2003年12月
Impossibility theorems on mutual evaluation
JOURNAL OF THE OPERATIONS RESEARCH SOCIETY OF JAPAN
- ,
- ,
- 巻
- 46
- 号
- 4
- 開始ページ
- 523
- 終了ページ
- 533
- 記述言語
- 英語
- 掲載種別
- 研究論文(学術雑誌)
- DOI
- 10.15807/jorsj.46.523
- 出版者・発行元
- ELSEVIER SCI LTD
Arrow's impossibility theorem, which is a classical result in social choice theory, shows that it is impossible to design a democratic rule for social decision making that obeys some reasonable criteria. In the Arrow's model, each individual of a society has a preference order among given alternatives and the society needs to agree on a preference order that aggregates individuals' preference orders. In this paper, we consider a model where each individual has a preference order on all the individuals but herself/himself. We introduce some reasonable criteria of an aggregation rule for this mutual evaluation model, investigate several combinations of these criteria, and show that each of these combinations leads to a negative consequence.
- リンク情報
- ID情報
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- DOI : 10.15807/jorsj.46.523
- ISSN : 0453-4514
- Web of Science ID : WOS:000188888700008