

Introduction

The newly discovered *Jitashū tōketsu gimon* 自他宗唐決疑問 or *Questionnaires to Tang China and Other Questions on the Doctrines of Our school and Other Schools*, which is preserved in the Tōdaiji Library, is important to understand the exchanges of Buddhist doctrines between Japan and China. The compiler or editor is unknown, while the cover has the signature of Jitsuei 実英 (1553–1637–) of the Tōdaiji temple, who seems to be an owner of the manuscript.

The *Jitashū tōketsu gimon* consists of seven parts:

1. Genshin's 源信 twenty-seven questions on the Tiantai/Tendai doctrine and Siming Zhili's 四明知礼 answers.
2. Four questions concerning the contents of the *Mahā-prajñāpāramitā Sutra* of 600 volumes, the *Da zhidu lun* 大智度論, and the *Shizhu piposha lun* 十住毘婆沙論.
3. Genshin's five questions on the doctrines of the Hossō school.
4. Genshin's three questions on the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*.
5. Six questions on the Sanron school and seven questions on the Hossō school, which were collected during the Jōwa period (hereafter *Jōwa Tōketsu*).
6. Shuon's 主恩 answers to 3.
7. Criticism on Genshin's understanding of Buddhist logic (*inmyō*).

While the first part is a variation of the well-known material called “Da riben guoshi ershiqi wen bing shu 答日本国師二十七問并序” (“Answers to Japanese master's 27 questions and the preface”; see Akiya Murakami's paper), the others are previously almost unknown. It is presumed that the fifth part is a fragment of *tōketsu* 唐決 (doctrinal questions sent to the China) made for the 15th Japanese envoy to the Tang Dynasty, dispatched in 838 (Jōwa 承和 5). The *Jōwa Tōketsu* is considered an important source for examining the history of Japanese Buddhist thought in the early Heian period, as well as the history of Japan-China exchange.

Since the historical context in which the *Jōwa Tōketsu* was established will be reported by Mayuko Kawakami in her presentation, this paper will introduce the contents of the *Jōwa Tōketsu* and examine how it is positioned in the history of Japanese Buddhist thought.

Contents of the *Jōwa Tōketsu*

The general structure of the *Jōwa Tōketsu* quoted in the *Jitashū tōketsu gimon* is as follows (S1 means the first question of the Sanron school and H2 means the second of the questions on the doctrine of the Hossō school)¹:

- a. Questions of the Sanron school
 - i. On the doctrine of the Buddha Nature: Two questions by Jitsubin 実敏 (788–856) of the Saidaiji temple (S1, S2) and a question by Juon 寿遠 (771–838) of the Daianji temple (S3).
 - ii. On the doctrine of explanations according to the audience (方言): A question by Gangyō 願曉 (?–874) of the Gangōji temple (S4).
 - iii. On the doctrine of the Twofold Truth: A question by Jitsubin (S5).
 - iv. On the proofs in the *Dasheng zhangzhen lun*: A question by Jitsubin (S6).
- b. Questions of the Hossō school
 - i. A question on the relationship between the eighth consciousness (*ālaya-vijñāna*) and the desire realms questioned by Shuin 守印 (783–843) of the Gangōji temple (H1).
 - ii. Questions on Xuanzang's proof of consciousness-only by Bumyō 豊明 (years of birth and death unknown) of the Gangōji temple (H2) and Enmyō 円明 (?–851) of the Tōdaiji temple (H3).
 - iii. A question on the pseudo proving in the Buddhist logic (*inmyō*) by Enmyō (H4).
 - iv. A question on the fallacy of the reason that both proponent and opponent do not accept

¹ An English translation of the *Jōwa Tōketsu* is included at the end of this paper.

- (**ubhaya-asiddha*) by Bumyō (H5).
- v. A question on Sarvāstivāda’s theory that the *dharma* always exists questioned by Shuin (H6).
 - vi. A question on an unknown Chinese word by Dōsen 道詮 (797–873) of the Hōryūji temple (H7).

The *Jōwa Tōketsu* is a compilation of six questions on the Sanron doctrine and seven questions on the Hossō doctrine. Since Engyō 円行 (799-852) of the Shingon school, Ensai 円載 (? -877) of the Tendai school, and Harusono no Tamanari 春苑玉成 of the Onmyōdō also brought their questions to the Tang (Kawakami 2022), the *Jōwa Tōketsu* in the *Jitashū tōketsu gimon* was part of the questions to China brought by the envoy in the Jōwa era.

