway. Under the accusation that Chinese soldiers had attacked the railway line, Ishiwaro ordered various units of the Kwantung Army to occupy other Chinese cities without informing the army general staff in Tokyo about the incident, which soon led to an occupation of the entire Chinese Manchuria.

that helped to defend military disobedience in the sense of a greater ideological vision.

This type of Pan-Asianism pledged both, the solidarity oriented, non-dominating harmonizing timeless sacrality of Asia, and the imperative for the leader, who had mastered Western civilisation. And to bring all the modern achievements to the region without destroying their traditions. Accordingly, the discourse necessarily possessed an anti-imperialist rhetoric in reaction to the Western character of civilization. Furthermore, it had to refer to the subjective richness of Asian ideals and moral superiority over the West to assert Asian unity and greatness.

In reality, Asia and Japan as its leader were in economical disarray, and Japan's eventual expansionist course became as much a quest for material survival as a cultural mission coined in the language of a greater Asian civilization.

To prove such a claim that Imperial Japan was a responsible overseer in preserving Asian heritage for posterity, what termed Okakura Tenshin Kakuzō in his 1904 'Ideals of the East' when he assigned his country to the role of caretaker as the 'Museum of Asiatic Civilization', Japanese authorities would collect and store various relics of the local civilization in newly constructed museums in the colonies.

By the late 1930s, the State Museum in Mukden, capital of Manchukuo, was but another of the many colonial museums throughout the empire of the self-appointed leader of Asia, legitimizing the creation of the supposedly independent state of Manchukuo in a way as it stressed how the region differed from the rest of China. In its founding the State Museum in Mukden diverges slightly from the typical storyline, for its holdings originated with a local Chinese governor who collected many examples of Manchu and Mongolian art. Only later was it turned into a government museum and became an attraction for the many tourists who explored Mukden and other imperial destinations. Nevertheless, the fact that this museum displayed mostly examples of Manchu and Mongolian art rather than Han Chinese ones meant that the museum conveniently supported the Japanese narrative that historically Manchuria had not been part of China.

Declaring Japan to be the preordained alliance leader on a crusade to save the rest of Asia from

Western imperialism, raised another problem in which the surrounding Asian nationalisms were equally newly emerging. Viewing Asia as 'Japan's Orient' by at once distinguishing itself from and identifying with it, raised the most immediate question of how to reconcile its bid for an Asian leadership with the advent of modern Chinese nationalism.<sup>32</sup>

### Rise of Nationalism

Not in command of the Manchurian Incident, the political civilians in Tokyo lost with time control over the military, which destabilised the authority of the government by sample coupe d'état attempts and became increasingly strong over the years.<sup>33</sup>

Nationalist groups, as the Sakurakai Cherry Blossom Society tried to establish a totalitarian state with a new cabinet based upon state socialism and restore Emperor Hirohito in a new military dictatorship.<sup>34</sup> Under the order to stamp out Japan's allegedly corrupt party politics, the unfair distribution of wealth, and the perceived degenerative influences of Japan's public morals, those groups won support from a public that had wanted its government to take more decisive measures to solve economic and social problems. Issues that also the Social Mass party

32 A critical mass of Japanese, including leftist intellectuals, responded to the Chinese criticism to restore Manchurian territory, which they gained from Russia after the war, with a voice for the construction of Manchukuo's new sovereignty and national identity under Japanese rule.

See Eri Hotta: Pan-Asianism and Japan's War 1931-1945, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p.115ff

33 Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi, (1870-1931) fell victim to an assassination attempt on 14 November 1930 when he was shot inside Tokyo Station by Tomeo Sagoya, a member of the Aikoku-sha ultranationalist secret society.

In March 1931, the radical Sakurakai secret society within the Imperial Japanese Army, planned a coup d'état, aided by civilian ultranationalist groups. The project was among others supported by Yoshichika Tokugawa, ultra-rightist member of the House of Peers, son of the last daimyo of Nagoya, and founder of the Tokugawa Art Museum. A riot upfront the coup d'état failed to materialize, and the leaders were arrested and the whole affair disintegrated.

Another abortive coup d'état attempt was launched by the same group on 21 October 1931, to 'prevent the government from squandering the fruits of our victory in Manchuria' (cit Capt. Isamu Chō in

Ben Kiernan: Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur, Yale University Press, 2007 p.467

On May 15, 1932, reactionary elements of the Imperial Japanese Navy, aided by cadets in the Imperial Japanese Army and civilian remnants of the ultra nationalist League of Blood launched an attempted coup d'état. Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi was assassinated by 11 young naval officers, which is remembered as the May 15 Incident. The extremely light sentences for the assassins at the following trial and the support of the Japanese population led to a further strengthening of the military. The original plan had included killing Charlie Chaplin, who had arrived one day earlier, at a reception with Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi.

Meirion Harries: Soldiers of the Sun: The Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Army. Random House, 1994

34 Richard Sims: Japanese Political History Since the Meiji Renovation 1868-2000. Palgrave Macmillan, 2001, p.155



carried to the general election of February 1936, which rewarded a new opposition on the left and right with seats heavily lost by the former ruling conservative Seiyūkai. But the attempted coup d'état on 26 February 1936, barely a week afterward, nullified the triumph of popular support for parliamentary democracy, and the military increased its control over the civilian government. As the Chinese Guomindang and communist forces were in 1937 expected to unite in concerted action against Japanese rather than against each other, a spark ignited the Second Sino-Japanese War *Nitchil sensa*, when Chinese and Japanese troops clashed several times at the Marco Polo Bridge, ten miles west of Peking, on July 7, 1937. When the incident unleashed a string of events it escalated into open war between China and Japan, and the Japanese state became involved in propagandising its cause and objectives.

