

Bhāviveka versus Candrakīrti on the Logic of *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*: Negation of Arising in the Four Possible Ways

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Abstract

This paper deals with hitherto unresolved questions regarding the opening verse of Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK) in Chapter 1 titled "Examination of Conditions." In this well-known stanza Nāgārjuna negates the "arising" of things in the four possible ways: from themselves, from others, from both, or without cause (MMK 1.1). Despite a good number of studies so far executed, a few significant questions remain unresolved. In this regard, the present paper aims at reconsidering the following three points yet to be fully examined. The first point is whether Nāgārjuna presents only a conclusion in the above stanza (MMK 1.1) without showing any reasons for it in his discussion. The second concerns Bhāviveka's criticism of Buddhapālita's explanation of the above verse and whether it is logically valid or not. In relation to this question, the third and most important point is whether we have arrived at an accurate understanding of Candrakīrti's discussion which vindicates Buddhapālita's explanation with a methodological criticism of Bhāviveka. This paper mainly discusses the third point, with reference to the first two, when necessary.

Key words: Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Buddhapālita, Bhāviveka, Candrakīrti, Logical Analysis

Introduction

Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (MMK) chapter one begins with the well-known verse in which the author negates "the arising" of things in the four possible ways: from themselves, from others, from both, or without cause (MMK 1.1).

This paper aims at reconsidering the following three points that remain unresolved: (1) The first point is whether Nāgārjuna presents only a conclusion in the above stanza without showing any reasons for it in his discussion. (2) The second concerns Bhāviveka's criticism of Buddhapālita's explanation of the above verse and whether it is logically valid or not. (3) In relation to this, the third and most important point is whether we have arrived at an accurate understanding of Candrakīrti's discussion which vindicates Buddhapālita's explanation with a methodological criticism of Bhāviveka. The present paper mainly discusses the third point, with reference to the first two when necessary.

On the order Of *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 1.1–3

Let us turn to the first point above. The *Prasannapadā* cites the first three verses of MMK from chapter one, in the following order:

- 1) *na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpy abetutaḥ/
utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana*// (MMK 1.1)

In any place, never are there any things that have arisen from themselves, from others, from both, or without cause.

- 2) *catvāraḥ pratyayā hetur ārambaṇam anantaram/
tathāvādhipateyaṃ ca pratyayo nāsti pañcamah*// (MMK 1.2)

There are four conditions: cause, object, the immediately preceding one, and the predominant one. There is no fifth condition.

- 3) *na hi svabhāvo bhāvānāṃ pratyayādiṣu vidyate/
avidyamāne svabhāve parabhāvo na vidyate*// (MMK 1.3)

Own-nature of things do not exist in conditions, etc. When there is no own-nature, other-nature does not exist.

As was pointed out by Ye (2011, 12), the order of the above three verses

cited in the commentaries is as follows:

In the *Buddhapālita-mūlamadhyamaka-vṛtti* of Buddhapālita (BP), *Prajñāpradīpa-mūlamadhyamaka-vṛtti* of Bhāviveka (PP), and *Mūlamadhyamaka-vṛtti-Prasannapadā* of Candrakīrti (PSP), these verses are cited in the following order: verse 1 → verse 2 → verse 3.

However, in the *Mūlamadhyamaka-vṛtty-Akutobhayā* of Nāgārjuna (ABh) and in the *Zhōnglùn* 中論,¹ the three verses are cited in the order, verse 1 → verse 3 → verse 2.

In this regard, it is interesting to note the following comment of Candrakīrti on the negation of “the arising of things from others”:

*parato 'pi notpadyante bhāvāḥ parābhāvād eva/ etac ca
na hi svabhāvo bhāvānām pratyayādiṣu vidyate/* (MMK 1.3ab)
ity atra pratīpādayiṣyate/ tatas ca parābhāvād eva nāpi parata utpadyante/
(MacDonald 2015, I: 191, §61)

Nor do things arise from others just because [something] other does not exist. And [Nāgārjuna] will explain this in this [*Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*]:

Own-nature of things does not exist in conditions, etc. [When there is no own-nature, other-nature does not exist.]² (MMK 1.3ab)

Therefore, just because [something] other does not exist, [things] do not arise from others, either.

