2013年7月
An experimental test of a committee search model
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
- ,
- ,
- 巻
- 61
- 号
- 開始ページ
- 59
- 終了ページ
- 76
- 記述言語
- 英語
- 掲載種別
- 研究論文(学術雑誌)
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.03.002
- 出版者・発行元
- ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
The objective of this paper is to design a laboratory experiment for an infinite-horizon sequential committee search model in order to test some of the implications obtained by the model in Albrecht et al. (2010) (AAV). We find that, compared with single-agent search, the search duration is longer for committee search under the unanimity rule, but is shorter for committee search in which at least one vote is required to stop searching. In addition, according to estimates from round-based search decisions, subjects are more likely to vote to stop searching in committee search than in single-agent search. This confirms that agents are less picky in committee search. Overall, the experimental outcomes are consistent with the implications suggested by the AAV model. However, despite the prediction from the AAV model, we could not obtain a significant outcome in relation to the size order of the probabilities of voting to stop searching in committee search for the various plurality voting rules. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
- リンク情報
- ID情報
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- DOI : 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.03.002
- ISSN : 0014-2921
- Web of Science ID : WOS:000320479900005