

The Glorious Revolution in the Dutch Context: Foreign-Policy Discourses, Local Patronage and Catholics

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In November 1688, William III of Orange (1650–1702) landed at Torbay, Devon. It was a remarkable expedition to Britain, with an army of more than 21,000 men, 5,000 horses, and 500 vessels — four times the size of the Spanish Armada just a century earlier.¹ Without this Dutch intervention or invasion, the revolution of 1688–9 might have never been accomplished.

This essay seeks to offer some Dutch perspectives on the Glorious Revolution. To achieve this limited aim, it will first trace Dutch historiography on the revolution, explaining why this extraordinary event has attracted limited attention from specialists on Dutch history. Secondly, it will introduce and review recent work by David Onnekink on Dutch foreign-policy discourses in 1688 and 1689, and by Coen Wilders on the local patronage network in the Dutch Republic after 1688. The former sheds light on political and ideological discourses of Dutch foreign policy relating to the revolution, positioning them in the context of the Dutch Forty Years' War from 1672 to 1713. The latter focuses on the revolution's aftermath on local politics in the province of Utrecht. Thirdly, this essay will present on new prospects for the future study of the Dutch Catholic perspective on the revolution. In this final section, I will offer some insight into my current research project, in which I attempt to examine Dutch Catholic survival tactics after 1685 vis-à-vis various types of immigrants and refugees pouring into the Protestant Republic.

Dutch Historiography on the Glorious Revolution

In *The Anglo-Dutch Moment* (1991), Jonathan Israel emphasised the Dutch role in, and the European dimension of, the Glorious Revolution, distancing himself from the traditional Whiggish interpretation of it in British historiography. To better understand the Glorious Revolution, he persuasively argued, historians have to take into account Dutch strategic considerations of international politics and warfare.² Israel's call, however, elicited hardly any reactions from Dutch historians.³ Some attention was given to the Dutch account of the

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1 Israel, Jonathan I., 'The Dutch Role in the Glorious Revolution', Idem (ed.), *The Anglo-Dutch Moment: Essays on the Glorious Revolution and Its World Impact* (Cambridge 1991) 106. I would like to express my gratitude to the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science for its generous funding (grant number: 19J00289) and to Albert Gootjes for correcting my English.

2 *Ibidem*, passim.

3 Onnekink, David, "'The Embarrassment of Power': The Historiography of the Dutch Republic in European Context in 1688", *Odysseus, The Bulletin of Area Studies (University of Tokyo)* (2009) 54.

invasion or the ‘glorious expedition’,⁴ but on the whole, scholars of Dutch history show little interest in the revolution of 1688–9.

Why have Dutch specialists all but neglected the event in which the Dutch undoubtedly played an indispensable role? According to Onnekink, who has spent the past decade studying Dutch perspectives on the Glorious Revolution, two factors may well have kept Dutch specialists from devoted scholarly efforts to the revolution. First, ‘the overwhelming military success of 1688 seems to be at odds with the narrative of victimisation’ among Dutch historians. In 1688, the Dutch succeeded in invading Britain with extraordinary military forces. Onnekink argues that Dutch scholars tended to depict the Dutch Republic as a tolerant, pacifist state threatened by offensive, militant neighbours, including expansionist France under Louis XIV (1638–1715). Such a historiographical ‘embarrassment of power’, so Onnekink claims, has led Dutch specialists to avert their eyes from the Glorious Revolution.⁵ Second, these historians gave preference to the early seventeenth century, or at least the period up to 1672. In that ‘Year of Disaster’, France, England, Cologne, and Münster simultaneously attacked the Dutch Republic. Large parts of the Republic, with the exception of the province of Holland which was spared by the tactical inundating of the waterlines, were occupied by foreign powers. Although the seventeenth century is commonly called the ‘Dutch Golden Age’, many historians assume that the Republic’s political and economic zenith had already passed by the Year of Disaster. According to this interpretation, the Dutch expedition of 1688 represented just another step towards the fall of Dutch hegemony, which had already started in 1672 or even earlier.⁶

In light of the above, the Glorious Revolution is better positioned in a somewhat longer period of Dutch history, starting from the Year of Disaster — i.e., the Dutch Forty Years’ War from 1672 to 1713, in which the Dutch Republic intermittently fought against France, including the Franco-Dutch War (1672–1678), as well as the Nine Years’ War (1688–1697), and the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1713). In his *Reinterpreting the Dutch Forty Years War, 1672–1713* (2016), Onnekink sets out to offer a new perspective of Dutch political discourses during the Forty Years’ War. He argues that the Forty Years’ War has been represented as a battle which the liberal Protestant republic was forced to wage to defend itself against the attacks of the tyrannical Catholic kingdom. He furthermore distinguishes five different interpretations of the cause of the Glorious Revolution from the Dutch perspective: The first underlines Dutch strategic considerations on the European balance of power; the second emphasises the Dutch reaction to the French *guerre de commerce*; the third highlights

4 Groenveld, Simon, ““J’equippe une flotte très considerable”: The Dutch Side of the Glorious Revolution”, in Robert Beddard (ed.), *The Revolution of 1688* (Oxford 1988); Kuil, Arjen van der, *De glorieuze overtocht. De expeditie van Willem III naar Engeland in 1688* (Amsterdam 1988).

