This article investigates the role of the League of Nations for Japan after latter's withdrawal from the League, focusing on Japanese attempt to continue enjoying equal opportunities for trade and commerce in mandated territories. It argues that Japan rediscovered usefulness of the former, which had advocated for the principle of equal opportunities for trade and commerce in mandated territories in the Covenant, and therefore the Japanese decision-makers demanded the League members to abide by it.<br>The League Covenant and the terms of the mandate required the League members that were in charge of mandated territories categories "A" and "B" to provide equal opportunities for trade and commerce to all other League members. Therefore, the Japanese faced the possibility of losing the right because of her withdrawal from the League. Japanese decision-makers initially negotiated bilaterally with the mandatory nations to avoid this fate from around 1934, asking the League members not to withdraw the rights that they had hitherto granted to Japan. However, the mandatory nations started discussing the issue of ceasing the privilege that the Japan enjoyed at the mandated territories from June 1935 in the Twenty-Seventh Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission before making any particular reply to the Japanese overtures. Such action by the mandatory nations alarmed the Japanese decision-makers, and thus started to make their case at the League, arguing that the members should abide by the spirit of the equal opportunities for trade and commerce even if they were dealing with the non-members.<br>The decision-makers of Britain, who also played a major part in the League, concluded that it would not be prudent to continuously marginalize the Japanese and therefore supported the idea of continuing to grant equal opportunities for trade and commerce to Japan in territories that they mandated. However, they refused to acknowledge the Japanese interpretation of the League Covenant, and insisted that they would grant Japan equal opportunities for trade and commerce based on the spirit of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. Despite the fact that the Japanese decision-makers understood the usefulness of the League in retaining and advancing their interests, such a gesture by the British decision-makers had a result of severely restricting the Japanese maneuverability at the League. The only thing that the Japanese could do was to continue appealing the principle of free trade to the deaf ears of the members of the League.