Each question in the *Jōwa Tōketsu* is followed by the name of the scholar monk who submitted the question and his very brief biography. The biographies seem to have been appended by the editor of the *Jitashū tōketsu gimon*, since they include information after the Jōwa envoy, such as the year of death of the scholar monks.

The temples of the scholar monks in the *Jōwa Tōketsu* were the Saidaiji, Daianji, Gangōji, Tōdaiji, and Hōryūji temples, but does not include the Kōfukuji temple, which was one of the centers of the Hossō school. In addition, Enmyō, who submitted two questions of the Hossō school, was not a scholar monk of the Hossō school but a disciple of Kūkai 空海 after studying the Sanron doctrine at the Tōdaiji temple. Dōsen, the questioner of H7, is also known as a scholar monk of the Sanron school. Therefore, the questions with heading “the Hossō school” in the *Jōwa Tōketsu* does not mean “questions submitted by scholar monks of the Hossō school,” but rather “questions about the doctrines studied in the Hossō school.”²

Relation to Contemporary Controversies

In previous studies, the term *tōketsu* has often referred to works of the Tiantai/Tendai school, especially the *Tōketsu shū* 唐決集, a compilation of seven doctrinal question-and-answers between Japanese Tendai monks and Chinese Tiantai monks. In recent years, however, it has been pointed out that there exist some *tōketsu* submitted by Nara Buddhists, especially those of the Sanron and Hossō schools, such as the *Tōdaiji rokushū miketsugi* 東大寺六宗未決義 or *Unsolved doctrinal questions gathered by the six schools in the Tōdaiji temple* which seems to have been compiled for the Hōki 宝龜 envoy to the Tang Dynasty (Kawakami 2022), “the five questions to Tang China brought by Master Tokushō (徳清法師五箇唐決)” which also was regarded as a *tōketsu* for the Hōki envoy (Moro 2017 and Kawakami 2022), and the Jiun’s 慈蘊 (8th-9th century) *Hossō zuinō* 法相髓腦 which seems to be a fragment of the *tōketsu* brought by Ryōsen 靈仙 (759?-827) for the Enryaku 延暦 envoy (Moro 2015: 308–309), as well as the *Jōwa Tōketsu*.

While the *tōketsus* produced by scholar monks of the Nara Buddhism contain a variety of questions and requests, the questions regarding the proofs of emptiness in Bhāviveka’s *Dasheng zhangzhen lun* 大乘掌珍論 or *the Jewel in the Palm* had been repeatedly addressed in *tōketsus* of the Hōki, Enryaku, and Jōwa periods (S6). The interpretation of the proofs was one of the main topics in the debate between the Sanron and Hossō schools, so-called “debate regarding emptiness and existence (空有諍論),” that developed from the Nara period to the early Heian period. It is reasonable to think that the two schools argued indirectly through their *tōketsus*. The questions on Xuanzang’s proof of consciousness-only, which is closely related to this controversy (Moro 2015), were also submitted in the *tōketsus* of the Hōki and Jōwa periods (H3).

Other questions, however, do not seem to be related to contemporary controversies. For example, Gen’ei’s 玄叡 (? -840) *Daijō sanron daigi shō* 大乘三論大義鈔, one of the *Tenchō roppon shūsho* 天長六本宗書 (Six books compiled at Imperial command by the six Buddhist schools during the Tenchō period), lists ten controversies that existed in the early Heian period:

² H6 is a question about the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, the core scripture of the Kūsha school, and although the Kūsha school and the Hossō school had a close relationship, it may be difficult to say that H6 is a question about the doctrine of the Hossō school. The Hossō group of the Tōdaiji temple raised a question concerning the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* in the *Tōdaiji rokushū miketsugi* 東大寺六宗未決義 edited for the envoy in the Hōki era.

