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“This” and “Such” in the Receptacle Passage of Plato’s *Timaeus*

Abstract

One short passage on what is called the Receptacle in Plato’s *Timaeus* (49c–50a) has been the subject of much controversy since Cherniss presented an alternative reading of it in 1954. In this paper, I criticize an influential argument presented by Zeyl for a traditional reading, and propose a new interpretation which adopts the alternative reading on important sentences of the passage, but is not accompanied by the defects of Cherniss’ interpretation.

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1 Introduction

In the opening scene (48e–52d) of the second part of the *Timaeus* cosmology, Plato introduces the so-called “Receptacle”. While the Receptacle seems to play an important role in the *Timaeus*, interpreters have widely disagreed on what its exact role is, since it is discussed only in vague terms. In particular, a crucial passage (49c–50a) on the Receptacle has been the subject of much controversy since H. Cherniss presented an alternative reading of it, against the traditional reading.¹ Although Cherniss’ reading has some grammatical merits, it has come under severe attack because of a certain serious interpretative defect accompanying his reading, especially since D. Zeyl presented a highly influential interpretation on behalf of the traditional reading. Although this controversy turns on a subtle grammatical treatment of a short passage, its consequence is significant. For, generally speaking, Cherniss’ alternative reading leads to the interpretation that Plato envisages such a radical flux in the natural world that we have to expel *things* or substances from the world, and that we cannot make direct references to phenomena. Zeyl’s traditional reading, on the contrary, admits some stability in Plato’s natural world to the extent that we can preserve *things* or substances and make references to them. In this paper, I will criticize Zeyl’s interpretation² and adopt the alternative reading, at least on the syntactical level, of

¹ Cherniss 1954b.

² In this article, I will mainly deal with the reading (translation) and interpretation of the text given in Zeyl 1975 and 2000, though he develops a new interpretation in Zeyl 2010. This is because Zeyl 2010, 120, n. 10 explicitly states that he still retains his reading of the text, which is presented only in those earlier works, and that his new interpretation is based on the reading. Moreover, most

the most important sentences of the passage.³ However, I will also propose a new interpretation of the alternative reading that is not accompanied by the defects of Cherniss' interpretation.⁴ That is, by examining some three passages (49e7–50a4, 50a5–b3, 51a4–6) which follow the most controversial and therefore the most closely read passage, but have not received enough attention so far, I will argue that Plato cautiously hints the reference to the Receptacle even before the official introduction of it at 49e7–50a2 (see section 5 below).

From this new interpretation, it follows that the flux discussed in the Receptacle theory is so radical as to expel *things* or substances from it (*pace* Zeyl), but it nevertheless somehow allows us to make direct references to phenomena (*pace* Cherniss).

2 Context and Controversy of the Receptacle Theory

The Receptacle theory is introduced in the second part (47e–69a) of Timaeus' cosmology. At the beginning of the second part, Timaeus presents the difficulty of describing the natural world, as in some of Plato's other dialogues (e.g., the *Theaetetus*

of the recent advocates of the traditional reading only refer to and rely on his earlier works (cf. Broadie, 2012, 187; Kahn, 2013, 190-191; Mason, 2016, 129-130, none of whom mentions his more recent article in 2010). For my treatment of his new interpretation, see n. 31 below.

³ However, as to some sentences in the passage (49c-50a), I adopt the traditional reading. See section 4 below.

⁴ By "reading" I basically mean how to understand the grammatical constructions of Greek sentences, and by "interpretation" I mean what philosophical implications to draw from those constructions.

181c-183c and the *Cratylus* 439d-440d). This time, however, Plato presents the difficulty alongside his new theory of the Receptacle. This difficulty is, as in those two other dialogues, the problem of referring to something that cannot remain the same, but in this dialogue Timaeus takes the case of the four elements (water, earth, air, and fire) transforming into one another in a cycle.

Then, Timaeus gives us “the safest” answer to this problem. The Greek text of this section is as follows:

... ἀσφαλέστατα μακρῷ περὶ τούτων τιθεμένους ὧδε λέγειν. αἰεὶ ὁ καθορῶμεν ἄλλοτε ἄλλη γιγνόμενον, ὡς πῦρ, μὴ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐκάστοτε προσαγορεύειν πῦρ, μὴδὲ ὕδωρ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον αἰεὶ ... (49d3–7)

Until Cherniss presented a new reading, this passage had been traditionally translated as follows:

The safest answer (49d4–7): Traditional reading (T-reading)⁵

... the safest course by far is to propose that we speak about these things in the following way: what we invariably observe becoming different at different times—fire, for example—
—to characterize that, i.e., fire, not as “this”, but each time as “what is such”, and speak of

⁵ All the translations of the *Timaeus* in this paper are from Zeyl 2000, except as otherwise noted. Before Cherniss 1954b, most translators had adopted this (traditional) line of reading. Cf. Archer-Hind 1888, 173-5; Taylor 1928, 316; Cornford 1935, 179, et al.

water not as “this”, but always as “what is such”.

In contrast to this, Cherniss proposed the following reading:

The safest answer (49d4–7): Alternative reading (A-reading)⁶

... the safest course by far is to propose that we speak about these things in the following way: what we invariably observe becoming different at different times—fire, for example—to characterize not this, but what on each occasion is such, as “fire”, and to call not this, but what is ever such, “water”.

The conflict between these two readings turns on how to render the short phrase “μὴ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐκάστοτε προσαγορεύειν πῦρ”, which literally translates to, “not *this* but *such* to call *fire*”. T-readers take “fire” as an object of the verb “to call” (προσαγορεύειν), and “this” and “such” as its complements (“to call *fire* not ‘this’, but ‘such’”). On the other hand, A-readers take “this” and “such” as objects and “fire” as their complement (“to call not *this*, but *such* ‘fire’”).

