

1 Phrases in Dispute and their Attribution

2
3 -Reading Reinhart Zöllner, *Wahrheitseffekte und Widerstreit:*

4 *Die „Trostrfrauen“ und ihre Denkmäler* (2021)¹

5
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7
8 Today we can see so many ‘comfort women’ statues.
9 Not only in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul
10 but also in so many places in the World. How could we
11 think of it?

12
13 Reinhart Zöllner is a professor in the Institute of
14 Eastern Asia Study in the University Bonn. He is one
15 of the most important Historian and Japanologist
16 today.

17 **Summarizing a serious work**

18 It contains three chapters, 143 pages of text, 16
19 pages of reference and index. It’s not a long book, but
20 this topic is very deeply serious for Japanese.
21



22
23 Following an introduction to his acquaintance with Japan, Korea and this problem
24 of ‘comfort women’ (Chap. 1), the main and long part (Chap. 2 “A History of Discourse
25 of ‘Comfort Women’” continues. It contains 105 pages of 10 sections.
26

27 **Sec.1. Suspended Crime**

28 “International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and
29 Children”(「婦人及児童ノ売買禁止ニ関スル国際条約」). This international
30 agreement was carried by the member states in the League of Nations in 1921. Japan,
31 which was a permanent member of the Executive Council, ratified it in 1925.
32 Nevertheless, the punishment against this crime in Japan cannot be found except in
33 only one case in 1936. How could we understand this erased history? This is a
34 fundamental question for Japanese.
35

36 **Sec. 2. Documentation in Myitkyina**

37 Myitkyina is the capital city of Kachin State in Myanmar (Burma), located near the

¹Reinhart Zöllner, *Wahrheitseffekte und Widerstreit: Die „Trostrfrauen“ und ihre Denkmäler*, Indicum Verlag/München 2021.

1 Chinese-Myanmar border. This town was liberated by the Chinese National Party Army,
2 the Chinese People liberation Army, and the U.S. Army from Japan in Summer 1944.

3 From the documentation, which the U.S. Intelligence Service collected in those days, the
4 Japanese Government came to find out in 1992 some information that the Japanese Army
5 had deeply concerned in organizing the 'comfort women.'

7 **Sec.3. Semarang**

8 Today Semarang is the capital and largest city of Central Java province in Indonesia.
9 Until 1942 it was a town in the Dutch East Asia. The documents of Dutch military court
10 are taken up. The facts, that lots of Dutchwomen inclusive of German women were
11 slaved sexually, were brought to light.

13 **Sec.4. Shanghai**

14 The Japanese Army themselves, which capitulated in 1945, could withdraw from
15 there to Japan. However, more than 1200 Korean women, who had been captured as
16 'comfort women', were left behind and had to return to their country with their
17 tremendous hardship.

19 **Sec.5. Beauties in the Battlefield**

20 Firstly, the special recreation facility (which means 'brothel') for foreign soldiers
21 under Allied Troops Occupation from September 1945 to April 1952 and the Japanese
22 government's stance on such a situation in those days.

24 Secondly, it might be an insensitive self-consciousness of Japanese that the 'comfort
25 women" was very naively depicted and played in some movies. In "Escape at Dawn (暁
26 の脱走)" in 1950, which Yoshiko Yamaguchi [the Chinese name Li Hsiang-lan (李香
27 蘭)] played as leading part, or in "Blood and Sand (血と砂)" in 1965, which Toshiro
28 Mifune played as leading part, the 'comfort women" from Korea are very insensitively
29 or, as if it were ordinarily, depicted and played.

31 Thirdly, in some abusive and violent words by Seijuro Arafune, who was one of the
32 influential LDP politicians after the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the
33 Republic of Korea in 1965, we could read the poor self-consciousness of some Japanese.

35 **Sec.6. Female Silence and Male Cracking Abusive and Violent Joke**

36 Firstly, the 'Japanese men's tourism to Korea and southeastern Asian counties' after
37 the recovery of Japan-Korea relation, which meant a prostitution tourism.

