Jul, 2002
Toward general impossibility theorems in pure exchange economies
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE
- ,
- Volume
- 19
- Number
- 3
- First page
- 659
- Last page
- 664
- Language
- English
- Publishing type
- Research paper (scientific journal)
- DOI
- 10.1007/s003550100143
- Publisher
- SPRINGER-VERLAG
We study the possibility of strategy-proof and efficient mechanisms in pure exchange economies. In his remarkable paper, Zhou (1991) establishes an elegant impossibility result: there is no strategy-proof, efficient, and nondictatorial mechanism in the two-agent case. He conjectures that there is no strategy-proof, efficient, and "non-inversely-dictatorial" mechanism in the case of three or more agents. However, we discover some counterexamples to his conjecture in the case of four or more agents. We present a new interesting open question: Is there any strategy-proof, efficient, and "non-alternately-dictatorial" mechanism?
- Link information
- ID information
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- DOI : 10.1007/s003550100143
- ISSN : 0176-1714
- Web of Science ID : WOS:000177456700014