### An Unified Body

Initiated by, what was called the Minobe Incident of 1935, 'The Essence of the National Polity' *Kokutai no hongji*, was issued in May 1937 by the Ministry of Education, and distributed nationwide to all schools from the elementary to university level. After MINOBE Tatsukichi (1878-1943), a professor emeritus of law at Tokyo Imperial University was forced to resign because of his thesis, which defined the emperor as 'organ of the State' through the constitutional structure, rather than as a sacred power beyond the state itself, a committee was formed to make a definitive exposition of the *Kokutai*, for the education and edification of the entire nation.<sup>35</sup>

In the rise of nationalism and militarism and the independent action of the army in Manchuria, the publication was instrumental in the ideological indoctrination of the Japanese people into the community of the *Kokutai*.<sup>36</sup> This was no longer a concept to generate spiritual unity, or a political theory of Japan designed to accommodate modern institutions of government, like the 1889 Constitution.

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35 He was influenced by the work of German Georg Jellinek's *Allgemeine Staatslehre* 'General Theory.'

After military reservists and others complained that Professor Minobe Tatsukichi's 'organ theory' of government insulted the throne by ignoring the divine origins of the emperor, the government publicly rejected Minobe's ideas. This event and others alerted intellectuals such as Miki Kiyoshi to the growing power of nationalists who insisted on a mystical bond between the emperor and the Japanese people.

36 Robert K. Hall, ed.: *Kokutai no Hongi. Cardinal Principles of the National Essence of Japan*, trans J. O. Gauntlett, Harvard University Press, 1949, p. 59

With the opening statement: "The unbroken line of Emperors, receiving the Oracle of the Founder of the Nation, reign eternally over the Japanese Empire. This is our great and immutable national entity *Kokutai*," this text required faith at the expense of logic and reason. The *Kokutai no hongji* had the objective of reinforcing the role of the emperor both on a moral and political level and to affirm the particularity and purity of Japan. Printed in more than two million copies it gained nearly the same status in Japan's schools as the Imperial Rescript on Education and the portrait of the Emperor.<sup>37</sup> Rejecting the individual in favour of a unified national body, the nation was understood as a concrete entity that could mobilize millions for the war effort by equating self-sacrifice with the preservation of the imperial institution.<sup>38</sup>

However, the *Kokutai no hongji* was clearly intended as a propaganda document, issued with the vision of strengthening the national support for the war in China. The expansion of governmental control to create patriotic citizens who cheerfully obeyed orders took another step with the policies of social reorganization as the Citizens' Total Spiritual Mobilization movement *Kokumin Seishin Sōdōin undō*, launched in September 1937, and the National Total Mobilization *Kokka Sōdōin-hō*, inaugurated in 1938.

Promulgated at the birthday of emperor Meiji on November 3, 1938, the 'New Order' *Shintaisei*, allowed the government to requisitioning human and material resources for the war effort.<sup>39</sup> The transformation of civilian life highlighted the latent process of increasing militarization of Japanese society since 1931, and was guided by an information revolution orchestrated by the government. It began in 1936 with the establishment of the Cabinet Information Committee, and the new 'Weekly Report' *Shūhō* magazine, inaugurated by the government to provide the citizens a rightful understanding of the purpose of the policies.<sup>40</sup>

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37 After the war it became extremely difficult to find copies of this work, produced in such abundance. When defeat was imminent, Japan's leaders ordered destruction of millions of such documents, with children even burning documents in schools. Liberals and radicals entered Japan's universities and libraries after the war, to clear shelf after shelf of objectionable material.

John S. Brownlee: *Four Stages Of The Japanese Kokutai*, JSAC Conference, University of British Columbia, October 2000

38 One of the most quoted propaganda slogans was 'one hundred million hearts beating as one.'

39 The New Order aimed to strengthen national unity, and envisioned the birth of a new totalitarian Japan by establishing a 'national defense state' *kokubō kokka*.

40 The government established the Cabinet Information Committee in

Comparable to the German *Wochenschau*, from February 1938 on, the Weekly Report was joined by a second news periodical, the 'Photographic Weekly Report' *Shashin Shūhō*, a service to the nation in support for the war.

## Japanese Fascism

Since the late 1920s the Japanese press was filled with discussions of fascism, with some reformist right wing group *kakushin uyoku*, advocating a fascist regime mainly related to a fascination the personality of Mussolini and the successes of his Fascist Party, the *Fascio di Combattimento*.<sup>41</sup>

The short-lived political organization *Keirin gakumei* was able to build an ideological bridge between nationalists and socialists, creating a political precedent for later ultra-right movements in Japan.<sup>42</sup> However, merely concluding that the Japanese right wing was aware of the existence of Fascism in Italy, since Benito Mussolini coined the term in 1919, intellectuals such as KITA Ikki (1883-1937) emphasized even prior to that a process of self-genesis through national awakening, by resembling ideas of writers as Rousseau, Kant, Darwin, Spencer and Marx, to reorganize Japan.<sup>43</sup>

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July 1936, and after the Marco Polo Incident, the committee was upgraded to a division, and by the end of 1940, it had become a bureau.

41 Notably political leader Nakano Seigo (1886-1943) sought to bring about a rebirth of Japan through a blend of the samurai ethic, Neo-Confucianism, and populist nationalism modelled on European fascism. In December 1937, Nakano had a personal audience with Benito Mussolini. In the next month, he met with Adolf Hitler and Joachim Ribbentrop. The idealist right wing, *kannen uyoku*, on the other hand, rejected fascism as they rejected all things of obvious western origin. The Great Japan Production Party, *Dai Nippon Seisan To*, Imperial Japan's preeminent self-declared fascist party, was founded with the help of Toyama Mitsuru (1855-1944).