1. Debate between the Sanron and Hossō schools regarding emptiness and existence, especially on the proofs of the *Dasheng zhangzhen lun* (空有諍論).
2. Debate between the Sanron and Hossō schools over whether the Buddha's body, especially the reward body (*saṃbhoga-kāya*), is permanent or impermanent (常無常諍論).
3. Debate between the Sanron and Hossō schools over whether the five gotras are primordial or not (五性爾非爾諍論).
4. Debate between the Sanron and Hossō schools on Kuiji's proof of the existence of sentient beings who lack the nature of Buddhahood (有性無性諍論).
5. Debate between the Sanron and Hossō schools on Kuiji's proof of the existence of the two vehicles of fixed nature (定不定性諍論).
6. Debate between the Sanron and Hossō schools regarding the miraculous birth-and-death (變易生死諍論).
7. Debate between the Sanron, Hossō and Tendai schools about which of the three-vehicle theory and the one-vehicle theory is essential and which is provisional (三一權實諍論).
8. Debate between the Sanron, Tendai and Kegon schools about whether there are three or four carts in the metaphor of the 'burning house' in the Lotus Sutra (三車四車諍論).
9. Debate between the Sanron, Tendai and Kegon schools regarding the teaching classification (教時諍論).
10. Debate between the Sanron, Shingon and Tendai schools about whether the Dharma body of Buddha expounds the Dharma or not (說不說諍論).

The first one is a topic that is often discussed in the *tōketsus* of Nara Buddhists, as mentioned earlier. In addition, S2 of the *Jōwa Tōketsu* can be related to the second debate. However, no other controversies can be found in the *tōketsus* of Nara Buddhists, while the topic 2–9 were also discussed in the Saichō-Tokuitsu controversy of the early Heian period.

It is important for considering the character of the *tōketsu* of Nara Buddhists to note that many of these controversies, which have been considered important in the history of Japanese Buddhist thought in previous studies, are not reflected in the *tōketsus* of Nara Buddhists. It is reasonable to suppose that there might be a distinction between the “public” questions brought by the Tang Dynasty envoys, which were state projects, and the “private” question-and-answers exchanged between schools, as seen in the *Daijō sanron daigi shō*, or individuals, such as Saichō and Tokuitsu. Mayuko Kawakami states that “repeated scripture lectures as a national policy and the doctrinal discussions (*rongi* 論義) related to the scripture lectures” might be a background of the *Tōdaiji rokushū miketsugi* (Kawakami 2022). It is reasonable to assume that the questions in the *Jōwa Tōketsu* were also “public,” since many of them were supposedly submitted in the lectures on the Jizang's *Dasheng xuanlun* 大乘玄論, an important scripture of the Sanron school, the *Cheng weishi lun* 成唯識論, one of the most important scriptures for the Hossō school, or *Yinming lu zhengli lun shu* 因明入正理論疏 (Kuiji's great commentary of the *Nyāyapraveśā*), a key text of Buddhist logic (*inmyō*). The question on the proofs of the *Dasheng zhangzhen lun* (S6) can be considered to have had a “public” character, since the authenticity of the *Da foding jing* 大仏頂經, which has almost the same formula of the proofs, was examined by imperial order, and the question of whether the two formulas of the *Dasheng zhangzhen lun* and the *Da foding jing* were logically identical or not was also asked in the *Tōdaiji rokushū miketsugi*, which was compiled by order of *Sōgō* 僧綱 or the national administrators of the clergy.

Continuing Discussions in Later Generations

It is not known whether the questions in the *Jōwa Tōketsu* were answered by Chinese scholar monks. Since it is believed that the Sanlun/Sanron and Faxiang/Hossō studies had been in decline in the Tang Dynasty at that time, it is highly possible that the Japanese envoys could not find scholar monks to solve the questions of Nara Buddhists. Even if there were answers, they may not have been satisfactory to the Japanese monks; It is known that there were answers to two of “the five questions to China brought by Master Tokushō” in the Enryaku envoys, but the answers were critically evaluated by Japanese scholar monks (Moro 2017). It is likely that Nara scholar monks did not uncritically authorize Chinese answers.

While there seemed to be no answers from China, some questions were discussed in Japan. The

following questions of the *Jōwa Tōketsu* continue to be debated in later literatures:

S1: Yōkan's 永觀 (1033–1111) *Chitai* 智袋, Chinkai's 珍海 (1091–1152) *Sanron gensho mongi yō* 三論玄疏文義要 and *Daijō gen mondō* 大乘玄問答, and Shūgi's 秀義 (the period of the Northern and Southern Courts) *Shūgi shō* 秀義抄.

