2020年3月
An assignment model with local constraints: Competitive equilibrium and ascending auction
Economics Letters
- ,
- ,
- 巻
- 188
- 号
- 記述言語
- 掲載種別
- 研究論文(学術雑誌)
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108905
We consider an assignment model where each agent has unit-demand quasi-linear preferences and may face some local constraint, i.e., her possible assignment is restricted to a subset of items. Our model takes the assignment models without and with outside options, e.g., Andersson (2007) and Andersson et al. (2013), as special cases. We show that local constraints may lead to the non-existence of competitive equilibrium (CE), and provide a sufficient and necessary condition that ensures its existence. We establish the lattice of CE prices. Besides, an ascending auction is proposed, either finding a CE or validating its non-existence in finitely many steps. It generalizes Andersson et al. (2013)’s auction by adjusting increments stepwise.
- リンク情報
- ID情報
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- DOI : 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108905
- ISSN : 0165-1765
- ORCIDのPut Code : 67077381
- SCOPUS ID : 85077355223