Leslie Russel Oates: *Populist Nationalism in Pre-War Japan: A Biography of Nakano Seigo*, 1985

The first books which presented Italian Fascism to a Japanese readership had already appeared in the 1920s.

Inoue Seiichi: *Mussorini to sono fashizumu*, Tokyo Jitsugyō no nihonsha, 1928

Giulio Aquila and Hiroshima Sadayoshi: *Itaria ni okeru fashizumu undō*, Tokyo Hakuyōsha, 1927

42 In January 1923, Takabatake Motoyuki (1886-1928), one of the first theoreticians of national socialism in Japan, who completed the first Japanese translation of *Das Kapital* in 1924, and anarchist Uesugi Shinkichi (1878-1929), who founded with Kita Ikki (1883-1937) the *Roso-kai* 'Old and Young Society' in 1919, created the *Keirin gakumei*, or the 'Statecraft Study Association' as the first fascist organization in Japan in the manner of Mussolini's Fascist Party. Besides the *Genyōsha* 'Dark Ocean Society' and the *Kokuryūkai* 'Amur River Society', the *Keirin gakumei* is considered the main progenitor of all important ultranationalist organizations.

Miles Fletcher: *Intellectuals and Fascism in Early Showa Japan*, *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1, November 1979, p.41

Tatiana Linkhoeva: *Debates on 'Japanese-style Fascism in the 1920s, Axis Empires: Toward a Global History of Fascist Imperialism*, Workshop LMU, Munich, 23-24 November, 2015

43 Kita Ikki outlined his philosophy of nationalistic socialism first in 1906 in his book 'The Theory of Japan's National Polity and Pure So-

Anti-Western and anti-liberal trends in Japan had high-ranking supporters and strong organizational solidarity during the 1920s and thus were able to exert disproportionate influence as a result of their popularity among the bureaucratic and military elite.

In the beginning of the 1920s, there was a pervasive culture of fascism that emerged, manifest through aesthetics and in a number of philosophical and literary works fascism was interlaced with the increasing sense of crisis that dominated the atmosphere of the period. Accompanied by transformations of massive urbanization that followed the transition to an industrial capitalist mode of production, during the Taishō liberal democracy and the capitalist internationalism, the persistence and violence displayed by right-wing groups was able to weaken and eventually to overturn the prevailing atmosphere of liberal society.<sup>44</sup> Thus, fears expressed in increasing state focus on the internal and external dangers posed by the spread of communism provided the motive and justification for political repression and the creation of fascist-style police powers from the late 1920s.

Legal and institutional structures linked to the Peace Preservation Law of 1925 connected communism as an existential threat to the national body *kokutai*. The expansion of a police state became the centrepiece of new forms of censorship, as internal surveillance, mass arrests, purges, and the forced recantations of left-wing beliefs emerged as part of daily governmentality. Fascist thought raised concerns with Comintern activism in the empire, and the propagated military threat posed by the Red Army

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cialism' *Kokutairon oyobi Junsei Shakaishugi* and emphasized a close relationship between Confucianism and platonic state authoritarianism as ideological father of Japanese fascism, in his 1919 book on the 'An Outline Plan for the Reorganization of Japan' published as *Nihon kaizō hōan taikō*, which has been called 'Mein Kampf' of the Shōwa ultranationalist movement and articulated a theory very similar to fascism. Mussolini convened the *Fascio di Combattimento* on March 23, 1919.

George M. Wilson: *Kita Ikki's Theory of Revolution*, *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 1, November 1966, pp.89-99

In 1923, socialist and historian Sakai Toshihiko (1871-1933), one of the founding members of the Japan Socialist Party in 1906 and the Japan Communist Party in 1922, and Arahata Kansō (1887-1981), left-wing labor leader, published 'Fascism in Japan' in the July 1923 journal of the Red International of Labor Unions RILU, also called Profintern, in English.

44 By the end of the Tokugawa period, Japan had a population of approximately 31.5 million people, with an urban population of about four million, and in 1920 the population of Japan had increased to just less than 56 million, and reached 73 million by 1940. The urban population of around four million had likewise increased to around 10 million in 1920, and that more than doubled to over 27 million in 1940. Over the same time period, the rural population actually decreased by about 300 000.

Thomas O. Wilkinson: *The Urbanization of Japanese Labour, 1868-1955*, University of Massachusetts Press, 1965, p.24

helped the ultranationalistic debates on aggressive expansionism to Asia. Their representatives, who could not implement their policy visions during the 1910s because the liberal group prevailed in domestic politics, argued for Japanese imperialism and expansionism, and securing the Asian continent under Japanese control.

Anti-communism became central to fascist imperialism through the strategic thinking and geopolitical vision of Japan's wartime leaders heightened during the Russo-Japanese War and its aftermath. The longstanding Russophobia in military doctrine goes back to the rivalry for control over Manchuria and Korea that had been nurtured since the turn of the century. The Japanese Army warned vehemently of evil ideas of Bolshevism, which was broadcasted in propaganda pamphlets and public speeches, inciting that the 'red peril' fused internal and external threats across the Japanese empire to spread a Bolshevik-Asia.<sup>45</sup> The demagogic slogan 'Asia to the Asians' aimed to establish Japan's leadership in Asia by excluding Western powers from the region and had already fallen on fertile ground in the name of racial solidarity and civilizational harmony. Even in China during the Russian-Japanese War despite the benevolent support of the Chinese government for Russia.<sup>46</sup> The expansionist transnational ideology towards China was not the monopoly of conservative anti-liberals. Within Japanese society an overwhelming consensus concerning policy in Manchuria, whether as the disseminator of a higher civilization or as the leading force in economic development and cooperation cut across the political aisle.

