論文

査読有り
1999年1月

Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with an indivisible good

SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE
  • S Ohseto

16
1
開始ページ
121
終了ページ
136
記述言語
英語
掲載種別
研究論文(学術雑誌)
DOI
10.1007/s003550050134
出版者・発行元
SPRINGER VERLAG

We consider economies with a single indivisible good and money. We characterize the set of mechanisms that satisfy strategy-proofness, individual rationality, equal compensation, and demand monotonicity. There are three types of mechanisms which have the following properties: (i) they determine the allocation of monetary compensation depending on who receives the indivisible good; (ii) they allocate the indivisible good to one of the prespecified (one or two) agent(s); and (iii) they disregard preferences of agents other than the pre-specified agent(s). This result implies that the presence of an indivisible good induces serious asymmetry in mechanisms.

Web of Science ® 被引用回数 : 13

リンク情報
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050134
Web of Science
https://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=JSTA_CEL&SrcApp=J_Gate_JST&DestLinkType=FullRecord&KeyUT=WOS:000077217200007&DestApp=WOS_CPL