5 Onnekink, ‘The Embarrassment of Power’, 54–55. Onnekink coined the term ‘embarrassment of power’, recalling Simon Schama’s famous *The Embarrassment of Riches: An Interpretation of Dutch Culture in the Golden Age* (New York 1987).

6 Onnekink, ‘The Embarrassment of Power’, 54, 59. On the ‘Year of Disaster’, see, for example, Israel, Jonathan I., *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477–1806* (Oxford 1995) 796–825; Tex, Jan den, *Onder vreemde heren. De Republiek der Nederlanden 1672–1674* (Zutphen 1982).

William's ambitions to the English throne; the fourth stresses the notion of the liberties of Europe; and the fifth dwells on William's role as the champion of Protestantism in Europe. Among them, so Onnekink argues, the first, strategic interpretation has dominated historiography. In this framework, the Glorious Revolution, or the Dutch invasion of Britain, is represented as an endeavour that the Republic was compelled to take so as to turn England against France, and to secure the balance of power in Europe threatened by Louis XIV's expansionism or imperialism. In this line, its proponents have suggested that the realist necessity incited the Dutch to intervene in Britain, while downplaying the ideological and religious dimension of Dutch foreign policy at the time. According to these historians, in 1688 there was a sort of consensus concerning the expedition to Britain among Dutch politicians, lacking a partisan conflict in domestic politics.⁷ Against this historiographical backdrop, Onnekink sets out his own view on the Dutch perspective on the Glorious Revolution.

Foreign-Policy Discourses in 1688 and 1689

According to Onnekink, early modern Dutch political history has been dominated by 'revisionist' historiography, which is composed of 'the structure-of-politics interpretation of domestic politics' and the realist interpretation of foreign policy. The former regards domestic politics as factional strife at the local level, denying the importance of parties at the national level. Both of these 'revisionist' historiographical trends, Onnekink claims, reduce politics to a struggle for material interests.⁸ Drawing on Lene Hansen's post-structuralist model of foreign-policy discourse, Onnekink rather insists that 'identity and foreign policy [...] are continuously shaping and reshaping each other', and that representations of 'identities are based on a Self-Other scheme'. Besides, foreign-policy discourses are understood to have provided 'policymakers with an "account, or a story, of the problems and issue they are trying to address"'.⁹ Basing himself on these assumptions, Onnekink in his analysis employs the two-party model of the Orangists and Republicans. The former are thought to have pursued the centralisation of government and backed the strict wing of the Dutch Reformed Church, deploying a Universal Monarchy Discourse — a pro-war discourse — which ascribed the root of all evils to Louis XIV in order to form alliances in Europe. The Republicans, on the other hand, are considered to have aimed at the preservation of provincial particularism and found support among the liberal wing of the Dutch Reformed Church, retaining a Peace and Commerce Discourse — an anti-war discourse — which proclaimed neutralism in international politics in order to pursue overseas trade. Although the historians whom Onnekink describes as 'revisionists' rejected the two-party model for early modern Dutch political history, he insists that it was the period of the Forty Years' War that shaped the partisan

7 Onnekink, David, *Reinterpreting the Dutch Forty Years War, 1672–1713* (Houndmills 2016) 2, 65–66, 83.

8 Idem, 'Embarrassment of Power', 43–45, 46–54; Idem, *Reinterpreting*, 5.

9 *Ibidem*, 18.

identities of Orangists and Republicans through foreign-policy discourses, while resisting the idea that the two parties existed ‘in an organizational sense’.¹⁰ Here Onnekink suggests parallels between the Whig-Tory and the Republican-Orangist division.¹¹

A brief outline of the two-party struggle in the seventeenth century as understood by Onnekink looks as follows: During the Twelve Years’ Truce (1609–1621), which interrupted the Dutch Revolt against Spain (1568–1648), the partisan struggle between Orangists and Republicans reached the level of a civil war. In 1619, Stadholder Maurice of Orange gained ascendancy over the Republicans, while Johan van Oldenbarnevelt (1547–1619), the Grand Pensionary (the *de facto* prime minister) and the leader of the Republican party, was executed. During that time, other Republican regents were likewise purged from their political offices throughout the United Provinces. In 1648, the Dutch Eighty Years’ War was finally ended with the Peace of Münster, but Stadholder William II of Orange (1626–1650) wanted to continue the war, against the wishes of the province of Holland. Then, in 1650, the Prince laid siege on the Republican city of Amsterdam and imprisoned a number of Republican leaders in the castle of Loevestein. However, William II passed away suddenly in the autumn of 1650, eight days before his son William III was born. Soon thereafter, the Great Assembly (1651) was convened, where the Republicans abolished the stadholderate in five provinces including Holland and Utrecht. During the first stadholderless period from 1650 to 1672, Dutch politics were led by the Republican party, headed by Grand Pensionary Johan de Witt (1625–1672). Soon after the French army invaded the Northern Netherlands in the Year of Disaster, De Witt was lynched and killed by an angry mob, who blamed the war on the conciliatory policies under the Republicans. Backed by popular support, William III was installed as the Stadholder that very same year. From that time on, the Orangists were in charge of national policy making, waging the Forty Years’ War against France.¹²