Many Japanese intellectuals who had no previous connection with conservative radical nationalist groups, such as the members of the Kyoto School of Philosophy or the semiofficial think tank *Shōwa Kenkyūkai*, also utilized anti-Western rhetoric and advocated a renewed Japanese Asian identity.

By the time of Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the terms 'fascism' *fuashizumu*, 'fascist' *fuassho*, had been common ground in intellectual discourse and seemed to correspond to Japan's so-

cial, political, and cultural realities. For marxist philosopher, deeply influenced by Kant, TOSAKA Jun (1900-1945), probably the most sustained prewar analyst of the relationship of fascist culture to politics in Japan, the debate was not anymore about the existence of fascism in Japan, as he was already discerning the aesthetic dimension of fascism. An aesthetic that, in Susan Sontag's description, glorifies surrender, exalts mindlessness, and glamorizes death.<sup>47</sup> A fascist mood in the 1930s drove an ideology of renewal and harmony and sought to restore a spiritual state of culture to cover social cracks. Fascist aesthetics attempted to resolve the conflicts of social abstraction of modernity itself, calling for a complete submission either to absolute order by harmonizing fractured daily life or to a undifferentiated, but liberating moment of violence. The aesthetisation of politics was a key feature of every fascist regime and the discourse of timeless harmony appealed to Japanese politics in which aesthetic issues permeated all aspects of society; the political, economy, and cultural realms.<sup>48</sup> While previous publications presented European fascisms as a foreign phenomenon, publications now generally referred to contemporary developments in Japan as a reform movement to strengthen social justice. From the spring of 1932, the *Nihon Fasshizumu renmei* Japanese Fascist League published a new monthly journal entitled *Fasshizumu*, which defined Japanese fascism, above all, as a nationalism deriving from Japanese consciousness.<sup>49</sup>

The swift occupation of Manchuria at the end of 1931 had caused enthusiasm among a large part of the Japanese population, as since the aftermath of the Sino- and Russo-Japanese wars at the turn of the century, the politics of imperialism evolved to accommodate new practices of mass mobilisation behind the new empire. The overwhelmingly popular

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47 In 1933 Tosaka, together with Miki Kiyoshi, the Marxist writer Nakanō Shigeharu (1902-1979) and the literary critic Aono Suekichi (1890-1961), founded the Alliance for Freedom of Science and the Arts *Gakugei jiyū dōmei*. In the short time up to his ban on publication in 1937, Tosaka wrote around 300 journal and newspaper articles and ten books and anthologies.

Susan Sontag: *Fascinating Fascism*, in Susan Sontag: *Under the Sign of Saturn*. New York Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1980, p.73-105

Leslie Pincus: *Authenticating Culture in Imperial Japan: Kuki Shūmzōm and the Rise of National Aesthetics*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996, p.247

48 See Walter Benjamin: *Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit*, in *Gesammelte Schriften I, 2*, Werkausgabe Band 2, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 1991 (1936), pp. 431-469

49 Gavan McCormack: *1930s Japan: Fascism? Social Analysis*, in *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 14, 2, April-June 1982, pp.20-33

45 Louise Young: *Japan's total empire, Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism*, University of California Press, 1998, pp.140ff

46 Japan began to celebrate East Asian culture first to the Koreans in the 1929 Exposition, when Japanese administrators shifted the focus from demonstrating what the West could give to Asia, to display Japanese strength instead, with focus on the co-prosperity between Japan and Korea.

support for the Kwantung Army's takeover of Manchuria did not appear spontaneously, but instead was assembled by a variety of social and political institutions that organized people to appeal to a mass following.<sup>50</sup> Imperialism was not monopolized by government anymore, but became an issue of private collectivities, enhanced by the mass media discourse on Manchuria, calling it a treasure-house of unlimited land and inexhaustible resources.

In a moment of depression due world-recession, the possibilities of an economic paradise for Japanese industrial expansion could no longer wait to be exploited.

At the same time the action led to international criticism of Japan's behaviour. But as the majority of Japan's political and intellectual elite, including the pro-Western internationalists, supported the new orientation in foreign policy, the Japanese government withdraw in March 1933 from the League of Nations.<sup>51</sup> After they very same had established a committee of inquiry in East Asia.<sup>52</sup> Japan's isolation after the Manchurian Incident was accelerated by the impact of world wide tendencies which altogether denied the capitalist internationalism, such as Germany and Russia for example.

The shift from liberal internationalism to regional order in East Asia became therefore more feasible policy in the changing international system of the 1930s and the Manchuria crisis formed in a way the background for the turn to fascism as an obvious step. The fascist movement, triggered so far by militant groups and some right-wing intellectuals was then absorbed into the totalitarian transformation that was taking place as the international situation

required national unity.<sup>53</sup> The reality of modern life clearly contradicted the anti-modern rhetoric of 'return to Japan' by utilizing products of modernity such as radio, newspapers and magazines to extend its control of the information available to citizens and to mobilize them on a national scale. Furthermore Japanese soldiers epitomised modernity with their armament of industrial technologies and one main task of colonisation was to elevate the imperial subjects to the high Japanese standards of civilisation.

