WORKING PAPER UZBEK MAHALLAS: CATALYST FOR ORDER AND SECURITY IN CENTRAL ASIA

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INTRODUCTION

In recent years the primary concern for many societies in developing world has been a fight against various criminal actions. Today, governments are barely resistant to the increasing power of terrorist groups, transnational organized crime, human trafficking as well as intra-regional conflicts fed with ethnically or politically driven motives. As such, the governments are seeking for options and taking various measures to secure their citizens against the involvement in or falling victims to malevolent situations. For Central Asian countries keeping and securing communities have become a priority policy since independence as the region has been suffering from various conflicts.

The Ferghana Valley - one of the most important historico-ethnographic and economic regions of Central Asia – is a good illustration to this (refer to the list below). The population density in the eastern part reaches 400 people per sq/km. The central part is occupied by the most densely populated region of Uzbekistan (Fergana, Namangan and Andijan), the peripheral parts - Jalal-Abad, Osh and Batken region of Kyrgyzstan and Sughd region of Tajikistan. About three quarters of all residents of the Ferghana Valley live in Uzbekistan. Of ethnic minorities more than 700,000 Uzbeks live in southern Kyrgyzstan, 300,000 Kyrgyzs in Uzbekistan and 1.4 million Uzbeks in Tajikistan (Tabyshalieva, 1999)

In the years prior to independence and sometime afterwards several bloody conflicts which took place in the Ferghana Valley are listed below.

1989 – Uzbekistan (Ferghana Valley): ethnic conflict between Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks

1990 – Tajikistan: massive student and xenophobic violence against Russians and urban residents, originally over low stipends and housing.

1990 – Kyrgyzstan (Ferghana Valley): violent conflict between Kyrgyzs and Uzbeks over land around city of Osh.

2010 – Kyrgyzstan (Ferghana Valley): largest massive violent conflict between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks primarily in the city of Osh and Jalal-Abad.

Authors' own compilation

Although they have not escalated and turned into major regional confrontation, these conflicts may serve as a clear indicator that the region has reached a potentially explosive

point. Despite the scale, these events have received very little public discussion and attention within Central Asia itself.



Figure 1. The borders of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan converge in Ferghana Valley.

Source: The Economist, 2000.

The recent Kyrgyz riots of 2010 primarily took place in the cities of Osh and Jalal-Abad, where violence between ethnic communities resulted in hundreds of people killed, more than 2000 residential buildings destroyed, and most crucially, "deepened the gulf between the country's ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks" (International Crisis Group, 2010; Economist, 2011). According to the International Crisis Group (2010), this, potentially, low-scale conflict had turned violent because of the government's inability to address people's grievances in the first place. Although such ethnic tensions had existed latently during Soviet times they were mostly suppressed by the central government in Moscow on the basis of promoting the ideas of friendship, internationalism and peaceful coexistence.

While admitting a high conflict potential in Central Asia and a growing number of scholarly works on this matter in recent tears, this project does not intend to examine the regional conflict dynamics by applying traditional "state-centered" paradigm, nor will it search for underlying causes of violence. Instead, **this project has a mission to explore possibilities for a sustainable peace and conflict resolution in Central Asia by**

shifting the focus to micro-level actors and institutions, while always keeping an eye on macro-level forces and facilitators. We, therefore, put a greater emphasis on "community-based organisations" (CBOs), their functions, leadership and membership issues, other general and specific characteristics across Central Asia in order to understand how well they are suited for making societies a safer place. Although we do not employ a traditional "state-centered" paradigm (i.e. during Cold War "security" almost always meant the one of the state), we cannot, however, entirely disregard the impact of the political authority (generally, the state) in shaping the contemporary outlook of CBOs and their potential in mitigating conflicts in Central Asia. As the literature review section will attempt to disclose below, our project to some extent is an effort to bridge existing gaps in this scholarly field.

Therefore, the principal aim of this project is to observe the structural and institutional significance of CBOs in preventing and resolving conflicts in Central Asia, including those driven by ethno-cultural grievances, and scrutinize the impact of the state authority and its institutional arrangements in facilitating/undermining the peace-building role of CBOs.

While CBOs may and should address conflicts (be it an ethnic or broader notion of conflict), it is rather interesting to look at the underpinnings of CBOs. In other words, the level of state, and to a lesser extent, of non-state support and involvement has to be analysed through the lens of potential benefit or drawbacks that it may bring to CBOs and, as a result, to conflict prevention and resolution in respective communities. **Whether institutionalised (with a legal status and explicit state intevention) CBOs are more advantageous than non-institutionalised CBOs (traditional and cultural structures)** is one of the pivotal aspects of this study. The Central Asian context, in this regard, provides a fruitful soil for such comparisons, as Kyrgyzstan has non-institutionalised CBOs, Tajikistan opted for semi-institutionalised CBOs and Uzbekistan chose to fully institutionalise their CBOs across the country.

Thus, within the course of this study, we will look at culturally and traditionally similar structures with different institutional arrangements of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. As these arrangements have already resulted in various positive and negative outcomes in terms of control of conflict outbursts, it is essential to juxtapose CBOs in three countries, examine the rationale behind their level of institutionalisation and consider the

applicability of the institutionalised model to other countries while taking into account the local settings and conditions. Therefore, the profile of CBOs vis-a-vis their success in coping with community and intra-community conflicts is at the core of this research.

As Uzbekistan boasts the fully institutionalised system of CBOs it comes as a little surprise that we compare the Uzbek experience with Kyrgyz and Tajik cases. Therefore, this country will take the central part in our analysis as we attempt to disclose its experience with CBO structures as an innovative (at least in the Central Asian context) model for conflict prevention and resolution. The degree and price of success (or a lack thereof) will be determined and examined within this study.

The government of Uzbekistan identified and endorsed "mahalla" (a domestic CBO) as a local authority structure in Uzbekistan. This type of the neighborhood structure has focused attention of various groups worldwide, including social scientists, economists, Islamic scholars, human rights activists and women's organisations. Internationally interested parties view the mahalla phenomenon as a mechanism for civil society, small business entrepreneurship, Muslim community, human rights awareness, and gender issues (Kassymbekova, 2003).

The fact that Uzbek communities within and outside Uzbekistan share the culturally engraved phenomenon of mahalla can be regarded as a good alternative tool for prevention of conflicts in the country and in the region. Considering the ethnic clashes following almost the same scenario over several decades in the region the set of following questions appear to be appropriate within this study:

1. How effective is institutionalised (the Uzbek model of mahalla) community-based organisations (CBOs) in preventing conflicts? What is the impact of institutionalisation of CBOs on conflict prevention and resolution?

We argue that the main analytical focus and potential policy-making and academic value is derived from the idea that the Uzbek *institutionalised* type of mahalla may serve as an answer to some tough regional questions, including peaceful coexistence between various ethnic groups or preventing local violence and crime. Thus, one way to assess the potential effectiveness of the Uzbek model of mahalla is to look closely at the internal structure and interactions within these mahallas. Hence, the next research question is posed as follows:

2. To what extent ethnicity-based conflicts are manifested in daily practices and interactions between community members? Do they trigger larger conflicts?

Furthermore, the main objective of the current research is to investigate the mahalla phenomenon in Uzbekistan and understand better its conflict prevention potential if applied to other communities. Before the issue was taken to the inter-regional context (Uzbekistan- Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan), it was important first to shed light on the genuine nature of a nationalist sentiment and discourse within the Uzbek society: a civic vs. ethnic card. The evidence suggests that by and large the ethnic clashes or collisions never have been a problem. Especially in Tashkent (a capital city of Uzbekistan), there are plenty of examples of a diverse ethnic representation both at managerial and ordinary activist level. But, as part of research, this observation was also tested with respect to other 'ethnically sensitive' regions, such as Samarkand and Nukus where Uzbeks with Tajiks and Uzbeks with Karakalpaks co-exist respectively. Finally, in the next step we also tested whether the institutionalized Uzbek model of mahalla can be applied to neighbouring Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Thus, the third research question of this study has been put as follows:

3. Can institutionalised (the Uzbek model of mahalla) CBOs serve as a role-model for neighbouring Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan?

As such, these three research questions have been the main analytical points of departure for our study. We sought to answer them by embarking on the methodology as described below.

RESEARCH DESIGN

In this study we employed a mixed research design based on secondary and primary data. Desk research helped us to collect relevant materials and systematize the experiences of local communities in preventing and resolving communal conflicts in different parts of the world. This and our prior knowledge of the region enabled us to construct interview guides for community leaders, foreign and local experts and public officials. Our interview guides are largely based on three key research questions we have identified above.

Thus, desk research was an important preliminary step for preparing better for the main stage of our research project, namely the primary data collection through semi-structured interviews. It was essential to collect primary data, as it was necessary to first identify and then analyse perceptions of key stakeholders in local communities on their attitudes and assessments of mahalla's (in Uzbekistan) and CBO's (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) role in preventing and resolving community conflicts. In 2013, before collecting primary data, we organized one international conference in Tsukuba, Japan and two round-table seminars in Central Asia; one in Uzbekistan and one in Kyrgyzstan. This was a pilot phase of our research project which helped to conduct pilot interviews and revise our methodological tools for collecting primary data.

Overall, we conducted 202 semi-structured interviews in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, with 92 interviews completed in Uzbekistan; 61 in Kyrgyzstan and 49 in Tajikistan. We approached the following categories of respondents: public officials and experts in three countries, mahalla leaders (aksakals) in Uzbekistan and community leaders in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. We intended to conduct interviews in both conflict-prone regions where ethnic group differences are more distinct as well as in the regions where they are less observable. In particular, we approached the Uzbek communities in the following cities and regions: Tashkent, Samarkand and Nukus; Kyrgyz communities in Bishkek and Chui region, Osh and Djalal-Abad; Tajik communities in Dushanbe, Rohati and Chorbogh.

We employed the snowball approach in contacting our interviewees and it proved useful and effective. We also approached few local and international experts by contacting administration offices of their organizations.

After conducting all 202 interviews we proceeded with systematization of data obtained. We employed mixed methods for data analysis by combining qualitative and quantitative approaches. We first created a coding frame (see **Appendix 1**) and then run the pilot coding as to ensure the consistency of our methodological approach used by all team members. This helped us to revise the coding frame and introduce few changes into it. After running the trial coding, we proceeded with the main coding and applied the revised coding scheme. Our methodological approach resulted in a rather high degree of reliability and validity of data analysis.

It should be noted that the findings of the Uzbekistan case-study should be viewed differently from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, due to the fact the former played a different role within this project. The Uzbek model of mahalla was first assessed and then tested as a role-model to two other countries under investigation. Thus our results should be considered in light of these differences.

STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

The final report consists of the following five sections. Section 1 presents a thorough literature review on the role of local communities in preventing ethnic conflicts in various parts of the world and in Central Asia. It also scrutinizes the existing literature on the role of mahalla and its specific institutionalized structure which makes it an effective tool of conflict prevention and resolution in Uzbekistan.

Section 2 presents the methodology of the research project. In particular, it touches upon the overall research design; describes the method of data collection which was in-depth semi-structured interviews; explains the mixed methods that have been employed in data analysis such as content analysis and quantitative analysis of interview results; finally, it evaluates the methodological approach and obtained results and specifies the caveats and limitations of this study.

Section 3 presents the interview results for each of the three country case-studies. First, the results for Uzbekistan, and then for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are introduced. The section provides an overview of respondents' perceptions as regards the conflict prevention and resolution potential and effectiveness of mahallas in Uzbekistan and community-based organizations (CBOs) in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; analysis and assessment of mahallas as a trust-building and inclusive mechanism for community members; as well as the potential applicability of the Uzbek (institutionalized) model of mahallas to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Section 4 proceeds with discussing the results of data analysis according to the three main research questions of this study. The cross-country comparisons are drawn as regards mahallas and CBOs and the results and conclusions are discussed.

Finally, the paper ends with conclusions, in which the results and major findings of the study are summarized. The work is wrapped up with the areas for future research.

SECTION I: LITERATURE REVIEW

1.1. DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS OF CONFLICT

Unlike the prediction of Karl Marx, the twentieth century has not been the age of revolutionary class struggles but rather of ethno-nationalist conflicts (Wimmer et al, 2009). Today multi-ethnic states have become a norm whereas traditional nation-state, where a distinct national group corresponds to a territorial unit, can be considered an endangered species. The majority of dominant cultures around the globe still try to impose their identity on other minority groups living in the same territory (United Nations, 2001). Efforts to impose uni-culturalistic values in multi-ethnic states often come at the expense of the minority groups. To elude marginalized status, minorities often have to become more active to preserve and protect their identities. Such state of affairs often leads to an increased intolerance or armed ethnic conflicts as the worst case scenario (ibid).

In recent years, ethnic conflicts have been one of the oft-observed forms of political violence in the world. "Ethnic conflict" indicates "violent conflict among groups who differ from one another in terms of culture, religion, physical features, or language" (Levinson, 1995). According to Cordell and Wolff (2007), the term "conflict" describes "a situation in which two or more actors pursue incompatible, yet from their individual perspectives entirely just goals. Ethnic conflicts are one particular form of such conflict: that in which the goals of at least one conflict party are defined in (exclusively) ethnic terms, and in which the primary fault line of confrontation is one of ethnic distinctions".


As Wolff (2007) puts it, "ethnic conflicts" are a new phenomenon that exploded on to the world arena with the end of the Cold War. As a result, conflicts within states have become more common than conflicts between states (Wolff, 2007). Today, the causes of almost two-thirds of all armed conflicts are embedded in ethnic components (Toft, 2003) and have claimed some 16 million lives since 1945 (Ibrahim, 1998). According to Sadowski (2007), ethnic conflicts appear to have superseded a nuclear war as the most pressing issue on the minds of policymakers. Ethnic conflicts are almost twice as likely to break out as fights over a government control and four times more likely than interstate wars (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 2001). Ethnic conflicts are the most rampant form of armed conflict and their number is unlikely to decrease in the short or long-term. Such state of

affairs with the intensity of ethnic conflicts threatens the lives of millions. Since World War II alone, millions of people have died as a result of their belongingness to a specific ethnic group (ibid). To highlight the escalating issue, the researchers at the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (Norway) and the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University (Sweden) have recently compiled a comprehensive data on ongoing and past conflicts. The research shows that there were about 50 ethnic conflicts between 1946 and 2001 each killing more than 25 people per year (Eriksson and Wallensteen, 2003). However, all but 16 of them had been settled by 2003 (Wolff, 2007).

According to the Encyclopedia of Human Experience (1995), in 1988 the majority of the 111 violent conflicts in the world involved the nations' minority and majority ethnic groups. As of July 1993, there were more than 25 ethnic conflicts that involved the regular use of violence such as mass killings, executions, terrorist bombings, assassinations, lootings, rapes and forced expulsion (Encyclopedia of Human Experience, 1995). This finding is corroborated by the recent empirical research by Gurr (cited in Tsutsui, 2004) who found an omnipresent increase in the number of ethnic mobilizations in the five decades following World War II. The following figure depicts the rising trend of both violent and non-violent type of ethnic social movements between the years of 1945 and 1994.

Sadowski (1998), however, argues that the claim that the number of ethnic conflicts has recently exploded is one of those optical illusions that the round-the-clock and round-the-world mass media has helped to create. As he further states, ethnic conflicts have continuously formed the vast majority of wars since the epoch of decolonization after 1945. Nevertheless, he concedes to the claim that in 1990-1991 several new and highly visible conflicts erupted as a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. However, the state formation wars that went along with "Leninist extinction" appear to be a one-time event rather than a new whirl of global deluge, since many of those tensions have been brought under control (Sadowski, 1998). In support, Gilley (2004) argues that much of the concern over rising ethnic conflicts was caused by the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the USSR.

Figure 2. Number of ethnic groups engaging in violent and non-violent mobilizations (1945-1994)



Source: Tsutsui, 2004.

As the number of newly emerging ethnic conflict increases, new journals and centers pertaining to the study of ethnic conflicts have been introduced with an increasing number of scholars starting their work in this direction (Gilley, 2004; Tsutsui, 2004).

Ethnic conflicts may be broken down into a variety of forms: in unranked situations versus ranked situations. In the former the conflicting ethnic groups share relatively equal power or perceive themselves to be so, whereas in the latter form the ethnic groups are ordered in a hierarchy of power. From a generally accepted perspective, ethnic conflicts will be more common and less subject to control in unranked situations where the groups compete for wealth and power, and one group is not powerful enough to suppress the other conflicting group (Levinson, 1995).




Figure 3. Religious and Ethnic Conflicts 1917-98


Source: Philip's Atlas of World History

The scholarly literature also distinguishes ethnic conflicts into five different categories (Levinson, 1995). *Separatist movements* – is a type of ethnic conflict in which violence occurs as a result of an effort by an ethnic group to become politically independent by facing resistance by a nation. *Internal Rivalry for Autonomy, Political Power, or Territorial Control* is a type of conflict between ethnic groups in one nation or between the ethnic group and the government over access to or control over the leashes for economic resources, political power, territory, or political autonomy within the nation. Such types of conflicts break out in former colonies and are common for former colonized nations in South Asia and Africa. Although a *conquest* type of conflicts is rare now, they occur as part of a war between two or more nations where ethnic differences between the groups are a major factor in the hostility between the groups. The objective of the war may be the group's proscription from all or some of a nations' territory.

survival in which violence occurs as part of an attempt by a national government to forcibly assimilate, harm, remove, or drive out an ethnic minority or deprive them of social, religious, political or economic rights granted to other residents outside these minority groups. While such type of conflict in most cases can be seen as non-violent, they have the potential to burst out into mass violence within a nation. Another type of conflict is *irredentist* in which violence occurs as part of claims by an ethnic group or nation to regain or retain its territory on the ground of alleged ancestral or historical rights to the territory. These conflicts are very common in today's world mainly caused by the national boundaries established during colonial times or during the era of the former Soviet Union. In addition to the five types of conflicts and at times indistinguishable from an ethnic conflict is a religious conflict which emerges between two groups who adhere to different religious groups. However, not all ethnic conflicts are caused by differences in religious beliefs, nor religious conflicts are considered ethnic in nature (Levinson, 1995).

In addition to categorizing ethnic conflicts into types, Wolff (2007) also distinguishes them by the level of severity and intensity. For example, few would disagree that Northern Ireland, Kosovo, Cyprus, the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, the genocide in Rwanda, the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kashmir and Sri-Lanka share, in one way or another, ethnic backgrounds and an element of violence. However, if one compares these conflicts to the ones rooted in the relationships between Estonians and Russians in Estonia, complex dynamics of interactions between different linguistic groups in Canada, Belgium and France, their manifestation can hardly be described as violent and therefore, can hardly be labeled as "ethnic conflicts" (Wolff, 2007).

Figure 4. Civic Life and Ethnic Conflict



Source: Varshney, 2001

1.2. CBO AND THEIR INSTITUTIONALISATION BY A STATE

According to Dentler (1961), community is the complex of economic, political, religious and familial institutions around which people group to cooperate, compete or conflict. Community based organizations (CBOs), however, have been defined as "local, nonformal organizations (usually without government or legal recognition) created and controlled by the beneficiaries themselves for their collective benefit (Gill, 1999). In recent years, there has been a growing concern over how social movement and civil society organizations interact with the state (Goldstone, 2003). Less focus has been accentuated on how state-civil society interactions may lead to violent outcomes. In particular, Cormier et al (2004) argue that these types of relationships fall between two extremes – "segretated" and "integrated". The segregated extreme indicates of the type of state-civil society relationships in which there is an absence of linking institutions between civil society and the state, whereas the integrated one describes quite the opposite. The institutionalized interconnectedness which is present between the two parties ensures that major disagreements that have the potential to lead to violence are successfully handled to the benefit of both sides (Cormier et al, 2004).

There has been a wide range of research concerning the issue of institutionalization and collaboration of the state with the community based organizations. In particular, Paul (1898) researched the institutional comparative advantage of governments and grassroot

organizations (community groups, non-governmental organizations, and co-operatives) in poverty alleviation. The main findings were that state-CBO collaborative initiatives could be fruitful for government programmes by mobilizing and educating the poor. Couton (2004), on the other hand, focuses on social movements and civil society, in turn, focusing on various dimensions of social and political consequences of the associational sector. The finding of his research point to the importance of state/civil society institutional integration. Bell et al (cited in Couton, 2004) studied civil society and analysed the extent to which peace agreements proffer new models of participatory democracy.

Thus, the academic world lacks the literature that would look at the institutionalized relationship of the state with community based organizations and the role of this tandem in preventing the eruption of conflicts. The traditional concept of civil society, which has always been used as a "universally prescriptive model" abolishing the value of existing indigenous structures, is not very applicable, in the context outside the western world (Hann, 1996). Anthropological research revealed that forms of associational life based on communal and familial ties can play a critical role in organizing citizens for particular causes (ibid).

1.3. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE MAHALLA INSTITUTION IN UZBEKISTAN

One of the biggest challenges to the intellectual inquiry into *mahalla* and its origins lies in the fact that this institution is neither regionally uniform nor static, nor is the types of public goods available to *mahalla* residents (Sievers, 2002). Moreover, *mahalla* institution has always been transforming - more structurally, than functionally- and this process went on depending on the historical, social and political events taking place in this vibrant region.

It was suggested, that for centuries Uzbek *mahallas* have been effective in terms of mobilisation of both human and material resources, yet they rarely depended on the political regimes and often their activities were not influenced by commercial interests (Urinboev, 2011). The first variants of *mahalla* may have formed as early as 11-12th centuries before the Mongol invasion. Such communities usually resembled a group of several hundred people, organized around religious rituals and other public events. Most of the *mahallas* have formed along ethnic, religious and even professional affinities. Some

of them had built their own social and religious infrastructure by mobilising labour mobilisation, such as mosques, teahouses, market places and so on (Abramson, 1998; Sievers, 2002).

Crucially, the daily management of these neighbourhood institutions was integrally linked to the prevailing social and ethical norms. For example, the elders played a key role in the administration of *mahalla* by providing advice on issues concerning an individual resident or the whole community (Bogner, 2003).

According to Sievers (2002), possibly the most universal feature of *mahalla* and the most noteworthy taking into consideration the social divisions in past and present Central Asia is that no member of the *mahalla* was and is, for class, profession, or religious reasons, excluded from community events and interactions. As such, *mahallas* have traditionally been the only place where people with different social, ethnic, religious backgrounds (Sunni, Shia, Jews, merchants, labourers, rich and poor) came together and interacted. Furthermore, the *mahalla* institution may have facilitated a mechanism through which services of charitable institutions reached a social cross-section of the population (Sievers, 2002).

Despite the fact that the *mahalla* organization had faced a number of challenges in its more than a thousand year history, though it was not until the beginning of the twentieth century when the inclusion of Uzbekistan into the Soviet politico-administrative, ideological and economic system put the tradition of *mahalla* under a serious risk of dissolution as part of Soviets' societal experiments.

The imposition of these Soviet "trappings of nationhood" began a process whereby Uzbekistan, a country of shared Muslim values, risked becoming a self-realized nation based on pre-existing cultural elements. Surprisingly, and perhaps yet another sign of *mahalla*'s resilience, these cultural structures -community-based and linked through bonds of kinship, geography, and mutual patronage - simply adapted themselves to this latest empire. According to Seiple (2005), as time went by, the Uzbeks rewrote Stalin's slogan, creating an Uzbek-Soviet civil society that was simultaneously Soviet in structure, but cultural in content. For example, this philosophy found its expression in both rural and urban settings. In the country side, the Soviet government created the collective farms (kolkhoz) and pooled manpower to irrigate those farms, using the rural elites to control

the irrigation system. The alternative to the kolkhoz was the traditional *mahalla*, through which local elders ruled the village, subdivision, or even apartment building (ibid).

In a similar fashion, Sievers (2002) argues that *mahallas* were integrated into the Soviet system of organization rather than aimed for dissolution. He points out that whether Soviet *apparatchiks* indeed considered *mahalla* as impossible to eradicate without risking protest or whether these authorities primarily saw the institution as complementing development and ideological goals is not clear, nor is it important to assign primacy to either of these reasons. In the final assessment, the Soviet government was forced to accept that the benefits of an effort to destroy *mahalla* far outweighed the costs of a campaign to abolish it.

Therefore, during the Soviet rule, *mahalla* existed informally, functioning in parallel with the government bureaucratic system. Often the retired party leader would become the local aksakal. The *mahalla* aksakal became a symbolically elected chairperson, whose appointment was decided by the local party apparatus. Instead of informal advisors, the aksakal now could rely on a committee to advise him, and certain issues were managed by separate committees, such as a women's committee. Meanwhile, the *mahalla* served to protect and pass on Uzbek culture, including Muslim practices. It was tolerated but not sanctioned by the Soviet state (Bonger, 2003: 5; Abashin, 2011).

According to Suda (2006), *mahalla* committees, in which residents themselves served as active members, collected and provided resident information, cooperated with the police to observe the registration rules, issued certificates of domicile, and in some cases created area maps, thereby allowing the spatial allocation of households and individuals. Importantly, residents of *mahallas* were not oppressed or mobilised one-sidedly; instead, they were citizen-subjects who enjoyed certain rights, fulfilled certain obligations and participated in public life. Thus, *mahalla* was not just another quasi-official unit in support of Soviet bureaucracies, but one of the foundations of the totality of power relations aside from places of work and families.

Once the Soviet state collapsed, and in 1991 Uzbekistan proclaimed its independence, the *mahalla* has become a cornerstone issue on the social, political and cultural agenda of the newly formed political elite. The government considered *mahalla* institution as a bulwark for winning the hearts and minds of former Soviet citizens and preventing interethnic or

religions clashes. Not surprisingly, the Uzbek authorities launched a systematic campaign to clear up a *mahalla* committee's image as a symbol of the Soviet rule and restore the *mahalla* as the fundamental unit of Uzbek society (Bonger, 2003). This campaign was and continues to be part of a larger effort to reconstruct the Uzbek history and traditional values.

1.4. THE MAHALLA PHENOMENON IN CONTEMPORARY UZBEK SOCIETY

1.4.1. DEFINITION AND LEGAL STATUS

"*Mahallas*" are traditional structures of Uzbek societies and neighborhood committees based around a group of elder who traditionally try to resolve problems and conflicts within the community and help the needy in various ways (Mickelwright, 2005). *Mahallas* emerged many centuries ago, and it is still an original institution of human communication, above all, respect for good neighborly relations, respect for elders and reverence for the younger age, caring for the elderly, children, the sick and the traditional way of mutual assistance and where all involved in the *mahalla* participate in organization of celebrations, conducts *hashar* (collective neighborhood environmental, greening or cleaning activities). It is a non-profit organization the objective of which is improving social, economic and cultural level of the *mahalla*, the preservation and promotion of the best national traditions and customs, the regulation, coordination and development of citizens' assemblies (Government of Uzbekistan, 2012). The word "*mahalla*" comes from the Arabic words "mahal" or "*mahalla*tum" meaning "place, society of people" (Saidov et al, 2003).

Leaders in each *mahalla* are elected by the local population, paid official salaries and form the governing body of the particular community. Today there are approximately 12 thousand *mahalla* institutions throughout Uzbekistan and "they continue to implement their traditional functions of serving as mediators in family and neighborhood disputes and organizers of community events" (Sievers, 2002). In particular, fellow neighbors unite on various occasions including wedding or funeral arrangements and participation (Tookey, 2003). Thus, *mahalla* institutions act as "*a guarantor of social stability*" since being part of *mahalla "gives a person a certain measure of wholeness and makes him more stable in everyday routine problems and worries" (ibid)*. There is even an Uzbek national saying which states that "*Mahalla is our home and our parent*". Today, *mahallas* institution has its own fund – *Mahalla* Fund, "*Mahalla*" newspaper and hobby and study groups; additionally it organizes traditional as well as sports contests.

Despite *mahallas* have long existed as traditional institutions governed by customary law, it is only after the independence of 1991 that the government of Uzbekistan took note of *mahallas* and their potential role in the Uzbek society. The Uzbek Constitution, for example, states that *mahallas* are responsible for deciding all local matters at general meetings and electing chairmen and other leaders (Constitution of Uzbekistan, 1992). Thus, the government has also sought to denote *mahallas* as the institutional incarnation of the Uzbek spirit of sociability and neighborly concern (Stevens, 2005).

Besides, the legal status of *mahallas* they are driven by "Law on Self-Governing bodies of Citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan" (Parliament of Uzbekistan, 2003). The law also states that citizens realize their "Constitutional right to self-government" in *mahallas*, and *mahallas* are not part of government bodies but have authority in a variety of matters, including environmental matters. Despite alleged autonomous role of *mahallas* granted by the state, many analysts view these institutions as being largely co-opted by the state (Epstein et al, 2003).

*Mahalla*s are the primary self-government unit which exists throughout Uzbekistan based on the principles of decentralization. The legal framework of *mahalla* is guided by the Law on Self-Government of Citizens as of 1993 and 1999, guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan, and defined as an independent activity of citizens on local issues based on their interests, the historical features of development, as well as national and spiritual values, local customs and traditions.

According to Coudouel (2010), the *mahalla* institution has been given the responsibility for administering social security and more recently carrying out functions of social control, education and promoting economic development (Cabinet of Ministers of Uzbekistan, 2003). According to Urinboyev (2011), the Law on Self-Government Bodies defines *mahallas* as non-governmental organizations but at the same time the law delegates some of the rights and obligations to *mahallas* which to some degree reflect the functions of the governmental agencies. Now *mahallas* implement a numerous state functions which have initially been performed by specialized state agencies during the

Soviet Union. Besides, the legislation with respect to *mahalla* regulations has become very detailed over the years, the fact which reflects the importance of this institution for Uzbekistan (Sievers, 2002).

With the objective to empower and legitimize the new state by association with the new institution, "*Mahalla* Fund" was established in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan dated 12 September 1992 in order to ensure public support measures for the conservation of wide propagation of national historical and cultural values, promoting the best of folk customs and traditions, the expansion of cultural and educational work among *mahallas* in the country and their further social and economic strengthening (Government of Uzbekistan, 2012).

The main activities of the fund include:

1) Wide promotion of national historical and spiritual values, the promotion of the best folk customs and traditions, the expansion of cultural and educational work among the population of the republic;

2) Implementation of active campaigning and advocacy work to explain the ideas of humanism and compassion, understanding and good neighborliness between people;

3) Comprehensive social protection of the rights of low-income families, the disabled, the elderly and children who live in a particular area;

4) Holding various traditional ceremonies; providing gratuitous financial aid to needy families and individuals; beautification of *mahalla* territories.

The explicit mission of the *Mahalla* Fund is to coordinate *mahallas*, conduct research on *mahallas* and explicate *mahalla* as the core component of Uzbekistan's transition to democratic civil society (Sievers, 2002).

Along with establishing the *Mahalla* Fund, the government also initiated "*Mahalla*" newspaper with the objective to propagate the core principles of *mahalla* institutions among the population. Although the newspaper is unpopular among the average people, it has become an efficient tool of the central administration to promote its newly passed laws and regulations.

1.4.2. MAHALLA ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE

Each mahalla has its own administrative center. Traditionally, it is usually located in a building in the center of the neighborhood. These types of buildings are typical for the capital city of Tashkent in which mahalla administrative centers are located in a one-store building among a block of apartments. The center usually includes a meeting room for various types of community meetings and some other types of accretions where the local bread is baked and sold.

Overall there are about 12 000 *mahalla* communities across Uzbekistan each containing about 150 to 1500 households. All *mahalla* activities are coordinated by *Mahalla* Foundation established in September of 1992 according to the Presidential Decree of September 12, 1992 "On Creation of *Mahalla* Foundation".

