論文

査読有り
2011年1月

Auction Price Formation with Costly Occupants: Evidence Using Data from the Osaka District Court

JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND ECONOMICS
  • Takako Idee
  • ,
  • Shinichiro Iwata
  • ,
  • Teruyuki Taguchi

42
1
開始ページ
84
終了ページ
98
記述言語
英語
掲載種別
研究論文(学術雑誌)
DOI
10.1007/s11146-009-9169-z
出版者・発行元
SPRINGER

Foreclosure properties sold at Japanese judicial auctions are delivered to buyers with an unclear title when occupants exist, because the foreclosure laws protect occupants from compulsory execution of auctions. The existence of occupants theoretically affects the auction price through two channels. First, it affects the reserve price, and this changes in auction price. Second, the number of bidders changes in response to changes in the reserve price that is controlled by occupants, and this changes the auction price. Using data from the Osaka District Court, we empirically find that the existence of occupants in properties reduces the auction price through two channels.

Web of Science ® 被引用回数 : 2

リンク情報
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-009-9169-z
Web of Science
https://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=JSTA_CEL&SrcApp=J_Gate_JST&DestLinkType=FullRecord&KeyUT=WOS:000286196900005&DestApp=WOS_CPL