Convinced that the decimation of the Japan Communist Party by 1933 made revolutionary action all but impossible within Japan, Marxist intellectuals shifted their hopes to Manchuria, where they could escape from the excesses of political repression in Japan and sought to pursue their revolutionary goals under the slogans of racial harmony.

When the Kwantung Army took over Manchuria the installed a form of controlled economy *tōsei keizai*, which drew inspiration from German total war doctrine and the Soviet command economy, they imposed an administrative structure on over 30 million Chinese and other native inhabitants, which made it a relatively simple matter for Japanese planners to develop existing structures rather than to create an entirely new apparatus under state-sponsored corporatism. To justify the continual expansion of state power they propagated a economic policy that could solve the crisis of capitalism in Japan's countryside through planned migration and the creation of state-managed farm cooperatives in Manchukuo.

The anti-capitalist rhetoric to introduce a series of free market and private sector controls by a colonial autocracy was well received by various sides as a solution to resource-poor Japan and as an exit scenario from the constraints of liberal world trade and free market capitalism.<sup>54</sup> Arguably, Manchukuo was

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50 In 1932, the first translation of *Mein Kampf* was published, the *Asahi Shimbun* published seventy-two articles featuring the word *fassho* (translation for the term fascism, alongside *fashizumu*), and seventeen titles appeared on the book market which explicitly referred to fascism, and almost twice as many did so in the following year.

Adolf Hitler: *Kokuminteki sekaikan*, Tokyo Naigaisha, 1932

See Daniel Hedinger: *Universal Fascism and its Global Legacy. Italy's and Japan's Entangled History in the Early 1930s*, *Fascism 2 Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies*, 2013, pp.141–160

51 A referendum on withdrawing from the League of Nations was held in Germany on 12 November 1933 alongside Reichstag elections. The measure was approved by 95.1% of voters.

52 Even Nitobe Inazō, known for his liberal internationalism, was prepared to defend Japan's policies that led to the Manchurian incident, and accepted Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, which he had served for so many years.

Thomas W. Burkman: *The Geneva Spirit*, in John F. Howes, ed.: *Nitobe Inazō: Japan's Bridge Across the Pacific*, Boulder Westview, 1995, pp.204–209

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53 These outbursts, inaugurated by intellectuals such as Kita Ikki, who called for constructing a revolutionized Japan, not only to detach Westernisation but also to replace Meiji oligarchy, which arrogates all power to itself and denied full popular representation. He promoted a coup d'état to accomplish these ends and carry out a new and more representative Diet, that could then overrule the bureaucracy and legislate away the 'economic daimyo class' of the zaibatsu. Nevertheless, Japanese fascism never allowed it to develop into a large-scale party capable of concrete action and political control. It came to an end in a failed coup by imperial loyalists in 1936, fuelled by the thinking of Kita Ikki and intended to effect a spiritual reformation of Japan by restoring the Imperial Way of government.

George M. Wilson: *Kita Ikki's Theory of Revolution*, *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 1, November 1966, pp.89-99

54 A controlled economy in Manchukuo represented a significant departure from twenty-five years of highly profitable economic activity under a regime of liberal imperialism by the direction of the South Man-

more thoroughly fascist than Japan itself and became a training ground for fascist ideas interacting with anti-colonial nationalisms under a policy that gave rise to new forms of sovereignty such as the client states of the Co-prosperity Sphere.

Supporting the idea of controls on the free market and private industry, leftist refugees of the Japanese police state helped to make Asian-style fascism in Manchuria, that represented the synergy of colonial and metropolitan autocracy before it gradually dispensed with democratic controls at home.

Intellectuals such as ŌKAWA Shumei (1886-1957) praised the establishment of Manchukuo both as a victory against the corruption of Zaibatsu business groups and political parties at home and as a courageous defence of Japanese continental policy against the American, British and Soviet opposition.<sup>55</sup> RŌYAMA Masamichi (1895–1980), a liberal intellectual of the time who was well respected internationally and influential in Japanese policy circles presented his analysis of Japan's relations with Manchuria to an international audience two years before the Manchurian Incident. There he insisted on international approval to protect Japan's established interests in Manchuria.

As the Japanese government began to use the slogan 'New Order in East Asia' to describe its foreign policy, Ōkawa established in May 1938 a teaching institute affiliated with the East Asian Economic Research Bureau in Tokyo, with funds from the Manchurian Railway Company, the army, and the For-

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churian Railway. Beneficiaries such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi drew heavy profits from handling exports of Manchurian soybeans, which constituted 75% of the company's revenues and half of the world supply.

Louise Young: *Japan's total empire, Manchuria and the Culture of War-time Imperialism*, University of California Press, 1998, p.32

55 Ōkawa, activist, writer, student of Indian philosophy, and translator of the Koran, regarded war as a positive historical factor: the dynamic creative force behind civilization and progress in a quasi-Mussolini emphasis on the 'creative aspect' of war. His position foreshadowed the in-famous October 1934 army pamphlet 'Cardinal Principles of National Defense and Proposals for Their Strengthening' *Kokubun no hongō to sono kyōka no teishō* which opened with the words 'War is the father of creation, the mother of culture. The central theme in world history, Ōkawa believed, was the incessant conflict between Asia and the West. Ōkawa was put on trial for his involvement in the May 15, 1932, assassination of Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi. After his arrest the court found him guilty of providing guns and money to conspirators during the planning stage of the assassination. He received a fifteen-year prison sentence, but spent less than two years in prison, between June 1936 and October 1937. In May 1938, he was reinstated to his position as director of the East Asia Economic Research Bureau in Tokyo, managing one of the largest research institutes in Japan to promote a pan-Asianist agenda

William Miles Fletcher: *The Search for a New Order: Intellectuals and Fascism in Prewar Japan*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982, p.29

Ministry.<sup>56</sup> Merging a colonial cultural policy with anti-colonial ideology, the school aimed to educate a body of Japanese bureaucrats who could understand the culture and language of Asian peoples to deal with the apparent unreadiness of the Japanese Empire for a great pan-Asian cause.<sup>57</sup> By the time Imperial Japan's façade of constitutional monarchy actually concealed a government controlled by the military and a sympathetic civilian bureaucracy committed to its own preservation and aggrandizement, operating without any need for accountability to the masses.