How, then, did the Dutch justify their invasion of Britain in 1688? In order to trace Dutch foreign-policy discourses in 1688 and 1689, Onnekink deals with three types of primary source materials, namely 1) formal published documents like declarations of war, 2) unpublished political documents such as diplomatic correspondences, and 3) popular publications like pamphlets. Onnekink argues that foreign-policy discourses in 1688 and 1689 overall demonstrate that the Dutch lived in fear of a repeat of the Year of Disaster, and that the Republicans’ Peace and Commerce Discourse was absent at that time.¹³

Before landing at Torbay, the Dutch formal published documents, including *Reasons for Parting* (*Redenen van afscheyt van sijn Hoogheyt den Heere Prince van Orange*, 1688), employed a Two Kings Discourse, in which English and French kings of the Catholic faith were represented as the menace. This sort of foreign-policy discourse emphasised the protection of the Protestant ‘religion and liberty’ in the Dutch Republic and England; a clear confessional divide was drawn between the English Protestant nation and the Catholic

10 *Ibidem*, 19, 26.

11 *Ibidem*, 25, 34.

12 *Ibidem*, 25–26.

13 *Ibidem*, 69–83.

monarch James II. According to Onnekink, it is remarkable that these formal published documents lacked the Universal Monarchy Discourse of the Orangists and hardly many any reference to the European balance of power at all. Although previous studies have assumed that a Religion and Liberty Discourse was mobilised as war propaganda in William's *Declaration of Reasons* (*The Declaration of His Highness William Henry*, 1688), aimed at an English audience, Onnekink points out that the Religion and Liberty Discourse is widespread in Dutch documents from 1688 and 1689, and that the *Declaration of Reasons* did compare the situation of 1672 with the situation of 1688 in the Dutch context. After William entered Britain, however, the first signs of a Universal Monarchy Discourse emerged in formal published documents, including the Dutch declaration of war on France issued in March 1689. William had already made England join the Dutch side, so that Two Kings Discourse disappeared in the declaration, which now focused on similarities between the French invasion of the Dutch Republic in 1672 and the war of 1688. The declaration assumed that Louis XIV had been and was still concocting a plot to destroy the Dutch Republic, a typical narrative in Universal Monarchy Discourse, even though the declaration itself was still based on a Religion and Liberty Discourse. Noteworthy in the declaration is its introspective nature, lacking all references to the balance of power, to Protestantism, or to the liberties in Europe (with the sole exception of the Huguenots in France). The exclusive object of the war was to defend the Reformed faith and liberties in the Dutch Republic.¹⁴

Political documents written by Dutch diplomats also deployed Two Kings and Religion and Liberty Discourses. Remarkable about such political documents is their orientation towards Europe, as they pursued a European, supra-confessional alliance against the two Catholic kings. The Dutch diplomats did not blame the French or Catholicism *per se*. Rather, they demonised only the two kings or the entourage at their courts, especially the Jesuits, thus creating room for potential support from Catholics on the continent, including the Holy Roman Emperor. In his private correspondence, William likewise utilised a Religion and Liberty Discourse, albeit without reference to the European balance of power or universal monarchy.¹⁵

Popular pamphlets published before and during the Glorious Revolution relied on a Two Kings Discourse too, reminding their audience of the Year of Disaster. It is worth noting, however, that some pamphlets, like *The English Herring Baked on a French Grill* (*Den Engelschen borkum gebraden op een France rooster...*, 1688), were fiercely anti-Catholic and depicted Louis XIV as a 'cursed Tyrant', who attempted to destroy the true church; here we see the Universal Monarchy Discourse of the Orangists. Likewise, *The Spirit of France* (*De geest van Frankryk, en de grondregelen van Lodewijk de XIV aan Europa ontdekt*, 1688) focused not so much on the international Jesuit conspiracy, but on Louis XIV as the universal monarchy. In such pamphlets, the sole cause of the wars in 1672 and 1688 was ascribed to Louis XIV, who seduced England to oppose the Dutch Republic. At the outset of the Dutch invasion of Britain in the autumn of 1688, Universal Monarchy Discourse had come to occupy

14 *Ibidem*, 69–72.

15 *Ibidem*, 72–76.

the Dutch popular pamphlets, replacing the Two Kings Discourse. Now the root of all evils was identified as the French King, who aimed at a universal monarchy by demolishing Christendom and liberties in Europe. Noteworthy in the popular pamphlets is the strong religious favour of the Universal Monarchy Discourse. Furthermore, the Orangist pamphlets after the Dutch invasion further developed the Religion and Liberty Discourse as well, integrating into it a commercial aspect of the Republicans' Peace and Commerce Discourse.¹⁶