This syntactic ambiguity of the sentence (49d4-e2) leads to ambiguity of some consequences. Since Zeyl’s gloss on these consequences is the most influential, let us

⁶ Since Cherniss 1954b, several versions of the A-reading have been proposed: Lee 1966, 341–368; Mohr 1980, 138–52; Silverman 1992, 87–113. However, Martin 1841, 135, had already proposed this line of “alternative” reading before Cherniss. The translation above is also taken from Zeyl 2000, lvi-lvii, who is the representative T-reader himself, but made this translation for comparing it to the A-reading.

see how he explains the contrast. According to Zeyl's scheme,⁷ two different types of linguistic and ontological consequences follow from the syntactical ambiguity of the sentence, as follows:

According to the T-reading, one should speak of phenomenal fire, water, and so on, as "such", but not as "this". In saying this, Plato does not mean to tell us not to call those phenomenal elements by their usual names ("fire", "water", etc.), but to understand their ontological status differently from the usual. For something to be a "this", it must be self-subsistent and be what it is in its own right, rather than because of something else. Unlike the Forms and the Receptacle, phenomena such as fire, water and so on, are not self-subsistent because of their instability. Because of their lack of self-subsistence, one can only refer to natural objects as "such", but not as "this". However, by this instruction Plato does not mean to tell us not to call, for example, a phenomenal fire "fire". Rather, he merely wants us to be careful not to make *identifying references* to those phenomena, but to make *adjectival (or attributive) references* to them.⁸

According to the A-reading, in contrast, Plato tells us not to call this phenomenal object "fire", but such and such character (e.g., the character of fire) "fire". In this view, Plato argues that the appropriate referent of the word "fire" is not this

⁷ Zeyl 2000, lvi–lxiv. This scheme, however, is not necessarily the only option as to the consequence that follows from one or the other reading, as I shall argue in the section 3 (See also n. 14 below). Zeyl 1975, 126, himself emphasizes that his interpretation is not the same as the traditional one, although it takes the traditional construction.

⁸ Zeyl 1975, 128–9 and 146–7. See also a summary of Zeyl's argument by Silverman 1992, 90.

phenomenal fire that we see, but the lasting character of fire, since the phenomenal fire does not remain as fire and can transform into other elements at any moment. Therefore, in a strict sense, Plato forbids us from describing this phenomenal world.⁹

In addition to this difference of linguistic consequences, Zeyl contrasts the two types of ontological consequences following from each reading. Even in the T-reading our understanding of phenomenal objects is revised in a moderate way. Plato tells us not to understand the changing phenomenal objects as self-subsistent (as some people might think), and only to call them “fire”, “water”, and so on, in an attributive way. In this (Zeyl’s version of) T-reading, however, a phenomenal object’s identity is preserved even when it undergoes qualitative changes, by virtue of the fact that it remains the same part of the Receptacle, which serves as a *substratum*.¹⁰ On this line of thought, the ordinary concept of “thing” or slightly more refined concept of “substance”, is preserved.¹¹

In the A-reading, in contrast, those phenomenal objects are no longer regarded as

⁹ One of the motivations for Cherniss to propose the A-reading was to draw this linguistic consequence. Cherniss 1957 attempted to refute the thesis of Owen 1953 that the *Timaeus* was composed in Plato’s middle period, partly by arguing that it is stated in this dialogue, as well as in other later dialogues (i.e. the *Theaetetus* and the *Cratylus*), that phenomenal flux cannot be distinctively denominated by any kind of expressions.

¹⁰ Zeyl 2000, lxi.

¹¹ Plato himself does not use the Greek words that correspond to “thing” or “substance” in the related passages of the *Timaeus*. By these words, I mean our ordinary concept of “thing” which we assume to persist through qualitative and locative changes at least for some time. Plato deals with a similar issue at *Phaedo* 102d-103a, where he contrasts something (or probably personal identity) that persists through qualitative changes with characters that come in and out of the thing (or the person).

“things”. Since, unlike T-readers, A-readers do not take the Receptacle to be a *substratum*, but a space in which appearances of fire or water emerge and perish, our ordinary concept of “thing” is dissolved into space and separate appearances entering it.¹² For, even if a phenomenal water appeared after a phenomenal fire had disappeared in the same place, there is no persisting identity (i.e., a *substratum*) between these two phenomena, but only two separate phenomena which happened to appear in the same place. Thus, if any qualitative change occurred at some place in this natural world, this means that one phenomenon *F* perished and another phenomenon not-*F* emerged at the same place, rather than the same “thing” or “substance” being qualitatively altered from *F* to not-*F*. This is quite a radical revision of our ordinary concept of the natural world and seems to reflect a “phenomenalistic”¹³ understanding of the world.¹⁴

¹² Zeyl 2000, lxi: “A-readers, on the other hand, argue that particulars are not ‘things’ at all: like reflections produced in mirrors, they are the products of the exits and entrances of the ‘such-things’ (as *A* understands these) into the Receptacle.”

¹³ By “phenomenalistic” view of the natural world, I broadly mean the view that the material object in the natural world is not a persisting something behind qualities, but rather a bundle of qualities, and therefore, that propositions about material objects are reducible to propositions about qualities. Cf. Lee 1967, 363: “According to *Tim* 48E-52D, we ought not to say, ‘this object *x*, which is at place *D*, is an image of the Form *F*’ [...] We should say instead, ‘the Form *F* is imaged at *D*.’ In the same way, instead of saying, ‘that object *x* there at *D* stands in some relation to the Form (whether one of representing it, or being like it),’ we ought to say just, ‘the Form is imaged there at *D*.’” See also Taylor’s use of the word “phenomenalist” in the next note.

¹⁴ As clear-cut as it seems, this contrast between two different consequences (T’s *substratum* consequence and A’s phenomenalist consequence) under Zeyl’s scheme is not the view that interpreters have universally agreed upon. In fact, before Cherniss proposed the A-reading, many interpreters adopted the T-reading together with the phenomenalist consequence, which, under

However, as we shall see below, my arguments attempt to undermine this contrast itself, which was explicitly formulated by Zeyl in arguing against Cherniss and Lee. In the next section, I will examine Zeyl's reading and present several reasons why we should not adopt his reading.

3 Zeyl's Reading

Let us see Zeyl's translation of the passage (49c7–50a4),¹⁵ where Timaeus contrastingly uses the words "touto" and "toiouton".

(1) 49c7–d3: Now then, since none of these appears ever to remain the same, which one of them can one categorically assert, without embarrassment, to be some particular thing, *this* one, and not something else? (2) 49d3–4: One can't. Rather, the safest course by far is to propose that we speak about these things in the following way: (3) 49d4–7: what we invariably observe becoming different at different times—fire, for example—to characterize it, that is, fire, not as "this," but each time as "what is such," and speak of water not as "this," but always as "what is such." (4) 49d7–e2: And never to speak of anything else as "this," as

Zeyl's scheme, is said to follow from the A-reading. Cornford 1935, 178, 180, for instance, clearly adopts the T-reading, but draws a phenomenalist consequence from it; Taylor 1928, too, adopts the T-reading, having consciously rejected the A-reading that was proposed by Martin 1841. However, Taylor also clearly says that the Receptacle is not a substrate (323, 347), and calls the Receptacle "the *res extensa*" or simply "extension" (326, 330–332). In the end, he says "Timaeus thus seems to be adopting a 'phenomenalist' account of the corporeal world" (332). See also Archer Hind 1888, 182. In contrast, Zeyl 2000, and Guthrie 1978, 264–269, adopt the T-reading, together with the *substratum* consequence.

