Feb, 2003
On strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores: A converse result
Social Choice and Welfare
- Volume
- 20
- Number
- 1
- First page
- 77
- Last page
- 83
- Language
- English
- Publishing type
- Research paper (scientific journal)
- DOI
- 10.1007/s003550200169
In a general model of indivisible good allocation, Sönmez (1999) established that, whenever the core is nonempty for each preference profile, if an allocation rule is strategy-proof, individually rational and Pareto optimal, then the rule is a selection from the core correspondence, and the core correspondence must be essentially single-valued. This paper studies the converse claim of this result. I demonstrate that whenever the preference domain satisfies a certain condition of 'richness', if the core correspondence is essentially single-valued, then any selection from the core correspondence is strategy-proof (even weakly coalition strategy-proof, in fact). In particular, on the domain of preferences in which each individual has strict preferences over his own assignments and there is no consumption externality, such an allocation rule is coalition strategy-proof. And on this domain, coalition strategy-proofness is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity, an important property in implementation theory.
- Link information
- ID information
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- DOI : 10.1007/s003550200169
- ISSN : 0176-1714
- SCOPUS ID : 0037245044