On the basis of these analyses, Onnekink formulates two conclusive arguments vis-à-vis previous scholarship. First, he claims that it was not the material but the religious interests that coloured the Dutch foreign-policy discourses at the time of the Glorious Revolution. Religion and Liberty Discourse dominated Dutch foreign-policy discourses throughout the period 1688–1689, while Two Kings Discourse prevailed before and during the Dutch invasion, and Universal Monarchy Discourse gained supremacy especially after the autumn of 1688. Onnekink finds no evidence for the notion of the European balance of power in Dutch foreign-policy discourses in 1688 and 1689, even though previous studies had adopted the strategic interpretation of the Glorious Revolution, emphasising the realist necessity for the Dutch to keep the European balance of power for the sake of material interests.¹⁷ Second, the Republicans' Peace and Commerce Discourse was absent not because of a national consensus on the Dutch invasion, as previously assumed, but because 'Republicans were confronted with a discursive deadlock'. As Onnekink puts it, 'Peace and Commerce Discourse seemed at odds with current threats' in 1688 and 1689. In addition, Orangists appropriated the commercial viewpoint of the Republicans when developing their Religion and Liberty Discourse.¹⁸

Although Onnekink's argument concerning the religious aspect of Dutch foreign-policy discourse and the absence of the European balance of power in such discourses is certainly persuasive, his claim regarding the two-party model of foreign-policy discourses raises many questions. For example, the absence of the Republicans' Peace and Commerce Discourse in 1688 and 1689 seems to exemplify the failure of their party's identity construction. While asserting that he does not aim to call for 'a revival of the two-party model [...] in an organizational sense',¹⁹ Onnekink does end up substantialising the two parties, even though he fails to find the Republican anti-war discourse (Peace and Commerce Discourse) once the war had started. As Pepijn Brandon points out, 'Onnekink seems to replace this one-sided realism [advocated by so-called revisionist historians] with an even more one-sided constructivist approach to international relations in which war is considered the outcome of a series of purely subjective discursive strategies'.²⁰ The two-party model seems to recede even further into the background in early modern Dutch local politics as we will discuss them in the next section.

16 *Ibidem*, 78–79.

17 *Ibidem*, 84.

18 *Ibidem*, 76–77, 79–84.

19 *Ibidem*, 26.

20 Brandon, Pepijn, 'Review: David Onnekink, *Reinterpreting the Dutch Forty Years War, 1672–1713*', *BMGN – Low Countries Historical Review* 133 (DOI: <http://doi.org/10.18352/bmgn-lchr.10581>) (2018).

Local Patronage Network in Utrecht after 1688

What impact, then, did the Glorious Revolution make on Dutch local politics in practice? Coen Wilders recently approached this hitherto neglected question in his study on the patronage system and networks of William III in the province of Utrecht from 1672 to 1702.²¹ Wilders's starting point is Daniel Jeen Roorda's interpretation of Dutch domestic politics as factional strife. In his groundbreaking study, Roorda subjected the traditional two-party 'Orangists vs. Republicans' model to heavy criticism, insisting that such distinctively organised national parties did not exist in practice. He rather suggested that local factions, rather than national parties, were at work in seventeenth-century Dutch politics. Factions were more loosely organised than parties, and driven by selfish and familial interests in local settings.²² Indeed, it is Roorda's view that Onnekink labels as 'revisionist'. Here Onnekink finds similarities between Roorda's model and the theory of the structure of politics advocated by Lewis Namier in British historiography.²³ Before delving into Wilders's analysis of the aftereffects of the Glorious Revolution on Utrecht's local politics, we first have to offer a brief overview of the political system of the province of Utrecht before 1688.

In the Dutch Republic, each of the seven sovereign provinces had its own unique political structure. Going even further back than the outset of the Dutch Revolt against Spain, the Provincial States of Utrecht had been composed of three voting units: the first estate represented the clergy (canons) of the five chapters in the city of Utrecht; the second estate, the Knighthood (*Ridderschap*), represented the nobility; and the third estate represented cities. After the outlawing of Catholic religious practices in Utrecht in 1580, the first estate came to consist of eight secularised canons from the five chapters who were known as *Geëligeerden*.²⁴ The five chapters held a quarter of all the land in the province, and hosted no fewer than 140 canons belonging to Utrecht's highest socio-economic strata. Since the chapters remained as secularised corporations, canons continued to enjoy socio-economic and political privileges, even with the loss of their clerical functions.²⁵ In seventeenth-century provincial politics in Utrecht, the second estate (four to seven representatives of the nobility) and the third estate (two incumbent burgomasters of Utrecht, and four to six members of the Utrecht city council, as well as one to three representatives from each smaller city) fought each other over the eight

21 Wilders, Coen, *Patronage in de provincie. Het Utrechtse netwerk van stadhouder Willem III* (Amsterdam 2015).

22 Roorda, Daniel Jeen, *Partij en factie. De oproeren van 1672 in de steden van Holland en Zeeland, een krachtmeting tussen partijen en facties* (Groningen 1961).

