論文

査読有り
2006年9月

Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods

ECONOMIC THEORY
  • Shinji Ohseto

29
1
開始ページ
111
終了ページ
121
記述言語
英語
掲載種別
研究論文(学術雑誌)
DOI
10.1007/s00199-005-0014-1
出版者・発行元
SPRINGER

We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods when monetary compensations are possible. First, we characterize the set of strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms. Second, we identify the Pareto undominated subset in the set of strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms. These characterizations can be interpreted as envy-free selections of Groves mechanisms.

Web of Science ® 被引用回数 : 28

リンク情報
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0014-1
Web of Science
https://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=JSTA_CEL&SrcApp=J_Gate_JST&DestLinkType=FullRecord&KeyUT=WOS:000240308000007&DestApp=WOS_CPL