38
39 Secondly, an article of talk by Takeshi Sakurada (President of the Japan Business
40 Federation) and Takashi Shikanai (President of the *Sankei Newspaper*), where they
41 were self-complacently and very proudly chattering how they could arrange and set up

1 venues for 'comfort women' in those days.

2
3 Thirdly, Seiji Yosida, who wrote a book Testimony about 'forcible taking away of
4 women on Jeju Island.' Some newspapers in Japan used his book as a factual source of
5 'comfort women.' However, the testimonies in this book were brought to light as his
6 fiction. As a terrible joke, he described a fictional account of 'comfort women.'

7 8 **Sec. 7. The will to truth**

9 The crucial change of discourse situation on the problem of 'comfort women' was
10 brought by the movement of feminism in the 1980s in Korea. An Association of "The
11 Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery(挺身隊協)' and its
12 leader Lee Hyo-jae(李効再) played an important role at that time.

13
14 According to Zöllner, "Der Kern des Trostfrauenproblems besteht darin, daß die
15 (japanische) Militärregierung militärische „Troststationen“ für den „sexuellen
16 Trost“ der kaiserlichen Truppen institutionalisierte, viele jungen Frauen in den
17 Kolonien und besetzten Gebieten zwangsweise mobilisierte und an die Front
18 transportierte und sie systematisch in die sexuelle Sklaverei zwang“ (Zöllner, S.65.)

19
20 「慰安婦問題の核心は、(日本の)軍事政権が軍の〈慰安所〉を皇軍の〈性的慰安のために制度化し
21 たこと、植民地および占領地域における多くの若い女性たち〉を強制的に動員し前線に送り、性
22 奴隷に組織的に強制したことにある。」

23
24 Yun Chôngok(尹貞玉) had been exploring various facilities and venues on 'comfort
25 women' in Japan and Asia since 1980. Before the Olympic Game Seoul in 1988, her field
26 research report gave an influential meaning in an international seminar for "Olympic
27 tourism and Prostitution."

28
29 With this as a start, two members of the National Diet in Japan; Shoji Motoaki and
30 Sumiko Shimizu who were members of the Japan Socialist Party, asked firstly the
31 cabinet on this problem in the National Diet.

32
33 A historian Yoshiaki Yoshimi, Professor of Chuo University, brought forward the
34 evidence that the then Japanese government had been concerned in setting up such
35 facilities. At the same time, the methodology and meaning by the oral history study also
36 were discussed there.

37
38 Zöllner expected that such a tendency of historical scientific discourses could criticize
39 the 'sexual characteristics of state power' on the universal level of human history.
40 Nevertheless, such a serious question was not put but avoided. If anything, a tendency
41 to put all responsibilities only to the Japanese had been confirmed very strongly. For

1 example, if you know a very famous book like Park Yu-ha(朴裕河) *comfort women of*
2 *the empire: the battle over colonial rule and memory*², the evaluation on this book was
3 totally divided not only in Japanese readers but also in Koreans.
4

5 **Sec. 8. Civil War of Discourse**

6 As a response to such a serious movement in Korea, I think, the then Japanese
7 Government also would meet their critiques and expectations by Japanese kind of
8 sincerity in the 1990s. However, a series of actions, which the Japanese Government
9 had taken, might be very regrettably bureaucratic officialism.