¹⁵ Zeyl 2000, 38–39.

though it has some stability, of all the things at which we point and use the expressions “that” and “this” and so think we are designating something. (5) 49e2–4: For it gets away without abiding the charge of “that” and “this,” or any other expression that indicts them of being stable.¹⁶ (6) 49e4: It is in fact safest not to refer to it by any of these expressions.¹⁷ (7) 49e5–6: Rather, “what is such”—coming around like what it was, again and again—*that’s* the thing to call it in each and every case.¹⁸ (8) 49e6–7: So fire, and generally everything that has becoming, it is safest to call “what is altogether such.” (9) 49e7–50a2: But that *in* which they each appear to keep coming to be and *from* which they subsequently perish, *that’s* the only thing to refer to by means of the expressions “that” and “this.” (10) 50a2–4: A thing that is some “such” or other, however,—hot or white, say, or any one of the opposites, and all things constituted by these—should be called none of these things [i.e., “this” or “that”].

According to Zeyl’s reading, what is said in 49c7-50a4 can be summarized as follows:

Z1: We should not call phenomenal objects like fire or water “this”. (1), (3), (4),

¹⁶ In Zeyl’s understanding, this means that a phenomenal thing escapes from any identifying references since it keeps changing its qualities.

¹⁷ In Zeyl’s understanding, this means that it is safest not to refer to a phenomenal object as “this” or “that” (or by any *identifying* expressions such as “fire” or “water”). Cf. Zeyl 1975, 138.

¹⁸ τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἀεὶ περιφερόμενον ὁμοίον ἐκάστου πέρι καὶ συμπάντων οὕτω καλεῖν. His previous translation in the following makes his construction more explicit than the recent one (Zeyl, 2000, 39) above: “rather, [it is safest] to call what is such-and-such, always recurring as similar in each and every case, just so” (Zeyl, 1975, 129).

(5), (6), (10)

Z2: We should call phenomenal objects like fire or water “such”. (3), (7), (8)

Z3: We should call only the Receptacle “this” or “that”. (9)

First, I will briefly criticize Zeyl’s translation mainly from a grammatical viewpoint. Most importantly, the reading of (3), (7), and (8) by T-readers, including Zeyl, is unreasonable. As has been said by others, the second πῦρ in (3) is inevitably redundant in the T-reading: αἰὲρ ὁ καθορῶμεν ἄλλοτε ἄλλη γιγνόμενον, ὥς πῦρ, μὴ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐκάστοτε προσαγορεύειν πῦρ (49d4-6). Zeyl attempts to solve this awkwardness, but his argument is not persuasive. The point he tries to make seems to be that the ὁ clause is too distant from the verb προσαγορεύειν to be its object, and that, therefore, Plato inserts πῦρ again next to the verb.¹⁹ This story is very unlikely, because the ὁ clause and ὥς πῦρ are actually not distant from the verb προσαγορεύειν. Indeed, the word order of this sentence would be perfect for the T-reading (to call αἰὲρ ὁ καθορῶμεν ἄλλοτε ἄλλη γιγνόμενον, ὥς πῦρ, not “τοῦτο” but “τὸ τοιοῦτον”) only if the second πῦρ were not there.²⁰

¹⁹ Zeyl 1975, 132-3.

²⁰ The literal translation of the T-reading here would be: “[it is the safest] not to refer to what we invariably observe becoming different at different times—fire, for example—*fire* as ‘this’, but as ‘what is such’”. Cornford 1935, 179, n. 1, just proposes to erase the second πῦρ. The best attempt to solve this problem for the T-reading seems to be the one proposed by Strobel 2007, 315. He proposes a new punctuation different from the traditional one, i.e., placing a high point after ὥς πῦρ (49d5) rather than after ὧδε λέγειν (d4): “... ἀλλ’ ἀσφαλέστατα μακρῶ περὶ τούτων τιθεμένους ὧδε λέγειν[·] αἰὲρ ὁ καθορῶμεν ἄλλοτε ἄλλη γιγνόμενον, ὥς πῦρ· μὴ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐκάστοτε προσαγορεύειν πῦρ ...” By dissecting “μὴ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐκάστοτε προσαγορεύειν πῦρ” from the preceding ὁ clause, he suggests that we do not have to worry about

Likewise, οὕτω (49e6) in (7) is redundant in the T-reading: τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἀεὶ περιφερόμενον ὅμοιον ἐκάστου πέρι καὶ συμπάντων οὕτω καλεῖν. According to the T-reading, τοιοῦτον is supposed to be the object complement rather than the object itself of the verb καλεῖν. However, the very existence of οὕτω makes the construction impossible. Therefore, Zeyl argues that, “The problem is resolved if we take τὸ τοιοῦτον as *primary* object of καλεῖν, and translate the οὕτω as ‘just that,’ i.e., as referring to the primary object and giving it the role of secondary object [object complement] as well. Thus X οὕτω καλεῖν means X καλεῖν ‘X’.”²¹ This explanation is implausible, especially when we note that Zeyl argues that “τοῦτο” is the identifying reference and “τοιοῦτον” is the predicative reference,²² because his construction—“to call τοιοῦτον ‘τοιοῦτον’”—looks more like identification than predication. Obviously, the construction in accordance with the A-reading is far more natural and plausible: to call τὸ τοιοῦτον in that way (“fire”, “water”, etc.). And (8) should be read in accordance with (7).

Therefore, as to (3), (7), and (8), we should adopt the A-reading. If so, however, the claim (Z2) that one should call a phenomenal thing “toiouton” vanishes from his

the redundancy of πῦρ. Strobel himself, however, mentions the concern that Plato rarely (or never) has the phrase “ὥδε λέγειν” have its direct object in other places, as it would have the ὁ clause in this proposal. Although it is the most plausible solution, it does not necessarily make the T-reading better than the A-reading with regard to this sentence. Since I have other concerns about the T-reading in general (especially from an interpretative point of view, rather than a grammatical one), as I will show below, I would like to adopt the A-reading in the end.

²¹ Zeyl 1975, 139.

²² Zeyl 1975, 128.

reading (Z2 consists only of (3), (7), and (8)). This would devastate Zeyl's whole interpretation, according to which "touto" represents identity and "toiouton" represents predication.