From Candrakīrti’s above comment on the negation of the second possibility, i.e. *nāpi parato* (MMK 1.1a) or in Candrakīrti’s words, *parato 'pi notpadyante bhāvāḥ*, “Things do not arise from others, either,” it is certain that Candrakīrti too regards MMK 1.3 as Nāgārjuna’s reason for denying the second possibility.²

Furthermore, it appears that Candrakīrti’s above understanding of MMK 1.3 follows that of Buddhapālita which claims:

Answer: Only if those four conditions, “cause” etc., which you designated as “others” were [really] other than the things, [then] things would indeed arise from others; however, they (the four conditions, i.e., cause, object, the immediately preceding one, and the predominant one) cannot possibly be other [than the things]. How?

Own-nature of things does not exist in conditions, etc. When there is

no own-nature, other-nature does not exist. (MMK 1.3)

bshad pa/ gal te khyod kyis rgyu la sogs pa rkyen bzhi po gang dag gzhan yin
par tha snyad btags pa de dag dngos po rnam las gzhan yin par gyur na ni
dngos po rnam las skye ber yang 'gyur ba zhig na/ de dag ni gzhan yin
par mi 'thad do// ji ltar zhe na/

dngos po rnam kyis rang bzhin ni// rkyen la sogs la yod ma yin//

bdag gi dngos po yod min na// gzhan gyi dngos po yod ma yin// (MMK 1.3)³

Therefore, the order of the first three verses found in ABh and Zhōng-lùn, viz., verse 1 → verse 3 → verse 2 appears more authentic than the order cited in BP, PP, and PSP, viz., verse 1 → verse 2 → verse 3. In the former order of the first three verses, we may not only find Nāgārjuna's reason for the first stanza, but we can also better understand the third verse as introducing Nāgārjuna's critique of both conditions in general (verses 4–6) and the four conditions (verses 7–10) in particular.⁴

Buddhapālita-mūlamadhyamaka-vṛtti on Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 1.1

With regard to the second point above, let me cite Buddhapālita's comment on MMK 1.1 which runs as follows:

Here is an objection: First of all, show [us] how the word “arising” (*utpāda*) is nothing but a conventional expression (*vyavahāramātra*).

Answer: It should be explained first.

In any place, no things whatsoever

Ever arise

From themselves, from others,

From both, or without cause. (MMK 1.1)

Here [in this world] if something arose, the arising of the thing would be either from itself, from another, from both, or without cause; however, when examined, it is not possible in all ways. How? “From themselves” (*svataḥ*) means “from oneself” (**ātmanah*).

(1) Among the [four possible ways], first, things do not arise from their own selves, because their arising would certainly be meaningless and because arising would be endless. In fact, things that exist by their own selves have no use for

arising once again. If, while existing, they arose again, there would be no time that they were not arising. This is not acceptable. Therefore, first, things do not arise from themselves.

(2) [Things] do not arise from others, either. For what reason? Because it would follow that all things arise from all things.

(3) Nor do they arise from both themselves and others, since it would result in both faults.

(4) Nor yet do they arise without cause, because it would follow that all things always arise from all things and because there would be a fault that all efforts are purposeless⁵.

In this manner, as it is not possible for a thing to arise in all ways, so the word “arising” is nothing but a conventional expression since there is no arising.

'dir smras pa/ re zhig ji ltar skye bar brjod pa tha snyad tsam yin pa de ltar rab tu ston cig//

bshad pa (/) de dang por bstan par bya'o//

bdag las ma yin gzhan las min//

gnyis las ma yin rgyu med min//

dngos po gang dag gang na yang//

skye ba nam yang yod ma yin// (MMK 1.1)

'di la gal te dngos po 'ga' zhig skye bar gyur na/ dngos po de'i skye ba de bdag las sam/ gzhan las sam/ bdag dang gzhan gnyis las sam/ rgyu med pa las 'gyur grang na/ brtags na rnam pa thams cad las mi 'thad do// ji ltar zhe na/ bdag las zhes bya ba ni bdag nyid las zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go//

(1) de la re zhig dngos po rnam bdag gi bdag nyid las skye ba med de/ de dag gi skye ba don med pa nyid du 'gyur ba'i phyir dang/ skye ba thug pa med par 'gyur ba'i phyir ro// 'di ltar dngos po bdag gi bdag nyid du yod pa rnam la yang skye ba dgos pa med do// gal te yod kyang yang skye na nam yang mi skye bar mi 'gyur bas de yang mi 'dod de/ de'i phyir re zhig dngos po rnam bdag las skye ba med do//

