論文

2005年8月

Strategic candidacy, monotonicity, and strategy-proofness

ECONOMICS LETTERS
  • Y Samejima

88
2
開始ページ
190
終了ページ
195
記述言語
英語
掲載種別
研究論文(学術雑誌)
DOI
10.1016/j.econlet.2005.01.017
出版者・発行元
ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA

We show that any voting rule satisfying unanimity and candidate stability (meaning that no candidate gains by withdrawing from the election) satisfies strategy-proofness. It follows that Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem implies candidate stability theorem of Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Web of Science ® 被引用回数 : 3

リンク情報
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2005.01.017
J-GLOBAL
https://jglobal.jst.go.jp/detail?JGLOBAL_ID=201502819555746480
Web of Science
https://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=JSTA_CEL&SrcApp=J_Gate_JST&DestLinkType=FullRecord&KeyUT=WOS:000230236100008&DestApp=WOS_CPL
ID情報
  • DOI : 10.1016/j.econlet.2005.01.017
  • ISSN : 0165-1765
  • J-Global ID : 201502819555746480
  • Web of Science ID : WOS:000230236100008

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