In addition to these grammatical problems, Zeyl's interpretation does not hold *even if we wholly adopt Zeyl's reading*. What I find problematic with this interpretation is the claim that we should call only the Receptacle "this" (Z3), but should not call phenomena "this" (Z1). According to Zeyl's interpretation, phenomenal objects are composites of the Receptacle (*substratum*) and qualities, and therefore, we should be able to say of a phenomenal fire, including the Receptacle (*substratum*), "this is fire". That is, we should be able, having referred to the phenomenal object as "this", to predicate of it "fire" (and say "this is fire").²³ However, according to Zeyl's reading of the text (Z1), Timaeus repeatedly says that one should *not* call phenomenal objects that keep changing their qualities "this". This contradicts the core of Zeyl's interpretation. Therefore, if we understand the phenomenon in Z1 as involving the Receptacle (let us call this understanding of Zeyl's reading "option 1"), it ends up contradicting Zeyl's own interpretation. For, one should not call the phenomenon "this" (Z1), even though it involves the Receptacle, which we should call "this" (Z3).

Against this criticism, some people might claim that the phenomena that should

²³ According to (Zeyl's version of) the T-reading, the Receptacle theory serves as the ontological grounds for ordinary subject-predicate expressions (see Zeyl, 1975, 128; Gregory, 2000, 211; Kahn, 2013, 188. See also Broadie, 2012, 187). In this understanding, however, we have to be able to attribute qualities (e.g., fire or water) to *substratum* (i.e. the Receptacle).

not be called “this” (phenomena in Z1) do not involve the Receptacle (*substratum*) (“option 2”). However, in that case, the phenomena in Z2 would not involve the Receptacle (*substratum*), either. Then, the phenomena that should be called “such” in Z2 would be separated from the Receptacle (*substratum*) in Zeyl’s interpretation as in the A-reading, and there would not be much difference from the interpretation of the A-reading.²⁴ For Zeyl’s interpretation to hold, it is *essential* that the persisting phenomenal objects that involve the *substratum* (the Receptacle) can be called “such” as well as “this”. That is, we have to be able to refer to one and the same subject including the Receptacle as “this” *identifyingly* and as “such” *attributively* (and say “this is fire”). Otherwise, we would separately call the Receptacle “this” on the one hand, and phenomena (without the Receptacle) “such” on the other,²⁵ and take on the phenomenalist view of the world, which Zeyl attributes to the A-reading.

At the end of his first article, Zeyl declares that “Plato’s use of τοῦτο, τόδε, τὸ τοιοῦτον is the direct ancestor of Aristotle’s admittedly technical use of such locutions

²⁴ I believe this is why, before Zeyl 1975 introduced his contrasting scheme between the T-reading’s *substratum* consequence and the A-reading’s phenomenalist consequence, most T-readers had adopted the T-reading together with the phenomenalist consequence (see n. 14 above). As my argument above shows, the *substratum* consequence actually does not follow even from the T-reading.

²⁵ According to Zeyl’s interpretation (1975, 128), it is prohibited to, pointing to the water in a pond in front of us, *identify* it as water, but it is allowed to *predicate* of it “water”. However, if “such” (predication) is applied only to phenomena without the Receptacle, but not to the Receptacle (*substratum*) itself, it is, after all, not predication, as contrasted with identification. If “such” really represents predication as Zeyl seems to argue, it has to be predicated of the Receptacle (*substratum*).

[τόδε τι and τοιόνδε].”²⁶ However, this claim is obviously not true, since Aristotle makes it clear that we can attribute both “this” and “such” to one and the same individual thing (and call it “τόδε τοιόνδε”)²⁷, as Zeyl himself explains.²⁸ In contrast, as we have just seen above, Zeyl’s reading (Z1-Z3) forces us to adopt the interpretation that *either* (“option 1”) one should *not* call a phenomenal object involving the *substratum* (i.e. the Receptacle) “this”, *or* (“option 2”) one should separately call the Receptacle “this” on the one hand, and phenomena (without the Receptacle) “such” on the other. Either option clearly contradicts Aristotle’s usage and Zeyl’s own interpretation, which exactly follows Aristotle.

Alternatively, some people might object on Zeyl’s behalf, again, that “this” is used in different ways in Z1 and Z3. They may claim that “this” in Z1 is an identifying reference to fire, water, and so on, while “this” in Z3 is an identifying reference to the Receptacle. Therefore, they say, what is prohibited in Z1 is to identify phenomenal objects with fire or water, but not to identify it with the Receptacle. However, how can we tell which use of “this” is the identifying reference to fire or water, and which use of “this” is the identifying reference to the Receptacle? By looking at the object to which we are going to refer? However, as I observed earlier, the phenomenal thing

²⁶ Zeyl 1975, 147. Some interpreters seem to prefer the T-reading to the A-reading because of this kind of alleged correspondence between Plato’s and Aristotle’s usages of those terms.

²⁷ *Metaphysics* 1033b19-24. For Aristotle’s usage of those terms, see also *Metaphysics* 1039a1-2; the *Categories* 3b11ff.; the *Sophistici Elenchi* 178b37-38.

²⁸ Zeyl 1975, 147.

must include the Receptacle in Zeyl's interpretation.²⁹ Therefore, it would be unjustifiably misleading for Timaeus to simply say that we must not call the phenomenal thing "this" if he only means that we must not identify it with fire or water, because the phenomenal thing includes the Receptacle and we should be able to call it "this" to refer to the Receptacle in Zeyl's interpretation.³⁰

Therefore, *even if we wholly adopt Zeyl's reading*, we cannot adopt his *substratum* consequence.³¹

²⁹ Otherwise, we would separately call the Receptacle "this" on the one hand, and phenomena (without the Receptacle) "such" on the other and end up with the phenomenalist view of the world.

³⁰ Some people might doubt that (in Zeyl's interpretation) we can call the phenomenal thing "this" (meaning the Receptacle) even if it involves the Receptacle. For, Zeyl (2000, lviii) says "What we ordinarily call fire is, *qua fire*, merely a 'such'" (italics mine). However, it is Zeyl himself (lxi) who argues that "Since the Receptacle takes on a rapid succession of imprints ..., a particular will change rapidly over time without, however, necessarily ceasing to be that same particular. Its identity over time is preserved by virtue of the fact that it remains the same part of the Receptacle, its neutral, self-subsistent *substratum*." If Zeyl does not admit that we can call the phenomenal thing (or a particular) "this" to refer to the Receptacle (the *substratum*), then I cannot understand what he really means by the claim just cited.

