Dec, 2003
A search model of two-sided matching under nontransferable utility
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
- Volume
- 113
- Number
- 2
- First page
- 182
- Last page
- 198
- Language
- English
- Publishing type
- Research paper (scientific journal)
- DOI
- 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00085-1
- Publisher
- ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
in a decentralized marriage market there are different types of men and women. Agents sequentially search for mating partners and meet bilaterally in a random fashion. Upon meeting, the paired agents complete mating if both agree, and separate and continue searching otherwise. The polarization of interests between men and women appears as in Gale-Shapley marriage problems; as agents of one sex become more selective about their mates, agents of the other sex lose. As search costs disappear, the set of equilibrium outcomes in a search model reduces to the set of stable matchings in a corresponding Gale-Shapley marriage problem. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
- Link information
- ID information
-
- DOI : 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00085-1
- ISSN : 0022-0531
- eISSN : 1095-7235
- Web of Science ID : WOS:000187346500002