Papers

Peer-reviewed
Dec, 2003

A search model of two-sided matching under nontransferable utility

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
  • H Adachi

Volume
113
Number
2
First page
182
Last page
198
Language
English
Publishing type
Research paper (scientific journal)
DOI
10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00085-1
Publisher
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE

in a decentralized marriage market there are different types of men and women. Agents sequentially search for mating partners and meet bilaterally in a random fashion. Upon meeting, the paired agents complete mating if both agree, and separate and continue searching otherwise. The polarization of interests between men and women appears as in Gale-Shapley marriage problems; as agents of one sex become more selective about their mates, agents of the other sex lose. As search costs disappear, the set of equilibrium outcomes in a search model reduces to the set of stable matchings in a corresponding Gale-Shapley marriage problem. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.

Link information
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00085-1
Web of Science
https://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=JSTA_CEL&SrcApp=J_Gate_JST&DestLinkType=FullRecord&KeyUT=WOS:000187346500002&DestApp=WOS_CPL
ID information
  • DOI : 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00085-1
  • ISSN : 0022-0531
  • eISSN : 1095-7235
  • Web of Science ID : WOS:000187346500002

Export
BibTeX RIS