³¹ Zeyl, in his more recent articles (Zeyl 2010; Zeyl and Sattler 2017), while clearly retaining the T-reading with the *substratum* consequence, attempts to combine the view that regards the Receptacle as the material of things with the view that regards it as space. He attempts this by arguing that the Receptacle is a medium (or "*matter-filled space*" in his words). In his explanation of this "*matter-filled space*", he introduces the analogy of a wave (2010, 122) and argues, "On this model what preserves the identity of a spatio-temporal particular is not the bit of matter that constitutes it, but the continuity of a configuration", since a particular wave moving toward the shore does not carry any water along with it. However, here a problem seems to arise. For, together with proposing this wave analogy, he retains his original claim that "the receptacle plays the role of cosmic *substratum* or *hypokeimenon*, the enduring subject of change" (2010, 121). Therefore, it is not clear at all whether it is a configuration or material *substratum* that Zeyl thinks of as the

4 My Reading

Now, I will give my translation of this passage (49c7–50a4),³² followed by a brief explanation of it (the defense of this reading will be given in the next section). As the controversy shows, it seems difficult to read through this entire passage, sticking to either the T or A reading.³³ Therefore, I have made decisions about which reading to adopt, on a sentence by sentence basis, from a grammatical as well as an interpretative point of view. The result becomes a hybrid of both readings, although I adopt the A-reading for the most important sentences.

(1) 49c7–d3: Then, since none of these ever appears the same in this way, which of them can one assert firmly to be *this*—whatever it may be—and not something else, without any embarrassment? (2) 49d3–4: One cannot. However, it is by far the safest to speak about these things in the following way. (3) 49d4–7: What we

identity preserver of a thing. Moreover, if some object changes its qualities while moving, it simply cannot preserve its identity since neither “the continuity of a configuration” nor the continuity of material is preserved. Therefore, I think that Zeyl’s attempt to reconcile the material view and the spatial view fails if he adheres to the *substratum* consequence view in his previous works (1975 and 2000). For a similar, but more general criticism against Zeyl 2010, see Buckels 2016, esp. 314–316.

³² Although this is a translation based on my understanding of the text, I have borrowed some expressions from previous translators such as Zeyl 2000 and Cornford 1935.

³³ Interpreters usually admit that the passage can be translated either way. E.g. Gill 1987, 36; Silverman 1992, 89; Gregory 2000, 189. However, interpreters have also pointed out several grammatical difficulties of either reading. As to the T-reading, I have already mentioned some grammatical problems above, esp. with regard to the redundancy of $\pi\tilde{\omega}\rho$ (49d6) and $\omicron\tilde{\omega}\tau\omega$ (e6). As to the grammatical difficulties of the A-reading, see n. 36 and n. 50 below.

always observe becoming different—for example, fire—at different times, we must speak not of *this*, but *what is such on each occasion* as “fire”, and speak not of *this*, but *what is ever such* as “water”. (4) 49d7–e2: Nor must we speak of that to which we point and use the expressions “that” and “this” and so think we are designating something, as any other thing [air, earth, etc.], as though it has any stability.³⁴ (5) 49e2–4: For it flees, without abiding, the expressions “this”, “that”, “here”, or any other expressions that exhibits them as being stable. (6) 49e4: It is not *these things* that we must call by each name (“fire”, “water” etc.),³⁵ (7) 49e5–6: but it is *such a thing which is moving around as similar in each and all cases* that we must call in that way (“fire”, “water” etc.). (8) 49e6–7: In fact, we must call *what is continually such* “fire”, and so with everything that has becoming. (9) 49e7–50a2: That in which each of them is always becoming and appearing, and again, from which they perish, in naming that alone must we use the words, “that” and “this”. (10) 50a2–4: But, that which is of whatever kind—hot or cold or any of the opposites—or any combination of these, we must not

³⁴ μηδὲ ἄλλο ποτὲ μηδὲν ὥς τινα ἔχον βεβαιότητα, ὅσα δεικνύντες τῷ ῥήματι τῷ τότε καὶ τοῦτο προσχρώμενοι δηλοῦν ἡγούμεθά τι. While both T and A readers take the ὅσα clause to depend upon ἄλλο μηδὲν, I take the ὅσα clause *alone* as an object of the supplied προσαγορεύειν, and ἄλλο μηδὲν as its complement. A-readers can avoid a serious grammatical problem by this move. See n. 50 below.

³⁵ ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἕκαστα μὴ λέγειν. I take ταῦτα (these things) as one of such demonstrative expressions as τοῦτο and τότε. However, on my reading it (ταῦτα) does not refer to the omitted subject of φεύγει (flees) in the previous sentence (5), since, as I will argue below, I take the omitted subject to be τὸ τοιοῦτον, which appears in (3) [49d5, 6], but not τοῦτο as all of the existing translations (both the T-reading and the A-reading) seem to take.

call that by any of these words (“that” and “this”).

I adopt the A-reading for (3), (7), and (8) for the reasons explained in the previous section. For (1), (5), and (10), on the other hand, the T-reading seems more natural.³⁶ This hybrid reading, with the A-reading adopted for the most controversial sentences, (3), (7), and (8), can be summarized as follows:

N1: We should not call *this* “fire” or “water”. (3), (4), (6)

N2: We should call *what is such* “fire” or “water”. (3), (7), (8)

N3: We should call only the Receptacle “this” or “that”. (9)

N4: We should not call phenomena “this” or “that”. (1), (5), (10)

It is clear that N1 and N2 form a pair, and N3 and N4 form another pair. The former pair contains statements about appropriate (and inappropriate) referents of such expressions as “fire” or “water”. The latter pair contains statements about appropriate (and inappropriate) referents of demonstratives, “this” or “that”. In addition, I propose that N1 makes a pair with N3, on the one hand, and N2 makes a pair with N4, on the

³⁶ The A-reading seems unnatural especially at (10): τὸ δὲ ὁποιοῦν τι, θερμὸν ἢ λευκὸν ἢ καὶ ὀτιοῦν τῶν ἐναντίων, καὶ πάνθ' ὅσα ἐκ τούτων, μηδὲν ἐκεῖνο αὖ τούτων καλεῖν. According to the A-reading, ἐκεῖνο is the object of καλεῖν (therefore, a referent of a name) and μηδὲν τούτων (which resumes τὸ δὲ ὁποιοῦν τι ... ἐκ τούτων) is the object complement of καλεῖν (therefore, a name). However, this seems unnatural, because neither “ὀτιοῦν τῶν ἐναντίων” nor “πάνθ' ὅσα ἐκ τούτων” seem to represent *names* by which people try to call phenomenal things, but rather *things themselves* (if they were supposed to be names, Timaeus would say “cold”, or “black”, rather than “the opposites”, and “house”, or “lamp”, for example, rather than “things constituted by components”). The same kind of confusion between things and their names seems to be found in the A-reading of (4). See n. 50 below.

other. The former pair contains statements about appropriate (and inappropriate) names of the Receptacle, and the latter contains statements about appropriate (and inappropriate) names of phenomena. That is, contrary to the interpretations of both T and A readers, I interpret *this* in N1 to represent the Receptacle, and contrary to the interpretation of A-readers, I interpret *what is such* in N2 to represent phenomena.