10
11 According to an official document,

12
13 “The Government of Japan launched a thorough fact-finding study on the issue of
14 comfort women in December 1991 and announced its results in July 1992 and in August
15 1993. Public documents found as a result of such study are now open to the public at
16 the Cabinet Secretariat. On the occasion of the announcement of the findings in 1993,
17 the then Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono released a statement and expressed in it
18 sincere apologies and remorse, recognizing this issue was, with the involvement of the
19 military authorities of the day, severely injured the honor and dignity of a large number
20 of women. The Government of Japan has since expressed its sincere apologies and
21 remorse to the former comfort women on many occasions.
22

23 Recognizing that the comfort women issue was a grave affront to the honor and
24 dignity of a large number of women, the Government of Japan, together with the people
25 of Japan, seriously discussed what could be done to express their sincere apologies and
26 remorse to the former comfort women. As a result, the Asian Women's Fund (AWF) was
27 established on July 19, 1995 in order to extend atonement from the Japanese people to
28 the former comfort women. Having decided to provide necessary assistance to the AWF
29 through a Cabinet decision in August 1995, the Government of Japan, with a view to
30 fulfilling its moral responsibility, provided all possible assistance for the AWF, including
31 bearing all of its operational costs, assisting its fund-raising and providing necessary
32 funds to implement its activities (approximately 4.8 billion yen from the AWF's
33 founding through fiscal year of 2005), in order for the AWF to attain its goals. The AWF
34 disbanded in March 2007 with the termination of the project in Indonesia.”³
35

36 It was in the 1990s that Japanese did not only experience the Post-Cold War era but
37 also a heavy depression of the post-Bubble. The LDP lost their strong power as a

²朴裕河 『帝国の慰安婦 植民地支配と記憶の闘い』 朝日新聞出版 2014年。

³“[Measures Taken by the Government of Japan on the Issue of "comfort women" | Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan \(mofa.go.jp\)](#).”

1 governmental party in 1993. The above-mentioned Japanese Governmental Action in
2 August 1995 was decided by a coalition government of LDP, Socialist Party Japan and
3 New Party Sakigake. Very interestingly, the then prime-minister Murayama was a
4 socialist.

5
6 But the government by the LDP had started again in January 1996. Very
7 problematically, they had begun to become more conservative and nationalistic than
8 before. The 'Kimigayo' as national anthem and the 'Hino-maru' as national flag were
9 legislated officially as law in 1999.

10 11 **Chapter 3: Each Phrase in Dispute is justified**

12 This title comes from Jean-François Lyotard. This chapter is philosophical. Zöllner
13 shows us, the movement had begun as a modernism of feministic ideas in Korea in the
14 1980s. This was the first motivation of movement. But the decade of 1990s had changed
15 it, and its originally single motivation had been decomposed into plural and multiple
16 partial small worlds.

17
18 The original stance of historical and scientific methodology, which was composed of
19 logics of discovery and truth, have been transformed to a multiple relativism. Under
20 such a relativistic argument it is more important whether various phrases are real or
21 more real, rather than whether they are true or not.

22
23 Consequently, as Zöllner points out, four main strong bridgeheads are constructed:

- 24 1) *Chôngdâhyôp-Narrative* as an original modernism of human rights.
- 25 2) *Feministic Narrative* as a modernity of binary antagonism.
- 26 3) *Socio-economic Narrative* as restauration of money matter.
- 27 4) *Refuser Narrative*; narrow-minded nationalisms of anti-Japan or anti-Korea.

28
29 For instance, how could we understand the 'comfort woman statue'? In which
30 narrative should the Japanese, particularly young generation accept this protest
31 movement? The consciousness of the Japanese is also inconsistent and scattered today.

32 33 **My impression: Christian Narrative and Japanese**

34
35 Professor Zöllner comes to the following conclusion:

36
37 „Nach dem Weltkrieg kam mit der Rechtsprechung über deutsche und japanische
38 Kriegsverbrechen und der Gründung der Vereinten Nationen der Diskurs über
39 allgemeine Menschenrechte hinzu. In den 1970er Jahren griffen die japanische und die
40 koreanische Frauenbewegung das Konzept der sexuellen Sklaverei auf. Da es
41 (zumindest auf der Seite der japanischen Frauenbewegung) dabei immer auch um

1 Kritik an den *herrschenden* gesellschaftlichen Verhältnissen ging, mußte jeder
 2 Versuch, das Problem mit einer rein *historischen* Argumentation zu lösen, scheitern.
 3 Dies war und ist das Dilemma der regierungsamtlichen japanischen Position: sie dachte
 4 historisch, nicht politisch – und damit in fataler Verkennung der Bedeutung des
 5 Begriffs „Geschichte“ auch wieder *ahistorisch*.“ (S.88f.)

