2015年8月
Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Threat-Point Effect
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
- ,
- 巻
- 7
- 号
- 3
- 開始ページ
- 318
- 終了ページ
- 346
- 記述言語
- 英語
- 掲載種別
- 研究論文(学術雑誌)
- DOI
- 10.1257/mic.20130111
- 出版者・発行元
- AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC
We investigate whether formal contracts can help in resolving the holdup problem by studying repeated transactions between a seller and a buyer. Contrary to previous findings, we demonstrate that a simple fixed-price contract based on product delivery is of value even when relation-specific investment is purely cooperative. Furthermore, we show that focusing our attention on fixed-price contracts as a form of formal contracts is without loss of generality. The key driving force is a possibility that the relation-specific investment decreases the surplus under no trade. This possibility, although very plausible, has been largely ignored in previous analyses of the holdup problem.
- リンク情報
- ID情報
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- DOI : 10.1257/mic.20130111
- ISSN : 1945-7669
- eISSN : 1945-7685
- Web of Science ID : WOS:000358575500012