(2) gzhan las kyang skye ba med de/ ci'i phyir zhe na/ thams cad las thams cad skye bar thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro//

(3) bdag dang gzhan gnyis las kyang skye ba med de/ gnyi ga'i skyon du thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro//

(4) rygu med pa las kyang skye ba med de/ rtag tu thams cad las thams cad skye bar thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir dang/ rtsom pa thams cad don med pa nyid

kyi skyon du 'gyur ba'i phyir⁵ ro//

de ltar gang gi phyir dngos po skye ba rnam pa thams cad du mi 'thad pas de'i phyir skye ba med pas skye bar brjod pa ni tha snyad tsam yin no// (Saito 1984, 10–11; D Tsa 161b1–7, P Tsa 182a3–b2)

As will be referred to below, the underlined parts were later cited by Candrakīrti in his PSP where he refutes Bhāviveka's criticism of Buddhapālita.

Mūlamadhyamaka-vṛtti-Prasannapadā (PSP) and *Prajñāpradīpa-mūlamadhyamaka-vṛtti* (PP) on *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (MMK) 1.1

Here, let us proceed to Candrakīrti's comments on Bhāviveka's criticism of Buddhapālita's explanation of MMK 1.1. Candrakīrti cites Buddhapālita's explanation of "[things'] not arising from themselves" as follows:

(1) *ācārya-Buddhapālitas tv āha – na svata utpadyante bhāvās tadutpādavaiarthhyād atiprasaṅgadoṣāc ca/ na hi svātmanā vidyamānānāṃ padārthānāṃ punarutpāde prayojanam asti/ attha sann api jāyeta na kadācin na jāyeta// iti//*

On the other hand, the Master Buddhapālita said [as follows: Among the four possible ways, first,] things do not arise from their own selves, because their arising would certainly be meaningless and because [arising] would be endless. In fact, things that exist by their own selves have no use for arising once again. If, while existing, they arose again, there would be no time that they were not arising. [This is not acceptable. Therefore, first, things do not arise from themselves]. (For the underlined part, see the above section II-(1).)

Candrakīrti thereafter quotes Bhāviveka's critique of the above:

atraike dūṣaṇam ābuh – tad ayuktaṃ hetudr̥ṣṭāntānabhidhānāt paroktadoṣāparihārāc ca/ prasaṅgavākya tvāc ca prakṛtārthaviparyayena viparītasādhyataddharmavyaktau paramād utpannā bhāvā janmasābhalyāj janmanirodhāc ceti kṛtāntavirodhaḥ syāt// iti// (MacDonald 2015, 140–142, §22–23)⁶

In regard to this [statement of Buddhapālita's], some [i.e., Bhāviveka and his

party] criticize: That [mode of argumentation] is not suitable, because a reason (*hetu*) and an example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) have not been stated and because the faults pronounced by the [*Sāṅkhya*] opponents have not been refuted. And because it is a statement of [unwanted] consequence (*prasaṅgavākya*), there must be a contradiction with [your own] accepted tenets (*kṛtāntavirodha*) since, when, with the reverse [i.e., negation] of the meaning [of the statement] under discussion, the reverse of the probandum (*sādhyā*) and its properties (*taddharma*) [i.e., probans] is expressed, it becomes [a statement] that things have arisen from others because arising is purposeful and because arising ends [upon completion of the process of arising] (Cf. MacDonald 2015, 54–56).

On the negation of “[things’] arising from others,” Candrakīrti cites both Buddhapālita’s explanation and Bhāviveka’s criticism of it as follows:

(2) *ācārya-Buddhapālitas tu vyācāṣṭe – na parata utpadyante bhāvāḥ sarvataḥ sarvasaṃbhavaprasaṅgāt/ iti/*

Atrācārya-Bhāviveko dūṣaṇam āha – tad atra prasaṅgavākya tvāt sādhyasādhanaviparyayaṃ kṛtvā svata ubhayato ’hetuto votpadyante bhāvāḥ kutaścīt kasyacid utpatter iti prākṣaṣavirodha iti/ anyathā sarvataḥ sarvasaṃbhavaprasaṅgād ity asya sādhanadūṣaṇānantahpātītvād asaṅgatārtham etat// iti/ (MacDonald 2015, I:192–193, §62–63).

