論文

2007年12月

Strategic candidacy and single-peakedness

JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW
  • Yusuke Samejima

58
4
開始ページ
423
終了ページ
442
記述言語
英語
掲載種別
研究論文(学術雑誌)
DOI
10.1111/j.1468-5876.2007.00381.x
出版者・発行元
BLACKWELL PUBLISHING

In elections, the voting outcomes are affected by strategic entries of candidates. We study a class of voting rules immune to strategic candidacy. Dutta et al. (2001) show that such rules satisfying unanimity are dictatorial if all orderings of candidates are admissible for voters' preferences. When voters' preferences are single-peaked over a political spectrum, there exist non-dictatorial rules immune to strategic candidacy. An example is the rule selecting the m-th peak from the left among the peaks of voters' preferences, where m is any natural number no more than the number of voters. We show that immunity from strategic candidacy with basic axioms fully characterizes the family of the m-th leftmost peak rules.

Web of Science ® 被引用回数 : 5

リンク情報
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5876.2007.00381.x
J-GLOBAL
https://jglobal.jst.go.jp/detail?JGLOBAL_ID=201302262172816923
Web of Science
https://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=JSTA_CEL&SrcApp=J_Gate_JST&DestLinkType=FullRecord&KeyUT=WOS:000250985500001&DestApp=WOS_CPL
ID情報
  • DOI : 10.1111/j.1468-5876.2007.00381.x
  • ISSN : 1352-4739
  • J-Global ID : 201302262172816923
  • Web of Science ID : WOS:000250985500001

エクスポート
BibTeX RIS