論文

査読有り
2004年3月

Implementing egalitarian-equivalent allocation of indivisible goods on restricted domains

ECONOMIC THEORY
  • S Ohseto

23
3
開始ページ
659
終了ページ
670
記述言語
英語
掲載種別
研究論文(学術雑誌)
DOI
10.1007/s00199-003-0369-0
出版者・発行元
SPRINGER-VERLAG

We study the problem of allocating several units of homogeneous indivisible goods when monetary compensations are possible. First, we show that there is no strategy-proof, budget balanced, and egalitarian-equivalent mechanism even on extremely restricted preference domains. Next, we present two characterizations of strategy-proof and decision-efficient mechanisms that satisfy a stronger version of egalitarian-equivalence on preference domains bounded above. These characterizations tell us a trade-off between strategy-proofness and Pareto efficiency, and a relationship with strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms. Finally, we prove that no egalitarian-equivalent mechanism is Nash implementable even on extremely restricted preference domains.

Web of Science ® 被引用回数 : 14

リンク情報
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-003-0369-0
Web of Science
https://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=JSTA_CEL&SrcApp=J_Gate_JST&DestLinkType=FullRecord&KeyUT=WOS:000185852100011&DestApp=WOS_CPL