The 'Concordia Association', a mass organization, helped to communicate a utopian fascism resembling the Italian model under Mussolini in the period after 1931 in the rise of militarism and ultra-nationalism to the people. In a well coordinated effort, the army sponsored speech tours, rallies, parades, newsreel screenings, and radio events to take their message to the people. The Imperial Japanese Government tried to shape and mold the population into just the sort of motivated yet servile populace that Mussolini and his *Fascio di Combattimento* were working toward in Fascist Italy, and after 1937, it followed Nazi Germany's 'neo-corporatism'. The Concordia Association became one of the primary disseminators of official and unofficial propaganda, maintaining the new state's moral virtues and values to the Manchukuo people, the Japanese, and people abroad. The association emerged from the former Manchurian Youth League, founded in July 1932, whose aim was to preserve unity and harmony between the five officially recognized ethnic groups. Another intention was to organize the Manchurian people into communities to overcome class differences and combat both communism and Western

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56 Actually the railway conglomerate and its military arm, the Kwantung Army, were conveniently in place and cooperating with Imperial Japan prior to the 1931 Incident.

Founded originally on an informal basis in 1933, the influence of the Shōwa Research Association, especially that of the subdivisional Cultural Research Group, created by the summer of 1938 under the leadership of Miki Kiyoshi (1897–1945), gained a lot of attention with the construction of a 'New East Asian Order' as a primary aim of Japan's foreign policy. Argued from the perspective of world history, his philosophy of an East Asian Cooperative Body, would overcome Western hegemony of Americanism by prioritizing the collectivity over individuality. Nevertheless to which extend politicians identified with the philosophical and social-scientific theories, the Shōwa Research Association, led by Miki Kiyoshi and social scientist Royama Masamichi, provided the attributed legitimacy to the interpretation of practical problems plaguing Japan's mission against the Western-backed Chinese Nationalists.

57 Grant K. Goodman: *Japanese Cultural Policies in Southeast Asia During World War 2*, New York St. Martin's, 1991

capitalism.<sup>58</sup> With gradually evolving totalitarian institutions out of its own native heritage, fascism developed with the active and enthusiastic support of the army, which had every reason to be the main pillar of a regime committed to imperialist expansion.<sup>59</sup> Manchukuo's fascism allowed a middle way between laissez-faire capitalism and communism, seemingly without the antagonism that causes its structural imbalance. In the case of Nazi Germany, also increasingly a model for Manchukuo's Japanese state planners after 1938, the form neo-corporatism represented a non-Marxist alternative to a failing liberal social and economic order.<sup>60</sup> Supported by the attempted military coups, the violent takeover in Manchuria, and the formation of radical right-wing organizations in 1931, Japan's fascism took hold and became regularized in 1936, with the beginning of mass mobilization and mass censorship.<sup>61</sup>

Historian Harry Harootunian and others have argued, when wartime Japan paradoxical both rejected modernity and actively developed it at the same time, actually it claimed a social order free from the uncertainties and indeterminacies of an alienated civil society to establish what can be called a 'capitalism without capitalism'.<sup>62</sup> This paradox of a tech-

nical modernity combined with a cultural anachronism, a simultaneous rejection and acceptance, embedded in a non-competitive capitalism, appears to be a salient feature of all fascist movements, which paradoxically use modernity itself as a reaction to the process of modernization, and thus become a form of 'reactionary modernity'.<sup>63</sup>

In Japan fascism emerged under the same cultural conditions that gave birth to European fascism. A reactionary modernist response to the threats of social and political division created by the economic and social crises following the First World War.<sup>64</sup>

Not only were the reforms which the movement advocated modelled on the institutions of fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, it embodied also the same contradiction of rejecting modern society while aiming to build an economically strong nation. In his book 'The Ideology of Japanese Fascism' MARUYAMA Masao (1914-1996) in 1947 pointed out the ideological affinities among wartime Japan, Fascist Italy, and Nazi Germany, such as collectivism and spiritualism.

But other than Italy and Germany, Japan could not gain support from a mass party, because it had not experienced a bourgeois revolution and the masses in a broader range had not successfully participated in politics. William M. Fletcher in 'The Search for a New Order: Intellectuals and Fascism in Prewar Japan' also compellingly revealed, how the extensive influence of German and Italian thinking on Japanese intellectuals and politicians who became key figures in the late 1930s and early 1940s, took place.<sup>65</sup> In comparing Japanese fascism with National Socialism, the uniqueness of the former was attributed to the deeply rooted structure of the 'pre-modern' Japanese mentality and its symptomatic 'system of individual irresponsibility' that permeated Japanese

58 The architects of Manchukuo borrowed the idea of the 'Way of the King' from Sun Yat-sen, who deployed the term in the mid 1920s to contrast the evils of Western imperialism with the promise of pan-Asianism modelled on the Sino-centric tribute system. Following Sun Yat-sen, a leader of the revolution that overthrew the Qing dynasty in 1911, and helped to establish the Republic of China in 1912, the promulgation of the 'Way of the King' in Manchukuo represented Japan's alternative against the imperialistic Western political models of liberalism and socialism. Secondly, the Japanese planners borrowed the idea of a harmony of five races under one union from Chinese political philosophy, which was mimicked by the official flag of Manchukuo. Together with the instalment of Emperor Pu Yi as imperial sovereign head of a state organized along Confucian principles, Manchukuo became the model for a new form of client state that could accommodate nationalist demands for sovereignty and self-determination but still ensured Japanese political control. A blueprint for Asianism in newly conquered territories in China and Southeast Asia in common cause with anti-colonial nationalism, and nominal sovereignty under a Japanese-led alliance of Asian nations.