S3: Shōshu's 聖守 (1215–1291) *Sanron kōen* 三論興緣.³

H1 and H2: Ryōzan's 良算 (Kamakura period) *Yuishikiron dōgakushō* 唯識論同學鈔.

H4: Zōshun's 藏俊 (1104–1180) *Inmyō daisho shō* 因明大疏抄.

Especially regarding H1, it is interesting to note that the history of international discussion including *tōketsu* is recorded in the *Yuishikiron dōgakushō*. H1 is a question on the scope of the object of perception of *ālaya-vijñāna* or the eighth consciousness. According to the Hossō doctrine, the *ālaya-vijñāna* of a sentient being perceives its body, the surrounding world or container world (器世間), and the seed (*bīja*). The Mahāyāna Buddhism, on the other hand, believes that there are “a billion worlds” (三千大千世界). The subject of the question H1 is whether the *ālaya-vijñāna* of a sentient being perceives such vast environmental worlds. Regarding this problem, the *Yuishikiron dōgakushō* records that there was international exchange of discussions as follows:

The range of the container worlds transformed by karmic power [of *ālaya-vijñāna*] is difficult to know. Therefore, a Chinese master said with regret, “This problem is too difficult, and should be resolved according to Maitreya.” ^{Quotation.} Wise ancestors in this country [Japan] sent [a letter on] the unsolved question to China. How can a disciple of the lowest ranking [like me] derive a conclusion?

During the Tenchō period (824–834), however, there was a brilliant scholar in this country whose name was Ryūchō⁴. His reputation spread throughout the four oceans and the learning shined on two scholarships, [namely, the Buddhist doctrine and the Buddhist logic]. Finally, he drew a conclusion [as follows]: “The root commentary states that the physical appearance induced by meditation cannot be transformed in the distance but nearby.”⁵ ^{Quotation.} According to this, it is reasonable to say, “If a desire realm is distant, although belonging to the same world, [the *ālaya-vijñāna* of a sentient being] does not transform into it. It is like a light which shines nearby but does not reach to the far distance. The function of transformation of consciousness is also similar to this. It is not same with the perfect mirror-like wisdom that reflects all the worlds.” ^{Quotation.} [Refutation:] Although we have this interpretation, it cannot be our guidance...⁶

Here records questions-and-answers several times made by unknown scholar monks. We do not know whether the first statement of “a Chinese master” was an answer to a *tōketsu*. It is also difficult to know whether the next “unsolved question to China” was of the *Jōwa Tōketsu*. Given that there is a subsequent description on Ryūchō of the Tenchō period, it is possible that “the unsolved question to China” was of a *tōketsu* before the Tenchō period, rather than the *Jōwa Tōketsu*. In any case, this question was not submitted only once in the *Jōwa Tōketsu* but had been continuously examined internationally. The continuous discussion like this indicates that *tōketsus* and their answers were recorded in some form and shared among the Nara temples. The *Jitashū tōketsu gimon* may be one such recording medium.

Reimon Yūki classifies research styles in the Hossō school according to period: the period from the Nara period to the early Heian period is the “age of commentaries,” the period from around Kōjō 空

³ S1 and S3 are based on research by Dr. Sachio Onoshima.

⁴ I have not yet found his historical information.

⁵ “The root commentary” might be Kuiji's commentary on *Cheng weishi lun*, while this quotation cannot be found in it.

⁶ 業力所變器界、分齊難知。是以唐朝人師歎而有言「此義難解、隨彌勒可決斷」云 本朝先德、爲遣唐未決。末學受膚、豈決雌雄耶。爰天長之比、本朝有一明匠、其名曰隆長。聲高四海、學光二明。即決此義云「本疏述定果色、遠_キ不_レ變之、近_ク可_レ變」云 准之可言「若遠欲界、雖同界、不變之。如燈光雖照近、不及極遠處。識變作用亦同之。不同大圓鏡智照一切界」云 雖有此義、頗難指南... (T2263, 66, 186c27–187a7)

晴 (877-977) to Zōshun is the “age of *shiki* 私記 (private note),” and the Middle age after Zōshun is the “age of *rongi* (doctrinal discussion)” (Yūki 1975). Yūki also claims that *shiki* was written in a question-and-answer format while retaining commentary natures, and that it attempts to collect as many scholarly opinions of its predecessors as possible.

