論文

査読有り
2000年11月

Strategy-proof and efficient allocation of an indivisible good on finitely restricted preference domains

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY
  • S Ohseto

29
3
開始ページ
365
終了ページ
374
記述言語
英語
掲載種別
研究論文(学術雑誌)
DOI
10.1007/s001820000046
出版者・発行元
PHYSICA-VERLAG GMBH & CO

We consider allocation mechanisms in economies with a single indivisible good and money. First, we show that there is no strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism on some preference domains which consist of a sufficiently large but finite number of quasi-linear preferences. Second, we show that there is no strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and equally compensatory mechanism on arbitrary preference domains which consist of more than three quasi-linear preferences.

Web of Science ® 被引用回数 : 16

リンク情報
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820000046
Web of Science
https://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=JSTA_CEL&SrcApp=J_Gate_JST&DestLinkType=FullRecord&KeyUT=WOS:000165964200005&DestApp=WOS_CPL