In modern Uzbekistan, *mahalla* leadership draws on four distinct sources of authority. Under the authority of law, a chairperson *(rais)* leads the *mahalla* committee which is called *kengash*. *Rais* is a person who is selected in an unstandardized way by district, government, internal voting and consensus. The *kengash* is comprised of the rais, elected for a period of 30 months, his advisors, commission chairs and usually a secretary. The approval of city or district government *(hokimiyat)* is required for the elected roles of the kengash or the *mahalla* committee chair. Given the fact that *hokimiyat* reports to the central government, the state intervention into the political structure of *mahalla* is obvious.

Among the local self-government terminology in Uzbekistan there is also *an aksakal* which means a "whitebeard" who is selected under informal authority and who is usually an older and most respectable, intelligent and influential person in the community. According to Sievers (2002), *aksakal* is a term normally applied for older men who are highly respected across many cultures in Central Asia. However, in contemporary Uzbekistan, *aksakal* is a term used with the reference to only one person and only to *mahalla* aksakal. Although the Law on Self-Government Bodies provide clear and distinct definitions of the terms, "rais" and "aksakal" in most cases are used interchangeably and have the same meaning. In reality, however, "aksakal" is traditionally referred to an informal leader, whereas "rais" is referred to a formal leader elected according to the law.

Mahalla rais and aksakals are usually between the ages of 40 and 65 years. Traditionally, rais are salaried officially appointed employees (managers) whereas aksakals were formally not salaried employees/dwellers of the corresponding *mahallas*, who were usually compensated by means of gifts and through gifts and small portions of sums passing through their hands for occasional house sales, festivals, funerals and other social events (Sievers, 2002).

Under the legislation, *rais* leads the *mahalla* through citizen's assembly or *fuqarolar yigini* along with with a formal female leader of *mahalla* women's committee. *Fuqarolar yigini* is considered the supreme body of *mahalla*, which elects *rais*, secretary, advisor, chairman of the auditing and administrative committees of *mahalla* as well as it has the right to approve the members of *kengash*. Citizens' assembly can be attended by the residents who are older than 18 years of age. Citizens' assembly represents the interests of the residents in the community and make decisions on behalf of the corresponding *mahalla*.





Figure 5. Structure of governing bodies in Uzbekistan



1.4.3. MAHALLA AND ITS SECURITY-RELATED FUNCTION

The Law on Self-Government Bodies was initially adopted in 1993 and later revised in 1999 in response to a series of bombings which took place in Tashkent in 1999 (Refworld, 2004). The law made mahalla officials state employees directly reporting to the city government. Besides, it became the direct responsibility of the mahalla committee (kengash) to ensure public order, reveal unregistered religious groups (HRW, 2003).

Ensuring security for its citizens is one of the primary objectives and functions of *mahallas* after 1999. To this end, the state advocated the creation of *mahalla posbonlar* (guards) as

neighborhood anti-crime groups. These groups are normally composed of voluntary members of respective communities (Sievers, 2002). According to Mueller (2003), *mahalla posbonlari* groups or otherwise translated as "defender of the people", were created in 1999 as part of the campaign against Islamic fundamentalism. The task of each posbon is to look into all suspicious activities and to cooperate with the police, which can be seen as proof of the political instrumentalization and institutionalization of *mahallas* in Uzbekistan. In their activities *mahalla posbonlari* informally report to district police and *rais.* In this regard, community members are expected to cooperate with a *posbon*, who in turn, is expected to inform the district police of the activities taking place in the community (HRW, 2003).


This, to some extent, resembles Soviet *dryzhiny*. It is important to note that during the Soviet and early post-Soviet period contemporary and traditional *mahalla* reported relatively lower crime rates than in other areas. According to "*Mahalla*" (newspaper), along with 'guarding' their homes, peaceful atmosphere and harmony "*Mahalla posboni*", organized by self-government bodies, help law enforcement authorities fight and prevent crime (*Mahalla*, 2009). Normally by collaborating with local police bases *posbons* know all the houses and families in the community. As one of the *posbons* points out, "*no crime has occurred in the neighborhood for many years*" (*Mahalla*, 2009).

Although figures on crime rates prior to institutionalizing "mahalla" and "mahalla posbons" are not available, by the information of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (2008) no crimes were reported in 179 out of 270 mahallas in Syrdarya region of Uzbekistan. Besides, it is reported that as much as 620 crimes were solved with the participation and help of mahalla posbons. This all has been achieved through significant enhancement of preventive work with the public, conducting explanatory work in the communities. Particularly, the government authorities brief mahalla leaders to stay alert for any potential conflicts arising within families or even between various groups which may result in potential ethnic clashes within communities.

Although the information on the number of *mahalla posbonlari* is unavailable, some sources indicated that for a *mahalla* of 3000 members, there are usually less than ten *posbons* (HRW, 2003). Security within *mahalla* is ensured by means of mutual collaboration of *rais, mahalla posbonlari* and local district police. According to the Decree

of the Cabinet of Ministers, special district policy was established within the structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. One of the legal responsibilities of district police in this regard is to ensure coordination and collaboration with institutions of education and culture, and community organizations, institutions of self-government and the media in matters of crime prevention, shaping and improving the legal culture of the population.





Source: Authors' own diagram

Today it is a rule for the police to discuss in *mahallas*, at places of study or work about evidences of offenses, the behavior of those who violated the law as well as to identify the causes and conditions that contributed to the commission of unlawful acts. It was noted that the stronger the collaboration ties between law enforcement agencies and local authorities and *posbons*, there is the highest decrease in the number of crimes and offenses.

Preventive work of law enforcement authorities and *mahallas* is multifaceted and includes not only conversations with citizens. Additionally, ongoing operational and preventive measures aimed at identifying violations in the sphere, for example, passport control, family conflicts, the prevention of juvenile delinquency and neglect are effective.

Mahallas and *posbons* are quite effective in prevention of crimes and offense due to working closely with the women's councils, conciliation commission for they are well aware of who in the community is prone to delinquency, does not work, does not go to school, has friends with whom, in which families conflicts happen more frequently and which person is involved in which social group (Ministry of Internal Affairs, 2009).

However, there is some criticism with respect to hidden functions of *mahalla* institutions. Particularly, upon necessity *mahallas* may serve as an intermediary between the society and law enforcement and national security authorities in identifying and revealing various individuals or groups involved in unlawful actions. Some sources claim that *mahallas* act as monitors in the neighborhoods for the Government of Uzbekistan's various security services (Tookey, 2003). Sources indicate that members of *mahallas* work with the police in conducting passport checks to make sure there is a compliance with resident permit requirements (HRW, 2003).

Sievers (2002) further points out the specific nature of traditional information gathering function of *mahallas* guided by customary law. In particular, in the study he emphasizes the "gossip and monitoring" function of *mahallas*. For example, "when a daughter moves out of a mahalla upon marrying, mahalla members know whom she married and to what mahalla she has moved". Additionally, when events of national importance occur, most people hear the news first from mahalla cohorts instead of from the national media (Sievers, 2002). This is due to information networks in mahallas which are quite comprehensive and quick. Although mahalla boundaries are not distinct, a stranger's entrance into mahalla leader to approach the stranger. The role of generating important community information is usually given to women who conduct the bulk of information exchange in mahallas. They are more active, less reserved and less selective in their information exchange than men (Sievers, 2002).

1.4.4. MAHALLA AND THE WELFARE FUNCTION

The Law on Self-Government Bodies commissioned *mahallas* to execute the social welfare function. Given the nation-wide coverage of the *mahalla* institution, social policy-makers in Uzbekistan realized that *mahallas* can serve as the most effective and credible

mechanism to execute the national welfare programs. Noteworthy, the welfare legislation in the Western countries is mainly implemented by the dedicated state agencies.

The mechanism of the welfare function is stated in details in instructions to *mahallas* given by the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection which is in charge of monitoring the implementation of the welfare function. Most details in the legislation remained unchanged since 1994. While the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection provides detailed instructions as to the indicators of living standards, they fail to specify the conditions in which the welfare benefits should be awarded to the poor. Based on the available knowledge and standards, the welfare benefits address the most needy families in the neighbourhood. This decision is made by the *mahalla* council *(kengash)*, which does not always follow rational and objective criteria and left to subjective interpretation of the individuals in charge of distributing welfare benefits (Sievers, 2002). Thus, the final decision of *mahalla* largely remains discretionary without any mechanism for appeal (Micklewright et al, 2005).

Micklewright further points out the advantages of *mahalla* as the distributor of welfare benefits. In particular, without detailed local knowledge of household circumstances it would have been difficult to follow a centrally codified system to locate the needy. Also, frivolous applications are discouraged taken into consideration the discretion given to the *mahalla* authority to decide who should receive welfare benefits based on the availability of the local information on the needy in the community. Additionally, several aspects of living standards are considered. While it is difficult to access and calculate real official wages given the mass self-employment, the detailed knowledge of household financial circumstances provides the opportunity to make an objective assessment and draw appropriate conclusions. It is also important to consider that poverty alleviation programs are mostly efficient when the needy targeted pointwise rather than *per se.* Thus, in accordance with *mahalla* regulations, financial help is given to those households.

1.4.5. MAHALLA PHENOMENON IN THE REST OF CENTRAL ASIA

The nations in Central Asia share many common traditional and cultural values and speak the language that has common linguistic roots. However, despite the abundance of similarities, the mahalla phenomenon in its present form in Central Asia can be found only in Uzbekistan. However, for ethnic Uzbek communities in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan a mahalla is not alien either for it is a culturally engraved phenomenon. Nevertheless, it is only in Uzbekistan that mahallas are institutionalized and have a clear set of functions delegated by the state.

Both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have adopted laws regulating activities of organs of local state power and local self-government (Kyrgyzstan - "On Local Self-government and Local State Administrations" of 2001 and Tajikistan "On Local State Power" of 1994 and "On Elections of Deputies of Local Councils of People's Deputies").

1.5. CASE OF KYRGYZSTAN

As of 2011 Kyrgyzstan's population was 5.6 million (World Bank, 2012). As of 1 January 2009, 69.6 percent of the population were Kyrgyz, 14.5 percent Uzbeks and Russians constituted 8.4 percent. Among other ethnic groups are representatives of Dungans (called Hui in northwest China where they came from in the 19th century and are predominantly in the north of the country) accounting for 60,000, about 52,000 Uygurs, 48,500 Tajiks largely in the south and 38,600 Kazakhs mainly in the north, making up the balance of Kyrgyzstan's 5.3 million population (National Statistics Committee of Kyrgyzstan, 2009; Ethnic Conflict Information Center, 2010). Uyghur communities in Kyrgyzstan reside mainly in and around Bishkek and the chairman of Ittipak (Uyghur cultural organization) is chosen by elders or other leaders from different Uyghur neighbourhood communities which are also called "mahalla" (Hojer, 2009).

There is no clear consensus among scholars on the historical background of selfgovernance institutions in Kyrgyzstan (UNESCAP, 2013). Two schools of thought exist today. Some scholars argue that throughout the history the Kyrgyzs have had a certain type of self-government institution (councils composed of the oldest and the most reputable citizens, oldest representatives of clans) that made decisions on practically all questions pertaining to the everyday life of the community. Thus, self-organization, selfprotection and self-government as well as reliance on internal resources and collegiate decision-making was the main factor which allowed the nation to survive. The second school of thought follows the opinion that there has never been a serious experience of the contemporary type of self-government institution. In particular, they argue that by the beginning of the twentieth century, the notion of territorial self-government based on the compliance with law and civil rights was alien to the Kyrgyz society of that time (UNESCAP, 2013).

After the independence the issue of self-government institutions was not a priority since the country was going through the process of implementing political and legislative reforms. The continuous reforms towards democracy and market reforms, however, brought the issue of self-government back to the priority list. As a result, self-government reforms were iniitated in 1994-1995 based on international experience, local traditions and mentality.

1.5.1. LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE IN KYRGYZSTAN

The structure and activities of local executive and representative bodies are determined by the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic of 1993. The Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic established the dual principle of local government under the Law on Local Self-Government and Local State Administration in the Kyrgyz Republic. The law identifies bodies of local self-government, including local kenesh, bodies of territorial community self-government and local referenda, citizen meetings as well as other forms of direct democracy.

Local self-government in the Kyrgyz Republic is implemented by local communities which under the law and under their own responsibility carry out affairs of local significance.

A local community is composed of the people residing on a permanent basis in the territory of *ayil*, villages and city keneshes, and which are united by common interests in the solution of local issues. They act through their:

- 1. Representative bodies (oblast kenesh, district and city kenesh, ayil kenesh)
- 2. Executive-regulatory bodies (city hall, ayil okmotu)
- 3. And other bodies (street committees, aksakal courts, women's committee, committee for youth).

The regional level consists of seven oblasts (regions), divided into 40 raions (districts) and the capital city, Bishkek, divided into four raions. Below raion level there are 22 towns,

29 urban-type settlements and 1,800 villages grouped into 457 ayil okmotu (rural administrations, as in the Russian selskaya uprava).

To guarantee more efficient realization of powers by local government bodies, new executive-administrative local government bodies in the form of village councils (*aiyl okmotu*) were introduced by the Presidential Decree ratified on March 20, 1996. An *aiyl okmotu* is an executive administrative body at the village (*aiyl*) or small town (*kenesh*) level. The administration of *aiyl okmotu* reports to the head of a city kenesh. At least once a year, the *aiyl okmotu* has to report to the respective kenesh and to citizens' assemblies on the territory of the appropriate kenesh.

The decentralization reforms which took place in 1999-2001 led to the election of heads of *aiyl okmotu*. In addition, a decree of 2001 re-introduced a traditional institution of community assembly (*kurultai*). The functions of *kurultai* comprise of debating and approval of the plans of the community on social and economic development commissioned by mayors and *aiyl okmotu*. By the decision of the citizens' assembly, local *keneshes* in the territory of *aiyls*, villages and cities can institute *aksakal courts* formed of the highly respected individuals of the community.

Unlike *mahallas*, in Kyrgyzstan there are no such institutions resembling such community structures as in Uzbekistan. In Kyrgyzstan, for example, the term "*mahalla*" refers to the densely populated areas where ethnic Uzbeks reside and where they appoint their own leaders. Yet, this phenomenon can be observed in Southern Kyrgyzstan only. The same holds true for other states in the region where the relatively significant ethnic composition of Uzbek population exists. However, *aksakal courts* are the most similar body to *mahallas*.

There is the special law of 2009 "on Aksakal Courts" which states that *Aksakal courts* is created on a voluntary basis and on the basis of eligibility and government public bodies called upon to carry out review of the materials sent to them in due course by the court, prosecutor, police and other government bodies and their officials, in accordance with the current legislation of the Kyrgyz Republic, as well as cases of disputes between citizens in the cases and manner provided by this Act. *Aksakal Courts* may be established by decision of the assembly of citizens, local councils or other representative body of local self-

government in the ayils, towns and cities of the elders, men and women who are held in respect and authority.

In their activities *aksakal courts* are also guided by their conscience, personal beliefs, norms of morality and ethics, historically established customs and traditions of the people of Kyrgyzstan as long as they do not contradict the legislation of the Kyrgyz Republic. *Aksakal courts* consider transmitted by the parties for their consideration various property, family and other disputes provided for by law in order to achieve reconciliation between the parties and to make a fair and not contrary to the law solutions.

Aksakal courts exist in every village and their services are rendered for free, making them an accessible form of justice for those who live in rural areas and for the poor. Resolving disputes at the village level is also effective in reducing the number of immigrants at already overburdened state courts. According to Ranjbar (2002), *aksakal courts* are obsolete and valid only in small villages to resolve small scale disputes, despite the initial objectives why they were formed to make justice accessible for a larger number of rural people. However, Ranjbar (2012) revealed that the decreasing role of *aksakal courts* in the community is explained by institutional limitations, the issues associated with the implementation of court decisions as well as limited judicial knowledge of aksakals. Despite their decreasing popularity, *aksakal courts* are still popular lower strata of the population who have limited access to public judicial system (ibid).




Figure 7. Structure of governing bodies in Kyrgyzstan

Source: Authors' own diagram

1.6. CASE OF TAJIKISTAN

Tajikistan has a population of nearly 7 million as of 2011 (World Bank, 2011). Tajiks who speak the Tajik language are the main ethnic group, although there is a sizable minority of Uzbeks and Russians, whose numbers are declining due to mass emigration. The most recent census of 2000 showed that ethnic Tajiks compose 79.9% of the population, Uzbeks – 15.3%, Russian 1.1% and Kyrgyz 1.1%.

The Law on Local Self-Government and Local Finance was first initiated under the Soviet rule in 1991 by the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik Socialist Republic, which established a local self-government and revised the administrative territorial structure according to the principles of decentralization. After the independence, in 1994 the Parliament adopted the Constitutional Law on Local Public Administration and the Law on Self-Government in Towns and Villages, which was amended in 1999 (OSCE, 2002).

According to the Constitution of Tajikistan, a "jamoat" (Tajik type of Uzbek *mahallas*) is an institution of self-government in towns and villages. The framework for their authority is prescribed in the Law on Self-government which describes "jamoats" as "the system of organizing public activities to address issues of local importance autonomously and at their own discretion, directly or indirectly in accordance with the legislation", (Freizer, 2002). The issues are resolved within the competence of "jamoats" either directly or through representatives. Jamoats are established on a territorial basis and have a legal status and an official seal. They may include a community property such as means of transporation, equipment and other facilities – public or social. Budget allocations from municipalities, voluntary donations of citizens and working businesses are the sources of revenue of jamoats (Ilolov et al, 2000; UNDP, 2011). Currently, there are 401 jamoats throughout the country.

A wide range of duties and competencies are prescribed by the Law on Local Selfgovernment in Towns and Villages to jamoats. "The main duties of Jamoat institutions is the fulfillment of the rights of citizens to participate in the management of the activities of the state and society, and ignites them to solve social and economic problems on their territory, as well as the most important problems concerning the interests of the population" (Government of Tajikistan, 2013). The extensive list of tasks includes the ones that may be considered as overlapping with the tasks of some government institutions. Thus, it is within the competency of jamoats to ensure implementation of the Constitution, legislation, acts of the President, Parliament and the central government of Tajikistan as well as local government decisions. Jamoats should also provide assistance to government bodies in collecting taxes and recruitment to military service (Freizer, 2002).

The administrative-territorial structure in Tajikistan is established by the Parliament of the republic and comprises three levels of local government:

- 1. The bottom tier comprises community level village and town governments in rural areas which are called *jamoaty shakhrak* and *dekhot*.
- The second tier includes administrations of cities and raions which report to oblast (regions), those of Dushanbe city districts as well as those of thirteen raion directly subordinate to the republic.

3. The most upper tier includes the administrations of Dushanbe (the capital city), the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region, Khatlon and Sughd oblasts which directly report to the national government.




Figure 8. Structure of governing bodies in Tajikistan

Source: Authors' own diagram

1.6.1. MAHALLAS IN TAJIKISTAN

Although the Law on Local Self-Government in Towns and Villages is relatively comprehensive, it fails to address other active "grassroots" institutions such as *makhallia* (community committees), microraion councils, housing block committees or other kishlak (village) organizations (Ilomov, 2000). Particularly, as a traditional form of local self-governance, mahallas were not included in the legislation in 1994. Their role in urban settlements decreased while they gained a much wider influence in rural areas of the country.

Mahallas in Tajikistan bear a slightly different meaning and execute different functions than those of Uzbekistan. "Makhallias", or community groups, have long existed in Tajikistan, guided by traditional Islamic concepts of social justice and the behavior of individuals in the community and mainly operate as a community based voluntary organization relatively free of the government control (USAID, 2009). Among the main functions of "*mahallas*" is to assist in organizing major events in the lives of individuals

and their participation in the respective community life. "Khashar" can be as one of the examples of such events, which is the traditional form of mutual aid in which the community comes together to clean the neighborhood, build a house or harvest crops. Additionally, *mahallas* facilitate the organization of marriages, births and funerals. Traditionally, makhallias are administered by a council of elders *(shura)* that helps resolve community issues, family conflicts as well as conflicts arising between neighbors of the community, thus helping maintain peace and establish social cohesion. The community members elect a chairman, called *"rais"*. Makhallas also give moral and physical support to orphans and the elderly.

While the legislation fails to address local self-government activities other than those above the village and town levels, local community level organizations are widespread across the country and play a significant role in the society of Tajikistan. Among these organizations are makhalla committees, micro-raion councils, apartment block councils, kishlak organization located in Pamir Mountains as well as local citizens' organizations called *guzar* and *tabagy.* The objective of all these organizations is to facilitate law enforcement and democratization processes, to protect citizens' rights and interests as well as to provide solutions to the community at the local level (Ilolov et al, 2000).

Whilst it is difficult to organize the notion of *mahalla* under one single standard due its diverse forms, some scholars believe its activities qualify under self-government concept. Unlike *mahallas* in the Uzbek society, local governments in Tajikistan can hardly exercise a full administrative control over *mahalla* activities for they do not bear a status as a self-government institution and not recognized by the legislation. In addition, *mahallas* are not commissioned administrative functions by local governments as it is the case in Uzbekistan, although the raion administrations made further recommendations on strengthening the role of *mahalla* committees by establishing paid positions for *rais* and granting them a legal status. However, as Ilolov (2000) points out, in some cases *mahallas* are in close cooperation with the state government. In particular, in the Ganchin raion of Sughd oblast *jamoats* and *mahalla committees*, women's council, veterans, clergymen, veterans and elders worked together in organizing folk festivals and other social events. Local and national traditions play an important role in the lives of local communities which at times become too costly for families to celebrate. Thus, in the recent years the

raion administrations by the decision of the President commissioned jamoats and *mahalla* committees to oversee the celebration of weddings, funerals and other traditional events so that communities and households in particular were able to celebrate their traditions at significantly reduced costs.

Despite the fact that local bodies of government in Tajikistan should act independently and perform the role of a self-government unit, in reality they act as agents of the central government (USAID, 2009; Freizer, 2002). The President appoints the heads of oblasts and raions, the heads of raions (khukumat), in turn, they appoint chairpersons of jamoats, who should be approved by the jamoat council for a five year term.

SECTION II: METHODOLOGY

2.1. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Before we proceed with description of our research design, we would like to introduce the conceptual framework and bring clarity as regards the use of the key terms in our study. To facilitate the understanding of our research questions and the material we collected, we describe below the conceptual definitions of the following key terms: "mahalla", "conflict" and "inclusiveness".

When we use the word "mahalla" in the context of Uzbekistan, we refer to the institutionalized type of mahalla that is widely adopted by the majority of local communities in the country. When mentioning "mahallas" in Kyrgyzstan (except in the South, where there Uzbek types of mahallas exist) we use it interchangeably with the words "neighbourhood", "community-based organization" (CBOs) as the structure of local Kyrgyz communities differs from the Uzbek model of mahalla due to the fact that they are not institutionalized. The same holds true for Tajikistan.

As for the second term, we refer to the specific definition of the word "conflict", namely we cover only those instances of conflict which involve three or more community members with the potential of causing a social instability in the community. Thus, for instance, a quarrel between two neighbours regarding the use of irrigation system; which had a long dispute and then was resolved without any further implications for their families and other community members. This case will not be used as an instance of a conflict due to the fact that the "social instability component" is missing in this case. However, if a local dispute between an ethnic Uzbek and an ethnic Kyrgyz turned into a fight involving relatives of these community members, then we assume that it may have serious negative social implications for the entire community. This case would be counted as an instance of a conflict and taken into account in our research. Therefore, in our study when we refer to "conflict", we refer to the particular type of conflict which involves three or more community members and includes the social instability component.

Finally, the third term 'inclusiveness' pertains to the governance approach put forward by Ahrens (2002), which evaluates the effectiveness of governance by assessing its key criteria: participation, openness, transparency and accountability. It is important to use this concept in our research as it should help identify whether mahallas as a selfgovernance institution serve as an effective tool in conflict prevention and resolution. We assume that if mahallas meet these four criteria, it would be possible to argue that they lead to trust-building among their members, thus diminishing inter-mahalla tensions.

Thereby, we operationalized the term "inclusiveness" by looking at the extent to which community members directly or indirectly participate in decision-making (participation); the degree of accessibility of community leaders to its members (openness); to what extent community-level decisions are transparent, clear and legitimate to their members (transparency); the extent to which community members feel responsible and accountable for their decisions to community members (accountability). Therefore, each time we refer to "inclusiveness" we imply the combination of these four criteria. In the analysis part we also refer separately to each of these four aspects in order to assess the overall inclusiveness of local communities.

2.2. ORGANIZATION OF FIELDWORK

Before starting the fieldwork, we tried to equip ourselves with practical tools and knowledge necessary to a successful implementation and smooth flow of the project. First, we constructed our interview guides for three categories of interviewees: community leaders, experts and public officials. Second, we organized one international conference at the University of Tsukuba in Japan in 2013, and 2 smaller round-table seminars in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan with experts and practitioners in 2013. This served two main purposes. First of all, during the seminars we conducted several pilot interviews with experts and practitioners who shared their feedback on the appropriateness of our interview guides and provided general views and advice as regards our research project. Moreover, the conference in Japan played an important role in drawing lessons from experiences of other countries in facilitating the development of CBOs. Participants from Asia, Europe and Africa provided important insights on their own local CBOs, their conflict prevention and resolution capacities as well as collective action potential, thus, helping us exchange knowledge and experiences with each other. These insights were useful for our research project as they enriched our work and allowed introducing several minor changes in the data collection process.

Third, all the organizational matters were divided among the team members and upon necessity, some tasks were outsourced to third parties. In particular, arranging and conducting meetings and interviews were implemented by project team members, whereas transcription and translation of interviews were later handled by third parties.

2.3. METHODS FOR DATA COLLECTION

To arrive at valid conclusions, both secondary and primary sources were employed for data collection. In particular, desk research was conducted to identify various literature sources revolving around the topic of *mahalla* and the issues pertaining to its effectiveness in terms of conflict prevention and resolution.

In our study semi-structured interviews became the main method for primary data collection. They facilitated systematic collection of empirical observations necessary to answer our research questions, while also allowing for researchers' flexibility in terms of identifying new relevant facts and data that were not covered by initial research design. This is the main strength of semi-structured interviews (Patton, 2002).

In particular, 202 semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. 92 interviews were conducted in Uzbekistan; 61 in Kyrgyzstan and 49 in Tajikistan with public officials and experts working in the field of conflict management, mahalla leaders (aksakals)¹ in Uzbekistan and community leaders in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (see **Table 1**). Importantly, the interviews were conducted in both conflict-prone regions where ethnic group differences are more distinct as well as in the regions where ethnic-driven clashes cannot be observed. To be more specific, the Uzbek mahallas in the following geographical areas were considered: Tashkent, Samarkand and Nukus; Kyrgyz CBOs in Bishkek and Chui region, Osh and Djalal-Abad; Tajik CBOs in Dushanbe, Rohati and Chorbogh.

Apart from retrieving the sample data on mahalla authorities from city municipalities, we expected that close contacts, friends and partner institutions would provide assistance in finding respondents who would match our sample. To that end, NGOs dealing with

¹ The category "mahalla leaders" included not only the heads of mahallas, but also mahalla members who represented mahallas' governing bodies and thus, were considered responsible for decision-making (e.g. assistants of leaders, mahalla council members, etc.)

regional security issues, law enforcement and conflict management experts, Mahalla Fund, local mahalla leaders were actively involved in the project and provided first-hand information. We used the snow-ball sampling as a tool for finding right respondents in order to have a higher yield for the project due to the collectivistic nature of local communities in Central Asia. In particular, the researchers' experiences show that respondents are relatively more open and eager to be interviewed if they are approached on behalf of the persons they know.

Table 1. Geographical distribution of interviews

	Uzbekistan		Ку	yrgyzsta	an		Tajikista	n
	Total: 92		Total: 61		Total: 49		1	
Tashken t	Samarkand	Nukus	Bishkek, Chui region	Osh	Jalal- Abad	Dushanbe	Rohati	Chorbogh
59	22	11	34	14	13	32	10	7

2.4. METHODS FOR DATA ANALYSIS

2.4.1. CONTENT ANALYSIS

The content analysis method was employed to analyze interview data.² This method helps systematize the obtained data and facilitate the analysis of qualitative material (Schreier, 2002). It is especially relevant when the collected data is massive (in our case 202 interviews; 5 pages each on average, making it almost 1010 A4 pages in total). This huge amount of data requires systematic classification of various parts of the material according to the initially elaborated categories in the coding frame (see **Appendix I**). In doing so, content analysis facilitates analysis of largely unstructured qualitative data.

2.4.2. PILOT CODING

In the very first step, we created the coding frame that covers the key aspects of our interview guides. Second, before proceeding with the main coding, we run the trial coding

 $^{^2}$ MAXQDA, a software program designed for computer-assisted analysis of qualitative data, was used in content analysis.

for each country under investigation. This was a necessary procedure to ensure reliability of our research results and comparability of the three cases. The inter-rater reliability (or consistency) was introduced as the main tool to measure reliability. Coding the selected interview material by two coders is at the core of the method as involving the second rater enhances the reliability of obtained results (Schreier, 2012). It is aimed at finding our differences in using the method by two researchers. The selected material is coded by two researchers who first do the coding separately and then compare the results. According to the commonly accepted standard, if 80 per cent of codes or higher are coded the same, the inter-rater reliability can be considered high and requires follow-up discussion between the two coders about all the codes that were coded differently. In this case, no substantial changes are normally required in the coding frame. If it is below 80%, then two coders should thoroughly discuss all the differences and, if necessary, they should introduce changes, sometimes significant, in the coding frame. The procedure helps to ensure that coding is done in a transparent, consistent and replicable way.

In our study, trial coding was conducted for three countries under investigation. First, two coders who represent the present research project coded 6 interviews (2 with community leaders, 2 with experts, 2 with public officials) from Kyrgyzstan; two project members coded 6 interviews from Tajikistan (2 community members, 2 experts, 2 public officials); and finally, two other project team members coded 6 interviews (2 community leaders; 2 experts; 2 public officials) from Uzbekistan according to the same procedure. After coding the results were compared and differences discussed. In trial coding for Kyrgyzstan, the inter-rater reliability was 93.5% which is considered to be very high. In the case of Tajikistan, it achieved 83%. In Uzbekistan, the rate amounted to 91%. The moderately low degree of inter-rater reliability in Tajikistan may relate to the fact that interviewees there were more concerned and sensitive about interviewing as such compared to respondents in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan who appeared to be more open and willing to be interviewed. Unlike these respondents, people in Tajikistan were generally providing overly broad and somewhat ambiguous answers thus making interpretation more difficult. This resulted in too many differences between the two coders. However, after running the trial coding both coders discussed in detail all the differences and made constructive suggestions on interpretation rules for the main coding.

In the end, the results of the pilot coding led to minor changes in the coding frame with several categories being slightly adjusted.

2.4.3. MAIN CODING

In following subsections the main aspects of the interview guides are coded and presented in the form of frequency tables. They serve as important indicators of general respondents' perceptions as regards the effectiveness of mahallas in preventing and resolving conflicts. There are five main general indicators (see coding frame in Appendix I): the effectiveness of mahallas (here and further including CBOs in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) in preventing community conflicts (1); the effectiveness of mahallas in resolving community conflicts (2); 'mahalla' as a trust-building instrument for community members (3); 'mahalla' as an inclusive participatory mechanism (in decision-making) (4); and potential application of the mahalla conflict-preventing/resolving structure to other countries (5). Identifying respondents' answers according to this coding structure revealed general trends and helped set the context for answering the main research questions posed in the present research project. As noted above, the coding structure is largely built according to the interview guides for experts, mahalla leaders and public officials and draws on their main aspects.