The *tōketsu* of Nara Buddhists also has a commentary nature, since, as mentioned before, it seemed to be based on “repeated scripture lectures.” However, we cannot find any tendency in the *tōketsu* to collect the scholarly opinions of predecessors, but rather it was one of the arguments of predecessors referred by later generations. In addition, it is reasonable to think that the *shiki* did not have “public” character that *tōketsu* had, since some *shikis*, such as *Mushō hiryō shiki* 無性比量私記 (*A private note on the proof of the existence of sentient beings who lack the nature of Buddhahood*) and *Nishu shoji shiki* 二種生死私記 (*A private note on the two kinds of saṃsāra*) discuss the topics which can be found in “private” debates in the *Daijō sanron daigi shō*. It may be said that the decline of the Sanlun/Sanron and Faxiang/Hossō studies in China and the demise of the Japanese envoys to the Tang China caused a shift from public question-and-answers like *tōketsu* to private ones like *shiki*.

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Translation of the Jōwa Tōketsu

Sanron school’s questions

Sanron school’s unresolved questions about the texts and doctrines, submitted by the envoy to Tang.

On the doctrine of the Buddha Nature:

[S1] Jizang’s *Dasheng xuanlun* quotes a sentence from an Āgama sutra that states, “All sentient beings have the nature of *śrāvaka*, the nature of *pratyeka-buddha*, and the nature of Buddha.” This sentence is not found in the Four Āgama Sutras.

[S2] [*Dasheng xuanlun* of Jizang] interprets the insight into the Buddha nature by citing the parable of losing a pearl from the *Nirvana Sutra*’s “Rulai xing” chapter (如来性品). However, this parable of losing a pearl is not found in this chapter. It is not appropriate to interpret it by using a sentence from another chapter.

The above two questions are dedicated by Dharma-master Jitsubin of the Saidaiji temple, who became a lecturer [of *Yuima-e*] in the eighth year of the Jōwa era (841) and died as a *Daisōzu*.⁷

[S3] Is the Buddha as the result of causality the Buddha of Original Enlightenment or the Buddha of Initial Enlightenment? If it was the Buddha of Initial Enlightenment, the Buddha of Initial Enlightenment would be identical to the Buddha of Original Enlightenment. If it was different from the Buddha of Original Enlightenment, it would be like a dream with the four statuses [of arising,

⁷ 三論宗遣唐文義未決

仏性義

大乘玄引阿含經文云、一切衆生悉有菩薩性、悉有辟支仏性、悉有仏性云々。四阿含中無此文也。惠見仏性、拳失珠喩尺此、引涅槃經如来性品文也。然失珠之喩無此品文也。以余処文尺云、義不相應也。

已上二条 西大寺実敏法師進

承和八年講師 大僧都卒

abiding, changing, and ceasing], and it is under delusions. How can we name such a thing as the Buddha as the result of causality?

The above question was dedicated by Great-dharma-master Juon of the DaiANJI temple. In the fifth year of the Jōwa era (838) [he became a lecturer of *Yuima-e*]. He entered the priesthood at the end of the Enryaku period (782–806).⁸

On the doctrine of explanations according to the audience (方言):

[S4] The Middle Way as the Essence (体中) in the doctrine of explanations according to the audience is identical to the fourth truth of the Four Levels of the Twofold Truth. But the former does not destroy disease, while the latter does. How to judge this?

[The above question was] dedicated by Dharma-master Gangyō of the Gangōji temple, who became a lecturer [of *Yuima-e*] in the second year of the Jōwa Era (835) and died as a *Risshi*.⁹

On the doctrine of the Twofold Truth:

[S5] Is refutation of the attachments of four types of people using the Four Levels of the Twofold Truth named as the accomplishment of diagnosis and correction (对治悉檀)? If so, all the Four Levels of the Twofold Truth would be conventional truth, [since the accomplishment of diagnosis and correction] can be destroyed. There should be forty-eight categories to explain the interrelationship between the middle and the provisional [in the Twofold Truth]. Why are there only 44 categories?

The above [two questions] were dedicated by Dharma-master Jitsubin.¹⁰

On the proofs in the *Dasheng zhangzhen lun*¹¹:

[S6] When proving that the conditioned existence [is empty], is the unconditioned existence included in similar instances or dissimilar instances?