23 Onnekink, 'Embarrassment of Power', 52–54; Idem, *Reinterpreting*, 5.

24 Kaplan, Benjamin J., *Calvinists and Libertines: Confessions and Community in Utrecht, 1578–1620* (Oxford 1995) 137.

25 *Ibidem*, 113–116; Rengers Hora Siccama, Duco Gerrold, *De geestelijke en kerkelijke goederen onder het cannonieke, het gereformeerde en het neutrale recht. Historisch-juridisch verhandeling, voornamelijk uit Utrechtsche gegevens samengesteld* (Utrecht 1905) 396–414. It is worth mentioning that Catholics — both priests and laymen — could be appointed to these prominent positions until 1615, when the Provincial States decided that from then on only the Reformed were to be eligible for appointment as canons. Water, Johan van de, *Groot Placaat-Boek vervattende all de placaten ... der Staten's lands van Utrecht*, 3 vols. (Utrecht 1729) I, 218.

votes of the first estate (the *Geëligeerden*); there was thus a conflict between the noble faction and the civic faction. Originally, the Stadholder had been a representative of the Burgundian and Habsburg sovereign in the Netherlands. In the Dutch Republic, the Stadholder in theory was appointed by and served the sovereign Provincial States, but in practice he asserted enormous influence on local politics, for example by the appointment of magistrates. Although Stadholder Maurice (1567–1625) decided in 1618 to distribute the eight representatives of the first estate equally between the nobility and the patriciate so as to achieve a power balance between the second estate of the noble faction and third estate of the civic faction, in practice this regulation was not always observed. In the course of the seventeenth century, the nobility gradually lost the political influence they had once had at the provincial level through the first and second estates, while the process of oligarchisation advanced in the third estate and in all of the city councils.²⁶

The Year of Disaster marked a watershed also in the history of Utrecht. From June 1672 to November 1673, Utrecht was occupied by the French army, allowing for a temporary revival of the freedom to practice the Catholic faith.²⁷ After the French evacuation, Utrecht was initially occupied by the Dutch army and the States General. All the public office holders, including members of the city council and the Provincial States, were forced to resign by the States General. This was decided under pressure from the strict Calvinists, who ascribed the cause of the Year of Disaster to the Republicans; a collective petition, signed by approximately forty local Calvinists, demanded the dismissal of all public office holders.²⁸ The Reformed minister Thaddaeus de Landtman came to Utrecht after its ‘liberation’ and incited local Calvinists to draw up this petition.²⁹ In the evening of 16 November 1673, De Landtman offered a prayer of thanksgiving in the Dom Church in Utrecht, but, so the local patrician Everard Booth (1638–1714) observes in his diary, he did so not for the city or province of Utrecht, but ‘only for the other Provinces’. The next day Johan van Nellesteyn (1617–1677), who had been burgomaster in the past and later was to serve in that capacity again, told Booth that ‘over this City possessing such notable privileges, neither Holland nor the Generality has

26 Wilders, *Patronage*, 11–13, 30–31, 138.

27 For the French occupation of Utrecht, see, for example, Jessurun-ten Dam Ham, Suzanna Christina Johanna, *Utrecht in 1672 en 1673* (Utrecht 1934); Tex, *Onder vreemde heren*, passim; Vanhaelen, Angela, *The Wake of Iconoclasm: Painting the Church in the Dutch Republic* (University Park 2012) 130–158. For Catholics in Utrecht under the French occupation, see Forclaz, Bertrand, *Catholiques au défi de la Réforme. La coexistence confessionnelle à Utrecht au XVIIe siècle* (Paris 2014) 181–225; Yasuhira, Genji, *Civic Agency in the Public Sphere: Catholics’ Survival Tactics in Utrecht, 1620s–1670s* (Ph.D. dissertation, Tilburg University 2019) 152–182; Idem, ‘Confessional Coexistence and Perceptions of the “Public”: Catholics’ Agency in Negotiations on Poverty and Charity in Utrecht, 1620s–1670s’, *BMGN – Low Countries Historical Review* 132:4 (2017) 11–15; Idem, ‘Interconfessional Relations and the Function of Toleration: The Struggle for the Practice of Faith in Utrecht during the 1670s’, *The Shirin or the Journal of History* 98:2 (2015, written in Japanese) 17–25.

28 Booth, Everard, ‘Dagelijksche aantekeningen gedurende het verblijf der Franschen te Utrecht in 1672 en 1673’, *Berigten van het Historisch Genootschap te Utrecht* 6 (1857) 149–151.

29 Roorda, Daniel Jeen, ‘Prins Willem III en het Utrechtse regeringsreglement. Een schets van gebeurtenissen, achtergronden en problemen’, in Huib Leeuwenberg & Louise van Tongerloo (eds.), *Van standen tot staten. 600 jaar Staten van Utrecht, 1375–1975* (Utrecht 1975) 110–111.

any power'.³⁰ These local Utrechters felt threatened by the central authority led by Holland, which tried to intervene in or reduce Utrecht's local privileges. On 14 April 1674, William entered the city, and two days later a new system of governance (*regeringsreglement*) was imposed on Utrecht, reducing its political independence and assigning greater political authority to the Stadholder in local politics through his appointive power. The new civil government was installed, tightening relations with William and the strict Calvinists, and purging Republicans and those who had collaborated with the French occupiers.³¹