According to the A-reading, it is safest to call not *this*, but *what is such* “fire” or “water”, and A-readers have thus far interpreted *this* (τοῦτο) at 49d5, 6 to represent phenomenal objects³⁷ and *what is such* (τοιοῦτον) to represent “self-identical”, “recurrent” characters.³⁸ Therefore, according to A-readers, Plato means here that we should not call this phenomenon “fire” (because it can appear as water at any minute),³⁹ but that we should call a *self-identical character* “fire”, and so on.

³⁷ Of course, A-readers, like all the other interpreters, understand that Timaeus reveals later (50a1-2) that τοῦτο *actually* represents the Receptacle. What I mean here, and in the following, by “A-readers interpret τοῦτο to represent phenomena” is their interpretation that τοῦτο at 49d5, 6, and the ὁ clause at 49d4-5, which is in apposition to it, are meant by Timaeus to represent phenomena.

³⁸ According to Mills 1968, this τοιοῦτον is the Form of fire, since Plato often says that the appropriate referents of common names are Forms. However, Timaeus says that τὸ τοιοῦτον comes into being in the Receptacle, and perishes from it (49e7–50a1), but also says explicitly a little later that it is not Forms, but images of Forms, that are moving in and out of the Receptacle (52a). For this reason, Cherniss and Lee argue that the τοιοῦτον that moves in and out of the Receptacle is “distinct and self-identical characteristics” (Cherniss, 1954b, 128) or “recurrent, stable, and determinate characters” (Lee, 1967, 27). However, this *self-identical, recurrent* character has been regarded as the biggest disadvantage for the A-reading by interpreters. For, this mysterious fourth item is not explicitly mentioned by Timaeus anywhere in his tripartite ontology which he defines as consisting of Forms, sensible images of Forms, and the Receptacle (48e sqq.).

³⁹ However, there seems to be a subtle difference between Cherniss and Lee on how to understand “τοῦτο” (this phenomenon) here. Lee 1967, 20-23 explicitly argues that “τοῦτο” here represents a persisting phenomenal *subject* that keeps changing its qualities, and therefore, that the contrast

As we saw above, I adopt the A-reading for (3), (7), and (8), but I interpret *this* (τοῦτο) to represent *this part of the Receptacle*, even at the stage of 49d5-6, rather than *this phase* of phenomenal flux (Cherniss)⁴⁰ or this phenomenal *thing* (Lee)⁴¹, and *what is such* (τοιοῦτον) to represent *each distinct phenomenon*,⁴² such as a phenomenon of fire or water. That is, I understand that Plato is claiming that we should not refer to *this* part of the Receptacle as “fire” (since it may appear as water at any moment), but that we should refer to *each* phenomenon (in this case, a phenomenon of fire) as “fire”.⁴³ The following is a summary of differences between Cherniss’

between “τοῦτο” and “τοιοῦτον” here is between mutable subjects (a persisting phenomenal *thing* or substance) and characters or qualities. On the other hand, Cherniss 1954b, 116 critically mentions Eva Sachs 1917, 189 who obviously understands τοῦτο in the same way as Lee and translates τοῦτο as “die Substanz” and τοιοῦτον as “die Qualität”. So, Cherniss seems rather to think that “τοῦτο” here represents *this phase* of phenomenal flux. And the contrast between “τοῦτο” and “τοιοῦτον” seems to be, for Cherniss, between indistinguishable phases of phenomenal flux and “distinct and self-identical characteristics” (1954b, 128).

⁴⁰ Cherniss 1954b, 128.

⁴¹ Lee 1967, 20-23.

⁴² The phenomena that appear in the Receptacle are described as *each*, separate, phenomenon, such as that of fire, or that of water: ἐν ᾧ δὲ ἐγγιγνόμενα ἀεὶ ἕκαστα αὐτῶν φαντάζεται ... (49e7–8).

⁴³ Therefore, N2 above virtually means: “We should call a phenomenon of fire ‘fire’, a phenomenon of water ‘water’”. I received a critical comment on this from a reader of an earlier draft that N2, understood in this way, is a tautology and unhelpful at best. Actually, this criticism reminds me of a passage in the *Phaedo*, where Socrates introduces the formula to describe the natural world in his second voyage: it is the safest (ἀσφαλέστατον) to say that in terms of Beauty (the Form of Beauty) all the beautiful things are beautiful (*Phaedo* 100d7–e3). Although this formula has given many of the commentators the impression of being tautological (e.g., Shorey 1933, 179; Sedley 1998, 117-8. Cf. Vlastos 1969), the point of the formula seems to be the logical safety in describing this unreliable natural world. In the same way, the point of N2 seems to be a confirmation of logical safety in describing the unstable world, since, after all, what Timaeus seeks

reading (A1), Lee's reading (A2), my reading (A3), and Zeyl's reading (T) of the sentence (3):

A1: We should not call *this phase* of phenomenal flux "fire" but such and such recurrent character "fire".⁴⁴

A2: We should not call this phenomenal *thing* "fire" but such and such recurrent character "fire".⁴⁵

A3: We should not call this part of the Receptacle "fire" but such and such phenomenon "fire".⁴⁶

here is the "safest" (ἀσφαλέστατον) way of describing the natural world (*Timaeus* 49d3, 50b1), as in the case of Socrates' "safest" formula (*Phaedo* 100d7–e3). Having said that, however, N2 is certainly not just a tautological statement, especially when understood in contrast to N1. For, actually, N1 and N2 occur in a single sentence, and each of them should be understood in the light of the other. By this whole sentence, Timaeus means that, although it is not safe to call a certain part of the Receptacle (τοῦτο) "fire", since it may change to appear as water or air at any time (N1), it is "safe" to call a phenomenon of fire (τοιοῦτον) "fire" since it may not change into any other thing, but only escape or perish (N2). This is quite a radical revision of our understanding of the natural world, and thus, not just an unhelpful tautology.

⁴⁴ In Cherniss' interpretation (1954b, 128), the reason we cannot call this phase of phenomenal flux "fire" seems to be that we cannot distinguish each phase of the flux from any other phases.

