論文

査読有り
2000年7月

Characterizations of strategy-proof mechanisms for excludable versus nonexcludable public projects

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
  • S Ohseto

32
1
開始ページ
51
終了ページ
66
記述言語
英語
掲載種別
研究論文(学術雑誌)
DOI
10.1006/game.1999.0755
出版者・発行元
ACADEMIC PRESS INC

First, we characterize "the unanimous mechanisms" as the set of strategy-proof, individually rational, and citizen sovereign mechanisms for the provision of a nonexcludable public project. Second, we characterize "the largest unanimous mechanisms" as the set of strategy-proof, individually rational, demand-monotonic, and access-independent mechanisms for the provision of an excludable public project. Comparing these two classes of mechanisms, we conclude that admitting partial exclusion always improves efficiency under the incentive compatibility constraint. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D71, D82, H41. (C) 2000 Academic Press.

Web of Science ® 被引用回数 : 9

リンク情報
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0755
Web of Science
https://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=JSTA_CEL&SrcApp=J_Gate_JST&DestLinkType=FullRecord&KeyUT=WOS:000088335700003&DestApp=WOS_CPL