Indicator 1 is based on the set of questions which has focused on: (a) the type of conflicts prevailing in the community; (b) the frequency of conflicts, including the likelihood of inter-ethnic disputes; (c) the attitude of government authorities toward community-based conflicts and their prevention; (d) the role of community leaders in preventing conflicts; (e) the effectiveness of various mechanisms to prevent conflicts at the early stage, such as the role of *vigilant groups* (or *posbons* in the Uzbek mahalla); (f) the overall performance of the CBO in preventing internal conflicts.

Similar to the analysis of conflict prevention, in addressing conflict resolution we have focused on a number of questions which in our view could shed light on community's overall capability to manage recurring disputes without engaging the state authorities or allowing their further escalation (*Indicator 2*): (a) the measures which the CBO takes to resolve emerging conflicts (including, whether or not conflicts are resolved by employing internal resources, without necessarily engaging the state authorities and formal law-enforcement agencies); (b) the extent to which CBOs cooperate with state authorities to

resolve conflicts; (c) whether community leaders should obtain specialised skills aimed at peaceful resolution of domestic conflicts; (d) the possibility of involving other neighbouring CBO in conflict resolution.

To examine the issue of "trust" (*Indicator 3*), we have included in our interview guides a few questions concerning the level of face-to-face communications between the members with different ethnic and religious background as well as questions relating to types of activities designed to facilitate healthy relations between the community members in general, and various ethnic groups in particular.

As regards *Indicator 4*, although from the outset we were keen to learn whether the majority of residents (considering the participation of at least one household member as an ideal situation) take part in general decision-making process at community-organized meetings, in due process our specific goal was to observe whether or not residents are involved when the community organisation makes decisions on issues related to public order, internal conflicts and security provision to its members. We did not ask this seemingly complex question openly, yet we extracted such data from the pool of general answers. In particular, we have looked at the responses received from all three groups of informants about: (a) how decisions are made in the community; (b) whether or not the majority of community members participate in the decision-making and deliberations; (c) how other residents are informed about taken decisions.

Finally, as regards *Indicator 5*, we asked the question about potential applicability of the Uzbek model (insititutionalized) of mahalla to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to our respondents in three countries.

During the main coding we analysed the interviews by content analysis, following the same rules as during the trial coding. Overall, we analysed 202 interviews. The challenges associated with the main coding were largely the same as during the pilot coding. The results of the main coding focused on our five indicators are presented in the next chapter.

Importantly, the results obtained should be treated differently for Uzbekistan, on the one hand, and for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on the other hand. This is largely due to the fact that we conceptualized the role of Uzbek mahalla differently compared to the CBOs in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. We aimed at analysing the role of these two different types of self-governance institutions in preventing and resolving community conflicts with the potential to apply the effective institutionalized Uzbek model of mahalla to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Thus, the results of Uzbek interviews should be treated in light of these conceptual differences.

2.5. EVALUATION OF RESEARCH RESULTS: VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY

First, we argue that we achieved a rather high degree of validity in our results as we described in detail the whole process of data collection, which serves as an important requirement for assessing validity (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009).

Second, the results of the main coding phase demonstrate high degree of reliability due to the fact that we run the content analysis of interviews according to the same transparent procedure as during the pilot coding and involved the second rater for analysing the interview results. The inter-rater reliability for Kyrgyzstan was 93.5%; in the case of Tajikistan it was 83%; and 91% for Uzbekistan. This shows higher inter-rater reliability and slight improvement of the coding frame compared to the pilot coding phase.

2.6. CAVEATS AND LIMITATIONS

It is also necessary to briefly describe the caveats and limitations of this study and treat the research results in light of these limitations. First, while collecting the primary data, we used the snowball method in approaching three categories of respondents. The method appears to be effective in a difficult research environment which requires personal connections between various respondents and which facilitates arranging and organizing interviews. The method is criticized for introducing a bias in research results. We acknowledge that this adds a certain limitation to our study. However, we also tried to mitigate it by contacting experts without personal recommendations. Moreover, given the difficult research environment in three countries, the respondents felt most comfortable if we approached them through personal recommendations. In this case to make the process of interviewing as convenient as possible and, as a result, to obtain as much information as possible, we largely relied on the snowball method in our study.

Second, our interview findings should not be treated as comprehensively representative of three countries. We did not have a possibility to interview each and every stakeholder. Moreover, we did not cover all the aspects of this complex and important topic. Rather, we tried to interview the key stakeholders according to our sample in order to shed light on the situation with mahallas in Uzbekistan, and CBOs in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Our study revealed a number of important dimensions and aspects of this issue-area; however, we also acknowledge that more aspects of the mahalla phenomenon need to be further explored. In the Conclusion chapter we advise the reader on further potential areas of research based on the results of our findings.

SECTION III: COUNTRY CASE-STUDIES

3.1. MAHALLAS IN UZBEKISTAN VIS-À-VIS CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION

In total, 92 interviews were conducted in Uzbekistan. In particular, 21 experts, 50 community leaders and 21 public officials were interviewed. **Table 2** below shows interview statistics both from the region-based perspective and based on the type of respondent.

Table 2. Regional representation of respondents in Uzbekistan

Respondents	Community leaders (%)	Experts (%)	Public officials (%)	Total per region (%)	Total number of respondents (%)
Tashkent	29 (31.5)	15 (16.3)	15 (16.3)	59 (64.1)	
Samarkand	14 (15.3)	4 (4.3)	4 (4.3)	22 (23.9)	02 (100)
Nukus	7 (7.6)	2 (2.2)	2 (2.2)	11 (12.0)	92 (100)
Total	50 (54.3)	21 (22.8)	21 (22.8)	92 (100)	

3.1.1. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MAHALLAS IN PREVENTING COMMUNITY CONFLICTS

	Very effective (%)	Effective (%)	Somewhat effective (%)	Not effective (%)
Experts	1 (1.1)	4 (4.3)	7 (7.6)	9 (9.8)
Community leaders	8 (8.7)	30 (32.6)	10 (10.9)	3 (3.3)
Public officials	15 (16.3)	5 (5.4)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Total	24 (26.1)	39 (42.4)	17 (18.5)	12 (13.0)
n=92				

Table 3 illustrates the summary of how respondents in Uzbekistan perceive the effectiveness of mahalla institution with respect to its role in conflict prevention. It can be clearly seen that the distribution of results are non-uniform across the four base categories. Nevertheless, the general tendency in the given responses can be observed. Particularly, experts are found to be relatively more skeptic as regards the efficiency of mahallas in preventing community conflicts compared to public officials, who ranked the effectiveness of the institution as the highest. The responses of community leaders, on the other hand, reflect somewhat equal distribution but with the priority towards

effectiveness. Particularly, the view that mahallas are a "very effective" tool in preventing conflict in the organization is shared by 24 respondents which accounts for 26 percent of the interviewed sample. This is mainly the belief pointed out by public officials (63 percent) and to a lesser extent by community leaders (only 13 percent). Only one expert claimed the high efficiency of mahallas in preventing conflicts. In this vein, none of the interviewed public officials claimed that mahallas are "not effective" or "somewhat effective" mechanism, whereas the majority of experts (43 percent) believe that mahallas are "not effective", followed by "somewhat effective" (33 percent).

In contrast, community leaders tended to have more neutral views over the effectiveness aspect of mahallas compared to public officials and the expert cohort. The majority (nearly 60 percent) of these respondents view mahallas as "effective" and only 16 percent perceive this institution to be "very effective" in conflict resolution terms. The clear disparity in views and perceptions can be explained by the roles the interviewed respondents "play" within their categories and the ability to assess the real situation. This explains the fact why public officials tend to express more positive and far too optimistic views over the conflict prevention aspect of mahallas.

Although the majority of community leaders reflect somewhat similar position as public officials, they tend to be more moderate and show restraint in their judgments. For example, one public official pointed out that "Mahallas are very effective in conflict prevention, because they have the required conditions and expertise to do this job". One community leader, however, emphasized the opposite view saying that "Mahalla is a good instrument to prevent conflicts. However, the allocated financial and human resources may not always match the size of the mahalla and suffice to tackle the conflicts emerging from within. It would be great if we had more volunteers to work as "posbons" - night guards and these people were compensated adequately". A reserved view over the effectiveness of mahallas was shared by one expert who said that "Mahallas could have become the perfect institution of its kind to facilitate the resolution of many emerging challenges. However, there are still some "holes" that need to be patched before going any further. In many cases, for community leaders the administration is the biggest problem. Many refuse to become a community leader (especially in large cities) because of the "excessive responsibility" over conflict prevention and resolution and therefore, a dweller without any prior experience may become a community leader. It would be a good idea to train those community leaders in respective fields – not only how to fill out government forms and attend meetings".

Nevertheless, the lion's share of respondents argues in favor of the positive role of mahallas in preventing conflicts. As one of the community leaders noted in his interview, "we, as community leaders, do all the backstage work to prevent the issues that may otherwise pop-up. These things can hardly be noticed by ordinary people or even dwellers within the same mahalla. We are always on the alert and try to suppress the problem before it is actually conceived". Many respondents indicated that this is mainly achieved with the continuous help, control and monitoring by the *khokimiyat* – the local municipality, as well as close coordination of their work by local police departments. The continuous mutual support, and most importantly, exchange of information between mahalla administration, night-guards (posbons) and the local police departments was mentioned as the most efficient interplay which is the core of conflict prevention system of mahallas.

As was mentioned above, the experts are predominantly inclined to the idea that mahallas are not effective enough or not effective at all to prevent conflicts, the response indicated by nearly 80%. Their major claim is that self-government institutions are able to prevent only minor conflicts, but lack adequate mechanisms if the scale of the conflicts grows. As one of the experts noted, "this can be justified by the "watchdog" role delegated by the state and not a full-fledged conflict prevention institution". According to the same interviewee, "confrontations larger in size are no longer the business of mahallas but rather become the issue of respective authorities or forces".

Going back to the major research question as to whether the institutionalized communitybased organization is effective in preventing conflicts in general it is possible to draw the main line of conclusion. While the majority of experts are resistant to accept the fact that mahallas can be a conflict preventive tool, they still admit that it is the matter of scale and degree. The difference between the responses of community leaders and public officials is justifiable by the extent of their involvement into the real issues of the mahalla institution. While for public officials mahallas are considered to be a sole and wellfunctioning mechanism, the real issues facing such mechanism are more salient for community leaders. Therefore, public officials are relatively more buoyant about the conflict preventive functions of mahallas.

3.1.2. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UZBEK MAHALLA IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Table 4 gives a summary of responses which addresses the issue of whether mahalla can be an effective institution in conflict resolution. We originally asked the respondents to indicate if there was any conflict in the community (family, interpersonal, ethnic, religioninduced, etc), thus we did not emphasise the salience of a particular conflict.

	Very effective (%)	Effective (%)	Somewhat effective (%)	Not effective (%)
Experts	2 (2.2)	2 (2.2)	13 (14.1)	4 (4.3)
Community leaders	16 (17.4)	23 (25.0)	10 (10.9)	2 (2.2)
Public officials	13 (14.1)	7 (7.6)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Total	31 (33.7)	32 (34.8)	23 (25.0)	6 (6.5)
n=92				

Table 4. The effectiveness of the Uzbek mahalla in resolving conflicts

Similar to the previous section, it would be rather problematic to deduce any clear-cut conclusions from the table as the figures are evenly distributed in total terms. Overall, it can be clearly observed that nearly equal number of respondents 31 and 32, which account for 34% and 35% respectively, consider mahalla institution to be "very effective" and "effective" in resolving community conflicts. Almost the quarter of respondents find mahallas as "somewhat effective", followed by "not effective", the opinion shared by only 7% of the respondents. These figures can hardly be interpreted unless the responses are broken down by "expert", "public official" and "community leader" categories.

As could be expected, there is not much difference in the viewpoints of the interviewed group of respondents compared to the previous block. According to 62% of experts, mahallas are considered as "somewhat effective" and "not effective" self-governance structures which help to resolve existing conflicts. Based on these responses it is possible to conclude that experts are relatively skeptic in their general assessment of the both conflict prevention and conflict resolution functions of mahallas. Many experts indicated that "mahallas alone may not always be helpful in preventing conflicts, however, once the conflicts come to the surface then various mahalla instruments are used to effectively resolve the conflict". The major assumption is that mahallas can be an efficient and well-

organized instrument for conflict resolution for smaller-scale problems. With respect to the types of conflicts, respondents answers mainly revolved around the range of conflicts which occurred in their respective communities with the prevalence of family, interpersonal and conflicts which occur between dwellers and local businesses. The emergence of ethnic based conflicts was not mentioned by any of the respondents.

In contrast, community leaders had a relatively more positive attitude towards "conflict prevention" function of mahallas. In total, nearly 70% of all respondents or 75% of community leaders, 100% of public officials and 20% of experts consider mahallas to be a "very effective" and "effective" tool in resolving community conflicts. Overall, the analysis of the responses reveals that compared to "conflict prevention", the interviewees have a more positive perception of community's "conflict resolution" attribute. Also, responses vary when it comes to whether the questions were answered by experts, public officials or community leaders. Noteworthy, although both public officials and community leaders indicated the "efficiency" of mahalla institution in preventing community conflicts, the scale and nature of responses generally vary greatly.

For the majority of public officials, including those who interact with mahalla institutions directly, mahalla is "the best organization" for conflict resolution and they believe in its current "conflict resolution" efficiency. In particular, it was pointed out that "mahallas are destined to work with those families who are minors, underage, unemployed or low-income. This is where most of the conflict potential or destabilizing forces within mahallas may emerge". The information and experience gathered with the help of local police authorities help them find weak points within each particular mahallas and prevent the conflict to burst out or escalate. Many public officials also noted that continuous educational and training works with mahalla leaders help them "be informed" and "make community leaders" to size up the situation within their respective mahallas properly and take adequate and timely measures.

According to many community leaders, there is a vast potential of mahallas in addressing various conflicts emerging within mahallas. The major challenge, however, is "the delegation of excessive number of tasks and duties on self-governance institutions". In order to mitigate the existing or emerging problems, a solid financial base is required to maintain and/or stimulate staff, organize various events. However, the major issue,

according to some of the respondents, is that a "staff" turnover is somewhat high which may undermine the efficiency of the institution. For example, "posbons" may not express eagerness or readiness to be continuously involved in conflict resolution issues between families, for example. This is due to a lack of motivational (financial) tools for staff to take preventive measures. Also, as one community leader notes, "as opposed to the state, private entrepreneurs are more actively engaged in rendering financial support to their mahallas. Such prevailing financial dependency on private individuals or businesses can be considered as "a weak point" and make mahallas fragile and subject to outer influence". Thus, in many cases this may serve as the major cause for emergence of new conflicts within the institution.

Linking back to the major research question, the analysis of the data suggests that the mainstream of experts share pessimistic views as regards mahallas' conflict prevention and resolution functions and their efficiency. To many of them, mahallas mainly address minor issues and are not designed for larger ones such as large scale ethnic confrontations. As it was voiced by one respondent, "mahalla is a perfect watchdog for the state to have. It gives a signal if something happens, and more powerful forces will start dealing with the issue. There is a clear task division between the state, self-government institutions and forces". On the other hand, these views are not universal across all the categories of respondents. For public officials and the majority of community leaders mahallas (institutionalized) are the perfect and the only mechanism to prevent and address conflicts within their communities. This is largely explained by the fact that for many years the mahalla phenomenon has been rooted in the culture and understanding of the majority of respondents in Uzbekistan and as such, is taken for granted. Due to the lack of knowledge for many public officials and community leaders differentiation of an institutionalized from non-institutionalized community organization is rather a complicated process. To sum up, the general view is that institutionalized community organizations in Uzbekistan play a significant role in conflict prevention and resolution, although it is believed that the degree of effectiveness is somewhat dependent on the scale of a conflict.

3.1.3. UZBEK MAHALLA AND ITS TRUST-BUILDING ROLE FOR COMMUNITY MEMBERS

There is no striking difference within the structure of mahalla of Soviet times and of independent Uzbekistan. The major difference between the two, however, is the process and scale of institutionalization. In other words, the mahalla structure in Uzbekistan is officially endorsed by the government, whereas in the Soviet Socialist Uzbek Republic this structure had more cultural features rather than serving a politically motivated watchdog of the government. As the phenomenon of mahalla is embedded in the hearts and minds of Uzbekistani citizens and mahalla dwellers, it comes as a little surprise that mahalla does function as a trust-building instrument, however, with some reservations. When it comes to major decisions which have been imposed by the government to mahalla, mahalla dwellers do understand that they cannot change or affect this decision. On the other hand, the structure of mahalla does create an environment, in which mahalla members do cooperate with each other on everyday issues, get to know each other, invite neighbours for major occasions such as weddings, funerals, religious and other fests. This, in turn, strengthens mutual relationships and boosts the level of trust.

	Very effective (%)	Effective (%)	Somewhat effective (%)	Not effective (%)
Experts	3 (3.3)	5 (5.4)	9 (9.8)	4 (4.3)
Community leaders	17 (18.5)	26 (28.3)	8 (8.7)	0 (0)
Public officials	16 (17.4)	4 (4.3)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Total	36 (39.1)	35 (38.0)	17 (18.5)	4 (4.3)
n=92				

Table 5. Uzbek mahalla and its trust-building role for community members

Our study has elicited the following results (see **Table 5**): 84 per cent of community leaders claimed that a mahalla is a very strong source of trust-building in Uzbekistan and 33 per cent out of them were convinced that a mahalla is a very effective instrument of trust-building. As one community leader noted, "for centuries the structure of mahalla provided an environment for a peaceful co-existence and trustworthy relationships among its dwellers". About 16 per cent argued that the structure of mahalla is somewhat effective, whereas, no respondents among community leaders refuted the overall effectiveness of the mahalla structure. In similar vein, the interviewed public officials depicted the level of effectiveness within mahalla. All 20 interviewed public officials concluded that the structure of mahalla is either effective (20 per cent) or very effective (80 per cent). According to an interviewed public official, "the government of Uzbekistan

took into account the historical and cultural traditions of community-building in the country [...] and institutionalised the mahalla at all levels to enable a new legal status to the local self-governance in the country. This in turn, boosted trust and appreciation among the citizens of Uzbekistan". Experts were less convinced that mahalla is as effective as it was painted by community leaders and public officials. Nevertheless, 38 per cent echoed the other two groups of respondents in tagging the structure as an important trust-building mechanism. Around 43 per cent have found the structure as somewhat effective, whereas 19 per cent of experts have emphasized that mahalla instills and fosters no trust at all. One expert claimed, "mahallas can be quite effective in their work and community leaders take advantage of the formed structure of trust and respect towards their neighbours and authorities without investing too much effort and resources in promoting and fostering trust".

Thus, while views of public officials and community leaders were rather predictable, the stances of experts partially reinforce the views of the remaining groups of interviewees. It is interesting, in this regard, to consider the views of 19 per cent of experts who were rather skeptic about the mahalla cultivating trust among its dwellers. The main argument which was voiced by these respondents was based on the overwhelming role of the state which undermines trust among its citizens in general and mahalla dwellers in particular (4 per cent of interviewees out of all conducted interviews). For instance, one expert claimed: "The institute of mahalla creates little trust, as mahalla members cannot open up and trust not only their mahalla leaders but also their fellow neighbours, since the government may use any information disclosure against its citizens". This argument might be valid and should be taken on board for our further analysis, nevertheless, we should seriously stick to the idea of a mahalla creating a space for trust-building, especially at a bottom up level where the role of the government is set at a minimum level. As 77 per cent of respondents consented that mahalla is an effective instrument in promoting trust among its members, these numbers appear to be rather convincing.

Going back to our major research question, we can observe that mahallas in Uzbekistan do create and instill trust sometimes even effortlessly due to the formed pattern of relationships within mahallas, which may serve as a strong fundament for conflict prevention in the country. While we may argue about the means (planting methods of the Uzbek government) used for reaching the required level of trust, one take away is undeniable, the issue of trust is on the agenda in the Uzbek mahallas and it serves as one of the cornerstones of conflict prevention within local communities.

3.1.4. MAHALLA AS AN INCLUSIVE PARTICIPATORY INSTITUTION

In order to understand the level of involvement of all mahalla members in the decision making process we had to identify the level participation, openness, transparency, and accountability of the mahalla structure. We did not expect that each and every household member can or does participate in decision-making, however, we analysed the data vis-a-vis a notion that at least one household member takes some part in taking major decisions. In terms of openness, we wanted to find out is how welcoming the structure of mahalla in terms of collective decision-making is. In other words, whether it is welcoming and encouraging its members to take part in the decision-making process. As for transparency, we identified how transparent is the decision-making process and whether all mahalla dwellers are familiar with taken decisions and a mechanism behind that. Last but not least, accountability implies that the decision-making body can be held accountable to its citizens for taken decisions and it consequences.

Thus, our study produced the following results. Participation varies from mahalla to mahalla: rural areas boast with a higher level of participation, whereas urban areas are characterised by lower levels of participation. It might be partially associated with a greater sense of belonging to the mahalla the people dwell in rural areas than in the urban areas. Another explanation for that is a stronger cultural and "good neighbour" ties in rural areas than in urban areas, especially in Tashkent.

In terms of openness, the mixed pattern of answers has been observed. On the one hand, the community leaders were emphasising their welcoming and encouraging attitude (which is a natural guess), experts and even some public officials were less certain about the level of openness with regard to making decisions. This, perhaps, may be due to the ready-made decisions that quite often come as instructions or orders from the central government and, as a result, mahalla leaders only deliver the number of signees for protocol purposes. Cognizant of this, mahalla leaders might be rather reluctant to invite more members in taking decisions.

The issue of transparency has produced two distinct outcomes. Community leaders and public officials agreed that transparency is observed and the members of their respective mahallas are fully aware of the decisions and mechanisms that have been used to arrive at these crucial decisions. However, experts were very skeptical about the overall transparency of the decision-making. According to them, if crucial decisions are formed and imposed by the central government, there is no transparency as such.

As for accountability, the question itself was frequently misunderstood by community leaders. Under the term "accountability", community leaders have understood accountability towards their superiors (i.e. the central government) and were largely bewildered by the idea of accountability towards their members. Therefore, it can be assumed that accountability to mahalla dwellers is barely the case in Uzbekistan. This was reinstated and reinforced by the findings of expert interviews.

	Very effective (%)	Effective (%)	Somewhat effective (%)	Not effective (%)
Experts	0 (0)	1 (1.1)	4 (4.3)	16 (17.4)
Community leaders	4 (4.3)	15 (16.3)	18 (19.7)	14 (15.2)
Public officials	10 (10.9)	5 (5.4)	5 (5.4)	0 (0)
Total	14 (15.2)	21 (22.8)	27 (29.4)	30 (32.6)
n=92				

Table 6. Mahalla as an inclusive participatory institution

Constructing these data into the single mosaic (see **Table 6**), the following highlights should be drawn: 75 per cent of public officials believe that the process of decision making is inclusive, while 25 per cent perceive it as partly inclusive. 37 per cent of community leaders echo the majority of public officials, while 35 per cent find it partly inclusive and 28 per cent perceive it as a closed process. Experts are more strict in their assessments: 76 per cent of interviewed experts are strongly convinced that the decision-making process is anything but inclusive, 19 per cent find some fractions of inclusiveness, whereas about 5 per cent (1 respondent) argued that the process of making decisions is inclusive.

Thus, it may be concluded that the decision-making mechanism is barely inclusive. While it varies from a mahalla to mahalla and has different features in urban-rural settings, it is rather an authoritative method of taking decisions. It is important to keep in mind that this scenario pertains not to all decisions but rather to top-bottom coordinated decisions from the central government.

Connecting these results to our research question, we may conclude that inclusiveness of decision-making does not contribute to strengthening conflict prevention in the country. Certainly, we may argue that the government takes care of conflict prevention by imposing tailored decisions to mahallas, however, it drags away the sense of belonging from the members of mahalla to a certain extent.

3.1.5. POSSIBILITIES OF A BROADER REGIONAL APPLICATION OF THE UZBEK MODEL ACROSS CENTRAL ASIA

Table 7 presents the breakdown of answers of respondents for the potential application of mahalla with respects to its conflict prevention and resolution mechanism in other neighboring countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

	Very effective (%)	Effective (%)	Somewhat effective (%)	Not effective (%)
Experts	1 (1.1)	3 (3.3)	5 (5.4)	12 (13.0)
Community leaders	23 (25)	9 (9.8)	10 (10.9)	9 (9.8)
Public officials	10 (10.9)	8 (8.7)	2 (2.2)	0 (0.0)
Total	34 (37.0)	20 (21.7)	17 (18.5)	21 (22.8)
n=92				

Table 7. A broader regional application of the Uzbek model across Central Asia

The majority view "the application of mahalla phenomenon" as eliciting "successful" results if deployed in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. This is represented by 34 respondents or 37% of total respondents, whereas almost equal number of the interviewed people perceives that such application would be "somewhat effective", "unsuccessful" and "irrelevant", with 22%, 18% and 23% respectively.

Given that the group of respondents differs in their level of familiarity and knowledge regarding mahalla institutions in the neighboring countries, the following divergent results were obtained from the analysis. In particular, 57% of experts expressed doubts and consider that the idea of mahalla in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan is irrelevant and can hardly be realized. Only 5% have the opinion that self-government institutions in these countries could be successful in terms of their conflict preventing and conflict resolution

aspects. Experts also added that "the full-fledged and properly functioning mahalla system" can be comparably better and more efficiently implemented in Tajikistan as opposed to Kyrgyzstan. For the most part, this can be explained by closer cultural as well as ethnic ties of the Tajik and Uzbek people who have similar settled lifestyles and similar neighborhood structures.

Another argument voiced by many experts is relatively similar socio-political and economic structure of Uzbekistan to that of Tajikistan, not Kyrgyzstan. According to some experts, "due to a more democratic nature of the socio-political landscape and less systemic unity among the people in Kyrgyz neighbourhoods, it is less likely that mahalla strategy will be successfully deployed as a role model in this country". Many opinions expressed both by experts and community leaders as regards "irrelevancy" of mahalla in providing sustainable peace and ensuring conflict resolution fall under a) the category of institutional differences of the studied countries and b) the extent of state engagement in day-to-day activities of its citizens. In particular, according to one expert, "In Kyrgyzstan it is impossible to be engaged in building a peaceful community under a strict supervision and dictatorship of the state like it is done in Uzbekistan. The Kyrgyz people got out of the habit to obey or be subordinate to their government authorities. In order to be successful, the mindset of citizens should be changed first". It was also emphasized that "in Uzbekistan mahalla is a clear manifestation of the current situation in the country and a representative agent of the government control through police force coordination as well as citizen's involuntary involvement in maintaining such control. Therefore, in the countries where "democratic" values prevail, the effective application of the mahalla model is likely to fail".

All of the respondents who expressed skepticism regarding the application of the role model of mahalla emphasized that in order to be successful, the central government as well as adjacent elements that form the system of self-government institution should be strong enough to be able to suppress communities' traditional ways of conflict prevention and resolution.

Public officials, on the other hand, are very optimistic and believe that the Uzbek mahalla can serve as a proper role model for building peace and security in the neighbouring countries. The "successful" and "somewhat successful" attitudes were shared by nearly 90% of the respondents within the "public official" category. The majority of those are certain that this model could be effectively deployed "in any part of the world where there is a group of people living together and there is a strong government". One public official mentioned that "mahalla can be successfully applied only in the countries where the people are living the collectivistic way of life; thus, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the most applicable nations for this model". While the successful applicability views were shared by the majority within "public officials" and "community leaders" group of respondents, the conducted analysis could hardly reveal any substantiated arguments to support such statements.

The responses voiced by community leaders followed a mixed pattern. Despite the majority of them (45%) agreed that the model of mahalla can be successfully implemented in the neighboring countries, the answers of the rest of the interviewed community leaders were evenly distributed across the array. In particular, "somewhat successful" responses accounted for 22%, "unsuccessful" – 18% and "irrelevant" – 23%, respectively.

It is important to note that those respondents who view it as 'somewhat successful' highlight the fact that "mahallas can hypothetically be successful, but they need to be properly altered and accustomed to satisfy specific local conditions. These conditions are quite different from those to be found in Uzbekistan". The main argument is that using the Uzbek model as a template for other countries would be inefficient and unfruitful. In contrast, those who mentioned that the model would be "irrelevant" placed a specific emphasis on differentiating Kyrgyzstan from Tajikistan in this stance. In particular, the model in Kyrgyzstan would hardly produce any results due to the country's long-lasting political and socio-economic instability. Besides, to show any sign of success, the country's failed system of strict government control and weak institutional basis should be revitalized. This is practically impossible to achieve unless the North-South division of power is still in force which is currently a true indication of power division on ethnic grounds. "Irrelevance" with respect to Tajikistan shows a somewhat different line of arguments, however, some of the answers were also found in the results pertaining to Kyrgyzstan. Namely, because of the strong influence of outside forces and foreign countries on the course of government policy development in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the implementation of the mahalla model could face some hard resistance and fail at some

point. This statement can be well summarized by the words of one respondent who pointed out that "the reason why the model in Uzbekistan is working successfully is that we are not listening to any of our foreign partners who continuously offer their development strategies and financial resources. If we had done, we would have ended up in the same situation as our neighboring countries".

Answering the general research questions, the experts have been predominantly skeptical of mahalla acting as a role model in addressing the causes and consequences of a conflict. While in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan the major common factor resisting the application of the Uzbek model is the weak governments, the analysis showed that institutionalizing community organization in Kyrgyzstan is less likely to be efficient or even not possible. The main reasons for Kyrgyzstan include loose cultural ties and different mindset of the Kyrgyz people influenced by the establishing democratic values in the country. Conversely, the arguments voiced by public officials and community leaders are mainly in favor of the successful implementation of mahalla in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. This was not surprising as many of the respondents in these categories (public officials, community leaders), unlike their counterparts from the experts cohort, lack adequate knowledge of the situation in the neighboring countries.

3.2. CBO IN KYRGYZSTAN: TOWARD CONFLICT MITIGATION AND SECURITY

Overall, 61 interviews were conducted in Kyrgyzstan. Among them, 28 experts, 21 leaders of mahallas and 12 public officials were interviewed. **Table 8** shows regional representation of interviews, with the majority of interviews conducted in Bishkek and Chui region (55.7%), while evenly covering Osh and Djalal-Abad regions, with 22.9 per cent and 21.3 per cent respectively. This distribution turned out to be reasonable given that most experts and public officials are based in Bishkek and most mahalla communities are located mainly in Osh and Djalal-Abad.

	Community leaders (%)	Experts (%)	Public officials (%)	Total per region (%)	Total number of respondents (%)
Bishkek and	6 (9.8)	18 (29.5)	10 (16.4)	34 (55.7)	
Chui region					
Osh	8 (13.1)	5 (8.2)	1 (1.6)	14 (22.9)	61 (100)
Djalal-Abad	7 (11.5)	5 (8.2)	1 (1.6)	13 (21.3)	61 (100)
Total	21 (34.4)	28 (45.9)	12 (19.7)	100	

Table 8. Regional representation of respondents in Kyrgyzstan

3.2.1. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF KYRGYZ CBOS IN PREVENTING COMMUNITY CONFLICTS

One of the key questions of this study was the role of local Kyrgyz communities in preserving peace and preventing conflict among its members. The potential of their conflict-preventing role has been assessed by three categories of respondents. Overall, studying the respondents' reaction reveals that community leaders, experts and public officials have a largely positive perception of effectiveness of community-based organizations (CBOs) in addressing the causes of communal conflict.