The Master Buddhapālita explains [as follows:] Things do not arise from others, either. [For what reason?] Because it would follow that all things arise from all things. (For the underlined part, see the above section II–(2).)

The Master Bhāviveka voices criticism in regard to this [statement of Buddhapālita’s]: Then, regarding this, because it is a statement of a consequence, when the reversal (*viparyaya*) of the probandum (*sādhyā*) and the probans (*sādhana*) is made, contradiction [of the consequence] with [your] original position (*prākṣaṣa*) [becomes evident, since the reversal states that] “Things arise from self, from both [self and other], or without a cause (*abhetuḥ*), because a certain thing (*kasyacid*) arises from a certain thing (*kutaścīt*).” Otherwise, [that is, if the reversal is not accepted], since this [probans] “because of the consequence that everything would originate from everything” does not fall under [either] proof (*sādhana*) or refutation (*dūṣaṇa*), this [statement of Buddhapālita’s would be] incoherent in meaning (*asaṅgatārtha*). (* Cf. MacDonald 2015, 142–144)⁷

On the negation of “[things] arising without cause,” Candrakīrti quotes both Buddhapālita’s explanation and Bhāviveka’s criticism of it as follows:

(4) *ācārya-Buddhapālitas tv āha – abetuto notpadyante bhāvāḥ sadā ca sarvataś ca sarvasambhavaḥ prasaṅgāt* ⁵ // iti//

atrāpi ācārya-Bhāviveko dūṣaṇam āha – atrāpi prasaṅgavākyatvād yadi viparitasādhyasādhanaḥ vyaktir vākyārtha īṣyate/ tadaitad uktaṃ bhavati – hetuta utpadyante bhāvāḥ kadācit kutaścit kasyacid utpatter ārambhasāphalyāc ca iti seyaṃ vyākhyā na yuktaḥ prāguktadoṣāt// iti// tad etad ayuktaṃ pūrvo ditaparihārād ity aḥ pare// (MacDonald 2015, I: 195–197, §66–68)⁸

On the other hand, the Master Buddhapālita said [as follows:] “Nor yet do they arise without cause, because it would follow that all things always arise from all things [and because there would be a fault that all efforts are purposeless].” (For the underlined part, see the above section II–(4).)

The Master Bhāviveka voices criticism in regard to this too: Also with respect to this [argument], on account of [its] being the statement of a consequence, if the expression of the reversed probandum and probans is accepted as the meaning of the statement (*vākyārtha*), then this ends up being asserted: “Things arise from a cause (*hetuḥ*), 1) because a certain thing (*kasyacid*) arises from a certain thing (*kutaścit*) at a certain time (*kadācit*), and 2) because of the usefulness of undertakings (*ārambhasāphalya*).” Therefore, that explanation [of Buddhapālita’s] is not appropriate because of the fault stated earlier. Thus others [Candrakīrti and his party consider] this [criticism of Bhāviveka’s] to be inappropriate because [its] refutation was stated previously (MacDonald 2015, II: 150–152).

Analysis of Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti’s Discussions

First, concerning Bhāviveka’s criticism of Buddhapālita’s commentary, those three reasons found in the above cited III–(1) are related respectively to the questions of whether to use an autonomous logic, whether to mention and refute the opponents’ objections, and whether the commentator Buddhapālita committed a logical fault. Let me discuss here the third question:

If we apply the following symbols to the related sentences,

p: “Things arise from their own selves.”

q: “Arising is purposeless and endless.”

~: negation

Buddhapālita’s explanation found in the above cited III–(1) can be expressed as: $\sim p$, because “[if *p*] then *q*, however in fact $\sim q$, therefore $\sim p$.” In other words,

Things do not arise from themselves.

[If things arise from their own selves,] arising is purposeless and endless.

However, in fact, arising is purposeful and ends.

Therefore, things do not arise from themselves.

As seen in the previous section III–(1), Bhāviveka criticized Buddhapālita’s explanation. However, it seems clear that Bhāviveka’s criticism involves two logical problems. The first problem in Bhāviveka’s discussion is that, as was found in his criticism of Buddhapālita under the discussion of the second possibility (2), i.e., arising from others, Bhāviveka should have therein referred to all the other three possibilities, viz., from themselves, from both [themselves and others], or without cause, just as in his critical analysis of the first possibility (1).