⁴⁵ In Lee's interpretation (1967, 23), the reason we cannot call this phenomenal thing (or subject in his word) "fire" is that a phenomenal subject may be called "fire" at one time, but not at another time.

⁴⁶ Each phenomenon (e.g., a phenomenon of fire, a phenomenon of water, and so on) represented by "such" in my interpretation (A3) is not the same as the phenomenal thing in Lee's interpretation (A2) or in Zeyl's interpretation (T). Each phenomenon in my interpretation (A3) is something which comes to be in the Receptacle but perishes from it when another phenomenon approaches. The phenomenal thing (or subject) in (A2) is something that we mistakenly assume to persist through qualitative changes (therefore, we cannot refer to it). The phenomenal thing in (T), on the other hand, is something which actually persists through qualitative changes thanks to the underlying Receptacle. Furthermore, it seems that each phenomenon in my interpretation is not

T: We should not call a phenomenal *thing*, fire for example, “this”, but “what is such”.

the same as an indistinguishable phase of phenomenal flux in Cherniss’ interpretation (A1) either, because the former is distinct and mentionable, whereas the latter is indistinguishable from other phases of the flux (Cherniss, 1954b, 128). Silverman 1992, 93-5, argues that, according to Cherniss, the original difficulty of describing the natural world at 49b-d is caused mainly by spatial or regional indeterminateness. That is, he seems to think that Cherniss (rightly) understands that we cannot refer to phenomena in flux because they are not only qualitatively, but also spatially indeterminate. It is clear, however, that Timaeus thinks the difficulty is caused only by qualitative indeterminateness through time: οὕτω δὴ τούτων οὐδέποτε τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκάστων φανταζομένων, ποῖον αὐτῶν ὡς ὃν ὅτιοῦν τοῦτο καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο παγίως δισχυριζόμενος οὐκ αἰσχυνεῖται τις ἑαυτόν; ... ἀεὶ ὁ καθορῶμεν ἄλλοτε ἄλλη γιγνόμενον, ὡς πῦρ, μὴ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐκάστοτε προσαγορεύειν πῦρ... (49c7-d5). Although Cherniss 1954b, 114 translates “ἄλλοτε ἄλλη γιγνόμενον” here as “coming to be at different times *in different places*” (italics mine), it is more natural to take it as “becoming different at different times” as most of the translators do. This is because, in Cherniss’ translation, the qualitative change through time, which is clearly the central issue here, would not be even mentioned as a problem, but only the locative change. Following Cherniss, Silverman takes the problem of spatial indeterminateness seriously and goes on to say that “the feature-placing” language (e.g., “fiery here now”) unjustifiably assumes that the regions in the Receptacle in which the recurrent characteristics appear are determinate. According to Silverman, this problem will be solved by the introduction of the geometrical particles which delimit specific regions in the Receptacle (Silverman 1992, esp. 93-94. Cf. Cherniss 1954a, 25 n.18). However, I do not think that this line of argument is plausible. First, as I have showed above, at the original difficulty, Timaeus does not see spatial indeterminateness as a problem, but only qualitative indeterminateness. Second, I believe that the introduction of the geometrical particles does not help solve the alleged problem of spatial indeterminateness. It is true that Timaeus’ particle theory formulates geometrical figures, but I do not understand why this can be any more help than the traditional Forms and the Receptacle. For, after all, the particle theory does not tell us anything about the specific sizes of the particles and the specific regions where the particles actually appear at a specific time. Without this kind of information, I believe that the particle theory is no more useful than the Receptacle theory to the alleged problem.

5 “Touto” and “Toiouton”

Let us now see what τοῦτο (49d5, 6) really represents by examining the related passages. Look again at clauses (a) and (b) in sentences (3) and (4) (49d4–e2).

(3) (a) ἀεὶ ὁ καθορῶμεν ἄλλοτε ἄλλη γιγνόμενον, ὥς πῦρ, μὴ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον
ἐκάστοτε προσαγορεύειν πῦρ, μηδὲ ὕδωρ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀεὶ, (4) μηδὲ ἄλλο ποτὲ
μηδὲν ὥς τινα ἔχον βεβαιότητα, (b) ὅσα δεικνύντες τῷ ῥήματι τῷ τότε καὶ τοῦτο
προσγρῶμενοι δηλοῦν ἡγούμεθά τι.

In the existing interpretations, whether they conform to the T or A reading, (a) has been translated as “what we invariably observe becoming different at different times —fire, for example”, and has generally been understood to mean a phenomenon that we perceive.⁴⁷ Therefore, according to the T-reading, the first sentence says that we should refer to *a phenomenal thing* not as “this”, but as “such”. On the other hand, according to the A-reading, we should not refer to *this phenomenon (this phase of phenomenal flux, or this phenomenal thing)* as “fire”,⁴⁸ but instead, should refer to *such and such character* as “fire”.

⁴⁷ Archer-Hind 1888, 173; Cherniss 1954b, 114; Lee 1967, 5; Zeyl 2000, lvi, 38. In all of these translations, it seems that “ὥς πῦρ” is taken to be in apposition to “ὁ καθορῶμεν ἄλλοτε ἄλλη γιγνόμενον”.

⁴⁸ Cherniss 1954b, 128: “Because you cannot, by saying ‘this is ...,’ distinguish any phase of the flux from any other, you cannot say of any ‘this is fire’ or ‘this is water,’ etc”. Lee 1967, 21: “Plato’s reference to the sort of thing ὁ καθορῶμεν ἄλλοτε ἄλλη γιγνόμενον (49D4-5) covers any mutable ‘subjects’ such as the wine.”

The relative clause (b) is taken to depend upon ἄλλο μηδὲν (49d7) in both the T-reading and the A-reading. While T-readers take clause (b) (with ἄλλο μηδὲν) to be an object of προσαγορεύειν (“one should not refer to ἄλλο μηδὲν (τούτων) ὅσα ... as ‘this’”),⁴⁹ A-readers take it to be an object complement of the verb (“one should not refer to *this* as ἄλλο μηδὲν (τούτων) ὅσα ...”).⁵⁰ In either reading, it is understood that Plato is here prohibiting us from referring to phenomena as something stable.⁵¹

Although this understanding of these two clauses, (a) and (b), that both represent phenomena, might seem to be inevitable, I propose that these clauses (and τοῦτο at

⁴⁹ Zeyl 2000, lvii. See (4) in the section 3 above.