6 「世界大戦後、ドイツと日本の戦争犯罪人をめぐる裁判と、国際連合の創設により、普遍的人權
 7 をめぐるディスクルスが付け加わった。1970年代、日本および韓国の女性運動は、性奴隷という
 8 コンセプトを取り上げた。その際（少なくとも日本の女性運動の側では）支配する全体社会諸関
 9 係批判が相変わらず問題となり続けたので、純粋に歴史的論証により問題解決しよとする試みが
 10 どれも頓挫することになった。これは、政府当局という日本的ポジションのジレンマだったし、
 11 今もそうある。歴史的には考察したが政治的にはしていない。それにより〈歴史〉という概念の
 12 指し示すものを致命的に見落とし、没歴史的となるのだ。」

13

14 How could we understand a series of actions taken by the Japanese government in
 15 the 1990s? How could they accept the sincere apologies and remorse in the statements
 16 released and expressed by Kouichi Katoh in July 1992 and by Yohei Kono in August
 17 1993? How could they understand the Asian Women's Fund established by the then
 18 prime minister Tomiichi Murayama?

19

20 I suppose that this position should be supported by the *Socio-economic Narrative* as
 21 restoration of money matter.

22

23 If we could compare such a typical Japanese ritual with “The Speech (Die Rede)” by
 24 Richard von Weizsäcker in May 1985, or with Willy Brandt's Kneefall at the Warsaw
 25 Memorial in December 1970, many Japanese cannot say anything.

26

27 The phrases “Wer aber vor der Vergangenheit die Augen verschließt, wird blind für
 28 die Gegenwart. Wer sich der Unmenschlichkeit nicht erinnern will, der wird wieder
 29 anfällig für neue Ansteckungsgefahren“⁴ in ‘The Speech’ has been emanating a strong
 30 perlocutionary effect over a time-space from the German Congress Hall in Bonn to the
 31 world wide public sphere toward future.

32

33 Brandt’s deed in the Warsaw Ghetto was not any discourse. His action gave a very
 34 strong perlocutionary effect to many people in Eastern Europe and in Germany⁵.

4 「過去に対して目を閉ざす者は、現在に対しても盲目となる。非人間的行為を思い出そうとしない者は、再び、
 新たな犯罪に身を染める危険に晒されよう。」

5 Joachim Fischer, “Das Verzeihen -Seine Sozialontologie im Lichte der Theorien >sozialer Akte<” und
 >Sprechakte<, Takemitsu Morikawa, *Verzeihen, Versöhnen, Vergessen -Soziologische Perspektive*,
 transcript Verlag/Bielefeld 2018, S.54.

1 Japanese and Japanese politicians made a group of
2 historians find out such some facts and examine them
3 for their officialism. However, did they do anything
4 political? I suppose that they should have only done
5 something stereotyped as typical Japanese politicians.



6
7 Murayama is a socialist. The politicians that firstly
8 took up this problem in the Diet were, as Zöllner shows it, the members of Japan
9 Socialist Party, too; Shouji Honda, Sumiko Shimizu, Mizuho Fukushima.

10 As Zöllner picks out an interpretation from Miki Dezaki(pp,66-7), who was the
11 producer and director of the film "Shusenjo -The Main Battleground of the Comfort
12 Women Issue," the movement participants in Korea could use this sole connection
13 through some members of the JSP to the Diet. They didn't have any other alternatives.

14
15 The National Diet in Japan has been composed of one big LDP governmental party
16 and other many small opposition parties for 70 years long. Murayama's Government of
17 Socialists-LDP Coalition was one of two very rare cases. At the same time, the Japan
18 Socialist Party (today: Japan Social Democratic Party) is originally very different from
19 the counterparts in European countries. Even in the 1990s lots of old members of this
20 party were Marx-Leninist and very strong mediators to Soviet Union, North-Korea.
21 They were tremendously old-fashioned.