The second problem is that, putting aside the question of whether the statement uses an absolute negation (*prasajya-pratiṣedha*) or a relative one (*pariyudāsa*), it is logically certain that the sentence “things do not arise from themselves,” does not necessarily mean “things arise from others.” This is because, given the four possibilities of arising, the sentence means either “things arise from others,” “from both,” “without cause,” or “things do not arise.” The last sentence, “things do not arise,” exactly corresponds to the final conclusion accepted by Nāgārjuna after negating all the four possible ways of things arising.

Second, as is found in the shaded parts of II–(4) and III–(4), it is to be noted that intentionally or not, commentators do not always provide all the necessary sentences in their discussion. In this regard, from both logical and philological points of view, it is interesting to mention the parallel expressions found in the above sections III–(1), III–(2), and III–(4) as follows:

III–(1) *prasaṅgavākya tvāc ca prakṛtārthaviparyayena viparītasādhyataddharmavyaktau paramād utpannā bhāvā janmasāphalyāj janmanirodhāc ceti kṛtāntavirodhaḥ syāt//*

... when, with the reversal [i.e., negation] of the meaning [of the statement] under discussion, the reverse of the probandum (*sādhyā*) and its properties (*taddharma*) [i.e., probans] are expressed,...

III–(2) *prasaṅgavākya tvāt sādhyasādhnaviparyayam kṛtvā svata ubhayato hetuto utpadyante bhāvāḥ kutaścīt kasyacid utpatter iti prāpkaṣavirodha iti/*

... when the reversal (*viparyaya*) of the probandum (*sādhyā*) and the probans (*sādhana*) is made,...

III–(4) *atrāpi prasaṅgavākya tvād yađi viparītasādhyasādhnavyaktir vākyaārtha iṣyate/ tadaitad uktaṃ bhavati – hetuta utpadyante bhāvāḥ kadācīt kutaścīt kasyacid utpatter ārambhasāphalyāc ca iti seyaṃ vyākhyā na yuktā prāguktadoṣāt// iti//*

... if the expression of the reversed probandum and probans is accepted as the meaning of the statement,...

The above sentence III–(1) means that when, with the negation of the meaning of the statement under discussion, i.e., from *q* or “Arising is meaningless and arising is endless” to $\sim q$ or “Arising is purposeful and arising ends”; and also from *p* or “Things arise from their own selves” to $\sim p$ or “Things arise from others”, the reverse of the probandum and probans are expressed, i.e. “ $\sim q$, therefore $\sim p$.” Buddhapālita’s discussion, according to Bhāviveka, results in a contradiction with his own tenets or original position.

Although, unlike in III–(1), Candrakīrti omitted the phrase *prakṛtārthaviparyayena* “the reversal [i.e., negation] of the meaning [of the statement] under discussion” in his discussions of III–(2) and III–(4) (respectively, “arising from others” and “arising without cause”), it is clear that *prakṛtārthaviparyayena* should also be inserted just before *sādhyasādhnaviparyayam kṛtvā* (III–(2)) and *viparītasādhyasādhnavyaktir* (III–(4)).

Conclusion

From the above discussion, we may draw the following conclusions: First, as was also understood by Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti, MMK 1.1 is closely

related to the current MMK 1.3, the latter verse providing the reason for the former. This fact also confirms the order of the first three verses, 1 → 3 → 2, which agrees with the order of those three stanzas as cited in ABh and *Zhōnglùn*.

Second, although Candrakīrti did not refer to it in his discussion, Bhāviveka's argument against Buddhapālita's explanation of MMK 1.1, as mentioned in section IV, involves, intentionally or not, two related logical problems.