Louise Young: Japan's total empire, Manchuria and the Culture of War-time Imperialism, University of California Press, 1998

59 William Ebenstein: Today's Isms: Communism, Fascism, Capitalism, Socialism, New Jersey Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967, p.108

60 Alan E. Steinweis: Art, ideology & economics in Nazi Germany: the Reich chambers of Music, Theater, and the Visual Arts, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, c1993

On 25 April 1938, after visiting Japan, Baron Giacomo Paolucci di Calboli came to Manchukuo with an Italian delegation for two weeks, which created a great sensation for the local people and for the heads of the Concordia Association since they hoped to apply Italian fascist principles to the new state.

Annika A. Culver: Glorify the Empire: Japanese Avant-Garde Propaganda in Manchukuo, UBC Press, 2013, p.141

61 See Abe Hirozumi: Fashizumu hihan no josetsu, Tokyo: Miraisha, 1975

62 Harry Harootunian: Overcome by Modernity, Princeton University

Press, 2000, p.xxx

63 Jeffrey Herf: Reactionary Modernism, New York Cambridge University Press, 1984

Roger D. Griffin: The Nature of Fascism, Routledge London, 1993

Modernity is not at all incompatible with authoritarianism, irrationalism or fascism and the model of modernity and the process of modernization is not to be seen as an effective, radical replacement of traditional society. There are forms of authoritarianism, among which he included fascism, which are not a reaction to modernity or a resistance to modernity, but are born of modernity itself, from the contradictions of modern society.

Emilio Gentile: Il fascismo, in Licia Morra ed.: L'Europa del XX secolo fra totalitarismo e democrazia, Itaca Lugo di Romagna, 1991, pp.109-110

64 Alan Tansman ed.: The Culture of Japanese Fascism, Duke University Press, 2009 p.8f

65 William M. Fletcher III: The Search for a New Order: Intellectuals and Fascism in Prewar Japan, The University of North Carolina Press, 1982

society. In contrast to National Socialism, in which a widespread ideology based on a theoretical foundation provided the participants with an objective justification for their behaviour, Japanese fascism did not come about through free decision-making, but through dependence on the only superior authority, the Emperor.<sup>66</sup>

In Maruyama's understanding there were several different fascist movements as part of a three-stage process of development with a preparatory period (1919-1931) when anti-proletarian civilian groups formed to advocate the authoritarian government. The second period of radical fascism (1931-1936) when these groups became active after the Manchurian Incident in 1931, and cooperated with young officers who started an uprising, eventuating in assassinations and attempted assassinations of government officials. This phase came to an end in the failed coup of imperial loyalists on February 26, 1936, when fascism from below was integrated into the existing political structure. In a call for a spiritual reformation, the period of consummation (1936-1945) began, when senior military powers gained power and together with political bureaucrats implemented fascist structures in the guise of state control.<sup>67</sup>

The unrest caused by the economic depression, the military expansion, the repressive state intervention, the cultural unease and the fear of the Anglo-American powers between 1936 and 1940 formed the framework for a system of an ideology of rule with kinship to the fascist systems of Germany and Italy. As far as Japanese fascism resembled Nazi Germany and the Italian model, it did so when the military, the bureaucracy, provincial landlords, and monopolistic capitalists joined forces to create an

oppressive fascist system to protect the capitalist structure in Japan from the dual threats of an economic depression and a proletarian revolution.

The institutional pattern may be constituted as special case, as Japanese fascism was a response to the contradictions of capitalism, suffusing politics, culture, and daily life. Generally accepted, it was experienced by a great breadth of people, knowingly or not, across educational and class lines, including students, politicians, the petite bourgeoisie, farmers, and labourers.<sup>68</sup> Japanese fascism took hold at the state level gradually, as military, political, and bureaucratic forces were stimulated from below by outbursts of radical, violent fascism and has not been created by a mass takeover led by a single charismatic leader. The fascist movement from below was completely absorbed into the totalitarian transformation from above but has never led to the absolute dissolution of pluralism. Japanese fascism was essential for the state-controlled mobilization for a 'holy war' under the banner of a nation as a family-state at home and expansion and control abroad, under a rhetoric of emancipation of Asian peoples from Western colonialism.<sup>69</sup>

## New Order

With (1) the promulgation of the 'New Order' *Shintaisei* policy by Prime Minister Kono Fumimaro in August 1940, (2) the formation of the 'Imperial Rule Assistance Association' *Taisei yokusankai*, which created a totalitarian single party organization, (3) the writings of the Ministry of Culture, 'Basics of our state body' *Kokutai no hongei* in 1937 and (3) 'Way of the Subjects' *Shinmin no michi* in 1941, the Japanese people were reinterpreted as politically immoral, who had to unconditionally submit to their fate.

