論文

査読有り
2002年7月

Toward general impossibility theorems in pure exchange economies

SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE
  • M Kato
  • ,
  • S Ohseto

19
3
開始ページ
659
終了ページ
664
記述言語
英語
掲載種別
研究論文(学術雑誌)
DOI
10.1007/s003550100143
出版者・発行元
SPRINGER-VERLAG

We study the possibility of strategy-proof and efficient mechanisms in pure exchange economies. In his remarkable paper, Zhou (1991) establishes an elegant impossibility result: there is no strategy-proof, efficient, and nondictatorial mechanism in the two-agent case. He conjectures that there is no strategy-proof, efficient, and "non-inversely-dictatorial" mechanism in the case of three or more agents. However, we discover some counterexamples to his conjecture in the case of four or more agents. We present a new interesting open question: Is there any strategy-proof, efficient, and "non-alternately-dictatorial" mechanism?

Web of Science ® 被引用回数 : 15

リンク情報
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550100143
Web of Science
https://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=JSTA_CEL&SrcApp=J_Gate_JST&DestLinkType=FullRecord&KeyUT=WOS:000177456700014&DestApp=WOS_CPL