The third and last conclusion concerns the understanding of the term *viparyaya* of the compound *sādhya-sādhana-viparyaya* or “the reversal of the probandum and the probans” used by Candrakīrti. Since this phrase presupposes another important but unfortunately latent phrase *prakṛtārthaviparyayena* or “with the reversal [i.e., negation] of the meaning [of the statement] under discussion,” the term *viparyaya* is to be understood as having the sense of “reversal” but not necessarily a logical “contraposition.”⁹

Notes

- 1 The *Zhōnglùn* 中論 is one of the oldest commentaries on the MMK, attributed to Nāgārjuna with annotations by *Piñgala (Qīngmù 青目), and is only available in Chinese translation by Kumārajīva (T 30, no. 1564).
- 2 Although Candrakīrti did not cite MMK 1.3cd (*avidyamāne svabhāve parabhāvo na vidyate*), the last half should have no doubt been cited here in order to fit his argument to the given context.
- 3 BP D Tsa 162a4–b3, P Tsa 182b8–183a8; Saito (1984, 11–13).
- 4 For the Sanskrit text of MMK, Chapter I, see **Appendix**.
- 5 Though Candrakīrti did not cite the shaded part from BP, the phrase which runs *sarvārambhanaiṣṭhalyadoṣaprasaṅgāc ca*, or the like, should have been quoted here.
- 6 Cf. PSP Tib.: 'di la kha cig gis de ni rigs pa ma yin te/ gtan tshigs dang dpe ma brjod pa'i phyir dang/ gzhan gyis smas pa'i nyes pa ma bsal ba'i phyir ro// thal bar 'gyur ba'i tshig yin pa'i phyir skabs kyi don las bzlog pas bsgrub par bya ba dang/ de'i chos bzlog pa'i don mngon pas dngos po rnams gzhan las skye bar 'gyur ba dang/ skye ba 'bras bu dang bcas pa nyid du 'gyur ba dang/ skye ba thug (P thugs) pa yod par 'gyur ba'i phyir grub pa'i mtha' dang 'gal bar 'gyur ro zhes skyon smra ste/ (D 'a 5b3–4, P 'a 6a4–6). The underlined part is identical with PP D Tsha 49a7–b1, P Tsha 58b8–59a2 except the two shaded parts, i.e., PP (D, P) has therein 1) glags yod pa'i tshig yin par 'gyur te/, and 2) mdzad.
- 7 Cf. PSP Tib.: slob dpon Sangs rgyas bskyangs ni dngos po rnams gzhan las skye ba med de/ thams cad las kyang thams cad skye bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro// zhes rnam par 'chad do// 'di la slob dpon Legs ldan byed ni des na de la ¹thal bar 'gyur ba'i ngag¹ yin pa'i phyir/ bsgrub par bya ba dang ²sgrub par byed pa bzlog par byas² na/ dngos po rnams bdag gam gnyis sam rgyu med pa las skye bar 'gyur ba dang/ 'ga' zhig las 'ga' zhig skye bar 'gyur ba'i phyir phyogs gong³ ma dang 'gal bar 'gyur ro// gzhan du na yang thams cad las thams cad skye bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro ⁴// de bas na⁴ de la sgrub pa dang sun 'byin pa nyid med pa'i phyir/ de ni don 'brel pa med pa yin te zhes sun 'byin smra'o// (D 'a 12a2–5, P 'a 13a5–8). The underlined part is identical with PP D Tsha 50a6–7, P Tsha 60a6–b1 except the above shaded parts, i.e., PP (D, P) has therein 1) glags yod pa'i tshig, 2) sgrub pa bzlog pa byas, 3) snga, and 4) //zhes bya ba (D om. //).
- 8 Cf. PSP Tib.: slob dpon Sangs rgyas bskyangs ni dngos po rnams rgyu med pa las kyang skye ba med de/ rtag tu thams cad las thams cad skye bar thal bar 'gyur ro zhes 'chad do// 'di la yang slob dpon Legs ldan byed/ de la yang ¹thal bar 'gyur ba'i ngag¹ yin pa'i phyir/ gal te bsgrub par bya ba dang ²sgrub par byed pa bzlog pa gsal ba ngag gi don du² mngon par 'dod na/ ³de'i tshe 'di skad du/³ dngos po rnams rgyu las skye bar 'gyur ba dang/ lan 'ga' kha cig las kha cig skye bar 'gyur ba dang/ rtsom pa 'bras bu dang bcas pa nyid du 'gyur ba'i phyir ⁴ro// zhes bstan par 'gyur na/ bshad pa⁴ de ni mi rigs te/ sngar smras pa'i skyon du thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro// zhes sun 'byin pa smra'o// (D 'a 12b1–3, P 'a 13b4–7). The underlined is identical with PP D Tsha 53a5–7, P Tsha 64a5–7 except the above

shaded parts, i.e., PP (D, P) has therein 1) *glags yod pa'i tshig*, 2) *bsgrub par bya ba dang* (P dang/) *sgrub pa bzlog* (P zlog) *pa'i tshig gi don*, 3) *des 'di skad bstan par 'gyur te/*, and 4) *om*.

