Nov, 2000
Strategy-proof and efficient allocation of an indivisible good on finitely restricted preference domains
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY
- Volume
- 29
- Number
- 3
- First page
- 365
- Last page
- 374
- Language
- English
- Publishing type
- Research paper (scientific journal)
- DOI
- 10.1007/s001820000046
- Publisher
- PHYSICA-VERLAG GMBH & CO
We consider allocation mechanisms in economies with a single indivisible good and money. First, we show that there is no strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism on some preference domains which consist of a sufficiently large but finite number of quasi-linear preferences. Second, we show that there is no strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and equally compensatory mechanism on arbitrary preference domains which consist of more than three quasi-linear preferences.
- Link information
- ID information
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- DOI : 10.1007/s001820000046
- ISSN : 0020-7276
- Web of Science ID : WOS:000165964200005