論文

査読有り
1999年11月

Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies: A note

ECONOMIC THEORY
  • R Deb
  • ,
  • S Ohseto

14
3
開始ページ
685
終了ページ
689
記述言語
英語
掲載種別
研究論文(学術雑誌)
DOI
10.1007/s001990050348
出版者・発行元
SPRINGER VERLAG

Serizawa [3] characterized the set of strategy-proof, individually rational, no exploitative, and non-bossy social choice functions in economies with pure public goods. He left an open question whether non-bossiness is necessary for his characterization. We will prove that nan-bossiness is implied by the other three axioms in his characterization.

Web of Science ® 被引用回数 : 6

リンク情報
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050348
Web of Science
https://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=JSTA_CEL&SrcApp=J_Gate_JST&DestLinkType=FullRecord&KeyUT=WOS:000083490300011&DestApp=WOS_CPL