In his study on the new system of governance installed in Utrecht in 1674, Roorda found factional conflicts rather than partisan struggles in the local politics: in Utrecht from 1660 to the mid-1680s, the Orangists were divided between pro-Holland and anti-Holland factions, a middle group existed between Orangists and Republicans, and there were also opportunists like Everard van Weede van Dijkveld (1626–1702). Roorda argued that after 1674, Utrecht's local politics were to be determined by William's patronage system, emphasising the increase in the Prince's political influence at the local level. In his view, the agency of the Utrecht elite was largely curtailed.³² Wilders, in contrast, reinterprets William's patronage system as a more reciprocal mediation system, modifying the previous image developed by Roorda and others, who claimed that Utrecht lost its political independence due to the new system of governance allowing the autocratic Stadholder to impose his own interests on the province. Wilders maintains that Utrecht's political elite also benefited from William's patronage and mediation.³³ Here, Wilders locates the turning point for Utrecht's local patronage and mediation system in the Glorious Revolution.³⁴

The new Stadholder William provided Utrecht with formal and informal routes of mediation in local politics, which the Provincial States needed in order to prevent a repeat of the Year of Disaster. Until the French occupation in 1672, the Stadholder had been able to intervene in the Provincial States of Utrecht only when invited by the States. The new system of governance of 1674 officialised the Stadholder's role as a mediator in the Provincial States. Concerning issues of foreign policy or provincial finance, both of which required unanimous approval in the States, William's position could now be accepted without any further discussion. Besides, through an informal network, William began interfering in the Provincial States of Utrecht in a way that had not been common before. He ordered the secretary of the Provincial States to send him extracts of all the important resolutions taken at the States, which enabled him to get a hold on local affairs in Utrecht while he was away from the province. While William was mostly absent from the assemblies of the Provincial States of Utrecht after

30 Booth, 'Dagelijksche aantekeningen', 153–154: 'alleenlijk voor d'andere Provintien' and 'dese Stad sulke notabele privilegien hebbende, Holland noch de Generaliteyt geen macht hadden'.

31 Booth, 'Dagelijksche aantekeningen', 161–162; Water, *Groot Placaat-Boek*, I, 169–174; Forclaz, *Catholiques*, 217; Roorda 'Prins Willem III', 117–119; Wilders, *Patronage*, 41–51, 58–62. For Utrecht Catholics in the aftermath of the French evacuation in the 1670s, see also Yasuhira, *Civic Agency*, 182–199; Idem, 'Confessional Coexistence', 15–21; Idem, 'Interconfessional Relations', 25–33.

32 Roorda 'Prins Willem III'.

33 Wilders, *Patronage*, passim, especially 152, 177–183.

34 *Ibidem*, 155–173.

1674, he did manage to express his views through his correspondence with the local political elite, even when he was not asked to do so.³⁵ In addition to correspondence, social gathering places in Utrecht offered another informal avenue for political power. Those places included the Prince's palace at Soestdijk in Utrecht, which William purchased in 1674, and the estates of noblemen, among them Godard Adriaan van Reede van Amerongen (1621–1691), the leader of the Utrecht noble faction. Hunting represented a particularly important occasion for Utrecht's elite to build a cordial relationship with the Prince.³⁶ Through these formal and informal patronage and mediation networks, Dijkveld and Amerongen expanded their political power in Utrecht.³⁷ In an attempt to quickly adopt a resolution in the Provincial States of Utrecht, after 1674, committees were to be formed to discuss the matter ahead of time in order to make proposals on political issues to the States. In these committees, Dijkveld and Amerongen were expected to approve the draft of the proposal, even though Dijkveld's influence was limited to the civic faction and Amerongen's to the noble faction.³⁸

The Glorious Revolution introduced changes to this reciprocal system of the local politics. After the Dutch invasion of Britain, it took more than two years for William to return to the Northern Netherlands, and even thereafter, the Prince-King stayed in his fatherland for only a limited period of time. Now his primary geopolitical concern shifted from the Dutch Republic to England, Ireland, and the Southern Netherlands. As a consequence of William's physical absence from the Dutch Republic after 1688, a number of formal and informal practical problems arose in Utrecht's politics, accelerating oligopoly among the local elite. As for the formal practical problems, since William was mostly away from Utrecht and could not check the list of magistrate nominees promptly, the process of their appointment was often delayed. As for the informal practical problems, his response to letters from the Utrecht elite at best came back late, and at worst were never returned at all. The Utrecht elite also lost the opportunity to have an audience with William at his palace or the Amerongen house. Since William's focus in foreign policy shifted from Germany to England after the revolution, Amerongen lost the role he had once had in William's foreign-policy network. After Amerongen's decline, no mediator appeared between William and the Utrecht elite. Dijkveld, on the other hand, became a trusted minion of the Prince-King, turning into his most important diplomat. At the provincial level, Dijkveld developed his own patronage relationships not only among the civic faction, but also among the noble faction in the province of Utrecht, enabling him to control the Provincial States of Utrecht according to William's wishes. All of these circumstances resulted in a unilateral growth in William's influence in Utrecht's local politics, contributing to the increase in political power of only a small number of the local elite at the cost of many others.³⁹

35 *Ibidem*, 141–142.

36 *Ibidem*, 73–92.

37 *Ibidem*, passim, especially 95–134.

38 *Ibidem*, 140–141.

39 *Ibidem*, 155–173.