⁹ For example, see Tillemans (1992, 318–325) and Watanabe (2013, 1232–1233).

Abbreviations

- ABh *Mūlamadhyamaka-vṛtṭy-Akutobhayā* of Nāgārjuna, D No.3829, P No.5229.
 BP *Buddhapālita-mūlamadhyamaka-vṛtṭi* of Buddhapālita, D No.3842, P No.5242.
 See Saito (1984).
 D sDe dge edition.
 MMK *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* of Nāgārjuna. See PSP, Ye (2011), and Appendix.
 P Peking edition.
 PP *Prajñāpradīpa-mūlamadhyamaka-vṛtṭi* of Bhāviveka, D No.3853, P No.5253.
 PSP *Mūlamadhyamaka-vṛtṭi-Prasannapadā* of Candrakīrti. See La Vallée Poussin (1903-1913). D No.3860, P No.5260.
 T *Taishō shinshū daizōkyō* 大正新脩大藏經 [Taishō edition of the Buddhist canon].
 Ed. Takakasu Junjirō 高楠順次郎, et al., 100 vols. Tokyo: Taishō Issaikyō Kankōkai. 1924-1934.

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Appendix

- Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, Chapter 1, *Pratyayaparikṣā*
*anirodham anutpādam anucchedam aśāśvatam/
 anekārtham anānārtham anāgamam anirgamam//
 yaḥ pratīyasamutpādaṃ prapañcōpaśamaṃ śīvam/
 deśayāṃ āsa sambuddhaṃ taṃ vande vadatāṃ varam//*
- 1 *na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpy abhetutaḥ/
 utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana//*
 - 2 *catvāraḥ pratyayā betur ārambaṇam anantaram/
 tathāivādhipateyaṃ ca pratyayo nāsti pañcamah//*
 - 3 *na hi svabhāvo bhāvānāṃ pratyayādiṣu vidyate/
 avidyamāne svabhāve parabhāvo na vidyate//*
 - 4 *kriyā na pratyayaavatī nāpratyayaavatī kriyā/
 pratyayā nākriyāvantaḥ kriyāvantaś ca santy uta//*
 - 5 *utpadyate pratīyemān itīme pratyayāḥ kila/
 jāvan notpadyata ime tāvan nāpratyayāḥ katham//*
 - 6 *naivāsato naiva sataḥ pratyayo rthasya yujyate/
 asataḥ pratyayaḥ kasya sataś ca pratyayena kim//*
 - 7 *na san nāsan na sadasan dharmo nirvartate yadā/
 kathaṃ nirvartako hetur evaṃ sati hi yujyate//*
 - 8 *anārambaṇa evāyaṃ san dharmo upadiśyate/
 athānārambaṇe dharme kuta ārambaṇaṃ punaḥ//*
 - 9 *anutpanneṣu dharmeṣu nirodho nopapadyate/
 nānantaram ato yuktaṃ niruddhe pratyayaś ca kaḥ//*
 - 10 *bhāvānāṃ niḥsvabhāvānāṃ na sattā vidyate yataḥ/
 satīdam asmin bhavatīty etan naivopapadyate//*
 - 11 *na ca vyastasamasteṣu pratyayeṣu asti tat phalam/
 pratyayebhyaḥ kathaṃ tac ca bhaven na pratyayeṣu yat//*
 - 12 *athāsad api tat tebhyaḥ pratyayebhyaḥ pravartate/
 *phalam apratyayebhyo 'pi kasmān nābhīpravartate//**
 (This phrase marked by * is emended. See Saito 1985, 844–845.)
 - 13 *phalam ca pratyayamayaṃ pratyayāś cāsvayamimayāḥ/
 phalam asvamayebhyo yat tat pratyayamayaṃ katham//*
 - 14 *tasmān na pratyayamayaṃ nāpratyayamayaṃ phalam/
 saṃvidyate phalābhāvāt pratyayāpratyayāḥ kutaḥ//*