Table 9 provides the disaggregated summary of respondents' perceptions as regards the effectiveness of mahallas in preventing community conflicts in Kyrgyzstan. The perceptions are relatively equally distributed among the four main dimensions, however, the two main patterns can be identified. First, given that respondents' answers are distributed largely on the positive scale from "very effective to somewhat effective", it points to the fact that CBOs are indeed have the conflict-preventing potential and equipped with necessary (mainly informal and not institutionalized) tools to confront any emerging conflict in an effective way.

However, in order to be successful they need to be properly governed and other factors like social stability/instability, high/low poverty, increasing/decreasing labour migration, may play a crucial role in determining success or the lack thereof at CBOs. In one example, a community leader from the North of the country has expressed his concern that community organisations in Kyrgyzstan are being negatively affected by "the lack of economic development, ineffective governance at district and provincial level, mounting crime rate..." Only five respondents mentioned the complete ineffectiveness of CBOs despite existing social and economic problems. In fact, one could assume that the mere prevalence of common societal problems and attempts to address these issues (irrespective of the outcomes) by the community members facilitates the positive image of this institution in preventing conflicts.

Symptomatic of this, some of the respondent's reactions tend to emphasise a range of mechanisms that helps the community in its conflict prevention activities, such as night watch practices, "the council of elders", etc. As one interviewed expert notes, "some practices - including night watch activities – are highly effective, subject to the provision of incentives to those who would commit themselves to it." Thus, we can assume that if CBOs were properly institutionalized coupled with the strong state's role and high degree of economic development, then they would project a better capability of coping with emerging conflicts. They have a good potential as a number of practices are regularly employed (e.g. night watch activities) quite successfully.

	Very effective (%)	Effective (%)	Somewhat effective (%)	Not effective (%)
Community leaders	5 (8.2)	9 (14.7)	7 (11.5)	0 (0.0)
Experts	11 (18)	4 (6.6)	10 (16.4)	3 (4.9)
Public officials	4 (6.6)	5 (8.2)	1 (1.6)	2 (3.3)
Total	20 (32.8)	18 (29.5)	18 (29.5)	5 (8.2)
n=61				

Table 9. The effectiveness of Kyrgyz CBOs in preventing community conflicts

Second, 32.8% of respondents view local community organizations 'as very effective' selfgovernance structures that indeed help to prevent conflicts. The majority of these respondents represent Kyrgyz regions other than the country's South, where ethnic violence took place in 2010. Second, those respondents, who represent the South region, tended to emphasize that their communities are 'somewhat effective' and relate this to the violence of 2010. They agree that community-based organizations could not help to prevent these ethnic clashes, however, it was exactly the CBOs' tools which were employed to prevent any further escalation of the conflict. In this regard, these respondents view them as 'somewhat effective' due to the fact that they were enacted too late to prevent the violence in the first place.

The respondents with professional expertise have a similar attitude toward conflictprevention capabilities of community organisations in Kyrgyzstan. One expert, speaking of the situation in the South, has stressed that "while ethnic tensions are still evident with a lot of ethnicity-induced discrimination, injustice and inequality, the community [mahalla] elders still retain the potential to influence the actions of the perpetrators through a dialogue." Another expert, from the northern Kyrgyzstan, has mentioned the positive experience of mahalla in Uzgen, stating that "the mahalla has played a crucial role in preventing violent incidents among ethnic groups in June 2010, whereas the rest of the South was in turmoil."

Based on these observations we can conclude that regardless of the continuing economic and social hardship, community organisations [mahalla in the South] have proved effective in downgrading the potentially explosive roots of inter-ethnic confrontation. However, their potential is somewhat undermined by current social and economic problems and the lacking institutionalization of best and effective practices adopted at various CBOs in Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore, in order to understand the aggregate peacemaking role of a community organisation in a divided society, one also has to look at its potential in conflict resolution.

3.2.2. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF KYRGYZ CBOS IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION

In our next table (see **Table 10**), we have summarised the responses regarding the effectiveness of a community organisation in resolving conflicts. We originally asked the respondents to indicate if there was any conflict in the community (family, interpersonal, ethnic, religion-induced, etc), thus we did not emphasise the salience of a particular conflict.

	Very effective (%)	Effective (%)	Somewhat effective (%)	Not effective (%)
Community leaders	1 (1.6)	12 (19.7)	4 (6.6)	4 (6.6)
Experts	6 (9.8)	6 (9.8)	10 (16.4)	6 (9.8)
Public officials	3 (4.9)	8 (13.1)	1 (1.6)	0
Total	10 (16.4)	26 (42.6)	15 (24.6)	10 (16.4)
n=61				

Table 10. The effectiveness of Kyrgyz CBOs in conflict resolution

The results allow concluding that the majority of respondents (42.6%) view mahallas as 'effective' and 16.4% as 'very effective' self-governance structures which help to resolve existing conflicts. What does this mean for our understanding of the role of local community-based organizations in Kyrgyzstan? First of all, bearing in mind the results of

Table 10 regarding the effectiveness of CBOs conflict prevention tools, we can argue that CBOs are viewed as important in resolving community conflicts as in preventing them. However, CBOs alone may not always help to prevent conflicts, however, once the conflicts come to the surface then various instruments are used to effectively resolve the conflict. Thus, it is possible to assume that non-institutionalized CBOs alone cannot fully prevent conflicts from outbreak due to various factors (social and economic instability, political tensions, etc.). However, at a later stage they are deemed more important to resolve the conflict. Only 10 respondents (16.4%) view them ineffective and this can partly be explained by the fact that these respondents referred to the violence of 2010 in the South of Kyrgyzstan, pointing to the ineffectiveness of local mahallas in quick resolution of the tensions. Thus, their perceptions were influenced by their own experiences of the most dramatic conflict events that took place in the country. This makes this group of respondents different from other respondents who did not have personal experiences of conflicts that took place within mahallas.

In most cases, respondents have mentioned a range of conflicts which occurred in their respective communities and studied regions. We have seen the prevalence of family, interpersonal and commercial conflicts over a high-intensity ethnic conflicts. However, the respondents who either lived in the Southern provinces [cities of Osh, Djalal-abad, etc.] or had their close relatives there, were more prone to mentioning low-intensity conflicts occurring along the lines of ethnicity and ethnic identity. Yet, after all in the analysis of data we sought to stick to the mentions of conflicts with the potential to be transformed from low-intensity to high-intensity conflicts.

Overall our study of the responses shows that compared to "conflict prevention", the interviewees have pretty much the same positive perception of community's "conflict resolution" mechanism.

One of the emerging trends is that the majority of respondents point, as before, to the fundamental societal issues in Kyrgyzstan which require the active engagement of higher political authorities. For, example one Bishkek-based expert has stressed that "mahalla can potentially resolve a conflict situation without drawing too much of public attention, but after all there are problems that should be addressed at a higher [state] level, e.g. jobs, inequalities, access to political institutions, etc." In fact, many respondents mentioned the

potentially important role of the state in terms of strengthening CBOs. Few respondents mentioned that in some CBOs the private sector is the only source of financing their activities. As one community leader notes, in several CBOs "private entrepreneurs more actively support mahallas than the state." However, even though private sector helps, still the state is the main donor of their activities. As one community leader notes, "if the economy functions well, then mahalla is a powerful self-governance structure..." Moreover, after the 2010 events, the state pays increasingly more attention to conflicts among and within local communities (Community member).

Another expert has also mentioned that "one of the key tasks of the mahalla institution is to skillfully balance between conflicting parties and their interests, instead of taking sides". On balance, the respondent from the community has stressed that the "state authorities realise the importance of conflict resolution at a community level, but they have yet to prove their efficacy in tackling the underlying origins for conflict which stretch beyond the community level."

It is noteworthy that when we asked about community's effectiveness in conflict resolution, most of the responses implied the state and pointed out more systematic causes of existing inequalities and conflict potential within Kyrgyzstani society, not only in the conflict-prone South but also in a relatively peaceful North. However, when assessing the overall CBOs' role in resolving conflict situations in Central Asia, one of the experts points out that "it is definitely more secure to live with mahalla than without it".

In order to understand the dynamic relationship between CBOs' potential in preventing and resolving conflicts, one has to examine some important micro-level variables within those organisations, such as "trust-building" and "inclusiveness". In our study, we argue that those variables are two fundamental components that for years determined the Uzbek's mahalla's performance in preserving peace and relative stability, especially when compared to some of the neighbouring countries.

Therefore, in these two sections we shed light on CBOs' potential in conflict prevention and conflict resolution which directly relate to our first research question which looks at whether an institutionalized structure of local CBOs would enhance communal security. We can observe that local CBOs in Kyrgyzstan are the victims of deteriorating economic situation in the country and the weakening state's role. The widespread use of informal communal practices helps to solve some of the existing problems, yet, it is insufficient to fully prevent conflicts at CBOs, which has been the case in 2010. We also saw that if CBOs receive sufficient funding by the state, they might well enhance their effectiveness in preventing and solving conflicts across the country. In turn, this may help 'institutionalize' CBOs and increase their legitimacy as effective conflict preventing mechanisms not only in the face of the community members, but also the state.

There is also one important concern that should be discussed. Kyrgyzstan is a country open to various sources of domestic and international funding. Unlike Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, an increasing number of private sources finance CBOs. While their exact effects on CBO activity are to be studied yet, one thing is clear, namely the fact that CBOs may use various sources of funding should inevitably lead to donor's agenda-setting in CBOs activities. This may lead to uncertainty and damage CBO's potential to prevent and resolve problems among its members.

To understand the key criteria that make CBOs successful in terms of conflict prevention and resolution, we now turn to the available data on the trust-building potential and social inclusiveness of community organisations in Kyrgyzstan which have been codified as shown in the following tables.

3.2.3. THE KYRGYZ CBOS AND THEIR TRUST-BUILDING ROLE FOR COMMUNITY MEMBERS

Table 11 shows the distribution of respondents' answers as regards assessing CBOs as a trust-building instrument for community members. We were interested as to what extent CBOs can provide the framework for trust-building among its members and what implications this has for conflict prevention and resolution of mahallas. The table shows that the majority of respondents view it as 'somewhat effective' (37.7%) and 'not effective' (26.2%), while 8 respondents (13.1%) deem as 'very effective' and 14 respondents as 'effective' (22.9%).

	Very effective (%)	Effective (%)	Somewhat effective (%)	Not effective (%)
Community leaders	0	3 (4.9)	13 (21.3)	5 (8.2)
Experts	3 (4.9)	6 (9.8)	9 (14.8)	10 (16.4)
Public officials	5 (8.2)	5 (8.2)	1 (1.6)	1 (1.6)
Total	8 (13.1)	14 (22.9)	23 (37.7)	16 (26.2)
n=61				

Table 11. Kyrgyz CBOs and their trust-building role for community members

We have found that in the majority of responses the community has been playing a significant role in nurturing trust between the members. Of the key aspects that we could spot in the range of responses was the possibility that community provided for daily face-to-face interactions between the members, irrespective of their ethnic or religious background. A respondent with an extensive experience in the South has stressed that "it is not an easy task to facilitate trust-building, especially when most of the community members are preoccupied with their daily routines and have no time to interact with fellow residents. However, the mahalla still retains traditions (such as regular meetings at *chaikhana* –teahouses) which make face-to-face interaction possible, even inevitable."

Still, the violent events of 2010 largely diminished the role of mahallas as a trust-building system for its community members. While one can observe a high degree of trust among the members of one ethnic group (e.g. Uzbeks), trust between various ethnic groups has been largely damaged. Nevertheless, the variety of opinions exists. A community leader has noted that "whenever there is a tension or conflict of interests among residents, we soon assemble the highly trusted community elders and active members who help us broker a settlement. As a whole, the community organisation is still trusted among residents, not least because of its role in facilitating social development (healthcare, education) and public safety." It is also evident from the available data that the trust building capability within mahalla has been hampered considerably especially after the violent clashes, but there is more trust in mahalla than in state institutions. Thus, we can conclude that mahallas remain an important mechanism which facilitates interaction between various groups of the society who form the mahalla communities.

3.2.4. THE KYRGYZ CBO AS AN INCLUSIVE PARTICIPATORY INSTITUTION

As for the inclusiveness of various groups in the process of decision-making within the community – we have observed a more visible variation in the respondents' perceptions. In the analysis of a given sample we have located the answers within at least three indicators of community organisation's level of inclusiveness, i.e. as "inclusive", "partly inclusive" and "closed" (see **Table 12**).

The "inclusive" character of a community organisation appears to be claimed by respondents (mostly by community leaders and members) as a way to demonstrate the natural integration of all members and their peaceful coexistence in the community. For instance, one respondent has been quick to indicate that "We do not put too much emphasis on it, because, in principle, all citizens are naturally integrated."

	Very inclusive	Inclusive	Partly inclusive	Closed
Community leaders	0	16 (26.2)	2 (3.3)	3 (4.9)
Experts	2 (3.3)	6 (9.8)	12 (19.7)	8 (13.1)
Public officials	4 (6.5)	6 (9.8)	1 (1.6)	1 (1.6)
Total	6 (9.8)	28 (45.9)	15 (24.6)	12 (19.7)
n=61				

Table 12. The Kyrgyz CBO as an inclusive participatory institution

We see that the majority of respondents view mahalla as an inclusive mechanism which helps its members co-exist in peaceful environment through the means of constant interaction and the opportunity to take part in decision-making process either through delegation of rights to *aksakals* (male elders, community leaders) or through direct participation and/or voting in decision-making processes. This enhances trust among its members and facilitates the dialogue.

When it comes to community-level problems, various CBOs use various tools which may bring various community members together. As noted above, these tools range from delegating the right to take decisions by the CBO leader only to active participation of all mahalla members in decision-making agenda. As most of the respondents note, most of the community members feel that they are part of one whole community because the level of their participation in CBO's decision-making is high. Moreover, from respondents' perceptions one can note that the CBO leaders provide feedback on their decisions and actions and feel responsible for the entire community. Thus, we may argue that some CBO leaders in Kyrgyzstan are accountable to their members. However, 44.3% of the respondents view mahallas as either 'partly inclusive' or even 'closed'.

The "partly inclusive" feature of the communal entity is derived from the logic that the degree of participation in decision-making within a community depends not on the communal power ("authoritarian" or "liberal") structure *per se*, rather it is characteristic of the choices of individual members. What is implied here was explicitly mentioned by one of the respondents that "the mahalla institution is designed to be inclusive, but it is a voluntary association, and residents choose whether or not to take part in decision-making."

Two main factors can help us explain the differing perceptions among the respondents. First, this can be attributed to the fact that personality of mahalla leaders matters significantly for inclusiveness of its members. Thus, the situation differs from one mahalla to another. If the leader is truly interested to have various members' voice represented, he will make sure that everyone has an equal possibility to take part in decision-making. When the leader is driven by his selfish interests (as it appears to be the case in several CBOs in our study), then the members feel deprived of this opportunity and cannot equally participate in the decision-making process. The fact that mainly experts belong to the groups of 'partly inclusive' and 'closed' is because the experts are not direct participants in mahalla processes and, thus, they view the whole process as somewhat intransparent. Sometimes various decisions are taken by different procedures (voting, written notices, etc.) and it may, thus, make the process somewhat unpredictable and entirely dependent on the will of the mahalla leader. While this can be viewed as still 'inclusive' by mahalla members, it is perceived rather negatively by experts.

Second, given the recent history of inter-ethnic clashes and an ongoing painful process of reconciliation, we also expected that some respondents would characterize the degree of inclusiveness of their respective communities as "closed". This is symptomatic of a larger picture. Based on the analysis of the situation in the field, one would agree that the communities in the southern cities of Osh and Jalal-Abad are becoming increasingly divided and isolated from one another. This could also be symptomatic of the failure to facilitate a micro-level reconciliatory diplomacy and trust-restoring measures. As one respondent has stressed, in the case of Osh city since 2010, the mahalla is increasingly

becoming a closed institution in which one could observe the signs of dominance of a certain ethnic group over another."

In this case, we see the structural deficiencies in the community, perhaps because of a lack of prominent leaders. Interestingly, we assume that the lack of skillful leaders (or their "social invisibility") is characteristic of a fear that the mere appearance of a leader can provoke violence again, because he can be seen by the opposing group as a sign of "group mobilisation."

Therefore, by evaluating to what extent local Kyrgyz CBOs serve as a trust-building and inclusive mechanism for community members, we shed light on our second research question and found that in Kyrgyzstan CBOs increasingly manifest ethnicity-based conflicts, especially after the 2010 violence. While CBOs can serve as effective trust-building and inclusive mechanism for one ethnic group, they may appear to be closed to other groups. This tendency is on the rise in the country. Moreover, in the case of Kyrgyzstan various CBOs demonstrate different degree of inclusiveness as they may use various participation, transparency and accountability tools. The role of a community leader is enormously important in this regard. Community leaders' type of behaviour often defines to what extent community members feel that they are part of the entire community. The absence of institutionalized CBOs in Kyrgyzstan enhances the leader's role in shaping the community development and may determine the degree to which a particular CBO is prone to an ethnic conflict.

3.2.5. POTENTIAL APPLICATION OF THE UZBEK CBO MODEL IN KYRGYZSTAN

We have now approached the final stage of our analysis regarding the degree of applicability of the "the Uzbek mahalla model" in Kyrgyzstan. The Table below presents the distribution of respondents' answers as regards viewing the prospects for the implementation of the institutionalized Uzbek mahalla in Kyrgyzstan.

Table 13 shows that the majority view it as 'successful' and 'somewhat successful', 19.7% and 37.7% respectively. However, tracing the categories of respondents, we see that mainly experts and public officials viewed its potential as high due to the fact that they are familiar with the mahalla phenomenon in Uzbekistan and understand its strengths. Community members are less familiar with the Uzbek model, therefore, they did not

assign a high potential to mahallas in terms of their conflict-preventing and resolving power. In this respect potential awareness-raising activities on the Uzbek type of mahallas are of utmost important for community members in Kyrgyzstan.

	Successful	Somewhat successful	Unsuccessful	Irrelevant
Community leaders	3 (4.9)	4 (6.5)	7 (11.5)	7 (11.5)
Experts	4 (6.5)	16 (26.2)	4 (6.5)	4 (6.5)
Public officials	5 (8.2)	3 (4.9)	2 (3.3)	2 (3.3)
Total	12 (19.7)	23 (37.7)	13 (21.3)	13 (21.3)
n=61				

Table 13. Potential application of the Uzbek CBO model in Kyrgyzstan

Our analysis of the data derived from respondents in Kyrgyzstan suggests that "the Uzbek model" is often associated with the socio-political and economic situation in neighbouring Uzbekistan. The latter implies that the relatively closed nature of society, stronger political and economic system in Uzbekistan, and mahalla (so much resembling a helping hand of a state apparatus) associated with this system cannot in principle be applied in Kyrgyzstan which has seen a prolonged political instability in recent years breaking the social norms, "state-society-individual" apart. To prove this, one respondent has mentioned "the "Uzbek mahalla" works well under social and political conditions specific to Uzbekistan...and yet, we have a different range of conditions in which mahalla may not be effective." In the word of another respondent "Community organisation is a more autonomous [from the state] institution in our [Kyrgyz] case. In that sense, Uzbek mahalla reflects very much the socio-political peculiarities of a place [Uzbekistan]".

It is important to note that those respondents (16 experts, 4 community members and 3 public officials) who view it as 'somewhat successful' stress the following reason. They argue that it can potentially be successful, however, it needs to be adjusted to specific local conditions, which are quite different from those to be found in Uzbekistan. Thus, a direct copying of Uzbek experience would hardly be successful, only if adjusted to local specifics it can play as important role as in Uzbekistan.

Considering that the key is not the applicability of a general "institutionalised" version of Uzbekistani mahalla in Kyrgyzstan, but rather the mahalla's peace-making potential, still the respondents have been skeptical of the sole role of mahalla in addressing the causes and consequences of a conflict. It can be summarised by the words of one respondent that "based on the knowledge of recent conflicts, it is hard to imagine that mahalla itself can independently prevent or resolve major conflicts. It is the state authorities that should address the key social, economic and political causes of conflict."

Thus, answering our final research question, we have found that Kyrgyz respondents view the Uzbek model of mahalla as relevant to Kyrgyzstan, however, it needs to be adjusted to local specifics and what is more important it should build on a strong state's role and coordination of CBOs' activities. The latter point indicates the exact mechanism according to which the Uzbek mahalla works. This is partly indicative of the fact that the mentality of people in Kyrgyzstan is similar to what we observe in Uzbekistan (as both societies positively view 'the strong role of the state'). However, what is missing in the case of Kyrgyzstan is a strong state authority which could effectively address the main causes of social and ethnic conflicts in the country, thus laying the ground for the emergence of more effective CBOs in the country.

3.3. CBO IN TAJIKISTAN: TOWARD CONFLICT MITIGATION AND SECURITY

As it was mentioned in the previous sections of this study, the majority of CBOs in Tajikistan are run according to the 1994 Constitutional Law on Local Public Administration and the Law on Self-government in Towns and Villages further amended in 1999. One version of Uzbek mahalla which we find in Tajikistan is known as "jamoat". Our fieldwork in Tajikistan and communication with community leaders and local residents shows that the functions of this organisation indeed match Freizer's (2002) description of jamoats as "public activities to address issues of local importance autonomously and at their own discretion, directly or indirectly in accordance with the legislation". In this respect, jamoats resemble the Uzbek mahallas in the sense of being self-governing bodies which address local issues independently of the higher government (local or central) structures.

It is important to note that apart from formal or institutionalised jamoats the Tajik society still retains more traditional institutions, also referred to as "makhallia" or community committees. Some experts whom we interviewed have confirmed that makhallia (along with other similar bodies, e.g. housing block councils or village committees) did not receive a needed attention formally, especially in the 1994 and following legislations, but

according to one Tajik expert "these organisations are often more existent and more influential in managing local life than institutionalised jamoats".

We have also learnt that because of dynamic changes in the Tajik urban setting, the functioning of traditional CBOs such as makhalia has been more visible in rural areas and small towns, whereas jamoats are more influential in cities and larger towns.

In our study of the Tajik CBOs, we have observed that although there is a difference in the level of central government's control over traditional self-governing bodies in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, we have also found that at a micro-level the structure and functions of these institutions have a number of similar features. In both countries, the mahalla and makhallia are designed to facilitating the community life by bringing people together and organising community-based activities. We have seen that "*khashar*" a traditional form of mutual aid in which the community comes together to clean up the neighbourhood, build a house or harvest crops is present in both countries under the same name. In both country settings, CBOs take a leading role in the organization of various ceremonies, including marriages, births and funerals.

To address the case of Tajikistan, we similarly completed 49 semi-structured in-depth interviews with the three categories of respondent in the capital city of Dushanbe and a number of smaller cities (also, jamoats) of Rohati and Chorbogh (see **Table 14**). Unfortunately, our plan to conduct interviews in the conflict-prone Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Okrug (GBAO) area, namely in Khorog province, did not materialise because our research team was denied access by the local authorities under the premise of worsening security situation in that region. It proved generally symptomatic of the recent trend in Tajikistan when the central government sought to limit the access of foreign media and researchers to GBAO that witnessed a number of violent incidents between local residents and law-enforcement agencies in the past several years.

	CBO leaders (%)	Experts (%)	Public officials (%)	Total per region (%)	Total number of respondents (%)
Dushanbe (capital city)	16 (32.6)	10 (20.4)	6 (12.2)	32 (65.3)	49 (100)

Table 14. Regional representation of respondents in Tajikistan

Rohati (Rudaki District)	7 (14.3)	2 (4.1)	1 (2.0)	10 (20.4)
Chorbogh (Varzob	5 (10.2)	2 (4.1)	0 (0)	7 (14.3)
District)				
Total	28 (57.1)	14 (28.6)	7 (14.3)	49 (100)

Thus, although our collected data may not be geographically representative of all Tajikistan, we assume that the knowledge we have gathered to date provides necessary clues to the social perception of a CBO and its role in ensuring security of its residents.

Before turning to the five key questions concerning conflict prevention, conflict resolution, trust-building, inclusiveness and applicability of the Uzbek model of mahalla, it is worth looking at a number of other factors. Particularly, in order to understand the potential application of institutionalised mahalla as a mechanism to provide sustainable peace and security in Tajikistan, we have first examined an overall perception of general security matters by the members of local communities.

The data we gathered in the capital city and several cities show that the majority of members of the local community share a relatively similar view regarding public order, personal safety and societal security. Overall, our study shows that there are fewer residents who are concerned with the political dimensions of security, including the possibility of ethnic tensions, recurrence of a civil war or foreign intervention. However the majority of respondents voiced their concerns regarding the societal, socio-ethical and environmental aspects of security.

First, it is clear that the large number of residents of local communities is more anxious about *social* aspects of security, such as a youth unemployment and worrying levels of labour migration, decreasing quality of public education, weakening of the state institutions and growing trends toward corruption and clientalism, and a difficulty of law-enforcement upon economically and politically powerful members of the society.

Secondly, some respondents have placed a stronger emphasis on worsening *socio-ethical* aspects which they strongly considered to grow as a challenge for public order in the future. This category of people expressed their concern with the changing patterns of interpersonal relationships between family members, among relatives and between youth and seniors. It was mentioned several times that the changing value systems is seen

primarily in the move towards material benefits and resource distribution which has facilitated the rise in the level of family violence (e.g. homicide and other criminal/immoral acts) in recent years.

Thirdly, a smaller category of respondents has stressed *environmental* changes of the past several decades as a key catalyst of instability in the Tajik communities. It was mentioned that the changing patterns of climate expressed in less precipitation and higher temperatures has had an impact on the increase in the volume and scale of disputes with regard to water and land distribution.

We note that the societal and socio-ethical aspects of public order mentioned by the respondents are largely symptomatic of the challenges of post-Soviet transition which Tajikistan has been struggling to overcome similar to the neighbouring countries. Even though environmental challenges resulting in intra-communal conflicts over scarce resources are not directly linked to the wider politico-economic situation after the collapse of Soviet Union, we overall observe that the members of local communities in Tajikistan are growing dissatisfied with the state of public order and societal security. These trends occur not least because of the weakening role of the state authority due to its limited capacity to deliver basic needs and inability to mediate between various societal groups.

Also, we have seen that all of the afore-mentioned aspects of security – societal, socioethical and environmental – have the potential for increasing the likelihood of intracommunity conflict in one way or another. Under such circumstances, we sought to examine the role of mahalla-type CBOs in Tajikistan in mitigating/resolving these and other forms of conflicts. In the next sections we shall discuss the findings of our fieldwork in Tajikistan not only with regard to conflict prevention/resolution, but also address more general questions concerning trust-building and inclusiveness of CBOs.

3.3.1. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TAJIK CBOS IN CONFLICT PREVENTION

To understand the role of CBOs in mitigating conflicts we have created a number of questions designed to reveal a public attitude regarding their role in this sphere. We assumed that in some situations, CBOs may have better mechanisms in place to prevent conflicts among residents, but they may lack instruments to resolve disputes, thus necessitating the involvement of formal law-enforcement agencies, and vice-versa. In this section, and based on the findings of the interviews we examine the question of whether CBOs have the capability to prevent conflicts before they further escalate. We understand that addressing this complex issue by asking only one question would not render our study effective, and therefore, we have asked a number of inter-linked questions to generate a larger picture (see Methodology section). As such, **Table 15** presents the aggregated result of received responses.

	Very effective (%)	Effective (%)	Somewhat effective (%)	Not effective (%)
Community	7 (14.3)	13 (26.5)	6 (12.2)	2 (4.1)
leaders				
Experts	0 (0)	5 (10.2)	8 (16.3)	1 (2.0)
Public officials	3 (6.1)	4 (8.2)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Total	10 (20.4)	22 (44.9)	14 (28.6)	3 (6.1)
n=49				

Table 15. The effectiveness of Tajik CBOs in conflict prevention

With regard to the type and frequency of community-based conflicts, the respondents have mainly mentioned those occurring within families and between neighbours. Depending on the ethnic composition of a given area, only several respondents have mentioned a few cases of disputes between members of different ethnic groups (including Russian, Uzbeks and Kyrgyz). It is worth mentioning that those alluded conflicts do not necessarily occur on an ethnicity issue *per se*, instead they are "regular conflicts between neighbours, who do not even care that much about their ethnicity, rather the substance of a dispute, which can be water distribution or excessive noise coming from the household".

As for conflicts between family members or neighbours, they seem to have increased in recent years. According to one expert, "the Tajik society is currently undergoing a serious "value transformation", which translates in the growing significance of material wellbeing, i.e. money and resources over centuries-old traditions of mutual respect and peaceful behaviour". The respondents have often stressed that due to a large scale of labour migration of Tajikistani citizens to Russia and Kazakhstan and a subsequent in-flow of cash, most of households started to afford rebuilding or expanding their houses which could not but trigger anxieties between family members and neighbours.

To understand how the latter occurs, one has to note that in Tajikistan traditionally a household (both in rural and urban settings) accommodates several smaller households

as male members (brothers, sons etc.) and their families continue to live with their parents after the marriage. Another example of prevailing "family-related" conflicts in Tajikistan, according to our respondents, has been seen in the rising number of "SMSdivorces", i.e. some male labour migrants who once left their families in the search of jobs abroad, for various reasons decide to get divorced with their spouses after several years by simply sending a text message, wrongly assuming that under the Islamic law one message is sufficient to get formally divorced with one's spouse. Such irrational behaviour resonates often violently back home due to the sudden involvement of other family members attempting to restore the "honour of the family".

Based on the received responses we also observe that the state authorities in recent years have been paying more attention to such societal imbalances and micro-level conflicts. In the opinion of one expert, "the sheer volume of family-based disputes in the past decade has grown tremendously, so that the state authorities can hardly disregard this potentially flammable social issue". What is clear is that the state authorities realise their own lack of influence in preventing such micro-level societal conflicts and are left to rely on traditional institutions, such as CBOs, their leaders and elders' councils. Therefore, we have found that the majority of respondents consider the role of community leaders in preventing community-based conflicts in Tajikistan as vital. It was observed that it is largely due to community leader's ability to envisage the escalation of a conflict in a given household or between family members, that the conflict can successfully be prevented. And yet, some respondents have also stressed that often times the scale of anxiety is so great that even community leaders have no choice but to engage the state authorities and legal frameworks. As one community leader has told us, "In recent times, community leaders are often failing to use value systems to influence the behaviour of citizens, especially the youth, and have no other possibilities but to cooperate with the lawenforcement organs".

On the question of applying additional mechanisms to prevent intra-community conflicts, our respondents have stressed that to date their communities never had the experience of voluntary *vigilant groups* working to prevent such disputes. Although a few respondents have expressed a positive view regarding such measure in making communities a safer place, we observed that the majority of respondents have been skeptical about the success of such efforts.

Overall, the analysis of the conflict prevention aspect shows that the members of the community share a largely positive attitude regarding the CBOs' effectiveness (20.4% and 44.9% of respondents consider such work as "very effective" and "effective respectively"). About 28.6% of respondents had some reservations regarding the mechanisms of preventing conflicts, mainly linked to the weakening traditional approach to influencing the behaviour of citizens. Some of the respondents mentioned the increased pace of internal migration and urbanisation, which rendered the work of CBOs more difficult especially vis-à-vis newly settled residents. A small number of respondents (6.1%) thought that the CBO was not effective at all because of the inability to employ traditional value-systems on the jobless young people. In terms of the respondent background, we have observed, as expected, that public officials (members of the municipal government, law-enforcement etc.) take generally a positive view on this question, whereas community leaders and experts appear to express their views more critically.