Based on Roorda's factional interpretation of seventeenth-century Dutch local politics, Wilders presents a persuasive, modified account of William's political role in Utrecht. After the new system of governance had been installed in 1674, William developed patronage and mediation networks in Utrecht, from which many members of the local political elite first benefited. It was the Glorious Revolution and William's physical absence from the Northern Netherlands that changed this reciprocal political system. In other words, the previous depiction of William's patronage system in Utrecht as a unilateral one may fit the situation after 1688, but certainly not the entire period of his stadholdership. As Tony Claydon vividly demonstrates, the revolution of 1688–9 and William's political circumstances gave birth to a parliamentary system in England.⁴⁰ In Utrecht, on the other hand, the revolution ended up reducing parliamentary independence.

Dutch Catholic Perspectives

This essay aims to present Dutch perspectives on the Glorious Revolution, but so far we have only considered the revolution from the top-down viewpoint of the Dutch Reformed political elite. Since in principle only full communicant members of the Dutch Reformed Church were allowed to hold a public political office in the Republic, we have no option but to employ the Reformed perspective in narrating early modern Dutch political history of either foreign-policy discourses or local patronage networks. What we lack are bottom-up Dutch Catholic perspectives on the revolution.

For a better understanding of the Glorious Revolution in Dutch history, we need to turn to the perspective of Dutch Catholics, who were too important as a politico-religious minority in the multi-confessional Republic to ignore. The Dutch Republic is and has been famous for its religious diversity. It is impossible to determine the precise number of believers of the various confessions in the Dutch Republic, since people could voluntarily choose their particular confessional affiliation on Dutch soil. The Union of Utrecht established in 1579 guaranteed freedom of conscience for every inhabitant in the Dutch Republic including Catholics, and thus people were not legally coerced to become members of the Dutch Reformed Church.⁴¹ Unlike the Anglican Church, the Dutch Reformed Church was not a state church but a 'public church', which had the obligation to serve everyone, meaning that even Catholics could baptise their children, marry, and be buried in public churches.⁴² It is certain, however, that the Reformed did not form a numerical majority of the seventeenth-century Dutch population, and that many men and women continued to belong to the Catholic Church. In the mid-seventeenth century, for example, the total population of the city of Utrecht (30,000) was

40 See Claydon's contribution in this issue.

41 E.g. Jong, O.J. de, 'Unie en religie', in Simon Groenveld & H.L.Ph. Leeuwenberg (eds.), *De Unie van Utrecht. Wording en werking van een verband en een verbondsacte* (The Hague 1979).

42 E.g. Deursen, Arie Theodorus van, *Bavianen en slijkgeuzen. Kerk en kerkvolk ten tijde van Maurits en Oldenbarnevelt* (Assen 1974) 13–33, 128–160.

composed of 12,000 Reformed full communicant members (40.0%), 10,000 Catholics (33.3%), 2,250 Lutherans (7.5%), 500 Anabaptists (1.7%), 200 Remonstrants (0.7%), and 5,000 undecided (16.6%).⁴³ Besides, in such cities as Utrecht, the Catholic community included many members of the socio-economic elite, even though Catholics on Dutch soil in theory lost the right to practice their faith publicly and to assume public offices. It was the 'tolerant' Dutch Republic that strategically institutionalised and legalised confessional discrimination against the politico-religious minority of Catholics.⁴⁴

During the past decade of early modern Dutch historiography, the study of Catholics has seen a particular boost, now covering a wide range of topics from national and individual Catholic identity or sub-culture to Catholic survival tactics in local settings. One of the characteristics of such recent studies is their focus on the period following the second half of the seventeenth century, while previous studies on early modern Dutch religious history had dealt primarily with the period of the Dutch Eighty Years' War, from 1568 to 1648.⁴⁵ One of the questions past scholarship has not resolved, however, is the following: While the Glorious Revolution paved the way for the Toleration Act in England, what impact it have for the survival of Catholics in the Dutch Republic?

While I do not as yet have an answer to this question, I can clarify an aspect of the circumstances in which Dutch Catholics in the late 1680s lived by considering their reaction to Huguenot refugees. Due to the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, hundreds of thousands of Huguenots (estimated ca. 150,000) fled from France to Protestant states, including the Dutch Republic (ca. 35,000).⁴⁶ David van der Linden has recently demonstrated that many Huguenot refugees experienced socio-economic hardships on Dutch soil despite the favourable condition offered by the Dutch Reformed authorities for their residence or business.⁴⁷ Remarkably, in the cities of Leiden and Haarlem, local Catholics made substantial donations for the Huguenot exiles.⁴⁸ Ever since the outbreak of the Dutch Revolt against

43 Forclaz, *Catholiques*, 87.

44 See, for example, Yasuhira, *Civic Agency*, passim, especially 64–106; Idem, 'Confessional Coexistence'; Idem, 'Delimitation of the "Public" and Freedom of Conscience: Catholics' Survival Tactics in Legal Discourses in Utrecht, 1630–1659', *Early Modern Low Countries* 3:1 (2019); Idem, 'A Swarm of "Locusts": Pro/Persecution and Toleration of Catholic Priests in Utrecht, 1620–1672', *Church History and Religious Culture* 99:2 (2019).