The above was dedicated by Dharma-master Jitsubin, who had double pupils and earholes that were connected on both sides.¹²

Hossō school's questions

Hossō school's [questions].

[H1] Question: All desire realms are transformations of the eighth consciousness. Above the heaven of the most rarefied form (色究竟天; **Akaniṣṭhāh*) [at the top of a form realm], there is another desire realm. Below a desire realm, there is the heaven of the most rarefied form [of another form realm]. Although they are so far apart, they are not the same desire realm. Are transformations of the eighth consciousness not apart from the eighth consciousness?

[The above question was] dedicated by Great-dharma-master Shuin of the Gangōji temple.¹³

⁸ 縁果仏者、本覚之仏耶、始覚之仏耶。若云始覚之仏者、始覚之仏即此本覚仏也。若異於本覚仏者、是則四相夢也、即此迷也。如何名縁果仏乎。

已上一条 大安寺寿遠大法師進
承和五年 延暦末出家

⁹ 方言義

方言門躰中、与四重二諦第四真、同也。然躰中不破病也。第四真破病也。邪正如何。

元興寺願曉法師進
承和二年講師 律師卒

¹⁰ 二諦義

以四重二諦破四種人執者、名為对治悉檀耶。若尔者、四重二諦皆成俗諦也。可破可壞故。說中仮出入、可有四十八句。何故唯有四十四句耶。

以上実敏法師 進

¹¹ 真性有為空 如幻縁生故 無為無有実 不起似空華 (T1578, 30, 268b21–22)

In truth (**tattvatas*), the conditioned is empty; like an illusion, because it comes about through causes. [In truth,] the unconditioned has no existence, because it does not come into being, like a sky-flower.

¹² 掌珍論比量

宣有為法時、無為法同異品中、何撰耶。

以上実敏法師進 眼有童瞳耳孔相通

¹³ 法相宗

[H2] If [the proof of consciousness-only¹⁴] only said “included in the first three” and did not say “not included in the eye,” one claims that there would be two fallacies, another says there would be three fallacies. How should this be considered?

[The above question was] dedicated by Great-dharma-master Bumyō of the Gangōji temple, who became a lecturer of *Yuima-e* in the second year of the Jōwa era (835) and died as a *Risshi*.¹⁵

[H3] The non-Buddhist’s criticism that Xuanzang’s proof of consciousness-only has the fallacy of contradicting implied-subject (有法差別相違; **dharmi-viśeṣa-viparīta-sādhana*) has not yet been settled. [According to the example inference of the fallacy in the *Nyāyapraveśa*¹⁶ and Kuiji’s commentary], the fallacy of contradicting implied-subject only excludes what makes us aware of the existence of the “most universal beingness” apart from the entity (離実作大有有縁性), but does not exclude “beingness” as a linguistic expression. Since “beingness” that is not separate from the entity is approved by both the proponent [Ulūka] and the opponent [Pañcasikha], [“most universal beingness”] is said to be implied. Here, the contradictory [formula of the proof of consciousness-only] is that “the physical appearance (色) approved by both the proponent and the opponent are not the physical appearance that are not separate from the visual consciousness.” Based on this protocol, there can be the physical appearance that are not separate from the visual consciousness. However, since the Mahāyāna [namely, Yogācāra] does not approve the physical appearance apart from the visual consciousness, it is not the same as [Ulūka’s case] that “beingness” implies both that is not apart from [the entity] and that is apart from [the entity]. If we say that there is a physical appearance that has been transformed by the eighth consciousness (that is apart from the visual consciousness), then this is not what the Hīnayāna approves of.¹⁷

[H4] The *Nyāyapraveśa* says, “The [valid] proving and the [valid] refutation, and the pseudo [proving and the pseudo refutation] are only for the understanding of the opponent.” Kuiji noted that the pseudo proving is what makes the judge and the proponent understand properly after the opponent has shown [the proponent’s fault]. This commentary is unresolved; If the understanding of the judge and the proponent is created when the opponent reveals the fault in [the proponent’s] erroneous proving, the understanding of the judge and the proponent is created by the valid refutation of the opponent, not by the pseudo proving of the proponent. In addition, we are not sure about “what makes the judge and the proponent understand properly after the opponent has shown [the proponent’s fault].” What kind of understanding is this?