Such an observation is useful for addressing one of our research questions, namely about the effectiveness of the institutionalised CBO in preventing conflicts in general. Given that Tajik CBOs are currently experiencing a gradual demise of the traditional value system, and hence a weaker capability to facilitate intra-community interactions, an introduction of fully-institutionalised model with greater degree of state involvement and support may potentially have positive repercussions.

3.3.2. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TAJIK CBOS IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Having examined the public perception about relatively successful performance of CBOs in Tajikistan to prevent the escalation of internal conflicts, we nonetheless observe that the majority of communities still experience societal conflicts in one way or another. Therefore, in our study we particularly sought to examine how well CBOs are suited to resolving conflicts which were not possible to deter.

Table 16 shows the aggregated result of conducted interviews. As we expected, all categories of respondents have mentioned a broad range of measures which CBOs in Tajikistan take whenever there is a conflict or a serious dispute. We have grouped the received responses into 6 categories, as follows:

- a. Set up a group of community elders who investigate the causes of conflict and suggest a plan to resolve it;
- b. Invite conflicting parties to a general community meeting and discuss the causes of conflict openly;
- c. Community leader's direct mediation between conflicting parties without openly deliberating the causes of conflict;
- d. Letting the conflicting sides to resolve their disputes on their own without the third-party intervention;
- e. Engaging the state authorities and law-enforcement agencies in parallel with one of the above mentioned actions;
- f. Engaging the state authorities and law-enforcement agencies only when one of the above mentioned actions fails to yield positive outcomes.

	Very effective (%)	Effective (%)	Somewhat effective (%)	Not effective (%)
Community leaders	3 (6.1)	16 (32.6)	9 (18.4)	0 (0)
Experts	2 (4.1)	6 (12.2)	1 (2.0)	5 (10.2)
Public officials	4 (8.2)	3 (6.2)	0 (0)	0 (0)
total	9 (18.4)	25 (51.0)	10 (20.4)	5 (10.2)
n=49				

Table 16. The effectiveness of Tajik CBOs in conflict resolution

In terms of frequency of responses and depending on the nature of a given conflict within the community, the majority of respondents have considered community leader's direct mediation and setting up of elders' "peace committee" more successful than other measures in the list. As we expected, most of the interviewed community leaders have favoured conflict resolution without engaging state authorities as being more effective not only in terms of the actual outcome, but also "in regard to the maintaining a decent reputation of the community as a whole". However, our interviews with experts yielded comparatively different results, some suggesting that "nowadays, CBOs can hardly be effective in resolving internal conflicts without informing the law-enforcement organs, simply because no one wants to bear the costs of the failed conflict resolution process..." Overall, this difference of views on this matter shows that community leaders tend to overestimate the significance of internal resources for conflict resolution, whilst in reality they prefer to resort to the formal legal procedures as many times as possible. This question is also related to the degree of cooperation between CBOs and state agencies in conflict resolution. Our analysis of received responses shows that the majority of CBOs though maintain some formal links to the local governments, in reality those formal links remain loose and are not translated into practical assistance program. According to one expert, "in many cases there is only one dimension of real cooperation which is between law-enforcement bodies and community organisations". We find that CBOs are generally not supported by the state authorities in developing community organisation's conflict resolution capacity. One such example is found while examining the question of whether or not community leaders should possess specialist knowledge and skills in regard to addressing intra-community disputes. While most respondents have favoured the need for community leaders to possess such skills, and given that several community leaders mentioned some form of participation in training programs at least once a year, the majority of experts stressed that they have never heard of any specialist training courses organised by the government or its agencies for community leaders.

Finally, we sought to examine if CBOs in Tajikistan are sufficiently open to involve neighbouring community organisations while managing a particular conflict. We found that due to the traditionally strong bonds between the members of different communities in a larger neighbourhood (especially, in rural Tajikistan), in recent years communal leaders began to conduct joint meetings with their colleagues from neighbouring communities to address disputes which involve residents of both areas. According to one public official, "this form of interaction between community leaders has a positive impact not only in a prompt manner of resolving a conflict, but also in the sphere of facilitating an exchange of expertise between them".

Thus, how can this observation reverberate with our research question about the impact of institutionalisation on the CBOs' capability to resolve conflicts? On the one hand, we observe that CBOs in Tajikistan are viewed by the wider public as being generally effective in resolving conflicts between its members. On the other hand, it is evident that due to a weak support by the government, CBOs seem to have been left on their own in resolving intra-community conflicts, until such disputes turn violent. If "institutionalisation" implies larger economic and organisational support of CBOs by the state beyond lawenforcement and administrative control, then we assume that the impact of this process on the overall performance of the organisation in resolving conflicts will be largely positive.

3.3.3. CBO AS A GROUND FOR BUILDING TRUST IN TAJIKISTAN

In our study of the CBO's role in preserving peace and security in Tajikistan, along with direct evaluation of their conflict management activities, we have included a number of proxy questions aimed at revealing the state of relations between its members. What we were particularly interested to find out whether CBOs were designed to build trust between members of the same community. Existence of the mechanisms within a CBO aimed at building trust is indicative of a generally healthy social environment which is fundamental to maintaining public order and peace. Meanwhile, we understand that the notion of "trust" is a manifold phenomenon and is, therefore, hard to measure.

The results of the interviews, as shown in **Table 17** demonstrate that in the view of all three categories of respondents, a CBO has a high degree of propensity toward upholding face-to-face communications between its members, irrespective of their ethnic or religious background. As one community leader stressed, "...Since Soviet times, people have generally been very friendly to each other, regardless of whether one is Tajik, Jew, Russian or Uzbek. Surprisingly, after the end of the Soviet state and its ideology of "international friendship", we still manage to preserve these traditions..." Another expert added that "even though Tajikistan had witnessed a bloody civil war in its recent history, as a whole it did not affect the state of inter-ethnic relations within communities in any negative way [...] the ethnic Russians who left the country in the past two decades did so for a variety of reasons, and not because of discrimination and nationalism".

	Very effective (%)	Effective (%)	Somewhat effective (%)	Not effective (%)
Community	14 (28.6)	8 (16.3)	6 (12.2)	0 (0)
leaders				
Experts	6 (12.2)	7 (14.3)	1 (2.0)	0 (0)
Public officials	5 (10.2)	2 (4.1)	0 (0)	0 (0)
total	25 (51.0)	17 (34.7)	7 (14.3)	0 (0)
n=49				

Table 17. Tajik CBO as an instrument for building trust

A great number of respondents have also stressed the importance of collective events (such as weddings, seasonal festivals, funerals etc.) which serve as a bridge between members who do not often meet face-to-face in usual days. This was stressed by many respondents, one of whom pointed out that "if there is anything that was left almost unchanged in recent decades, then it would probably be a tradition of attending community events by all members irrespective of gender, ethnicity or religion".

In general, the analysis of trust-building by/within CBOs is relevant to our research question concerning whether ethnicity-based conflicts are manifested in daily practices and interactions between the members of community. As a whole, and despite the prevailing patterns of intra-communal conflicts (between families, neighbours, etc.), we have observed that the degree of trust-building among community members is considered high. It is also noteworthy that "ethnicity" as such is not a significant factor in the overall intra-community conflict setting in the areas where we have conducted interviews.

3.3.4. THE TAJIK CBO AS AN INCLUSIVE PARTICIPATORY INSTITUTION

To evaluate the overall performance of CBOs in Tajikistan we decided to examine one additional question concerning a degree of inclusiveness, especially when it comes to public participation in decision-making, openness, transparency, and accountability to the general public (see Methodology section). We can make some preliminary observations based on the aggregate results shown in **Table 18** below.

The data shows that more than half of all respondents considered CBOs being generally inclusive. As in previous cases, we observe that community leaders and public officials tend to be more confident while addressing this set of questions. For example, one community leader we approached in the capital city of Dushanbe has stressed that "as a community organisation we have no choice but to be inclusive when making decisions regarding a wide range of issues – from social assistance to dispute resolution. What is the point in being a closed organisation when you deal with the daily issues of hundreds of people in the neighbourhood?" Similar responses were given by a number of public officials as well, suggesting that "community organisations in Tajikistan provide a very flexible platform for public deliberation and decision-making, and yet, the situation is somewhat worrying when one observes the willingness of residents themselves to

participate in the discussion and decision making [...], the majority of residents appear to be more concerned with their own personal problems than with issues of public importance". We also took note of a view of another public official affiliated with a lawenforcement body, who thought that a CBO "is a natural ground for engaging people to discuss and decide upon matters of their personal safety, prosperity and peaceful coexistence".

	Very inclusive (%)	Inclusive (%)	Partly inclusive (%)	Closed (%)
Community leaders	3 (6.1)	20 (40.8)	5 (10.2)	0 (0)
Experts	0 (0)	4 (8.2)	5 (10.2)	5 (10.2)
Public officials	3 (6.1)	4 (8.2)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Total	6 (12.2)	28 (57.2)	10 (20.4)	5 (10.2)
n=49				

Table 18. Tajik CBOs as an inclusive participatory institution

From the perspective of several experts, CBOs "are not very inclusive institutions, particularly, when they take decisions on resource allocation (water, land for livestock, social benefits, and revenues from community enterprises)". From this viewpoint, in some cases, the inclusiveness of the general public in this process depends on the attitudes of community leaders and their deputies. As one expert added, "of course, this is not reflective of all CBOs in Tajikistan, but only those that have such resources at their disposal".

Similar to the previous section, we go back to the research question of whether any conflicts occurring along ethnicity lines are manifested in daily practices and interactions between community members. Our observation of the CBOs in Tajikistan being perceived as generally inclusive also implies that "ethnic factor" as such is not related in any way to the degree of members' participation in the decision-making process, openness, transparency and so on. In other words, some CBOs can be more closed compared to others not because of ethnic grievances and inequalities, rather depending on material interests involved. In which case, we have seen once again the crucial role of community leadership in facilitating the image of the organisation, as well as transparency and openness in running its daily activities. We have observed that the lack of the latter elements increases the level of distrust among the members of community (irrespective

of members' ethnic background), and thus, it undermines its potential for proving sustainable peace.

3.3.5. POTENTIAL APPLICATION OF THE UZBEK CBO MODEL IN TAJIKISTAN

Our final, and perhaps, the key question that we would like to discuss in this section focuses on the extent to which the institutionalised model of a CBO can serve as a role-model in Tajikistan given its socio-political and economic conditions.

As we discussed in the previous chapter devoted to mahalla in Uzbekistan, the Uzbekmodel of organising the community has a number of unique features which are very different from other CBOs in Central Asia, especially in Tajikistan where CBOs are semiinstitutionalised. *First*, in the past decade mahalla organisation in Uzbekistan has been undergoing dramatic state-induced institutionalisation under which it has transformed from security-recipient to a security-provider. This has not happened in Tajikistan despite the fact that in recent years local administrations in the country put some efforts in strengthening the role of CBOs by establishing paid positions for its leaders and granting them a legal status. *Secondly*, such transformation in the functioning of a traditional CBO in Uzbekistan has created a strict and formal mechanism between state authorities, lawenforcement bodies and community officials which was reflected in regular reporting to the state, conducted of joint propaganda activities and so forth. *Thirdly*, under the premise of timely responding to the threats to public order (terrorism, religious extremism, ethnic and societal violence, juvenile crime, etc.) the authorities in Uzbekistan have initiated the creation of vigilant groups (mahalla posboni) which are formally dissimilar to a formal law-enforcement agency (e.g. local police), and yet carry out the similar set of responsibilities and get paid from the local government budget. Such groups have not yet appeared in Tajikistan.

Based on these institutional differences in running CBOs in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, we sought to examine the public attitude in Tajikistan with regard to its applicability under socio-political and economic conditions of the latter. The results that we received on this particular question differ from the respondents' reaction to other questions.

	Successful (%)	Somewhat successful (%)	Unsuccessful (%)	Irrelevant (%)
Community	3 (6.1)	5 (10.2)	13 (26.5)	7 (14.4)
leaders				
Experts	1 (2.0)	0 (0)	10 (20.4)	3 (6.1)
Public officials	0 (0)	5 (10.2)	1 (2.0)	1 (2.0)
Total	4 (8.2)	10 (20.4)	24 (48.9)	11 (22.5)
n=49				

Table 19. Potential application	of the Uzbek CBO	model in Tajikistan
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As shown in **Table 19**, almost half of the responses (48.9 %) voiced skepticism in regard to the effectiveness of "the Uzbek model of mahalla" when applied to Tajikistan. The majority of both community leaders and experts have expressed doubts on the success of activities for providing sustainable peace (including, conflict prevention and conflict resolution) under a tight supervision of the state (26.5% and 20.4% respectively). In the opinion of a community leader, "it's hard to imagine that our work to ensure public order at a communal level will be fruitful at all, if the state authority steps in and dictates what activities we are ought to conduct". Another community leader in Dushanbe has stressed that "even under a relatively loose relationship with the state agencies at the moment, we still experience some bureaucratic burdens that decreases our overall effectiveness. Now, people could hardly accept that the local government would have powers to intervene in the communal affairs and, furthermore, request regular reports on security situation and so on".

Some of the respondents went further to suggest that the Uzbekistani model is more applicable in that country which has a stronger government and necessary resources to commit. According to one expert, "because the central and local governments in Tajikistan are significantly weaker than in neighbouring country, and do not have enough material resources at their disposal, the issue of tightening state supervision over the community's traditional approach to conflict resolution is irrelevant here". It appears from other responses that "the genuine power of CBOs in effectively addressing the issues of public order lies with its status as an independent body from the government and its affiliates".

In general, we have found that the role of CBOs in Tajikistan is symptomatic of an existing social dilemma: on the one hand, the general public has a strong position vis-à-vis the need to retain a traditional autonomy from the state on all matters, including those

concerning public order and security. On the other hand, CBOs ability to address most of those issues independently is seriously restrained due to the lack of resources and state support.

Linking this analysis back to our key research question, and based on the range of responses we received thus far, an institutionalised (the Uzbek model of mahalla) CBO is less likely to fit in the socio-political setting in Tajikistan. However, in terms of the deficiency of resources and lack of state support which the majority of the Tajik CBOs experience, the institutionalisation of mahalla by the Tajikistani government could empower local CBOs economically, and as such, allow them to carry out social projects aimed at preventing/resolving conflicts and providing sustainable peace.

SECTION IV: DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

4.1. THE EFFECTIVENESS AND WIDER IMPACT OF THE INSTITUTIONALIZED MODEL OF CBO IN PREVENTING CONFLICTS

The pattern of institutionalisation of CBOs allows us a full diversity of options: stretching from non-institutionalised CBOs in Kyrgyzstan to semi-institutionalised CBOs in Tajikistan and to, finally, fully institutionalised CBOs in Uzbekistan. While the Uzbek model of institutionalised CBOs appeared to be rather efficient (based on literature and empirical findings) in tackling conflicts, the Kyrgyz and Tajik cases yielded mixed results.

The Kyrgyz CBOs are characterised by the non-institutionalised *modus operandi* and, according to respondents, such form of a CBO proved to be highly inefficient during the turmoil of 2010. The structure was simply incapable of neither preventing nor resolving the conflict in South Kyrgyzstan. As the Kyrgyz government had a loose grip over CBOs across the country, it resulted in an outburst of the violent conflict which undermined the trust towards the government in general and CBOs in particular even further. Therefore, the respondents emphasised the need for a stronger government which should institutionalise CBOs but, at the meantime, the local features and domestic environment should be factored in. These special conditions imply that while the government should provide the legal, financial and infrastructural bases, it should not follow the Uzbek model by appointing CBOs to serve as its watchdog.

The Tajik CBOs, such as *jamoats* have been partly institutionalised, whereas *makhallias* have not. This is the reason we label CBOs in Tajikistan as semi-institutionalised. The ethnic issue is not on the agenda in the country and the potential of inter-ethnic conflicts is rather low. Certainly, this, most probably, is not due to the institutionalisation or non-institutionalisation status of CBOs, it rather explains once again why we should look at a broader notion of conflict within the framework of this project.

Thus, it is important to summarise the key findings of this project and juxtapose results across the countries under investigation (refer to **Table 20** below). The major types of conflicts do, thereby, differ between the countries. In Kyrgyzstan, as it was noted above, the ethnic card is very high on the agenda but, in addition to it, many respondents argued that the lack of the required financial resources causes numerous conflicts between

households. While the financial nature of conflict might not be the same size as the ethnic issue it is rather serious and has to be meticulously analysed. This is a sensitive issue in which the government has to play a more active role. However, as this issue concerns the entire economic situation of Kyrgyzstan it is rather hard to sort out the issue in the short run and the institutionalisation of CBOs, as a channel of revenue redistribution and financial assistance, would not be a panacea. Tajikistan, on the other hand, faces the issues of the youth unemployment and, as a result the escalating number of departing labour migrants; decreasing quality of education, increasing levels of clientelism and nepotism, etc. Another set of problems is based on resource allocation: water, land for livestock and crops, social benefits, etc. These issues inevitably lead to conflicts though at a small scale. In the case of Tajikistan, the institutionalisation and state support towards CBOs may help offset (even partially) some of the above-mentioned problems. In the case of Uzbekistan, large-scale conflicts are not envisaged as the government strictly controls all the activities of its citizens mostly via mahallas. Apparently, it creates myriads of other problems such as a personal freedoms and rights jeopardy of mahalla dwellers, nevertheless, the conflicts are being limited to occasional inter-family conflicts which in most cases have been successfully tackled by mahalla itself.

No	Issues	Kyrgyzstan	Tajikistan	Uzbekistan	
KEY MAHALLA CHARACTERISTICS					
1.	Institutionalisation of CBO	No	Partially	Yes	
2.	General Efficiency of CBO	Inefficient	Somewhat Efficient	Rather Efficient	
3.	Independence in Decision- Making	High	Moderate	None	
4.	Major Types of Conflicts	Ethnic, Financial	Social, Resource Allocation	Inter-Family Conflicts	
5.	Potential for Ethnic Conflict Outburst	High	Moderate	Moderate	
6.	Vigilant Groups (such as Posbons)	No	No	Yes	
	ROLE OF THE STATE				
7.	Perception of the State Control over CBO	Insufficient	Insufficient (More Financial Contribution Required)	Excessive	
8.	Government Support	Insufficient	Moderate	Full	
9.	Financial Sources	Private Domestic, International and State	Mainly State (insufficient)	State	

Table 20. Key findings across Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan

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10.	Reporting to the State	Almost Absent	Irregular	Regular	
CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION CAPACITIES					
11.	Conflict Prevention Capacity	Low	Moderate	Moderate	
12.	CBO's Large Conflict-Solving Resources	Very Limited	Very Limited	Limited	
13.	Conflict Resolution Capacity	Low	Low	High	
14.	CBO's Small Conflict-Solving Resources	Limited	Limited	Rather Sufficient	
	THE ROLE OF COMMUNITY LEADERS				
15.	The Role of Community Leader (Human Factor) within CBO	High	Moderate	Low	
16.	The Role of Community Leader in Addressing Conflict	Moderate	Low	Low	
17.	Trainings and Education for Community Leaders	On an ad-hoc basis (mostly by international entities)	None	Provided	
TRUST-BUILDING AND INCLUSIVENESS OF MAHALLAS					
18.	CBO as a Trust-Building Entity	Medium	Strong	Strong	
19.	CBO Promoting Inclusiveness	Weak	Medium	Medium	

Source: Authors' own compilation

As for the financial component, the institutionalisation of CBOs in Kyrgyzstan could assist in streamlining financial infusions to CBOs as the current situation results in chaos in which some CBOs are much wealthier than others and the agenda of fund providers is not always obvious and straightforward. This lead to the overall instability within the country and, therefore, the issue has to be addressed appropriately. In Tajikistan, the situation differs as the government mostly provides funds to CBOs but this financial support is a tiny fraction of required funds. In this case, institutionalisation could potentially accentuate the most problematic regions and matters within the country and resolve the most acute issues within the disposed budget. In Uzbekistan, the government strictly controls all financial flows and provides spot assistance to the vulnerable families and citizens. Certainly, such approach does not resolve all economic issues within mahallas, however, it aims at the most vulnerable strata of the society and this method, perhaps, prevents or relieves an upheaval and/or conflict to some extent. It is rather interesting, however, to examine the pattern of perception towards the role of the state in three countries. Most respondents in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan argued that the role of the government within CBOs is insufficient and they simultaneously advocated the more resolute role of the state with regard to CBOs. Conversely, many respondents in Uzbekistan (especially the expert cohort) complained about a rather excessive role of the studied country or we can articulate it to the excessively high expectations by citizens when it comes to Central Asian governments is hard to say. However, it is evident that the Central Asian governments should take a second look at their respective CBOs, as the citizens are not completely buoyant with the status-quo.

As for the conflict resolution capacity we have to distinguish between small- and largescale conflicts. Based on our findings, the large-scale conflicts can be barely tackled by CBOs in all three countries. Therefore, we can conclude that the degree of institutionalisation does not make any difference in this regard. Putting aside the largescale conflicts, we have to focus on small-scale conflicts as the pattern yields striking results in non-, semi-institutionalised CBOs of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and institutionalised CBOs of Uzbekistan. Our findings indicate that the potential of CBOs in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to tackle even small-scaled conflicts is very low: in Kyrgyzstan it may largely depend on the personality of a community leader, whereas in Tajikistan the resource base is rather poor to address the issue appropriately. This leaves Uzbek CBOs in an advantaged position compared to its neighbours. As mahallas in Uzbekistan have representatives of *militia* and *posbons* at their disposal as well as they are able to closely monitor the dwellers and their respective activities, Uzbek CBOs turn out to be more efficient in terms of extinguishing a small-scale conflict.

Thus, institutionalised CBOs appear to be more efficient in terms of preventing but more importantly in terms of resolving conflicts. Obviously, this finding should not be treated as a panacea within the conflict-resolution realm, however, the degree of institutionalisation and state support appear to make a difference, especially when it comes to small-scale conflicts which may potentially escalate to larger ones. With the certain degree of independence and provided state support, institutionalised CBOs may nurture trust and serve as an outpost for their citizens, which in turn, may translate into a less conflict environment within CBOs.

4.2. MANIFESTATION OF ETHNICICTY-BASED CONFLICTS IN DAILY PRACTICES AND INTERACTIONS WITHIN CBOS

This section will look at the comparative analysis of the ethnicity-based conflicts and whether they are manifested in daily practices as well as interactions between community members. In this regard, it would probably be more interesting to look at the ethnic case in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which have different priority levels of the ethnicity issue in the agendas of the governments. Unlike in Tajikistan, the ethnic card is currently a challenge for the Kyrgyz government, especially after the recent ethnically-driven bloody events of 2010. As for the case in Uzbekistan, there has always been a strong government control over ethnicity issues, although they have not been prioritized to the same degree as religious matters.

The fact that the ethnic issue is not in the priority list of the government is reflected in the results of our analysis. Thus, only several respondents in Tajikistan mentioned a few cases of disputes between neighbours of different ethnic groups. In this regard, it is worth pointing out that the mentioned conflicts do not necessarily occur on ethnicity grounds but are rather of domestic character, in which the conflicting parties are mostly indifferent to ethnicity. The types of conflicts are trite and mainly include water distribution or excessive noise coming from the household. The general observation shows that the members of CBOs, irrespective of their ethnic or religious background, have been able to preserve the peaceful inter-ethnic traditions, despite the end of the Soviet state and its ideology of "international friendship". In spite of the devastating consequences of the civil war in the recent history of Tajikistan, the state of inter-ethnic relations within communities was not affected by this phenomenon. Those ethnic minorities who had to exile, had to do so for a number of reasons not founded on discrimination or nationalistic factors.

In Kyrgyzstan, on the other hand, the manifestation of conflicts is more salient and has different roots and causes. Generally, there has been the prevalence of family, interpersonal and commercial type of conflicts over high-intensity ethnic conflicts. However, if one is to single out the Southern provinces (cities of Osh, Djalal-abad), in which the substantial proportion of the population is represented by Uzbeks, the situation yields different results. The low-intensity conflicts in this part of the country

predominantly occur along the lines of ethnicity and ethnic identity. Ethnic tensions in Kyrgyzstan are still manifested with a lot of ethnicity-induced discrimination, injustice and inequality. This can be largely evinced in the "management" of CBOs in which the signs of dominance of a certain ethnic group over another can be observed. Thus, while CBOs can serve as an effective trust-building and inclusive mechanism for one ethnic group, they may appear to be relatively closed to other groups in terms of equal degree of participation, transparency and accountability towards particular ethnic groups.

Sometimes, even though the initial roots of confrontations go down to domestic type of conflicts (such as regularly occurring complaints between neighbors), they may eventually grow into large-scale ethnic confrontations involving many more parties and groups larger in size. Evidently, this is inevitable and it is more likely that the ethnically motivated violent clashes of 2010 will remain in the memories of the local population and such behaviours will continue to pop up for some time in the future.

Dissimilar to any of the countries, the situation in Uzbekistan can be characterized as highly peaceful in terms of ethnicity issues, although the country is represented by a wider ethnic diversity and larger population. There is nothing striking about the fact that no single respondent mentioned about the ethnic component of the roots of causes of the conflicts. Many attribute this to the presence of the comparatively much stronger government and its ability to undertake a close control over the daily routines of practically every citizen. While the community leadership and public officials find many advantages of such procedures, the expert cohort mainly share negative views associating such acts with restriction of freedom.

It should also be emphasized that in Tajikistan the "ethnic factor" as such is not what counts and it plays no role when it comes to the degree of members' taking part in the decision-making process, openness and transparency within CBOs. It is rather financial or other reasons involved (rather than ethnicity-driven), which may contribute to various types of conflicts within CBOs. In most cases, the crucial role of community leadership is played in facilitating the image of the organization which is directly linked to the level of distrust among the members of community irrespective of their ethnic background. Due to the semi-institutionalizated character of the CBOs, the role of leadership is substantial. Thus, the lack of strong leadership may undermine its potential for maintaining peace.

The significant role of strong community leadership can also be observed in the neighboring Kyrgyzstan, although the level of institutionalization of CBOs in this country is lower. Similar to Tajikistan, in Kyrgyzstan it is mainly the leaders of the respective CBOs (community elders or *aksakals*) who retain the potential to influence the actions of the perpetrators of such ethnically-driven clashes through a dialogue. The Uzgen case is a good illustration to this. While in June 2010, violence sparked in the most of the Southern part of Kyrgyzstan, the situation in Uzgen and its surrounding villages remained stable. It was clear from the outset that an escalation in Uzgen was immanent too but due to the rapid response from local community leaders and *aksakals* as well as the parallel coordination of such efforts by the local government officials, it was possible to prevent violence from breaking out. Noteworthy, the Uzbek community leaders (aksakals) and Kyrgyz municipal leaders in Uzgen have managed to set up unofficial "sub-national dialogue" mechanisms which to many people's surprise proved successful.

While in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan the ability to extinguish the emerging conflicts largely depends on personality of a community leader, the situation in Uzbekistan is quite the opposite. It is rather the matter of "institutionalized" status of CBOs that leaves Uzbekistan in an advantaged position compared to its neighbors, as CBOs in Uzbekistan (mahallas) have representatives of local police and posbons at their disposal, who can monitor community members and the activities they are involved in. Personal qualities and experience of a community leader in CBOs in Uzbekistan become a less priority issue as the well-established CBO system itself introduces its own adjustments when necessary. As a result, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are at disadvantage due to the fact that non-institutionalization (to the level practiced in Uzbekistan) does not stipulate such benefits.

In all studied countries one of the major factors contributing to maintaining peaceful atmosphere is the ability to nurture trust between the members of CBOs. All countries share similar features when it comes to preventing manifestations of the ethnic nature. In Uzbekistan, the trust-building model is mostly based on a systemic and institutionalized approach based on cultural and anthropological pillars and supported by the state. As the phenomenon of mahalla is embedded in the hearts and minds of Uzbekistani citizens, it comes as a little surprise that mahalla does function as a trust-building instrument. Many major decisions introduced by the government to mahallas have to be discussed and followed by community members on special meetings. This creates a favourable environment for the meetings, in which not only macro (government-related) decisions, but also micro (community-related) matters can be decided. These meetings can be attended by representatives of various ethnic groups and are usually accompanied by close participation of the local police department and influential dwellers of the community. In addition, the structure of mahalla does create an environment, in which mahalla members do cooperate with each other on everyday issues, get to know each other, invite neighbours for major occasions such as weddings, funerals, religious and other fests. This, in turn, strengthens mutual relationships and boost the level of trust that is likely to translate into prevention of ethnically motivated conflicts.

In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, however, the trust-building approach is more of an unsystematic nature based on cultural and individual features. Despite the fact that the trust-building role of CBOs in Kyrgyzstan was adversely affected by the recent ethnic clashes, it is the possibility for CBOs and local community leaders in particular to ensure the environment for daily face-to-face interactions between the members, irrespective of their ethnic or religious backgrounds. The major deficiency in this respect is that the trust building mechanism in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is not supported by the government at the same level as that in Uzbekistan. In particular, trust-building is solely placed on the shoulders of community leaders and his/her authority within the respective community.

Similar to Uzbekistan, the preventive and smoothing role in conflict resolution both in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is played by collective events, which serve as a bridge between members, who are mainly represented by the ethnic group dwelling in a particular CBO. Such events are open to any CBO member regardless of his/her gender, ethnicity or religion.

Thus, it appears that ethnicity-based conflicts are still manifested in Kyrgyzstan, compared to Tajikistan or Uzbekistan where the study did not reveal such observations. Although large-scale conflicts were not observed the last few years following 2010, the findings should be examined with scrutiny as they should be interpreted as a signal for urgent actions. Obviously, the institutionalization of CBOs to the degree of Uzbekistan and providing a strong government will help relieve community leaders from acting as sole conflict resolvers within the community. The provided state support to these ethnic matters are likely to elicit positive outcomes both for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan,

especially when we are talking about the existing ethnic collisions which may eventually broke out into more violent actions.

4.3. CAN INSTITUTIONALIZED CBO SERVE AS A ROLE-MODEL FOR CENTRAL ASIA?

The discussion we have initiated so far has paved the way to one of the key empirical dilemmas of our research project, yet the one which has inspired us to undertake this endeavour from the outset. In this section, we shall examine whether or not an institutionalized CBO can serve as a role-model for other Central Asian countries in preventing and resolving conflicts.

Our cross-country data obtained in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan shows the prevalence of a large number of perspectives as regards the potential use of the Uzbek model of mahalla in the two neighbouring countries with a record of intra- and intercommunal conflict. Ideally, while contemplating such a possibility, one has to differentiate between subjective and objective knowledge in a broad sense: the former is mostly referred to the data we have gained in Uzbekistan where respondents have some degree of bias in evaluating the prospects for a wider regional application of mahalla, while in the latter case, one could identify the respondent base in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan as presenting the objective assessment of the Uzbek model's shortcomings and barriers for success. Meanwhile, we assume that the borderline between the subjective and objective knowledge is rather loose in all country cases because we have identified a significant variation between the responses given by CBO leaders, experts and public officials.