45 E.g. Forclaz, *Catholiques*; Frijhoff, Willem, *Embodied Belief: Ten Essays on Religious Culture in Dutch History* (Hilversum 2002); Geraerts, Jaap, *Patrons of the Old Faith: The Catholic Nobility in Utrecht and Guelders, c.1580–1702* (Leiden 2018); Janssen, Geert H., *The Dutch Revolt and Catholic Exile in Reformation Europe* (Cambridge 2014); Lenarduzzi, Carolina, *Katholiek in de Republiek. De belevingswereld van een religieuze minderheid 1570–1750* (Nijmegen 2019); Parker, Charles H., *Faith on the Margins: Catholics and Catholicism in the Dutch Golden Age* (Cambridge 2008); Pollmann, Judith, *Catholic Identity and the Revolt of the Netherlands* (Oxford 2011); Spaans, Joke, *De Levens der Maechden. Het verhaal van een religieuze vrouwengemeenschap in de eerste helft van de zeventiende eeuw* (Hilversum 2012); Yasuhira, *Civic Agency*; Idem, 'Confessional Coexistence'; Idem, 'Delimitation'; Idem, 'A Swarm'.

46 Nusteling, Hubert, 'The Netherlands and the Huguenot Émigrés', in H. Bots & G.H.M. Posthumus Meyjes (eds.), *La Révocation de l'Edit de Nantes et les Provinces-Unies, 1685* (Amsterdam 1986) 26–30.

47 Linden, David van der, *Experiencing Exile: Huguenot Refugees in the Dutch Republic, 1680–1700* (Farnham 2015) 39–78.

48 Bots, H., Posthumus Meyjes, G.H.M. & Wieringa, Frouke, *Vlucht naar de Vrijheid. De Hugenoten en de*

Spain in 1568, Catholics were at times represented as the fifth column, who might betray the Reformed Republic and collaborate with Catholic enemies such as Spain and France.⁴⁹ As we have seen above, the Dutch Forty Years' War was justified as the battle for religion and liberty against the universal monarchy of Louis XIV. Accordingly, Catholic donations to Huguenot refugees in Leiden and Haarlem may well suggest that image construction was one of their tactics for survival. Local Catholics in these cities attempted to demonstrate their solidarity with the Protestant exiles, constructing a positive self-representation; and they tried to denounce what the Catholic king of France had done to the Huguenots, rejecting their own negative representation by the Dutch Reformed. This raises another research question for future studies: How did the Glorious Revolution change the domestic environment of confessional coexistence in the Dutch Republic, under which Catholics sought to create room for their survival by constructing their positive self-image vis-à-vis Huguenot refugees? The study of this question will offer us a bottom-up Dutch Catholic perspective on the revolution of 1688–9.

Concluding Remarks

If we wish to understand the Glorious Revolution in the Dutch context, we must first position it in the context of the Dutch Forty Years' War against France from 1672 to 1713. The Year of Disaster inflicted a profound trauma on the Dutch, in whose eyes the situation of 1688 resembled that of 1672. Since Dutch historiography has commonly assumed that the decline of the Dutch Republic began no later than the Year of Disaster, the Glorious Revolution has failed to attract attention from specialists on Dutch history. The historiographical 'embarrassment of power' might be another reason for the neglect of this event among Dutch scholars. Regardless of whether or not the idealised two-party model may be applied to the analysis of Dutch foreign-policy discourses, Onnekink's argument is certainly persuasive with a view to the importance of the religious cause in such discourses and the absence of the notion of the European balance of power there. For the study of Dutch domestic politics in local settings at least, the framework of factional politics advocated by Roorda is still useful. As Wilders demonstrates, the patronage and mediation system in Utrecht, which was constructed in the aftermath of the Year of Disaster, was at first highly reciprocal for William and the local political elite. It was the Glorious Revolution and William's resulting physical absence from

Nederlanden (Amsterdam, 1985) 72. On Leiden, see also Israel, Jonathan I., *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477–1806* (Oxford 1995) 647–648. On Haarlem, see also Bergin, Emma, 'Defending the True Faith: Religious Themes in Dutch Pamphlets on England, 1688–1689', in David Onnekink (ed.), *War and Religion after Westphalia, 1648–1713* (Aldershot 2009) 228; Gibbs, Graham, 'The Reception of the Huguenots in England and the Dutch Republic, 1680–1690', in Ole Peter Grell, Jonathan I. Israel & Nicholas Tyacke (eds.), *From Persecution to Toleration: The Glorious Revolution and Religion in England* (Oxford 1991) 302.

49 E.g. Yasuhira, *Civic Agency*, passim; Idem, 'Confessional Coexistence'; Idem, 'Delimitation', passim; Idem, 'A Swarm', passim.

the Northern Netherlands that transformed the patronage and mediation system into a unilateral political tool for William's autocratic power. The revolution therefore ended up diminishing parliamentary independence in Dutch local politics. On the other hand, to date we still lack Dutch Catholic perspectives on the Glorious Revolution. Catholic survival tactics through representations vis-à-vis incoming Huguenot refugees may thus present prospects for future bottom-up studies on Dutch Catholic perspectives of the Glorious Revolution.