論文

査読有り
2005年9月

Strategy-proof assignment with fair compensation

MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES
  • S Ohseto

50
2
開始ページ
215
終了ページ
226
記述言語
英語
掲載種別
研究論文(学術雑誌)
DOI
10.1016/j.mathsosci.2005.01.006
出版者・発行元
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV

We study the problem of allocating heterogeneous indivisible objects (e.g. jobs, houses, etc.) when monetary compensations are possible. We present a new family of strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms. Each mechanism in the family is a variation of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves pivotal mechanism: the planner selects tentative compensations associated with the indivisible objects and implements the pivotal mechanism for the objects with tentative compensations. We characterize this family as the "Pareto dominant" class of strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms in the two-agent case. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V All rights reserved.

Web of Science ® 被引用回数 : 3

リンク情報
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsosci.2005.01.006
Web of Science
https://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=JSTA_CEL&SrcApp=J_Gate_JST&DestLinkType=FullRecord&KeyUT=WOS:000230979100006&DestApp=WOS_CPL