To advance our discussion further, we need to once again mention at least three main distinguishing features of the Uzbek model of CBO as regards the security dimension: First, since country's independence in 1991, the mahalla institution in Uzbekistan has seen an unprecedented state-induced institutionalisation under which its role as a security recipient has transformed into a security-provider. Secondly, this government-initiated transformation has led to the creation of formal institutional links between state authority, law-enforcement bodies and CBOs as reflected in daily rituals, such as compulsory reporting to the state and joint propaganda activities. Thirdly, in line with the deterioration of domestic and regional security situation (terrorism, religious extremism, ethnic and societal violence, juvenile crime, etc.) the government authorities in Uzbekistan have initiated the creation of community-based vigilant groups not recognised

as a law-enforcement body formally (unlike local police), yet they continue carrying out policing role in the area and receive wages from the local government budget.

Table 21 allows us to look at the key findings regarding the chances of incorporating the institutionalised Uzbek model of CBO in Central Asia, namely in at least two neighbouring countries – Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Respondents	Chance of success	Key opportunity/strength	Key barrier/weakness
		As viewed in Uzbekistan	
CBO leaders	Moderate	Can be effective when adjusted to local conditions;	 Long-lasting political and socio- economic instability in neighbouring countries; Prevalence of foreign developmentalist strategies with vague in interests in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.
Experts	Low	More adaptable in Tajikistan, than elsewhere due to similarities in ethno-cultural lifestyle, neighbourhood traditions and type of political leadership.	 Alternative "stronger" democratic practices (e.g. in Kyrgyzstan); Little systemic unity in some countries (e.g. the Kyrgyz society); Weak state administration and poorly-structured self- governance.
Public officials	High	 Collectivist lifestyle in all Central Asian countries; Shared values; Institutionalised CBO's proven effectiveness in providing sustainable peace, preventing/resolving societal conflicts in conjunction with formal authorities. 	 Varied economic and political conditions; Deteriorated security situation in the countries concerned.

Table 21. A broader regional application of the institutionalised model of CBO: keyfindings in a cross-national comparison

General observation: The country data shows that the success of institutionalised model of CBO beyond Uzbekistan is dependent on a number of domestic political, socio-economic and cultural conditions. The key prerequisite for a smooth introduction of this model lies with the strength of the

state system (also	o, its stability) c	oupled with its ability to effectively needs of the people.	respond to the economic and social	
As viewed in Kyrgyzstan				
CBO leaders	Low	More disciplined structure with better access to state- sponsored projects.	- Evidence of failure to prevent bloody ethnic strife in 1990 and 2010 and resolve existing confrontations among community members, irrespective of the "institutionalised status";	
Experts	Moderate	- The existence of non- institutionalised Uzbek mahallas in the Southern provinces; - An effective force in uniting people around a single cause.	 Weak state administration; Lack of material and technical resources; Non-existent legal framework and potentially poor prospects of its establishment in the short-term. 	
Public officials	Moderate	Internal value-based mechanisms regulating the citizenry relationships and influencing the behaviour of disorderly members of the community.	 Different type of political regime; High risk of public resentment toward increased state regulation of private and community life. 	
institutionalised there seem to b other factors revolutions, the	l model of CBO be some serious s, the changing lack of resourc	effective in developing community s obstacles to its real-life implemen nature of a political authority follow es to be committed to CBO develop	tation. The latter includes, among wing the two quazi-democratic	
As viewed in Tajikistan				
CBO leaders	Low	Strengthening of CBO's financial capacity	 Strong state supervision over a traditionally autonomous institution; Local government's control of community's routine life. 	
Experts	Low	More systemic involvement of CBOs in state-sponsored social projects	- Strong state regulation and supervision; - Greater bureaucracy, "red-tape";	

			 Comparably weaker central and local government in Tajikistan; Deficient financial and technical resources.
Public officials	Moderate	 Strengthening of community- government relationships; Promotion of regular contacts between state authority and ordinary citizens. 	Lack of legal framework

General observation: Similar to the Kyrgyz data, the data on Tajikistan feature similar patterns of popular perception. However, one of the key obstacles to the institutionalisation of the Tajik CBOs seems to be a strong public resentment against growing state control over a traditionally autonomous institution and local government's grip on community's routine life.

Source: Authors' own compilation

The cross-country comparison yielded somewhat interesting, yet mixed results in all of the countries observed. Especially, from the outset we had anticipated that the findings in Uzbekistan would be associated with a positive evaluation of the prospects for institutionalising CBOs in other Central Asian states. The public officials in Uzbekistan have indeed appeared to be more confident than other cohort of respondents, by stressing the facilitating factors, such as collectivist nature of interpersonal relationships in all Central Asian countries, shared values, and existing evidence that supports the peacemaking role of the Uzbek model of mahalla. In our view, the responses from the public officials is yet another indication of often-unspoken but well-established trend in the Uzbek society: in the past two decades, especially amid growing international concerns over the undemocratic nature of governance in the country, the mahalla discourse in Uzbekistan has gradually become part of a *nation-branding* strategy to demonstrate to the world community that the country has developed its own variant of democracy and pluralism. Therefore, it is not uncommon for the representatives of the state to over-emphasize the positive image of the Uzbek mahalla.

However, looking closely at the responses for other groups of informants, namely by Uzbekistani mahalla leaders and CBO experts, reveals a number of hurdles which renders the prospects for CBO institutionalisation in neighbouring Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan obscure. Among many factors, the bulk of the Uzbek mahalla leaders and experts have emphasized a long-lasting political and socio-economic instability, especially in Kyrgyzstan which did nothing but to disorient the state authorities from taking adequate measures for addressing societal conflicts. In the view of Uzbek mahalla leaders, the main obstacle for institutionalisation of the Kyrgyz CBOs is indicative of the prevailing role of foreign-funded agencies in the overall civil society sector in Kyrgyzstan. In other words, the availability of external resources and capacity-building projects enhances the societal impact of the "third sector" (i.e. NGOs, NPOs etc.) and hence upholds their competitive advantage, but it also downgrades the capacity and potentially useful role of traditional CBOs in preventing and resolving conflicts. This aspect was further raised by the CBO expert community in Uzbekistan, who suggested that the quasi-democratic nature of political environment in Kyrgyzstan with lesser systemic unity among different social groups combined with a fragile state administration and poorly-structured selfgovernance does not allow for an effective application of the Uzbek model. Meanwhile, the experts seem to maintain that compared to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan had more appropriate conditions for a more successful implementation of the Uzbekistani model due to the similarities with the later in terms of ethno-cultural lifestyle, neighbourhood traditions and type of political leadership.

Certainly the data we have collected in Uzbekistan does provide some clues in regard to the posed research question, it is however through examination of responses in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan that one could create a much clearer picture. It is noteworthy, that among interview samples in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan we have encountered a number of cases which did not completely disregard the progressive role of the institutionalised model of CBO. The Kyrgyz data suggest that institutionalisation of CBOs would certainly enhance their structural and functional performance via better access to state-sponsored projects, including in conflict prevention/resolution area. As it was mentioned in previous chapters, Kyrgyzstan in fact hosts a non-institutionalised version of the mahalla institution, located mainly in predominantly Uzbek-populated areas of the Southern provinces. Based on experiences with Uzbek mahallas in the South, some data suggested that even under a non-institutionalised format, these CBOs have proved effective in uniting people around a single cause whereas the internal value-based mechanisms regulated the citizenry relationships and influenced the behaviour of disorderly members of community. Similar to the Kyrgyz case, some Tajik data also stated that the institutionalisation of CBOs would likely strengthen their financial base, through for example, a systemic involvement of CBOs in state-supported social projects. Tajik public officials have also emphasised that this process might potentially strengthen community-government relationships and promote regular contacts between state authority and ordinary citizens.

Though we can see that there is some support for the institutionalisation of CBOs in these two countries, yet we have found stronger evidence suggesting that the current sociopolitical, legal and economic environment in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan does not allow for a full-fledged implementation of the Uzbek model. In Kyrgyzstan, such barriers are linked to the failure of CBO structures as a whole to prevent ethnic tensions resulting in violent conflicts in 1990 and 2010, a poor record of stable political authority following the revolutions in recent years, a poorly-designed CBO legal framework and potentially bleak prospects for its establishment in the short-term, a high risk of public resentment toward increased state regulation of private and community life and others. In Tajikistan too, the data suggest a number of factors which could undermine any intention to reform domestic CBOs in line with the Uzbek model. Specifically, the wider public appears to be suspicious of the stronger state supervision over a traditionally autonomous institution which translates into the local government's greater control of the community's routine life. Among other hurdles, the data suggested the lack of legal framework, a comparably weaker central and local government in Tajikistan which lacks financial and technical resources that it would be ready to commit in strengthening CBOs.

SECTION V: CONCLUSION

For this research project we selected the case of Central Asia for a range of reasons, of which three are particularly noteworthy: first, the post-Soviet Central Asian states, despite a slow but steady tendency toward modernisation and industrialisation, continue to retain their traditional outlook with characteristic practices, values and modes of citizenry interaction. In spite of a 70-year long history of the state-initiated *collectivisation* which implied a partial abolishment of pre-Soviet networks of civic interaction, such institutions have proven their resilience under a new political reality and effectiveness in

addressing some of its challenges. These trends were less visible in other post-Soviet states of South Caucasus, the Baltic region, and Eastern-Europe, including Russia.

The second factor which makes the selection of this group of countries (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) appealing is the nature of political authority in each of them, especially after a demise of the Soviet Union. The intra-regional cross-country examination of the relationship between the state and a CBO also sheds light on a complex role of the political authority in post-Soviet society at large. Finally, contemporary Central Asia, compared to other parts of the post-communist Eurasia, continues to draw attention of conflict analysts and scholars due to the intertwined societal, economic, political and ethno-cultural grievances that solidify the region's conflict potential and trigger new antagonisms.

Thus, the core aim of this research project was two-fold: on the one hand, we sought to examine, *the structural and institutional significance of CBOs in preventing and resolving conflicts in Central Asia*, including the ones grounded on ethno-cultural grievances, while on the other hand, we aspired to *study the impact of the state and its institutional arrangements in facilitating/undermining the peace-building role of CBOs*.

While addressing this aim, our study has produced a number of interesting findings. The qualitative data and analysis of the situation in three countries of Central Asia, albeit not without limitations, proved generally helpful in evaluating the current role of CBOs in resolving conflicts as well as in examining the prospects of government-induced CBO institutionalisation in each case.

While addressing the potential effectiveness of the institutionalized CBOs in preventing and resolving conflicts, this research has initially distinguished between small- and largescale conflicts. Our findings show that **CBOs in all three countries are not equipped with the appropriate sets of tools (and, they are not designed to) for addressing large-scale conflicts.** This explicitly implies that the degree of institutionalisation does not make any difference in this regard. However, when we shift our focus from large-scale to small-scale conflicts, we observe striking results in non-, semi-institutionalised CBOs of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and institutionalised CBOs of Uzbekistan. Our findings indicate that the potential of CBOs in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to address a small-scale conflict is very low: in Kyrgyzstan it may largely depend on the personality of a community leader, whereas in Tajikistan the resource base is insufficient to address the issue appropriately. This leaves Uzbek CBOs in an advantaged position compared to its neighbours. As mahallas in Uzbekistan have their own law-enforcement structures (vigilant groups, such as posbon) allowing them to closely monitor the dwellers and their respective activities, Uzbek CBOs turn out to be more efficient in terms of extinguishing a small-scale conflict. This leads to our **key finding that institutionalised CBOs appear to be more competent in both preventing and resolving small-scale conflicts.** The degree of institutionalisation and state support appear to make a difference, especially when it comes to small-scale conflicts which may potentially trigger the larger ones. With the certain degree of independence and provided state support, institutionalised CBOs may nurture trust and serve as an outpost for their citizens, which in turn, may translate into a less conflict environment within CBOs.

Our analytic focus on the CBOs and their roles in conflict prevention/resolution, has allowed us to investigate in parallel the degree to which ethno-cultural conflicts are manifested in daily practices and interactions between community members. For example, in the case of "ethnicity factor" posing as a trigger in domestic conflicts, we have observed diverse situations in all three countries. Notable of these is Kyrgyzstan with an ongoing, yet somewhat elusive, confrontation between the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz living in the south of the country which culminated in a series of violent clashes in 2010. The data collected in the conflict-prone cities of Osh and Djalal-abad have indeed suggested that communities are growing more divided because of discrimination, denial of access to basic resources (jobs, education, business ventures, etc.) for one group by another. On balance, the data from Tajikistan have shown that despite a history of a long and bloody civil war in 1992-1997, the country has gradually restored inter-ethnic peace both at national and community levels, and yet some instability grounded in ethnocultural grievances continue to persist in the Pamir region. More extensive studies should be undertaken there, as we could not collect data due to a tight government control.

Uzbekistan too had a series of small-scale inter-ethnic clashes in late 1980s, namely between Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks, but ever since country's independence in 1991, the government had realised the high political cost of ethno-cultural nationalism in a country hosting more than 120 different ethnic groups. The latter concern was evident in the strict government censorship of any activities emphasising the dominance of one ethnic group over another. One finding that we could draw is that **the degree of government robustness and grassroots policies in suppressing nationalism constitutes the most important indicator of the state's propensity toward ethnic conflict**.

We have to admit that this conclusion is provisional and is subject to the hidden strengths and conflict-preventing capacity of CBOs even in a non-institutionalised setting *per se* with a weak role of the central government. One such strength is linked to the mode of leadership within respective CBOs. For instance, we have seen that in the conflict-prone regions of Kyrgyzstan it is mainly CBO leaders (*aksakals*) who retain the potential to influence the actions of the perpetrators through a dialogue. The Uzgen town case in southern Kyrgyzstan is a good illustration to this. While in June 2010, violence sparked in the largest southern cities, the security situation in Uzgen and its adjacent villages remained relatively under control. It was clear from the outset that the conflict escalation in Uzgen was immanent too but due to the rapid response from *aksakals* and coordination of such efforts by the local government, the violence was prevented before it could spread out. Noteworthy, the Uzbek community leaders and Kyrgyz municipal leaders in Uzgen have managed to set up an informal "sub-national dialogue" mechanism which to many people's surprise proved successful.

To our view, this encouraging achievement in Uzgen town is not entirely coincidental; rather it was indicative of the positive role of CBO institutionalisation but of a different kind. While it is generally known that Uzgen town was the site of the initial ethnic clashes between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in 1990, there is little said about the lessons that the communities here had learnt ever since and the informal frameworks that were set up with the help of aid agencies. The later had filled the "institutional vacuum" generated by the absence of central government's targeted security-enhancing and reconciliation-oriented programs. Due to the coordinated mediation mainly from the UN-affiliated agencies and OSCE, both communities and their leaders have regularly interacted in awareness-enhancing and security-promoting trainings which gave them the confidence that the superficial obstacles to inter-ethnic peace can be overcome through a dialogue.

While we were completing our fieldwork in Kyrgyzstan, one such framework came out in the form of a new training Centre for representatives of local crime-prevention centres (LCPCs) opened by OSCE in 2013, allowing representatives of CBOs to meet regularly, coordinate their activities, share experiences, and attend training courses on communitypolicing practices. Although, this is only one example of CBO institutionalisation with no or partial involvement of the state, we could follow an additional evidence that **the process of institutionalisation (even promulgated by a non-state actor) has a potentially positive outcome in the way how CBOs prevent and resolve ethnicitydriven conflicts**.

The mentioned case of Uzgen can also be used to reinforce an important finding that the higher the level of institutionalisation of CBO is, the lower is the influence of a community leader in terms of conflict resolution and prevention, the lower the level of institutionalisation is, the higher is the influence of a community leader. However, the level of institutionalisation does not affect the reputation and authority of a leader within the community, as the traditional CBO structures of Central Asia have always envisaged obeydienice, docility and respect towards *aksakals* and community leaders.

Another major analytical dilemma that this research project was designed to address was to see if the institutionalized model of CBO – such as the Uzbek mahalla - could serve as a role-model for other states of Central Asia. As per our initial expectations, the data collected in all three countries turned out symptomatic of the largely positive attitude toward wider-regional implementation of an institutionalized CBO model (as seen in Uzbekistan) on the one hand, and the attitudes toward weaknesses that respondents associated with the Uzbek mahalla model and the country-specific conditions (as viewed in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) on the other.

By and large, the respondents' attitude toward wider-regional institutionalisation of CBO is characteristic of a number of domestic features that each country holds. First, **the question of potential incorporation of a CBO by state structures is intertwined with a long-lasting dilemma of democratic governance**, i.e. with the way how democracy writ is perceived in the country. When looking at the Uzbekistan data, especially in light of a sustained international pressure over undemocratic governing practices here, the

discourse of "the Uzbek model of mahalla" was regularly employed as part of a nationbranding technique to demonstrate to the world that the country's version of democracy and pluralism have their strong grassroots footing. On a similar question, yet from the opposite angle, the data on Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have maintained that **the more CBOs fall in the "institutionalisation trap", the less freedoms in decision-making and more harmful state intervention they would face**. The latter finding was crucial in explaining why despite an overall positive evaluation of CBO's conflict-prevention and conflict-resolution capability, our data on Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan turned out to consider "CBO institutionalisation by the political authority" largely irrelevant or ineffective.

Secondly, the possibility of a broader regional application of the Uzbek model of institutionalised CBOs, as seen from the data derived in all three countries, is interweaved with the capacity of the state in terms of manageability. In other words, there appears to be some evidence suggesting that **stronger and politically stable states with sufficient organisational and material resources, yet challenged on the security dimension, are more prone to incorporating CBOs into their governing framework, whereas those states that possess fewer resources and show weaker systemic stability, would hardly have incentives to intervene in the community life and challenge a CBO's traditional autonomy**.

Thus, it should be stressed that our research findings in several respects supplement and enrich the concepts of "community" when linked to "conflict resolution". As we have mentioned in the earlier sections of this project paper, "community" in large has a function of creating an image of togetherness, unity and consensus – the cornerstone factor for maintaining social cohesion and preventing conflicts. It becomes more than simply a place or locality, but is 'used to refer to a set of relations that exist between individuals and govern their moral or social behaviour with one another' (Little, 2002). On the other hand, such a community 'demands stern obedience in exchange for the services it renders or promises to render' (Bauman, 2001). However, it should also be mentioned that traditional forms of community-based association are often seen as being demolished by industrialisation and urbanisation, which resulted in changes in the nature of social relations and the generation of new sites of community conflict (Cooper, 2008).

Since from the very outset we considered a CBO as a traditional civil society organisation, it is hard to disregard Greenberg, et al (2011) whose study assigned a broader civil society with a range of functions in preventing/resolving conflicts. These include an "early warning function" (voicing an alarm when situations are deteriorating), "structural prevention" (develop adequate local institutions capable of resolving a conflict long before actual violence breaks out), "conflict resolution" (offer mediation services at a "second track" level outside governmental channels) and "post-conflict peace-building" (engage in rebuilding war-torn societies, and in preventing a reescalation of violence).

Our research project has also benefited conceptually from Varshney's proposition which focused on civic engagement across ethnic groups which is a critical peace-building factor, and not civic engagement *per se*. In other words, interethnic (or inter-communal) engagement is a key driver toward peace as it leads to the formation of what might be called "**institutionalized peace systems**". It is key, according to this view, that inter-communal form of association not only promotes peace, but also helps withstand "exogenous shocks" at a national level (Varshney, 2001).

In light of the mentioned body of literature, the implications of our findings appear to be manifold: First, this research project in some ways brings all of the highlighted concepts under a single analytic umbrella, thus inadvertently creating linkages between these works. Secondly, this research has not only emphasized the significance of CBOs and their internal mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution, but also it looked at the impact of political authority (the state) and degree of its intervention on facilitating and/or undermining the CBO effectiveness in this field. Thirdly, this project has focused on an issue which was poorly-researched through intra-regional cross-country methodology, especially when applied to post-Soviet Central Asia.

In terms of the directions for future research, we hope that some of our findings would inspire more cross-national studies focusing for example, but not limited to: (1) the role of NGOs in mitigating conflicts in Central Asia; (2) the impact of "non-state institutionalization" by foreign aid agencies in strengthening the peace-building potential of CBOs; (3) the impact of traditional institutions within CBOs, such as "elders councils", in conflict resolution.

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APPENDIX I. CODING FRAME FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS

1. The effectiveness of community-based organizations (CBOs) in preventing community conflicts

- 1.1. Very effective
- 1.2. Effective
- 1.3. Somewhat effective
- 1.4. Not effective

2. The effectiveness of CBOs in resolving community conflicts

- 2.1. Very effective
- 2.2. Effective
- 2.3. Somewhat effective
- 2.4. Not effective

3. CBOs as a trust-building instrument for community members

- 3.1. Very effective
- 3.2. Effective
- 3.3. Somewhat effective
- 3.4. Not effective

4. CBOs as inclusive participatory mechanism (in decision-making)

- 4.1. Very inclusive4.2. Inclusive4.3. Partly inclusive
- 4.4. Closed

5. Potential application of mahalla conflict-preventing/resolving structure in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan

5.1. Successful5.2. Somewhat successful5.3. Unsuccessful5.4. Irrelevant

APPENDIX II. INTERVIEW GUIDES.

MAHALLA EXPERTS (INTERVIEW GUIDE)

	оиш қисми ва маҳалла тузулиши
	oduction and mahalla structure
	дная часть и структура махалли
1.	Қайси мезонларга (критерийларга) кўра одатда махалла ташкил топилади?
	Согласно каким критериям образуется махалля? What are the main criteria on which mahallas are usually established?
2.	Мақалла аъзолари деб кимларни айтиш мумкин?
	Кого можно назвать членами махалли?
	Who can be categorized as mahalla members?
3.	Сизнинг фикрингизча, маҳалла ташкилотининг асосий мақсадлари нималардан иборат?
	По Вашему, в чем заключаются главные цели махалли?
	In your opinion, what is the major objective of mahalla?
4.	Озгина ўзингиз маълумотингиз ва профессионал тажрибангиз хакида айтиб берсангиз?
	Расскажите немного о своём образовании и профессиональной деятельности.
	Could you tell us something about your academic and professional background?
5.	Маҳалла раиси бўлиш учун инсон қайси хусусиятларга эга болиши лозим?
	По Вашему, какими качествами должен обладать председатель махалли?
	What features a person has to possess to be the leader of mahalla?
6.	Ўз иш фаолияти давомида қайси иқтисодий тўсқинликларга ва қийинчиликларга махалла ташкилоти дуч
	келади?
	С какими экономическими препятствиями сталкивается махалля в процессе своей деятельности?
	What economic challenges does mahalla (or its variant) institution face in your region?
7.	Маҳалла ташкилотининг фаолияти қандай килиб моддий томондан таъминланади?
	Каким образом осуществляется финансовое обеспечение деятельности махалли?
	How are the activities of mahallas financed?
8.	Маҳалла фаолияти давлат томониданми ёки хусусий манбалар орқали таъминланадими? Нодавлат
	ташкилотлар маҳалла фаолиятини моддий томондан таъминлаб турадими?
	Обеспечивается ли деятельность махаллии со стороны государства или же частного сектора? Поддерживают ли
	деятельность махалли неправительственные организации (ННО)?
	Do mahallas use public or private sources of financing? Do NGOs finance mahallas' activities?
9.	Бугунги кундаги маҳалла ташкилотининг тузулиши қайси кўринишга эга? Сўнгги йиллар ичида маҳалла
	ташкилотида қандайдир ўзгаришлар рўй бердими?
	Как выглядит организационная структура махалли в настоящее время? Какие изменения коснулись
	органиционной структуры махалли за последние годы? What is the surrent structure of mahalles? Did it underse any shanges over time?
	What is the current structure of mahallas? Did it undergo any changes over time?
10.	Сўнгги йиллар ичида махалла ташкилоти тузулишида қандайдир ўзгаришлар рўй бердими? Қандай
	ўзгаришлар ва нима мақсадда шу ўзгаришлар киритилди?
	Происходили ли какие либо изменения в структуре махалли за последние годы? Когда, какого рода были изменения
	и какова была цель внедрения тех или иных структурных изменений? Has it undergone any structural changes in recent years? If yes, when and why has it undergone structural changes?
	nas it and is for a strattarial changes in recent years. In yes, when and why has it and isone strattarial changes:
11.	Қискача қилиб мақалла тарихи қақида айтиб берсангиз?
	Можете ли Вы вкратце рассказать об истории своей махалли?
	Could you tell us about the history of mahallas?

12.	Маҳалла ташкилоти қачон биринчи бўлиб ташкил этилган? Ва бугунги кундаги маҳалла ва собиқ Иттифоқ давридаги маҳалла ташкилотлари орасидаги бўлган фарқларини айтиб берсангиз? На Ваш взгляд каким образом отличается современная маҳалля от маҳалли времен Советской эпоҳи?
	Could you please describe when it first emerged and what were the main
	differences between the mahalla (or its variant) prior to and of Soviet times and of present?
	ор қабул қилиш ва ваколат тақсимланиши інятие решений и распределение обязанностей
	ision-making and power distribution
	Махалла ташкилотида асосий қарорлар қай тарзда қабул қилинади?
	Каким образом принимаются решения внутри махалли?
	What is the decision-making process for major decisions within mahallas?
14.	Қарор қабул қилишдан олдин, шу қарорлар маҳалла яшовчилари билан қандайдир муҳокама қилинадими? Маҳалла оқсоқоли қарорларларини
	Вносится ли принятое решение на обсуждение жителей махалли? Prior to making decisions, do mahallas allow and/or facilitate discussion within the community? (are the decisions of a mahalla
	leader undisputable?)
15.	
	Каким образом жители махалли информируются о принятых решениях?
	Do they inform the mahalla members on their decisions?
16.	Махалла раиси қай тарзда сайланади? Каким образом избирается председатель махалли?
	How the head of mahalla is being (s)elected?
17.	Мақалла бошқарув тузулиши қандай кўринишга эга? Бошқа мақалла ташкилотларидачи?
	Как выглядит структура руководства махалли? А как в других махаллях?
	What is the power structure in mahallas?
18.	Ваколат бир кишига бериладими ёки бир неча киши орасида тақсимланадими?
	Исполняются ли обязанности одним человеком или же распределяются между сотрудниками? Is power concentrated around one person or spread among several or more members?
	іқа ташкилотлар билан алоқа ва муносабатлар
	олняются ли обязанности одним человеком или же распределяются между сотрудниками? ations with other institutions
	Мақалла бошқа давлат ташкилотлари билан иш юритадими? Буларга қайси давлат ташкилотлари киради?
	Работает ли махалля с другими государственными организациями? Какие организации можно к ним отнести? Do mahallas deal with various state agencies? Prompt: If yes, please name the agencies and explain the nature of interaction?
20.	Махалла давлат ташкилотлари билан мунтазам равишда ўзаро муносабатдами еки номунтазам равишдами?
	Носят ли отношения махалли с государственными организациями регулярный или непостоянный характер?
	Do mahallas interact with public agencies regularly or on ad-hoc basis?
21.	Маҳалла (ёки бошқа маҳаллалар) давлат ташкилотлари билан ўзаро муносабат механизми қандай кўринишга
	эга? Как выглядит мезанизм взаимодействия махалли (или других махаллей) с государственными организациями?
	What is the mechanism of interaction of mahallas (other mahallas) with public agencies?
22.	
	Какие имеются каналы связи с государственными организациями?
	What are the established communication channels?
23.	
	Шу муносабатларга ким ташаббускор?

	//
	Кто первым инициирует налаживание взаимодействия махалли с государственными организациями? Who exercises initiative in state-mahalla interaction?
24.	Махалла бошқа давлат ёки махаллий ташкилотлардан ёрдам олиб турадими?
	Получает ли махалля помощь от государственных или местных организаций?
	Does mahalla receive any kind of support from the government/local authorities?
25	Маҳаллалар бир бирлари билан ўзаро муносабатда бўлишадими? Шундай бўлса, ўзаро муносабатининг
25.	махаллалар бир бирлари билан узарб муносабатда булишадими? шундай булса, узарб муносабатинин мазмун мохияти ва мақсади нимадан иборат?
	мазмун модияти ва мадсади нимадан иоорат: Поддерживает ли махалля отношения с соседними махаллями? Если так, охарактеризуйте особенности
	взаимоотношений и что это даёт махалле?
	Do mahallas interact with other/neighbouring mahallas?
	Prompt: If yes, why do they decide to interact and explain the nature of interaction?
Мох	каролар олдини олиш ва уларни ҳал қилиш
	ь в предотвращении и разрешении конфликтов
	flict prevention and resolution
26.	Маҳалла яшовчилари одатда қанақа тўқнашув ёки можароларга дуч келишлари мумкин? Оиладаги ўзаро
	можаролар? Ижтимоий? Жамият? Этник? Бошқа?
	С какими формами конфликтов и противоятояний сталкиваются жители махалли? Семейные? Общинные?
	Этнические? Другие?
	What is the common type of conflict members of mahallas may face with? Prompt: family, inter-family, social, ethnic, etc.?
27.	Фикрингизча, қайси омиллар шу мақалладаги ўзаро мужаролар ва бақсларни келиб чиқишига сабаб бўлиши
	мумкин?
	По Вашему, какие факторы провоцируют конфликты и споры внутри махалли?
	In your opinion, what factors can potentially trigger intra-communal disputes/clashes? (If yes) Why? (If not) Why not?
28.	Тажрибадан келиб чиққан холда, ақолини қайси мақалладаги хавфсизлик муаммолари энг кўп безовта қилиб
	туради?
	Исходя из Вашего опыта, какие вызовы общественному порядку и безопасности волнуют жителей махалли больше
	scero? In your experience, which safety problems bother people the most in local communities?
	in your experience, which safety problems bother people the most in local communities:
29.	Можароларни ечишда, маҳалла раисларининг роли ва аҳамияти қанақа?
	Насколько значима роль председателей махалли в разрешении конфликтов?
	Which role do mahalla leaders play in solving a conflict?
30.	Махалла раислари шу можаро ва бахсларни ечиш учун махсус билимга эга бўлишлари керакми?
	Должны ли председатели махаллей обладать специальными знаниями по разрешению конфликтов и споров?
	Should a mahalla leader possess conflict resolution skills?
31.	Маҳалла раислари қанчалик тез-тез орада маҳалла ҳавфсизлигини ошириш ва маҳалла ахолининг ўзаро
	можароларни олдини олиш мавзусига тегишли семинар ва тренингларда қатнашиб туришади?
	Как часто председатели махаллей принимают участие на семинарах и тренингах, посвященных повышению
	безопасности в махалле и разрешению споров между его жителями?
	How often do mahalla leaders receive training/attend seminars focusing on the means to uphold public safety and/or prevent intra-
	communal clashes?
32.	Фикрингизча, давлатимиз жамоалараро рўй берадиган можароларга қай ақамият билан қарайди?
	На Ваш взгляд, какое значение придаёт государство конфликтам, возникающим между общинами?
	In your opinion, how concerned is the state (government) about the conflict potential within communities?
33.	Махалла яшовчилари учун бир махалладан иккинчи махаллага кўчиш қанчалик енгил ёки қийин?
	Насколько легко жителям одной махалли переселяться в другую махаллю?
	How easily can mahalla members shift from one mahalla to the other?
24	.
34.	Янги маҳаллага кўчиб келган яшовчиларга интеграция жараёни енгилроқ кечиш учун нима ишлар олиб борилади?
	νυματαίτε

	Какая работа ведется в целях содействия жителям, переселившимся в новую махаллю? What is done for newcomers to integrate in mahallas?
35.	Бошқа етник ва диний гурух вакилларига нисбатан маҳалла яшовчилари бошқача муносабатдами? Каково отношение жителей маҳалли к представителям другой этнической и религиозной общины? How inclusive (in terms of the presence of different ethnic or religious groups) is a mahalla institution?
36.	Айни бир сабабларга кўра махалла яшовчиси махалладан четлантирилиши мумкинми? Может ли житель по какой-либо причине быть выселен из махалли? Can a mahalla member be excluded from the mahalla?
37.	Можароларни олдини олиш учун маҳаллаларда қандай мажбур қилиш ва рахбатлантириш восита ва йўллари мавжуд? Какие принудительные или поощрительные меры практикует Ваша маҳалля (или другие маҳалли) в целях разрешения конфликтных ситуаций? What are the coercion and encouragement instruments for conflict prevention used in mahallas?
38.	Маҳаллада маҳалла қонун-қоидаларига риоя қилмаган яшовчиларга қарши қандай чора-тадбирлар мавжуд? Какие меры наказания применяет маҳалля в отношении жителей, несоблюдающих нормы и законы общественного порядка? What are the punishments mechanisms for non-abiding with mahalla rules?
39.	Этник можароларни олдини олишда маҳалланинг роли ва аҳамияти қандай? Какова роль и значение маҳалли в предотвращении этнических конфликтов? What is the role of mahallas in preventing ethnic conflicts?
40.	Маҳалла яшовчилари орасида турли ҳил этник гурух вакиллари ўзаро тинч хаёт кечириши учун нима ишлар олиб борилади? Какая деятельность проводится в целях обеспечения мирного сосуществования жителей махалли с представителями других общин? What the mahalla undertakes to ensure peaceful co-existence of different ethnic groups?
41.	Маҳалла (бошқа маҳалла) яшовчилари ўзаро тинч хаёт кечириши учун маҳаллада қанақа тарғибот ишлари олиб борилади? Какая деятельность проводится среди населения маҳалли в целяҳ пропаганды мирного сосуществования? Does mahalla (other mahallas) propagate peaceful co-existence among members? If yes, by which means?
42.	Маҳаллада тинчликни таъминлаш мақсадида қандай тарбиявий тадбирлар олиб борилади? Шу тадбирларга қанчалик тез-тез орада амалдор шаҳслар (давлат хавфсизлик орган вакиллари) таклиф этиб турилади? Какая образовательная деятельность проводится среди населения маҳалли в целях обеспечения общественного порядка? Как часто на данные мероприятия приглашаются ответственные работники (предстаивтели органов правопорядка)? What kind of educational activities are conducted in order to uphold public safety? How often do they invite local officials/law- enforcement authorities to those activities?
43.	Маҳалла яшовчилари орасида ўзаро можаро келиб чиққанда, қандай чоралар олиб борилади? Какие меры принимаются в случае возникновения конфликтной ситуации между жителями махалли? In case of a conflict between mahalla members, how do they deal with the situation?
44.	Маҳаллалар орасида ўзаро можаро келиб чиққанда, қандай чоралар олиб борилади? Какие меры принимаются в случае возникновения конфликтной ситуации между различными махаллями? In case of a conflict between mahallas, how do they deal with the situation?
45.	Маҳалла қандай қилиб этник гүрүҳ вакилларини ўз фаолиятига жалб этади? Қайси фаолиятига этник гүрүҳларни жалб этади? Каким образом маҳалля подключает предствателей других этнических групп к своей деятельности? В каких меропиятиях они участвуют? How does the mahalla engages ethnic minority groups in their activities? If yes, in which activities?