Even the most basic actions became an expression of the greatness of the Yamato race and by extension, national destiny. The Ministry of Education patronized its citizens with guidelines on the right etiquette for eating Japanese food, the right angle at which subordinates and superiors bow to each other, and even the right way to climb stairs. Even fashion became an expression of the right attitude. Manners were more than just a mark of civilization, they

66 Fascism is an alternative form of modernity between socialism and capitalism, which advocates the benefit of a community and a group over that of individuals.

Roger Eatwell: Universal Fascism?: Approaches and Definitions. In S. Larsen ed.: Fascism outside Europe, Boulder: Columbia University Press/Social Science Monographs, 2001, pp.15—45

67 Maruyama Masao: Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, New York Oxford University Press, 1963

Maruyama Masao: The Ideology and Dynamics of Japanese Fascism, trans. Andrew Fraser, in Ivan Morris ed.: *Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969

The development was accommodated by such events as the murder of Marshal Chang Tso-lin in 1928, the Manchurian Incident in 1931, when party cabinets died out after the assassination of Premier Inukai Tsuyoshi in 1932, the attempted coup d'état on 26 February 1936, the China Incident in 1937, the 'unconstitutional' National Mobilisation law in May 1938, when the New Order foreign policy was announced in 1938 at the birthday of emperor Meiji on November 3, and when the political parties dissolved themselves in 1940.

68 Fabian Schäfer ed.: Tosaka Jun. Ideologie - Medien - Alltag, Leipzig Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2011

69 Andrew Gordon: Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991, p.237ff

were the sign of racial superiority. This veiled type of nationalist sentiment corresponded with the consolidation of civilian organizations *tonarigumi* (neighbourhood associations of several households that functioned as a local surveillance system), as part of the 'National Spiritual Mobilization Sentiment Movement' *Kokumin Seishin Sōdōin Undō*.<sup>70</sup>

Private lives of citizens were monitored by police and local community watch organisations, who reported immoral behaviour, potential espionage activities or political crimes to the Military Police *Kempeitai* and Special Higher Police *Tokkō Keisatsu*, who were under the command of the military, respectively the emperor. Through this network of self control imposed by the state, independent organisations of socialists, communists, tenant farmers, workers and anybody who opposed the emperor system, created over the previous years, were continuously dissolved.

In Imperial Japan, the socially distorting forces triggered by industrialization and modernization intensified a growing tension between progressive embourgeoisement and demands for social participation at the end of the Meiji era, a tension that gave way to a break between politics and culture.

With regulated access for all ordinary people, the public sphere became more and more identified with the emperor, and the new educational system focused on the transformation of the populace at large into loyal imperial subjects rather than educate them as a participatory citizens. Published by the Ministry of Education, millions copies of the 1937 'Cardinal Principles of the National Entity of Japan' *Kokutai no hongji* were disseminated to the country to clarifying the absolute principle of *kokutai*, the sacred bond between the Emperor, as descendant of the sun goddess Amaterasu, and the people as his protégés. The social and economic reforms formerly enacted by the state in the style of Western modernism slightly were pushed back again by the 'return to

Japan' *Nihon kaiki* movement that strove to define and recreate a Japaneseness that was contradictory to the West and the modern. Nationalistic voices called for restoration of the 'authentic' Japanese culture that existed prior to modernization, which had ostensible created those conditions for the emergence of private interest and individual ambition as a social form. The rising demands from constituencies for a larger role in the disbursement of social power was countered by a imperialistic state further restricting the private sphere to ever more unpolitical forms of expression. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, Japanese citizens came to be linked to the state and the emperor through a vast and expanding network of functional organs imposed upon them by the state due youth groups, women's groups, village and neighbourhood associations, and others.

Civil, private organizations established in the period of Imperial Democracy were gradually swallowed up into state organization, especially through the Election Purification Movement of 1935 and the National Mobilization Law of 1938.<sup>71</sup>

Proclaiming a 'New Order in East Asia', a year after the outbreak of the war with China in 1937, Prime Minister Prince KONOE Fumimaro (1891-1945) resurrected the Meiji-era Pan-Asianist 'Asia is One' rhetoric that maintained that all Asian ethnicities shared a common culture. The New Order Movement *Shintaisei undō*, which the Showa Research Association *Shōwa kenkyūkai* organized from 1938 to 1940, started out as a spiritual mobilization campaign of the 'Holy War' against China, and led to a vision of Japanese regional hegemony.

The declaration of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere *Daitōa Kyōeiken* in June 1940, which clearly solidified the common ground between Imperial Japan, Fascist Italy, and Nazi Germany.<sup>72</sup> Under Japanese leadership, the regions of Manchukuo, Taiwan, Southeast Asia and the South Pacific were thus expected to thrive in a symbiotic, self-sustaining economic structure freed from Western exploitation.

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70 The creation of *tonarigumi* Neighborhood mutual-aid associations was formalized on 11 September 1940 by order of the Home Ministry. Participation was mandatory. Responsible for sample duties and civil defence, each unit was also assisting the National Spiritual Mobilization Movement, by distributing government propaganda, and organizing participation in patriotic rallies.

Together with the Imperial Rule Assistance Association IRAA, *Taisei yokusankai*, a superstructure modelled after the Nazi Party in Germany, home front mobilization entered a new phase. Funded as association and consciously not as a party, the New Order movement would promote to place 'One Hundred Million' into one body to conduct all energies and abilities for the sake of the nation.

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71 Andrew Gordon: *Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan*, Berkeley University of California Press, 1992, p.320

72 The Tripartite Pact, between the three countries, was signed in Berlin on 27 September 1940 by, respectively, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Galeazzo Ciano and Saburō Kurosu.