22
23 It is a very serious fundamental problem that the old two parties; Seiyu-kai (政友会)
24 and Kensei-tou(憲政党), which had played a main role in the 1920s, had been
25 metamorphosed through the militaristic totalitarian corporatism into the LDP and the
26 other small opposition parties after the Pacific War. They remain old-fashioned still
27 now.

28
29 The 'politics' in this context is only a negotiation, which a personage in his own fief
30 can coordinate with his followers. I think, such a traditional boss-hench persons-
31 relation remains particularly prevalent in the political world in Japan still today.

32
33 Interestingly the socialists also have same way of politics. Japanese socialism might
34 have copied Marx, copied Lenin etc., but they could not have any original ideas and
35 ideologies.

36
37 On the other hand, Zöllner points out Yayori Matsui. She worked in *Asahi Shinbun*.
38 She was a very active journalist and a very strong civil movement organizer. In 1976,
39 she founded the organization *Asian Women in Solidarity in opposition to sex tourism*
40 *in Asia*. She founded the *Asia-Japan Women's Resource Center*. Her very vivid sub-

1 political orientation of non-politicians was very important.⁶

2
3 I feel that a few more words are called for on Yayori Matsui. In 1995 I requested her
4 a lecture to our students in Waseda. Very interestingly, so many students came to hear
5 her lecture in our international hall. She is an evangelist. She grew up in her Christian
6 family. As a chief-correspondent of *Asahi Shinbun* in Singapore, she knew the women
7 in Asia very well. At the same time, she had her own practical know-how for objection,
8 namely organizing civil movements.

9
10 It might be unfortunate that Japanese are not in the Christian tradition and culture.
11 We have not had any ideas on Christianity as everyday knowledge stocks.

12
13 Zöllner cited from Jean-Francois Lyotard:

14
15 "Die christliche Erzählung hat in Rom die anderen Erzählungen besiegt, weil sie den
16 Spieleinsatz der Diskursart selbst bezeichnete, in dem sie die Liebe zum Vorkommnis
17 in den Erzählungen und die entsprechenden Erzählakte einführte ... Die Autorisierung
18 zu erzählen, zuzuhören, erzählt zu werden entspringt nicht einer Teilhabe an einer
19 Welt von Namen, die selbst aus Ur-Erzählungen hervorgegangen wären, sondern
20 einem Auftrag zu universaler Zuneigung: Liebet einander, ein Auftrag, der für alle
21 Helden, Erzähler und Zuhörer gilt."(S.90)⁷

22
23 「キリスト教の語りが、ローマにおいて他の語りに優ったのは、語りに現れる事々に愛、そして
24 それ相応の語り方を感情移入することで、言説様式そのものの担保としたからである。(…) 語
25 ること、聞き入ること、そして語られることの正当性は、名ある人たちの世界に参加しているか
26 らではなく、それ自体、語りそのものから生じてくるものであろうし、〈共に愛せ〉という普遍
27 的愛情への使命であり、それはすべての英雄、語り手、聞き手にあてはまる。」

28
29 Yayori Matui died of illness in 2002. She was 68 years old. Her last book is *Love!*
30 *Anger! Fight with Courage!* I expect that Japanese, particularly the younger
31 generation, will learn her activity.

32
33 I suppose that Matsui and many Europeans like Zöllner and today's colleagues from
34 Germany should accept the above-mentioned Lyotard's phrase as categorical
35 imperatives. Very regrettably, I could learn it only as imported knowledge, but it might
36 not become any part of my everyday life.

37

6 Yayori Matsui, "Sexual Slavery in Korea", in: *A Journal of Women Studies*, Spring 1977, Vol.2(1), pp.22-30.

7 Jean-Francois Lyotard, *Der Widerstreit*, Wilhelm Fink Verlag 1989, S.264.