46.	Қанча тез-тез орада мақаллада этник гуруқлар орасида ўзаро можаролар юз бериб туради? Как часто возникают в махалле конфликтные ситуации между разными этническими группами? How often do ethnic conflicts usually take place in mahallas?
47.	Шу можароларни олдини олишда маҳалла раисларининг роли ва вазифалари нималардан иборат? Какова роль и задачи председателей маҳалли в предотвращении данныҳ конфликтов? Which role do mahalla leaders play in preventing a conflict?
48.	Жамоа ҳавфсизлигини таъминлашда маҳалланинг роли нимада ва унга қанақа баҳо берасиз? Какова роль маҳалли в обеспечении общественного правопорядка и какую оценку этой деятельности Вы бы дали? How would you assess the role of mahalla (or its variant) in promoting public safety?
49.	Шу борада, махалланинг камчиликлари нимада деб ўйлайсиз? В этой связи, на Ваш взгляд, в чем заключаются главные недостатки махалли? What are the mahalla's weaknesses in this respect in your view?
50.	Можароларга тегишли бўлмаган ва уларда қатнашмаган маҳалла яшовчиларининг шу можароларни ва жанжалларни олдини олишда роли ва аҳамияти қандай? Яшовчилар ўзаро бирлашганлигининг аҳамияти қанақа? Какова роль в предотвращении конфликтов и споров тех жителей маҳалли которые напрямую не связаны с данной конфликтной ситуацией? What is the role of other mahalla members, who are not direct conflict participants, in preventing and resolving a conflict/dispute? (the role of group cohesion)
Воп If 'n	далла посбонлари ҳақида айтиб ўтилган бўлса, қуйидаги саволларга ўтиш лозим pocы, зававаемые в случае если были упомянуты народные дружинники (посбоны): nahalla posbonlari'/ neighborhood watch group is mentioned, the following questions should be asked Иш жараёнида посбонлар асосан қандай тўсқин ва қийинчиликларга дуч келишади? С какими препятствиями и трудностями сталкиваются дружинники в процессе своей работы? What are the main challenges that 'watch groups' face in their work with the community?
52.	Маҳалла посбонлари қаторига қўшилишдан олдин, янги келган йигитлар махсус тренингларда қатнашишадими? Принимают ли участие новобранцы в работе специальных подготовительных тренингов, до своего назначения дружинниками? What kind of training do new-comers receive prior to joining the 'watch groups'?
Воп If 'n	алла посбонлари хақида айтиб ўтилмаган холда, қуйидаги саволлар берилиши лозим росы, зававаемые в случае если не были упомянуты народные дружинники (посбоны): nahalla posbonlari'/ neighborhood watch group is not mentioned, the following questions should be mentioned
53.	Қуйидагига ўз фикрингизни билдирсангиз: Посбонлар ҳаракати жорий этилиши жамоа хавфсизлигини таъминлаш учун зарур бўлган ташаббус. Нега айни шундай деб ўйлайсиз? Выскажите своё мнение по следующему предположению: Внедрение практики народных дружинников является важной иницативой в деле обеспечения общетсвенного правопорядка. Почему Вы так думаете? Do you agree/disagree with the idea to initiate 'neighborhood watch groups' to uphold public safety and why?
54.	Қайси томонлари билан посбонлар ҳаракати жамоа ва маҳалла учун фойдали деб ўйлайсиз? Какими своими качествами деятельность дружинников может или не может быть полезной для общества и махалли? In what sense will their work may or may not be useful for the community?
55.	Фикрингизча, нима сабабларга кўра маҳалла яшовчилари ўз хавфсизлигини посбонларга ишониб топшириши лозим (лозим эмас)? По Вашему, почему жители махалли должны (или не должны) доверять свою безопасность дружинникам (посбонам)? Can you expand a little on why people, in your view, should or should not entrust their safety to these watch groups?
Воп	алла посбонлари ҳақида айтиб ўтилган холда, қуйидаги саволлар берилиши лозим росы, зававаемые в случае если были упомянуты народные дружинники (посбоны): nahalla posbonlari'/ neighborhood watch group is mentioned, the following questions should be asked

56.	Посбонлар жамоа билан ўзаро иш жараёнида асосан қайси тўсқин ва қийинчиликларга дуч келишади? С какими препятствиями и трудностями сталкиваются дружинники в процессе своей работы? What are the main challenges that 'watch groups' face in their work with the community?
57.	Посбонлар иши билан қониқяпсизми? Қониқишизга нима сабаб? Ёки қониқмаганлигизга нима сабаб? Удовлетровены ли Вы деятельностью дружинников? В чём причины на это?Или наоборот, почему Вы не удовлетворены их работой? Are you satisfied with their work and why?
58.	Фикрингизча, посбонлар ҳаракатига қўшилишдан олдин, йигитларга қандай тренинглар бериш лозим? Уларга нималарни ўргатиш лозим? На Ваш взгляд, какого вида тренинги необходимо проводить с дружинниками прежде чем они приступят к своей работе? Каким навыкам следовало бы их научить? What kind of training should new-comers receive prior to joining the 'watch groups'?
Max	алла посбонлари ҳақида айтиб ўтилмаган холда, қуйидаги саволлар берилиши лозим
	росы, зававаемые в случае если не были упомянуты народные дружинники (посбоны):
	nahalla posbonlari'/ neighborhood watch group is not mentioned, the following questions should be mentioned
59.	Қуйидагига ўз фикрингизни билдирсангиз: Посбонлар ҳаракати жорий этилиши жамоат хавфсизлигини таъминлаш учун зарур бўлган ташаббус. Hera? Выскажите своё мнение по следующему предположению: Внедрение практики народных дружинников является важной иницативой в деле обеспечения общетсвенного правопорядка. Почему Вы так думаете? Do you agree/disagree with the idea to initiate 'neighborhood watch groups' to uphold public safety and why?
60.	Қайси томонлари билан посбонлар фаолияти маҳалла фаолиятига ўхшаш ва бир бирини такрорлайди? Какими аспектами своей деятельности дружинники повторяют или не дублируют проводимую Вами работу? In what sense will their work may or may not duplicate their work/activities?
61.	Фикрингизча, нима сабабларга кўра маҳалла яшовчилари ўз хавфсизлигини посбонларга ишониб топшириши лозим (лозим эмас)? По Вашему, почему жители махалли должны (или не должны) доверять свою безопасность дружинникам (посбонам)? Can you expand a little on why people, in your view, should or should not entrust their safety to these watch groups?
62.	Можаролар ва жанжалларни ечиш учун маҳаллалар бошқа маҳаллаларни ердам беришга жалб этишадими? Қанақа қилиб? Привлекаете ли Вы другие маҳалли к разрешению конфликтныҳ ситуаций и споров? Каким образом? Do mahallas also involve other mahallas to assist in solving a dispute or conflict between mahalla members? If yes, how?
63.	Бошқа маҳаллаларни жалб этиш орқали ва улар ёрдами билан олди олинган ва ҳал этилган можароларга мисол келтириб берсангиз. Не могли бы Ва привести пример того, каким образом была привлечена другая махалля и какую помощь она оказала в разрешении конфликтой ситуации? Can you give us any example of cross-mahalla mutual influence on conflict prevention and resolution in mahallas?
64.	Можаролар ва яшовчилар орасида ўзаро жанжалларни хал этиш учун маҳаллалар бошқа бир ташқи ташкилотларни (давлат ташкилотларни, мисол учун) хам жалб этиб туришадими? Уларни жалб қилиш йўли қанақа? Привлекаете ли Вы внешние организации (например, государственные ведомства) к разрешению конфликтных ситуаций и споров в маҳалле? Do mahallas involve external institutions (e.g. Public agencies) to assist in solving a dispute or conflict between mahalla members? If yes, how?
65.	Давлат ва маҳаллий ташкилотлар билан этник масалаларини ва жамоа хавфсизлигига тегишли муаммоларни бартараф қилишда маҳаллалар қанчалик яқин хамкорлик қилишади? Насколько тесно поддерживается сотрудничество с государственными и местными организациями в целях решения проблем на этнической почве либо касающихся общественного правопорядка? How closely do mahallas cooperate/discuss with local authorities issues related to inter-ethnic relations / or general public safety issues?

66.	Шу
	Насколько эффективно данное сотрудничество? How effective is such cooperation?
67.	Маҳаллий милиция ва хокимият вакиллари билан ҳамкорлик қилишдан ташқари, жамоанинг хавфсизлигини таъминлаш мақсадида маҳаллалар яна қайси ички ресурсларни ишга соласизлар?
	Наряду с сотрудничеством с органами милиции и местной власти, какие еще внутренние ресурсы вы задействуйте в
	целях обеспечения общественного порядка? Besides working with local police/authorities what internal resources do mahallas mobilize to uphold public safety?
	Besides working with local police/authorities what internal resources do manalias mobilize to uphold public safety?
68.	Маҳалладаги можаро ва жанжалларни олдини олиш ва хал этиш йўлида ташкилотларнинг ёрдами теккан ёки
	таъсири бўлган холатга мисол келтириб бера оласизми?
	Не могли бы Вы привести пример того как привлечение внешней организации оказала положительный эффект в разрешении конфликтной ситуации в махалле?
	Can you give an example of influence of external institutions (e.g. International orgnaisations, ngos) on conflict prevention and
	resolution in mahallas?
69.	Фикрингизча, маҳалла яшовчилари ўз маҳаллаларидаги мазкур хавфсизлик механизмларидан қай даражада қониқишади?
	На Ваш взгляд, насколько удовлетворены жители махалли данным механизмом обеспечения безопасности и правопорядка?
	In your opinion, how satisfied are people with the existing public safety arrangements in their communities?
70.	Фикрингизча, маҳаллада жамоа ҳавфсизлиги маълум бир томони билан қониқмаган бирон бир яшовчилар ёки гуруҳлар борми?
	На Ваш взгляд, имеются ли люди или группы лиц, недовольные определенным аспектом обеспечения порядка и
	<i>безопасности в махалле?</i> In your opinion, how satisfied are people with the existing public safety arrangements in their communities?
71.	Фикрингизча, четга чиқиб ва қайтиб келаетган ишчилар жамоа ва маҳаллий хавфсизлик тизими ва этник
	гурухлараро ахиллигининг қайси томонларига ўз таъсирини кўрсатади? Нега ундай деб ўйлайсиз? На Ваш взгляд, какое воздействие оказывают вернувшиеся на родину трудовые мигранты на состояние
	общественной безопасности и мирного сосуществования различных этнических групп?
	Having observed the continuous influx of returning migrant workers from abroad, what impact, do you think, they make on the
	system of public safety and interethnic harmony in their communities? If not, please explain why not.
72.	Чет элга ишга чиқиб кетаетган мигрантларнинг хавфсизлик холатига таъсири канака?
	Какое воздействие на состояние безопасности в махалле оказывают трудовые мигранты, выезжающие за границу?
	What is the impact of outbound migrants on the safety situation?
	oca/Conclusion
73.	Махалла ташкилоти давлатнинг ўз-ўзини бошқариш тизимига қандай таъсир кўрсатади? Какое воздействие оказывает махалля на систему самоуправления в государстве?
	What impact can mahalla institutions (or its variants) make on the system of self-governance in your country?
74.	Шу холат жамоани яшаш учун хавфсизлиро қ қиладими? Делает ли это общество более безопасным?
	Does it make communities a safer place?
75.	Фикрингизча, маҳалла ўзбек модели бошқа давлатларда самарали қўлланилиши мумкинми ёки маҳалла — бу фақат Ўзбекистонга хос бўлган феноменми?
	факат эзоекистонта хос булган феноменми: На Ваш взгляд, может ли узбекская модель махалли быть успешно внедрена в других странах или же махалля это
	лищь присущий Узбекистану феномен?
	Do you think that the uzbek model of mahallas can be applied outside of uzbekistan or it is a purely uzbek phenomenon?
76.	Фикрингизча, маҳалла – бу мустақил фуқаро ташкилотими ёки бу собиқ иттифоқ майдонида пайдо бўлган ва
	давлат томонидан бошқариш учун яратилган яна бир қуролми?
	На Ваш взгляд, махалля это независимое гражданское объединение или же это еще одно средство, созданное для управления государством, и образованное еще в Советскую эпоху?
	уприоления сосубиретом, и воризовинное еще в советскую эпоху:

Is mahalla (or its variant) an independent civil society institution or yet another arm of the state in post-soviet Central Asia?
Фикрингизча, Қирғизистонда маҳаллага ўхшаш бир ташкилот бўлганда, Қирғизистонда яқинда рўй берган этник гурухлараро можароларни олдини олса бўлармиди? Нега ундай деб ўйлайсиз? На Ваш взгляд, если бы в Киргизстане имелась организация, похожая на маҳаллю, можно ли было предотвратить межэтнические столкновения, имевшие место в недалёком прошлом? Do you think the mahalla institution could have effectively prevented/ mitigated the eruption of the recent inter-ethnic conflict in Kyrgyzstan and why?
Этник можароларни олдини олишда маҳалланинг Ўрта Осиёдаги потенциал роли ва аҳамияти хақида нима дея оласиз? Что бы Вы могли сказать о потенциальной роли и значении махалли в разрешении конфликтных ситуаций в Центрально-азиатском регионе? Do you want to add anything on mahalla's role as a potential mitigator of inter-ethnic conflict in Central Asia?
Бугунги кунда маҳалла ташкилоти ўз фаолиятини самарали олиб бориш йўлида қайси тўсқинликларга дуч келади? С какими препятствиями сталкивается на сегодняшний день маҳалля для более эффективного проведения своей деятельности? What are the main challenges to the effective functioning of the mahalla institution (or its variant) today?
Фикрингизча, маҳалла ташкилотининг самарасини ошириш учун нима ишлар олиб борилиши лозим? По Вашему, какие меры должны быть приняты для того, чтобы повысить эффективность работы махалли? What do you think should be done (would you suggest) to increase the effectiveness of the mahalla institution?

	MAHALLA LEADERS (INTERVIEW GUIDE)
	риш қисми ва маҳалла тузулиши
	roduction and mahalla structure
<u>ВВ</u>	одная часть и структура махалли
1.	Маҳалла номи? Название Вашей маҳалли?
	Name of mahalla?
2.	Маҳалладаги яшовчилар таҳминий сони?
	Приблизительное число жителей махалли?
	Approximate number of members?
3.	Қачон ва қандай қилиб мақалла ташкил топилган?
	Когда и каким образом была образована Ваша махалля?
	When and how this mahalla was established?
4.	Қайси мезонларга (критерийларга) кўра одатда маҳалла ташкил топилади?
	Согласно каким критериям образуется махалля?
	What are the main criteria on which mahallas are usually established?
5.	Маҳалла аъзолари деб кимларни айтиш мумкин?
	Кого можно назвать членами махалли?
	Who can be categorized as mahalla members?
6.	Сизнинг фикрингизча, маҳалла ташкилотининг асосий мақсадлари нималардан иборат?
	По Вашему, в чем заключаются главные цели махалли?
	In your opinion, what is the major objective of mahalla?
7.	Озгина ўзингиз маълумотингиз ва профессионал тажрибангиз хакида айтиб берсангиз?
	Расскажите немного о своём образовании и профессиональной деятельности.

	Could you tell us something about your academic and professional background?
8.	Нима мақсадда мақалла раиси мавқэсини олиб боришни танладингиз? Что подтолкнуло Вас к решению работать председателем махалли?
	Why did you decide to pursue a career as a mahalla leader?
9.	Маҳалла раиси бўлиш учун инсон қайси хусусиятларга эга болиши лозим?
	По Вашему, какими качествами должен обладать председатель махалли? What features a person has to possess to be the leader of mahalla?
	What leaders a person has to possess to be the leader of manana:
10.	Бугунги кунда сизнинг асосий вазифаларингиз нималардан иборат?
	В настоящее время, в чем заключаются Ваши основные обязанности?
	What are currently your main duties and responsibilities?
11.	Хозирги кунда қайси асосий лойиҳалар устида маҳалла иш олиб бормоқда? Шу кунда маҳаллада нима
	ишлар амалга ошяпти?
	Над какими проектами в настоящее время работает Ваша махалля? Какие мероприятия осуществляются в махалле?
	What are the main projects (activities) you are working on?
12.	Сизнинг назоратингиз остида неча нафар киши иш олиб боради?
	Сколько человек работает под Вашим руководством? How many employees work in your subordination?
	How many employees work in your subordination?
13.	Ўз иш фаолияти давомида қайси иқтисодий тўсқинликларга махалла ташкилоти дуч келади?
	С какими экономическими препятствиями сталкивается махалля в процессе своей деятельности?
	What economic challenges does mahalla (or its variant) institution face in your region?
14.	Маҳалла ташкилотининг фаолияти қандай килиб молиявий томондан таъминланади?
	Каким образом осуществляется финансовое обеспечение деятельности махалли?
	How do you finance your activities?
15.	Маҳалла фаолияти давлат томониданми ёки хусусий манбалар орқали таъминланадими? Нодавлат
	ташкилотлар маҳалла фаолиятини молиявий жихатдан таъминлаб турадими?
	Обеспечивается ли деятельность махаллии со стороны государства или же частного сектора? Поддерживают ли
	деятельность махалли неправительственные организации (ННО)? Do you use public or private sources of financing? Do NGOs finance your activities?
	be you use public of private sources of interieng. Do roos interice your detivities.
16.	Бугунги кундаги маҳалла ташкилотининг тузулиши қайси кўринишга эга? Сўнгги йиллар ичида маҳалла
	ташкилотида қандайдир ўзгаришлар рўй бердими?
	Как выглядит организационная структура махалли в настоящее время? Какие изменения коснулись органиционной структуры махалли за последние годы?
	What is the current structure of your mahalla? Did it undergo any changes over time?
17.	Сўнгги йиллар ичида махалла ташкилоти тузулишида қандайдир ўзгаришлар рўй бердими? Қандай Халаришара да ишла кариала ала ши баларишара ширишара да
	ўзгаришлар ва нима мақсадда шу ўзгаришлар киритилди? Как выглядит организационная структура махалли в настоящее время? Какие изменения коснулись
	органиционной структуры махалли за последние годы?
	Has it undergone any structural changes in recent years? If yes, when and why has it undergone structural changes?
18	Қискача қилиб мақалла тарихини айтиб берсангиз?
10.	цискача цилио мадалла гарихини антно оерсантиз: Можете ли Вы вкратце рассказать об истории своей махалли?
	Could you tell us about the history of mahallas?
10	
19.	Махалла ташкилоти қачон биринчи бўлиб ташкил этилган ва бугунги кундаги махалла ва собиқ Иттифоқ давридаги махалла ташкилотлари орасидаги фарқларини айтиб берсангиз?
	давридати мадалла ташкилотлари орасидати фаркларини айтио осреантиз: На Ваш взгляд каким образом отличается современная махалля от махалли времен Советской эпохи?
	Could you please describe when it first emerged and what were the main
	differences between the mahalla (or its variant) prior to and of Soviet times and of present?

Қар	ор қабул қилиш ва ваколат тақсимланиши
	инятие решений и распределение обязанностей
Dec	ision-making and power distribution
20.	Мақалла ташкилотида асосий қарорлар қай тарзда қабул қилинади?
	Каким образом принимаются решения внутри махалли?
	What is the decision-making process for major decisions within your mahalla?
21	Қарор қабул қилишдан олдин, шу қарорлар маҳалла яшовчилари билан қандайдир муҳокама қилинадими?
41.	царор қасул қилишдан олдин, шу қарорлар мақалла яшовчилари билан қандайдир муқокама қилинадими: Мақалла оқсоқоли қарорларларини
	Вносится ли принятое решение на обсуждение жителей махалли?
	Prior to making decisions, do you allow and/or facilitate discussion within the community? (are the decisions of a mahalla leader
	undisputable?)
22.	Қабул қилинган қарорлар қакида мақалла яшовчиларига қандай қабар берасизлар?
	Каким образом жители махалли информируются о принятых решениях?
	How do you inform the mahalla members on your decisions?
23.	Маҳалла раиси қай тарзда сайланади?
-0.	Каким образом избирается председатель махалли?
	How the head of mahalla is being (s)elected?
24.	Мақалла бошқарув тузулиши қандай кўринишга эга? Бошқа мақалла ташкилотларидачи?
	Как выглядит структура руководства махалли? А как в других махаллях?
	What is the power structure in your mahalla? In other mahallas?
25.	Ваколат бир кишига бериладими ёки бир неча киши орасида тақсимланадими?
4 J.	Ваколат ойр кишита оериладими еки ойр неча киши орасида таксимланадими: Исполняются ли обязанности одним человеком или же распределяются между сотрудниками?
	Is power concentrated around one person or spread among several or more members?
	иқа ташкилотлар билан алоқа ва муносабатлар
	юлняются ли обязанности одним человеком или же распределяются между сотрудниками?
	ations with other institutions
26.	Ваколат бир кишига бериладими ёки бир неча киши орасида тақсимланадими? Исполняются ли обязанности одним человеком или же распределяются между сотрудниками?
	Is power concentrated around one person or spread among several or more members?
	is power concentrated around one person of spread antong several of more members.
27.	Мақалла бошқа давлат ташкилотлари билан иш юритадими? Буларга қайси давлат ташкилотлари киради?
	Работает ли махалля с другими государственными организациями? Какие организации можно к ним отнести?
	Does your mahalla deal with various state agencies? Prompt: If yes, please name the agencies and explain the nature of interaction?
28.	
	Носят ли отношения махалли с государственными организациями регулярный или непостоянный характер? Do you interact with public agencies regularly or on ad-hoc basis?
	by you interact with public agencies regularly of on au-not basis:
29.	Сизнинг маҳалла (ёки бошқа маҳаллалар) бошқа давлат ташкилотлари билан ўзаро муносабат механизми
	қандай кўринишга эга?
	Как выглядит мезанизм взаимодействия Вашей махалли (или других махаллей) с государственными организациями?
	What is the mechanism of interaction of your mahalla (other mahallas) with public agencies?
30.	
	Какие имеются каналы связи с государственными организациями? What are the established communication channels?
31.	Маҳалла билан давлат ўзаро муносабатларини олиб бориш хакидаги ташаббус ким томондан чиқади? Шу
	муносабатларга ким ташаббускор?
	Кто первым инициирует налаживание взаимодействия махалли с государственными организациями?
	Who exercises initiative in state-mahalla interaction?

32.	Қанчалик тез-тез маҳалла фаолияти ҳақида юқоридаги турганларга ҳисобот бериб турасизлар?
	Как часто махалля отчитывается перед вышестоящими инстанциями?
	How often do you have to report to superior bodies on developments within your mahalla?
33.	Сизнинг маҳалла ташкилотингиз бошқа давлат ёки маҳаллий ташкилотлардан ёрдам олиб турадими?
	Получает ли Ваша махалля помощь от государственных или местных организаций?
	Does your mahalla receive any kind of support from the government/local authorities?
34.	Сизнинг маҳалла бошқа бир қўшни маҳаллалар билан ўзаро муносабатдами? Шундай бўлса, ўзаро муносабатининг мазмун моҳияти нимадан иборат ва нима мақсадда шу ўзаро муносабатга киришга қарор қилдингиз?
	Поддерживает ли Ваша махалля отношения с соседними махаллями? Если так, охарактеризуйте особенности
	взаимоотношений и что это даёт махалле?
	Does your mahalla interact with other/neighbouring mahallas? Prompt: If yes, why do you decide to interact and explain the nature of interaction?
35.	Сизнинг маҳаллани бошқа қўшни маҳаллалардан фарқ қилиб турадиган томони нимада?
	Какими чертами отличается Ваша махалля от других махаллей?
	Is there anything that differentiates your mahalla from other/neighbouring mahallas?
KoN	каролар олдини олиш ва уларни ҳал қилиш
	ь в предотвращении и разрешении конфликтов
	flict prevention and resolution
36.	Мақалла яшовчилари одатда қанақа тўқнашув ёки можароларга дуч келишлари мумкин? Оиладаги ўзаро
	можаролар? Ижтимоий? Жамият? Этник? Бошқа?
	С какими формами конфликтов и противоятояний сталкиваются жители махалли? Семейные? Общинные?
	Этнические? Другие?
	What is the common type of conflict members of your mahalla (other mahallas) may face with? Prompt: family, inter-family, social,
	ethnic, etc.?
37.	Фикрингизча, қайси омиллар шу маҳалладаги ўзаро мужаролар ва баҳсларни келиб чиқишига сабаб бўлиши
	мумкин?
	По Вашему, какие факторы провоцируют конфликты и споры внутри махалли?
	In your opinion, what factors can potentially trigger intra-communal disputes/clashes? (If yes) Why? (If not) Why not?
38.	Тажрибадан келиб чиққан холда, ақолини қайси мақалладаги хавфсизлик муаммолари энг кўп безовта қили
	туради?
	Исходя из Вашего опыта, какие вызовы общественному порядку и безопасности волнуют жителей махалли больше
	In your experience, which safety problems bother people the most in local communities?
39.	Можароларни ечишда, маҳалла раисларининг роли ва аҳамияти қанақа?
	Насколько значима роль председателей махалли в разрешении конфликтов?
	Which role do mahalla leaders play in solving a conflict?
40.	Маҳалла раислари шу можаро ва баҳсларни ечиш учун маҳсус билимга эга бўлишлари керакми?
	Должны ли председатели махаллей обладать специальными знаниями по разрешению конфликтов и споров?
	Should a mahalla leader possess conflict resolution skills?
41.	Сиз қанчалик тез-тез мақалла қавфсизлигини ошириш ва мақалла ахолининг ўзаро можароларни олдини
	олиш мавзусига тегишли семинар ва тренингларда қатнашиб турасиз? Фикрингизча, шу семинар ва
	тренинглар фойдалими ёки бефойда ва зерикарлими? Шунақа бўлишига нима сабаб?
	Как часто Вы принимаете участие на семинарах и тренингах, посвященных повышению безопасности в махалле и
	разрешению споров между его жителями?
	How often do you receive training/attend seminars focusing on the means to uphold public safety and/or prevent intra-communal
	clashes? (If yes) Did you find it useful or boring, why?
42	IIIv талбирларнинг (семинар ва тренингларнинг) асосий ташкилотиилари ими?
2 .	Шу тадбирларнинг (семинар ва тренингларнинг) асосий ташкилотчилари ким? Кто выступает главным организацитором данных мероприятий (семинаров и тренингов)?

	Who was the principal organizer of that training program?
43.	Маҳалладаги булаетган можаролар Волнуют ли Вас конфликтные ситуации и споры, возникающие в махалле? How concerned are you about conflicts in your mahalla?
44.	Фикрингизча, давлатимиз жамоалараро рўй берадиган можароларга қай ақамият билан қарайди? На Ваш взгляд, какое значение придаёт государство конфликтам, возникающим между общинами? In your opinion, how concerned is the state (government) about the conflict potential within communities?
45.	Махалла яшовчилари учун бир махалладан иккинчи махаллага кўчиш қанчалик енгил ёки қийин? Насколько легко жителям одной махалли переселяться в другую махаллю? How easily can mahalla members shift from one mahalla to the other?
46.	Янги маҳаллага кўчиб келган яшовчиларга интеграция жараёни енгилроқ кечиш учун нима ишлар олиб борилади? Какая работа ведется в целях содействия жителям, переселившимся в новую махаллю? What is done for newcomers to integrate in your mahalla?
47.	Бошқа етник ва диний гурух вакилларига нисбатан маҳалла яшовчилари бошқача муносабатдами? Каково отношение жителей маҳалли к представителям другой этнической и религиозной общины? How inclusive (in terms of the presence of different ethnic or religious groups) is a mahalla institution?
48.	Айни бир сабабларга кўра маҳалла яшовчиси шу маҳалладан четлантирилиши мумкинми? Может ли житель по какой-либо причине быть выселен из маҳалли? Can a mahalla member be excluded from the mahalla?
49.	Можароларни олдини олиш учун маҳаллада (бошқа маҳаллаларда) қандай мажбур қилиш ва рахбатлантириш восита ва йўллари мавжуд? Какие принудительные или поощрительные меры практикует Ваша маҳалля (или другие маҳалли) в целяҳ разрешения конфликтныҳ cumyaций? What are the coercion and encouragement instruments for conflict prevention used in your and/or other mahallas?
50.	Маҳаллада маҳалла қонун-қоидаларига риоя қилмаган яшовчиларга қарши қандай чора-тадбирлар мавжуд? Какие меры наказания применяет маҳалля в отношении жителей, несоблюдающих нормы и законы общественного порядка? What are the punishments mechanisms for non-abiding with mahalla rules?
51.	Этник можароларни олдини олишда маҳалланинг роли ва аҳамияти қандай? Какова роль и значение маҳалли в предотвращении этнических конфликтов? What is the role of mahallas in preventing ethnic conflicts?
52.	Маҳалла яшовчилари орасида турли ҳил этник гурух вакиллари ўзаро тинч хаёт кечириши учун нима ишлар олиб борилади? Какая деятельность проводится в целях обеспечения мирного сосуществования жителей махалли с представителями других общин? What the mahalla undertakes to ensure peaceful co-existence of different ethnic groups?
53.	Маҳалла (бошқа маҳалла) яшовчилари ўзаро тинч хаёт кечириши учун маҳаллада қанақа тарғибот ишлари олиб борилади? Какая деятельность проводится среди населения маҳалли в целяҳ пропаганды мирного сосуществования? Does your mahalla (other mahallas) propagate peaceful co-existence among members? If yes, by which means?
54.	Маҳаллада тинчликни таъминлаш мақсадида маҳаллада қандай тарбиявий тадбирлар олиб борилади? Шу тадбирларга қанчалик тез-тез орада амалдор шаҳсларни (давлат хавфсизлик орган вакиллари) таклиф этиб турасизлар? Какая образовательная деятельность проводится среди населения маҳалли в целяҳ обеспечения общественного порядка? Как часто на данные мероприятия приглашаются ответственные работники (предстаивтели органов правопорядка)?

