Side-channel attack is a cryptanalytic attack based on information gained from the physical implementation of a cryptographic IC. The simultaneous switching noise (SSN) current is generated as logic gates in cryptographic IC switch simultaneously in encryption processes. SSN current is a cause of electromagnetic interference (EMI). In this study, linear equivalent circuit modeling was examined for the sake of a developing method to evaluate cryptographic systems before fabrication. A linear equivalent circuit model of a cryptographic FPGA, in which an AES algorithm had been implemented, was determined from experimental measurements. The model was implemented into a commercial analog circuit simulator, and the SSN current was estimated under three configurations among which a decoupling circuit, used as a countermeasure, was changed. Estimated current traces were analyzed statistically by using the correlation power analysis (CPA) method to obtain correlation values, a major index security against side-channel attacks. Variation of the correlation values with a decoupling configuration agreed with the corresponding experimental results also obtained in this study. This means that the security of cryptographic devices against side-channel attacks based on analysis of the SSN current can be estimated by using the equivalent circuit model before fabrication.