2013年3月
No-Envy and Dominant Strategy Implementability in Non-Excludable Public Good Economies with Quasi-Linear Preferences
Economics Bulletin
- 巻
- 33
- 号
- 1
- 開始ページ
- 557
- 終了ページ
- 563
- 記述言語
- 英語
- 掲載種別
- 研究論文(学術雑誌)
This paper studies the relationship between no-envy (Foley, D. (1967) "Resource allocation and the public sector," Yale Economics Essays 7, pp.45-98) and dominant strategy implementability in non-excludable public good economies with quasi-linear preferences. The main result shows that the combination of non-bossiness (Satterthwaite, M. A. and H. Sonnenschein (1981) "Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms at differentiable points," Review of Economic Studies 48, pp.587-597) and equal treatment of equals is equivalent to no-envy under strategy-proof social choice functions in the economies which are incompatible with strict monotonic closedness (Fleurbaey, M. and F. Maniquet (1997) "Implementability and horizontal equity imply no-envy," Econometrica 65, pp.1215-1219).
- リンク情報
- ID情報
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- ORCIDのPut Code : 50440338
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