	What kind of educational activities does your community conduct in order to uphold public safety? How often do you invite local officials/law-enforcement authorities to those activities?
55.	Маҳалла яшовчилари орасида ўзаро можаро келиб чиққанда, қандай чоралар олиб борилади? Какие меры принимаются в случае возникновения конфликтной ситуации между жителями махалли? In case of a conflict between mahalla members, how do you deal with the situation?
56.	Маҳалла яшовчилари орасида рўй берган можароларни муваффақиятли бартараф этилганига бир мисол келтириб берсангиз. <i>Не могли бы Ва привести пример успешного разрешения конфликта между жителями махалли?</i> Please tell us one story in which mahalla was successful in resolving a problem between its members? (Could one of the conflict participants tell us how the conflict took place?; to be asked if the situation allows)
57.	Маҳалла қандай қилиб этник гуруҳ вакилларини ўз фаолиятига жалб этади? Қайси фаолиятига этник гуруҳларни жалб этади? Каким образом маҳалля подключает предствателей других этнических групп к своей деятельности? В каких меропиятиях они участвуют? How the mahalla engages ethnic minority groups in their activities? If yes, in which activities?
58.	Маҳалла фаолиятига этник гуруҳларни жалб этилишига бир мисол келтириб берсангиз? Не могли бы Ва привести пример привлечения придставителей других этническихз групп в деятельность махалли? Could you please give us an example of how mahalla engages ethnic minority groups in its activities?
59.	Маҳаллада (бошқа маҳаллаларда) рўй берган этник можаро ва жанжалларга бир мисол келтириб бера оласизми? Шу можаро ва жанжаллар қандай қилиб бартараф этилган? Не могли бы Ва привести пример конфликтной ситуации, возникшего на этнической почве. Каким образом был разрешен данный конфликт? Can you give an example of an ethnic dispute, quarrel or conflict in your and/or other mahallas? How was it settled?
60.	Тасаввур қилинг, агар этник гуруҳлараро можаролар юз бериб қолса, уларга қарши қандай чоралар олиб борар эдингиз? Представьте, какие меры Вы бы приняли в случае возникновения конфликтной ситуации на этнической почве? Hypothetically, if an inter-ethnic conflict were to happen, how would you react and which measures undertake?
61.	Қанча тез-тез орада маҳаллада этник гуруҳлар орасида ўзаро можаролар юз бериб туради? Как часто возникают в маҳалле конфликтные ситуации между разными этническими группами? How often do ethnic conflicts usually take place in your mahalla (other mahallas)?
62.	Шу можароларни олдини олишда маҳалла раисларининг роли ва вазифалари нималардан иборат? Какова роль и задачи председателей махалли в предотвращении данных конфликтов? Which role do mahalla leaders play in preventing a conflict?
63.	Жамоа ҳавфсизлигини таъминлашда маҳалланинг роли нимада ва унга қанақа баҳо берасиз? Какова роль маҳалли в обеспечении общественного правопорядка и какую оценку этой деятельности Вы бы дали? How would you assess the role of mahalla (or its variant) in promoting public safety?
64.	Шу борада, маҳалланинг камчиликлари нимада деб ўйлайсиз? В этой связи, на Ваш взгляд, в чем заключаются главные недостатки махалли? What are the mahalla's weaknesses in this respect in your view?
65.	Можароларга тегишли бўлмаган ва уларда қатнашмаган маҳалла яшовчиларининг шу можароларни ва жанжалларни олдини олишда роли ва аҳамияти қандай? Яшовчилар ўзаро бирлашганлигининг аҳамияти қанақа? Какова роль в предотвращении конфликтов и споров тех жителей маҳалли которые напрямую не связаны с данной конфликтной ситуацией? What is the role of other mahalla members, who are not direct conflict participants, in preventing and resolving a conflict/dispute? (the role of group cohesion)

Max	алла посбонлари хақида айтиб ўтилган холда, қуйидаги саволлар берилиши лозим
Воп	росы, зававаемые в случае если были упомянуты народные дружинники (посбоны):
lf 'm	ahalla posbonlari'/ neighborhood watch group is mentioned, the following questions should be asked
66.	Иш жараёнида посбонлар асосан қандай тўсқин ва қийинчиликларга дуч келишади?
	С какими препятствиями и трудностями сталкиваются дружинники в процессе своей работы?
	What are the main challenges that 'watch groups' face in their work with the community?
67.	Маҳалла посбонлари қаторига қўшилишдан олдин, янги келган йигитлар махсус тренингларда қатнашишадими
	Принимают ли участие новобранцы в работе специальных подготовительных тренингов, до своего назначения
	<i>дружинниками?</i> What kind of training do new-comers receive prior to joining the 'watch groups'?
Max	алла посбонлари ҳақида айтиб ўтилмаган холда, қуйидаги саволлар берилиши лозим
	алла посооплари закида айтио утилмаган холда, куйидаги саволлар оерилиши лозим росы, зававаемые в случае если не были упомянуты народные дружинники (посбоны):
	ahalla posbonlari'/ neighborhood watch group is not mentioned, the following questions should be asked
	Куйидагига ўз фикрингизни билдирсангиз: Посбонлар харакати жорий этилиши жамоа хавфсизлигини
	таъминлаш учун зарур бўлган ташаббус. Нега айни шундай деб ўйлайсиз?
	Выскажите своё мнение по следующему предположению: Внедрение практики народных дружинников является важной
	иницативой в деле обеспечения общетсвенного правопорядка. Почему Вы так думаете?
	Do you agree/disagree with the idea to initiate 'neighborhood watch groups' to uphold public safety and why?
69.	Қайси томонлари билан посбонлар ҳаракати жамоа ва маҳалла учун фойдали деб ўйлайсиз?
	Какими своими качествами деятельность дружинников может или не может быть полезной для общества и махалли?
	In what sense will their work may or may not be useful for the community?
70.	
	лозим (лозим эмас)?
	По Вашему, почему жители махалли должны (или не должны) доверять свою безопасность дружинникам (посбонам)?
	Can you expand a little on why people, in your view, should or should not entrust their safety to these watch groups?
	алла посбонлари ҳақида айтиб ўтилган холда, қуйидаги саволлар берилиши лозим
	росы, зававаемые в случае если были упомянуты народные дружинники (посбоны):
	ahalla posbonlari'/ neighborhood watch group is mentioned, the following questions should be asked
71.	Посбонлар жамоа билан ўзаро иш жараёнида асосан қайси тўсқин ва қийинчиликларга дуч келишади?
	С какими препятствиями и трудностями сталкиваются дружинники в процессе своей работы? What are the main shallonges that (watch groups' fees in their work with the community?
	What are the main challenges that 'watch groups' face in their work with the community?
72.	Посбонлар иши билан қониқяпсизми? Қониқишизга нима сабаб? Ёки қониқмаганлигизга нима сабаб?
	Удовлетровены ли Вы деятельностью дружинников? В чём причины на это?Или наоборот, почему Вы не удовлетворены
	их работой?
	Are you satisfied with their work and why?
73.	
	нималарни ўргатиш лозим?
	На Ваш взгляд, какого вида тренинги необходимо проводить с дружинниками прежде чем они приступят к своей работе
	Каким навыкам следовало бы их научить?
	What kind of training should new-comers receive prior to joining the 'watch groups'?
	алла посбонлари ҳақида айтиб ўтилмаган холда, қуйидаги саволлар берилиши лозим
Воп	алла посбонлари хақида айтиб ўтилмаган холда, қуйидаги саволлар берилиши лозим росы, зававаемые в случае если не были упомянуты народные дружинники (посбоны):
Воп If 'n	алла посбонлари хақида айтиб ўтилмаган холда, қуйидаги саволлар берилиши лозим росы, зававаемые в случае если не были упомянуты народные дружинники (посбоны): ahalla posbonlari'/ neighborhood watch group is not mentioned, the following questions should be asked
Воп If 'n	алла посбонлари хақида айтиб ўтилмаган холда, қуйидаги саволлар берилиши лозим росы, зававаемые в случае если не были упомянуты народные дружинники (посбоны):

	Выскажите своё мнение по следующему предположению: Внедрение практики народных дружинников является важной иницативой в деле обеспечения общетсвенного правопорядка. Почему Вы так думаете?
	Do you agree/disagree with the idea to initiate 'neighborhood watch groups' to uphold public safety and why?
75.	Қайси томонлари билан посбонлар фаолияти маҳалла фаолиятига ўхшаш ва бир бирини такрорлайди? Какими аспектами своей деятельности дружинники повторяют или не дублируют проводимую Вами работу?
	In what sense will their work may or may not duplicate your work/activities?
76.	
	лозим (лозим эмас)?
	По Вашему, почему жители махалли должны (или не должны) доверять свою безопасность дружинникам (посбонам)? Can you expand a little on why people, in your view, should or should not entrust their safety to these watch groups?
77.	Можаролар ва жанжалларни ечиш учун бошқа маҳаллаларни ердам беришга жалб этасизларми? Қанақа қилиб?
	Привлекаете ли Ва другие махалли к разрешению конфликтных ситуаций и споров? Каким образом?
	Do you also involve other mahallas to assist in solving a dispute or conflict between mahalla members? If yes, how?
78.	Бошқа маҳаллаларни жалб этиш орқали ва улар ёрдами билан олди олинган ва ҳал этилган можароларга мисол
	келтириб берсангиз. Не могли бы Ва привести пример того, каким образом была привлечена другая махалля и какую помощь она оказала в
	разрешении конфликтой ситуации?
	Can you give us any example of cross-mahalla mutual influence on conflict prevention and resolution in your mahalla (other mahallas)?
79.	Можаролар ва яшовчилар орасида ўзаро жанжалларни хал этиш учун бошқа бир ташқи ташкилотларни (давлат
	ташкилотларни, мисол учун) хам жалб этиб турасизларми? Уларни жалб қилиш йўли қанақа?
	Привлекаете ли Вы внешние организации (например, государственные ведомства) к разрешению конфликтных ситуаций и споров в махалле?
	Do you also involve external institutions (e.g. Public agencies) to assist in solving a dispute or conflict between mahalla members? If yes,
	how?
80.	Давлат ва маҳаллий ташкилотлар билан этник масалаларини ва жамоа хавфсизлигига тегишли муаммоларни
	бартараф қилиш учун қанчалик яқин хамкордасиз?
	Насколько тесно поддерживается сотрудничество с государственными и местными организациями в целях решения проблем на этнической почве либо касающихся общественного правопорядка?
	How closely do you cooperate/discuss with local authorities issues related to inter-ethnic relations / or general public safety issues in
	your area?
81.	Шу ҳамкорлигингиз қанчалик самарали?
	Насколько эффективно данное сотрудничество? How effective is such cooperation?
82.	Махаллий милиция ва хокимият вакиллари билан хамкорлик килишдан ташкари, жамоанинг хавфсизлигини
	таъминлаш мақсадида яна қайси ички ресурсларни ишга соласизлар? Ташаббусингизга мақаллий хокимият қандай қарайди?
	цандан царанди. Наряду с сотрудничеством с органами милиции и местной власти, какие еще внутренние ресурсы вы задействуйте в
	целях обеспечения общественного порядка?
	Besides working with local police/authorities what internal resources do you mobilize to uphold public safety? How do local authorities
	accept your initiative?
83.	Маҳалладаги можаро ва жанжалларни олдини олиш ва хал этиш йўлида ташкилотларнинг ёрдами теккан ёки
	таъсири бўлган холатга мисол келтириб бера оласизми? Не могли бы Вы привести пример того как привлечение внешней организации оказала положительный эффект в
	не могли об вы привести пример того кик привлечение внешней организации окизали положительный эффект в разрешении конфликтной ситуации в махалле?
	Can you give an example of influence of external institutions (e.g. International orgnaisations, ngos) on conflict prevention and
	resolution in your mahalla (other mahallas)?
84.	Фикрингизча, маҳалла яшовчилари ўз маҳаллаларидаги мазкур хавфсизлик механизмларидан қай даражада
	қониқишади?

	На Ваш взгляд, насколько удовлетворены жители махалли данным механизмом обеспечения безопасности и
	правопорядка?
	In your opinion, how satisfied are people with the existing public safety arrangements in their communities?
85.	
	гурухлараро ахиллигининг қайси томонларига ўз таъсирини кўрсатади? Нега ундай деб ўйлайсиз?
	На Ваш взгляд, какое воздействие оказывают вернувшиеся на родину трудовые мигранты на состояние общественной
	безопасности и мирного сосуществования различных этнических групп? Having observed the continuous influx of returning migrant workers from abroad, what impact, do you think, they make on the system
	of public safety and interethnic harmony in their communities? If not, please explain why not.
	- F
86.	Чет элга ишга чиқиб кетаетган мигрантларнинг хавфсизлик холатига таъсири канака?
	Какое воздействие на состояние безопасности в махалле оказывают трудовые мигранты, выезжающие за границу?
	What is the impact of outbound migrants on the safety situation?
	oca/Conclusion
87.	a the second the second of the second s
	Какое воздействие на состояние безопасности в махалле оказывают трудовые мигранты, выезжающие за границу? What is the impact of outbound migrants on the safety situation?
	what is the impact of outbound migrants on the safety situation:
88.	Маҳалла ташкилоти давлатнинг ўз-ўзини бошқариш тизимига қандай таъсир кўрсатади?
	Какое воздействие оказывает махалля на систему самоуправления в государстве?
	What impact can mahalla institutions (or its variants) make on the system of self-governance in your country?
89.	
	Делает ли это общество более безопасным?
	Does it make communities a safer place?
90.	Фикрингизча, маҳалла ўзбек модели бошқа давлатларда самарали қӱ́лланилиши мумкинми ёки маҳалла – бу
50.	фикрингизча, мадалла узоек модели общка давлагларда самарали кулланилиши мумкинми еки мадалла – бу фақат Ўзбекистонга хос бўлган феноменми?
	фадат эзоекистонта хос булган феноменми: На Ваш взгляд, может ли узбекская модель махалли быть успешно внедрена в других странах или же махалля это лищь
	присущий Узбекистану феномен?
	Do you think that the uzbek model of mahallas can be applied outside of Uzbekistan or it is a purely Uzbek phenomenon?
91.	
	давлат томонидан бошқариш учун яратилган яна бир қуролми?
	На Ваш взгляд, махалля это независимое гражданское объединение или же это еще одно средство, созданное для управления государством, и образованное еще в Советскую эпоху?
	Is mahalla (or its variant) an independent civil society institution or yet another arm of the state in post-Soviet Central Asia?
92.	Фикрингизча, Қирғизистонда маҳаллага ўхшаш бир ташкилот бўлганда, Қирғизистонда яқинда рўй берган этник
	гурухлараро можароларни олдини олса бўлармиди? Нега ундай деб ўйлайсиз?
	На Ваш взгляд, если бы в Киргизстане имелась организация, похожая на махаллю, можно ли было предотвратить
	межэтнические столкновения, имевшие место в недалёком прошлом?
	Do you think the mahalla institution could have effectively prevented/ mitigated the eruption of the recent inter-ethnic conflict in
	Kyrgyzstan and why?
93.	Этник можароларни олдини олишда махалланинг Ўрта Осиёдаги потенциал роли ва ахамияти хақида нима дея
	оласиз?
	Что бы Вы могли сказать о потенциальной роли и значении махалли в разрешении конфликтных ситуаций в
	Центрально-азиатском регионе?
	Do you want to add anything on mahalla's role as a potential mitigator of inter-ethnic conflict in Central Asia?
94.	Бугунги кунда маҳалла ташкилоти ўз фаолиятини самарали олиб бориш йўлида қайси тўсқинликларга дуч
74.	бугунги кунда махалла ташкилоти уз фаолиятини самарали олио оориш иулида қаиси тусқинликларга дуч келади?
	кслади : С какими препятствиями сталкивается на сегодняшний день махалля для более эффективного проведения своей
	беятельности?
	What are the main challenges to the effective functioning of the mahalla institution (or its variant) today?

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95.	Фикрингизча, маҳалла ташкилотининг самарасини ошириш учун нима ишлар олиб борилиши лозим? По Вашему, какие меры должны быть приняты для того, чтобы повысить эффективность работы маҳалле? What do you think should be done (would you suggest) to increase the effectiveness of the mahalla institution?
96.	Фикрингизча, келаётган йиллар ичида маҳалла фаолиятига тегишли қанақа тўсқинликлар бўлиши мумкин?
	На Ваш взгляд, с какими сложностями может столкнуться махалля с ближайшие годы?
	What will be the challenges in coming years?
	PUBLIC OFFICIALS (INTERVIEW GUIDE)
Кир	иш қисми ва маҳалла тузулиши
Intr	oduction and mahalla structure
	дная часть и структура махалли
1.	Қайси мезонларга (критерийларга) кўра одатда маҳалла ташкил топилади?
	Согласно каким критериям образуется махалля? What are the main criteria on which mahallas are usually established?
2.	Фикрингизча, маҳалла ташкилотининг асосий мақсадлари нималардан иборат?
	По Вашему, в чем заключаются главные цели махалли?
	In your opinion, what is the major objective of mahalla?
3.	Озгина ўзингиз маълумотингиз ва профессионал тажрибангиз хакида айтиб берсангиз?
5.	Расскажите немного о своём образовании и профессиональной деятельности.
	Could you tell us something about your academic and professional background?
4.	Маҳалла раиси бўлиш учун инсон қайси хусусиятларга ва билимларга эга болиши лозим?
	По вашему, какими качествами должен обладать председатель махалли?
	What features a person has to possess to be the leader of mahalla?
5.	Маҳалла ташкилотининг фаолияти қандай килиб моддий томондан таъминланади?
	Каким образом осуществляется финансовое обеспечение деятельности махалли?
	How do mahallas finance their activities?
Кар	ор қабул қилиш ва ваколат тақсимланиши
	нятие решений и распределение обязанностей
·	ision-making and power distribution
6.	Маҳалла ташкилотида асосий қарорлар қай тарзда қабул қилинади?
	Каким образом принимаются решения внутри махалли?
	What is the decision-making process for major decisions in mahallas?
7.	Қарор қабул қилишдан олдин, шу қарорлар маҳалла яшовчилари билан қандайдир муҳокама
	қилинадими?
	Махалла оқсоқоли қарорларларини
	Вносится ли принятое решение на обсуждение жителей махалли?
	Prior to making decisions, do mahalla leaders allow and/or facilitate discussion within the community? (<i>are the decisions of a</i>
	mahalla leader undisputable?)
8.	Маҳалла раиси қай тарзда сайланади?
0.	Каким образом избирается председатель махалли?
	How the head of mahalla is being (s)elected?
9.	Махалла бошқарув тузулиши қандай кўринишга эга?
	Как выглядит структура руководства махалли? А как в других махаллях?
	What is the power structure in mahallas?
10.	Ваколат бир кишига бериладими ёки бир неча киши орасида тақсимланадими?
	Исполняются ли обязанности одним человеком или же распределяются между сотрудниками?
	Is power concentrated around one person or spread among several or more members?

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	Бошқа ташкилотлар билан алоқа ва муносабатлар	
	юлняются ли обязанности одним человеком или же распределяются между сотрудниками?	
Rela	ations with other institutions	
11.	Сизнинг ташкилот маҳаллалар билан биргаликда иш олиб борадими?	
	Осуществляет ли Ваша организация совместную работу с махаллями?	
	Does your agency deal with mahallas?	
12.	Сизнинг ташкилот маҳаллалар билан мунтазам равишда ўзаро муносабатдами еки номунтазам равишдами?	
	Носят ли отношения махалли с Вашей организацией регулярный или непостоянный характер?	
	Do you interact with mahallas regularly or on ad-hoc basis?	
13.	Сизнинг ташкилотнинг маҳаллалар билан ўзаро муносабат механизми қандай кўринишга эга?	
101	сизнит ташкилотнит мадаллалар ойлат узаро мутосаоат мехапизми цандай куритишна эта . Как выглядит мезанизм взаимодействия махалли (или других махаллей) с Вашей организацией?	
	What is the mechanism of interaction of your public agency with mahallas?	
	which is the meeting in or meeting of your public agency with mananas.	
14.		
14.	The second	
	Какие имеются каналы связи с государственными организациями?	
	What are the established communication channels?	
1 -	M	
15.		
	муносабатларга ким ташаббускор?	
	Кто первым инициирует налаживание взаимодействия махалли с государственными организациями?	
	Who exercises initiative in state-mahalla interaction?	
16.	Мақаллалар билан олиб борилаетган иш фаолияти қақида юқоридаги турганларга қанчалик тез-тез қисобот	
	бериб турасизлар?	
	Как часто Ваша организация отчитывается вышестоящим инстанциям о проделываемой совместно с махаллей	
	работе?	
	How often do you have to report to superior bodies on developments with mahallas?	
17.	Сизнинг ташкилот маҳаллаларга қандайдир моддий ёрдам берадими?	
	Оказывает ли Ваша организация какую-либо материальную помощь махалле?	
	Does your organization provide any kind of support to mahallas?	
Moz	каролар олдини олиш ва уларни ҳал қилиш	
	ь в предотвращении и разрешении конфликтов	
	flict prevention and resolution	
-	Маҳалла яшовчилари орасида одатда қанақа тўқнашув ёки можароларга рўй беради? Оиладаги ўзаро	
_	можароларми? Ижтимоий? Жамият? Этник? Бошқа?	
	С какими формами конфликтов и противоятояний сталкиваются жители махалли? Семейные? Общинные?	
	Этнические? Другие?	
	What is the common type of conflict which may take place in mahallas?	
	Prompt: family, inter-family, social, ethnic, etc.?	
19.	Фикрингизча, қайси омиллар шу маҳалладаги ўзаро мужаролар ва баҳсларни келиб чиқишига сабаб бўлиши	
	мумкин?	
	По Вашему, какие факторы провоцируют конфликты и споры внутри махалли?	
	In your opinion, what factors can potentially trigger intra-communal disputes/clashes? (If yes) Why? (If not) Why not?	
20.	Тажрибадан келиб чиққан холда, ақолини қайси мақалладаги хавфсизлик муаммолари энг кўп безовта қилиб	
20.		
	туради? Исхода из Вашого од ита, какио о горон общостронноми поладии и бого дасности ординист жито рай маха сан большо	
	Исходя из Вашего опыта, какие вызовы общественному порядку и безопасности волнуют жителей махалли больше	
	80020?	
	In your experience, which safety problems bother people the most in local communities?	
0.1		
21.		
	Насколько значима роль председателей махалли в разрешении конфликтов?	
	Which role do mahalla leaders play in solving a conflict?	

22.	Маҳалла раислари шу можаро ва баҳсларни ечиш учун маҳсус билимга эга бўлишлари керакми?
	Должны ли председатели махаллей обладать специальными знаниями по разрешению конфликтов и споров?
	Should a mahalla leader possess conflict resolution skills?
23.	
	можароларни олдини олиш мавзусига тегишли семинар ва тренингларда қатнашиб туришади?
	Как часто председатели махаллей принимают участие на семинарах и тренингах, посвященных повышению безопасности в махалле и разрешению споров между его жителями?
	How often do they receive training/attend seminars focusing on the means to uphold public safety and/or prevent intra-communal
	clashes?
24.	Фикрингизча, давлатимиз жамоалараро рўй берадиган можароларга қай ақамият билан қарайди?
	На Ваш взгляд, какое значение придаёт государство конфликтам, возникающим между общинами?
	In your opinion, how concerned is the state (government) about the conflict potential within communities?
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25.	
	томонидан ҳамма керакли чоралар олиб борилдими? По Вашему, все ли необходимые меры принимает государство в целях устранения угрозы конфликтов на этнической
	по вашему, все ла необховамые меры пранамает госубарство в целях устранения угрозы конфлактов на этначеской или религиозной почве или по уменьшению этих угроз?
	Has your government (local or central) taken all necessary measures to reduce the risk of intra-communal interethnic/interreligious
	dispute?
26.	Мақалла яшовчилари учун бир мақалладан иккинчи мақаллага кўчиш қанчалик енгил ёки қийин?
	Насколько трудно жителю одной махалли переселяться в другую махаллю?
	How easily can mahalla members shift from one mahalla to the other?
27.	Бошқа етник ва диний гурух вакилларига нисбатан маҳалла яшовчилари бошқача муносабатдами?
- / .	Каково отношение жителей махалли к представителям другой этнической и религиозной общины?
	How inclusive (in terms of the presence of different ethnic or religious groups) is a mahalla institution?
28.	
	Какова роль и значение махалли в предотвращении этнических конфликтов?
	What is the role of mahallas in preventing ethnic conflicts?
29.	Шу можароларни олдини олишда маҳалла раисларининг роли ва вазифалари нималардан иборат?
	Какова роль и задачи председателей махалли в предотвращении данных конфликтов?
	Which role do mahalla leaders play in preventing a conflict?
30.	Яшовчилар орасида турли ҳил этник гурух вакиллари ўзаро тинч хаёт кечириши учун маҳаллада нима ишлар
	олиб борилади?
	Какая деятельность проводится в целях обеспечения мирного сосуществования жителей махалли с
	представителями других общин?
	What the mahalla undertakes to ensure peaceful co-existence of different ethnic groups?
31.	Мақаллада тинчликни таъминлаш мақсадида давлат томонидан қандай тарбиявий тадбирлар олиб
51.	борилади? Шу тадбирларга қанчалик тез-тез орада маҳалла вакил ёки яшовчиларини (давлат хавфсизлик
	орган вакиллари) таклиф этиб турасизлар?
	Какая образовательная деятельность проводится среди населения махалли в целях обеспечения общественного
	порядка? Как часто на данные мероприятия приглашаются ответственные работники (предстаивтели органов
	правопорядка)?
	What kind of educational activities does the government undertake in order to uphold public safety? How often do you invite local
	officials/law-enforcement authorities to those activities?
32.	
	Как часто возникают в махалле конфликтные ситуации между разными этническими группами? How often do ethnic conflicts usually take place in your mahalla (other mahallas)?
33.	Жамоа хавфсизлигини таъминлашда махалланинг роли нимада ва унга канака бахо берасиз?
	Какова роль махалли в обеспечении общественного правопорядка и какую оценку этой деятельности Вы бы дали?
	How would you assess the role of mahalla (or its variant) in promoting public safety?

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34.	Фикрингизча, мақалла яшовчилари ўз мақаллаларидаги мазкур хавфсизлик механизмларидан қай даражада қониқишади?
	На Ваш взгляд, насколько удовлетворены жители махалли данным механизмом обеспечения безопасности и правопорядка?
	In your opinion, how satisfied are people with the existing public safety arrangements in their communities?
35.	Фикрингизча, маҳаллада жамоа ҳавфсизлиги билан қониқмаган бирон бир яшовчилар ёки гуруҳлар борми?
	На Ваш взгляд, имеются ли люди или группы лиц, недовольные определенным аспектом обеспечения порядка и
	безопасности в махалле?
	In your opinion, how satisfied are people with the existing public safety arrangements in their communities?
36.	Фикрингизча, четга чиқиб ва қайтиб келаетган ишчилар жамоа ва маҳаллий хавфсизлик тизими ва этник
	гурухлараро ахиллигининг қайси томонларига ўз таъсирини кўрсатади? Нега ундай деб ўйлайсиз?
	На Ваш взгляд, какое воздействие оказывают вернувшиеся на родину трудовые мигранты на состояние
	общественной безопасности и мирного сосуществования различных этнических групп?
	Having observed the continuous influx of returning migrant workers from abroad, what impact, do you think, they make on the system of public safety and interethnic harmony in their communities? If not, please explain why not.
37.	Чет элга ишга чиқиб кетаетган мигрантларнинг маҳалланинг хавфсизлик холатига таъсири канака?
	Какое воздействие на состояние безопасности в махалле оказывают трудовые мигранты, выезжающие за границу?
	What is the impact of outbound migrants on the safety situation?
Хул	loca/Conclusion
38.	Маҳалла ташкилоти давлат ўз-ўзини бошқариш тизимига қандай таъсир кўрсатади?
	Какое воздействие оказывает махалля на систему самоуправления в государстве?
	What impact can mahalla institutions (or its variants) make on the system of self-governance in your country?
39.	Шу қолат жамоани яшаш учун хавфсизлироқ қиладими?
	Делает ли это общество более безопасным?
	Does it make communities a safer place?
40.	
	фақат Ўзбекистонга хос бўлган феноменми?
	На Ваш взгляд, может ли узбекская модель махалли быть успешно внедрена в других странах или же махалля это лищь присущий Узбекистану феномен?
	Do you think that the Uzbek model of mahallas can be applied outside of Uzbekistan or it is a purely Uzbek phenomenon?
41.	
	этник гурухлараро можароларни олдини олса бўлармиди? Нега ундай деб ўйлайсиз? На Ваш взгляд, если бы в Киргизстане имелась организация, похожая на махаллю, можно ли было предотвратить
	на ваш взеляю, есла ові в каргазстане амелась органазацая, похожая на махаллю, можно ла овіло преобтвратать межэтнические столкновения, имевшие место в недалёком прошлом?
	Do you think the mahalla institution could have effectively prevented/ mitigated the eruption of the recent inter-ethnic conflict in
	Kyrgyzstan and why?
42.	Этник можароларни олдини олишда маҳалланинг Ўрта Осиёдаги потенциал роли ва аҳамияти хақида яна
	нима дея оласиз?
	Что бы Вы могли сказать о потенциальной роли и значении махалли в разрешении конфликтных ситуаций в
	Центрально-азиатском регионе?
	Do you want to add anything on mahalla's role as a potential mitigator of inter-ethnic conflict in central asia?
43.	Фикрингизча, маҳалла ташкилотининг самарасини ошириш учун яна нима ишлар олиб борилиши лозим?
	По Вашему, какие меры должны быть приняты для того, чтобы повысить эффективность работы махалли?
	What do you think should be done (would you suggest) to increase the effectiveness of the mahalla institution?
	what do you think should be done (would you subject) to increase the encentreness of the manual institution.