The above [two questions] were dedicated by Great-dharma-master Enmyō of the

問。欲界皆第八識反也。然色究竟天之上、有欲界也。欲界之下、有色究竟天。上下遙隔、如何同欲界。第八所反不離第八心中云耶。

元興寺守印大法師進

¹⁴ 真故極成色不離於眼識宗。自許初三攝眼所不攝故因。猶如眼識職。(T1840, 44, 115b26–27)

Thesis: In truth (**tattvatas*), the physical appearance (**rūpa*), which are mutually accepted [by proponent and opponent], are not separate from the visual consciousness.

Reason: Because, [based on the ground] I accept, they are included in the first three [*dhātus*, namely, eyes, the physical appearance, and the visual consciousness], but are not included in the eye.

Example: Like the visual consciousness.

¹⁵ 言初三攝不言眼等不攝時、有二過云々、亦有三過云々。如何乎。

元興寺豐明大法師進

承和二年維摩會講師 律師卒

¹⁶ 有性非実非徳非業。有一実故、有徳業故。如同異性。(T1630, 32, 12a23–24)

Thesis: The beingness (有性; *bhāva*) is neither the entity (実; *dravya*), nor the property (徳; *guṇa*), nor the motion (業; *karman*).

Reason: Because it depends on a single entity, property, and motion.

Example: Like the “universal and specific” (同異性; *sāmānyaviśeṣa*).

¹⁷ 三蔵唯識比量、外人作法差別相違難、其意未決。何者、且必有法差別相違、但遮離実作大有有縁性、而不遮言陳有性。由即実有立敵共許、故得名差別。今此相違云、極成之色非不離眼識色。准彼作法、可有離眼識色。大乘不許有離眼識色。不同有性有即離。若言有第八所反色者、非是小乘所許。

Tōdaiji temple.¹⁸

[H5] It is said that there is no [fallacy of] inconclusive reason (不定; **anaikāntika*) in the inference with [the fallacy that] both proponent and opponent do not accept [the reason] (兩俱不成; **ubhaya-asiddha*) and no **ubhaya-asiddha* in the inference with **anaikāntika*. However, the seventh combination in the Nine Combinations of Examples is said to have **ubhaya-asiddha* but also **anaikāntika*. Why is this so?

[The above question was] dedicated by Great-dharma-master Bumyō.¹⁹

[H6] Concerning on Sarvāstivāda's theory that the essences of *dharmas* always exist: When the saints of the two vehicles destroy delusion, do they destroy the essences of the *dharmas*, or do they destroy the functions? If they destroy the essences of the *dharmas*, why does [Sarvāstivāda] claim that the essences of *dharmas* always exist? If so, then what delusion arise when an *arhat* retrogresses [from enlightenment] and produces delusion [again]? If they destroy only the functions, why does they not destroy the essences of *dharmas*?

[The above question was] dedicated by Great-dharma-master Shuin, WHO DIED IN THE TENTH YEAR OF THE JŌWA ERA (843).²⁰

[H7] 諛拜: We do not know these two characters. [THIS QUESTION WAS] DEDICATED BY DŌSEN OF THE HŌRYŪJI TEMPLE, WHO WAS A MASTER OF BUDDHIST LOGIC (*INMYŌ*) AND LIVED IN THE FUKKIJI TEMPLE. HE BECAME A LECTURER [OF *YUIMA-E*] IN THE FIRST YEAR OF THE SAIKŌ ERA (854).²¹

¹⁸ 論云、能立与能破、及似唯悟他。慈恩尺是、似立悟証及立論主、由他顯己証自解生。此尺未決。何者、且由他顯其似立之過、証及自解生者、此但由他真能破証自解生、非是似立悟自。又未知由他顯己所生解、是何解耶。

以上東大寺円明大法師進

¹⁹ 有兩俱不比量、無不定。有不定比量、無兩俱不成云々。而九句中之第七句、有兩俱不成、亦不定過。如何是耶。

豐明大法師進

²⁰ 就娑婆多法師恒有云々。然二乘聖者断煩惱時、若断法軌耶、若断用耶。若断法軌者、何云法軌恒有耶。若尔、云阿羅漢退、起煩惱、退失果時、起何煩惱耶。若唯断作用者、何故不断法軌耶。

守印大法師進承和十年卒

²¹ 諛拜不知件二字 〈法隆寺僧道詮進 〈因明師也／住福基寺〉〉 〈齊衡元年講師〉