⁵⁰ This construction causes a serious grammatical problem to the A-reading. Lee 1967, 5 gives the translation: “neither <should we ever refer to that>—as though it had any permanence—by any other <of the terms> which we believe to have some definite meaning, as we point, and make use of the terms ‘this’ and ‘that’”. This translation is very unlikely, as Zeyl 1975, 136-7, with n. 29 rightly argues. For, if the (b) clause should be understood in this way, the whole clause (or the ἄλλο μηδὲν upon which it depends) has to be bracketed by such an expression as “by (any other) of the *terms*”, exactly as Lee himself translates. However, there is no such counterpart in the Greek text. Or, we might think that we should just understand the clause (with the ἄλλο μηδὲν) in the same way as πῦρ and ὕδωρ in 49d6 and add a quotation mark to the clause (with the ἄλλο μηδὲν) as we do to πῦρ and ὕδωρ. However, the translation in that case would be even worse. The unlikelihood of Lee’s translations comes from his forced attempt to treat “ἄλλο μηδὲν (τούτων) ὅσα ...” as a *mention* of a linguistic expression rather than a *use* of it (cf. Zeyl, 1975, 136, n. 29). Cherniss 1954b, 114, seems to have noticed this problem for the A-reading, and thus translates the sentence by using the form “to say A is B” rather than “to call something so and so” in order to avoid the problem: “not to say ‘this is fire’ [...] nor ever ‘<this>’, as if it had some permanence, ‘is some other’ of the things that we think we are designating as something when by way of pointing we use the term ‘this’ or ‘that’”. However, we cannot adopt this strategy. For, simply, the verb “προσαγορεύειν” cannot be translated as “to say A is B”, but only as “to call so and so”.

⁵¹ Zeyl 1975, 137, says “Now it is pretty clear (and apparently agreed by all) that what we are pointing to [the clause (b)] must be phenomena”.

49d5, 6, which is in apposition with (a)) actually represent the Receptacle, as I have briefly described in the previous section. An obvious objection to this proposal⁵² is that Timaeus has not officially introduced the Receptacle here at 49d4–7 (= (3)) and does not do so until 49e7–50a2 (= (9)). However, if we take into account not only the “safest answer” passage, but also the following passages, we will soon realize that this proposal is exactly what Plato intends. Let us look at three passages below:

Passage 1 (49e7–50a4)⁵³

But that in which they each appear to keep coming to be and from which they subsequently perish, *that's the only thing to refer to by means of the expressions “that” and “this”* (μόνον ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ προσαγορεύειν τῷ τε τοῦτο καὶ τῷ τόδε προσχρωμένους ὀνόματι). A thing that is some “such” or other, however,—hot or white, say, or any one of the opposites, and all things constituted by these—should be called none of these things [i.e., “this” or “that”].
(Italics mine)

Passage 2 (50a5–b3)

Suppose you were molding gold into every shape there is, going on nonstop remolding one

⁵² I will also deal with another possible objection to this proposal at the end of this section.

⁵³ Translations of Passage 1, 2, and 3 are all taken from Zeyl 2000. Although I have given my translation of Passage 1 as (9) and (10) in section 4, there is no structural difference between Zeyl's translation and mine in these sentences. For, as to the first sentence, or (9), there is no disagreement between T and A readers, and as to the second sentence, or (10), I adopt the T-reading, as I have argued in n. 36 above.

shape into the next. *If someone then were to point at one of them* (δεικνύντος δὴ τινος αὐτῶν ἐν) *and ask you, “what is it?”, your safest answer by far, with respect to truth, would be to say, “gold”, but never “triangle” or any of the other shapes that come to be in the gold...* (Italics mine.)

Passage 3 (51a4–6)

This, of course, is the reason why we shouldn’t call the mother or receptacle of what has come to be, of what is visible or perceivable in every other way, either earth or air, fire, or water, or any of their compounds or their constituents.

In these passages, the things that we are told to not refer to by common names such as “hot”, “white”, “triangle”, “earth”, or “air” are *not* the phenomena that we see, but the parts of the Receptacle that underlie those phenomena. In clause (b), in particular, Timaeus says, “that to which we *point and use the expressions ‘that’ and ‘this’*” (ὅσα δεικνύντες τῷ ῥήματι τῷ τόδε καὶ τοῦτο προσχρώμενοι).⁵⁴ However, in Passage 1, he explicitly says that the Receptacle is the appropriate referent of the demonstratives “this” and “that”, and in Passage 2, he says that what we point at (δεικνύειν) is the Receptacle (or gold in this metaphor).

From these pieces of evidence, it is clear that Plato cautiously prepares for the official introduction of the Receptacle at 49e7–50a2 by intentionally using beforehand

⁵⁴ ὅσα is the plural form, but of course that does not cause any trouble to the interpretation of it as *some parts or regions* of the Receptacle.

the same expressions (τόδε, τοῦτο, and δεικνύειν) that he is going to use afterwards to officially introduce the Receptacle.⁵⁵ Therefore, I claim that what relative clauses (a) and (b) indicate is not a phenomenon (a “*phase* of phenomenal flux” in Cherniss’ interpretation, or a phenomenal *thing* in Lee’s interpretation), but (some parts of) the

⁵⁵ From an anonymous referee I received a comment that my interpretation reads two very different meanings (or uses) into the occurrences of “τοῦτο” in 49d5 and 6: the one is merely an anaphoric use (because I point out on p.25-6 that τοῦτο at 49d5, 6 is in apposition with the preceding phrase, αἰὲν ὁ καθορῶμεν ἄλλοτε ἄλλῃ γιγνόμενον, ὡς πῦρ), and the other is an ontologically loaded use, referring to a special sort of entities, namely parts of the Receptacle (because I also argue here that the same τοῦτο at 49d5, 6 already refers to the Receptacle). As to this comment, first, I would like to make sure that Plato’s special (ontologically loaded) use of “τοῦτο” is clearly derived from the ordinary use of the word. It is true that Plato’s use of “τοῦτο” is ontologically loaded. However, he obviously does not make up this use out of nowhere. It must be derived from its original deictic function. That is, in our ordinary use of the language, we point to something in front of us and say, “this is fire”, for example, assuming that the thing preserves its identity even if it loses its fiery quality and becomes watery afterward. So, when we say “this is water” afterward, “this” refers to the same thing as before, which preserves its identity over quality changes (so we assume). However, Plato argues against this kind of ordinary assumption that there is nothing that preserves its identity over quality changes, except its location (the Receptacle) where those qualities appear and disappear. In this line of argument, when Timaeus says that “this” only refers to the Receptacle, it is clear that the newly introduced function of the word is derived from its original deictic function (and I believe that the same story goes for Aristotle’s use of “τόδε τι” and Russell’s logically proper name). Second, it might be pointed out that anaphoric use of “this” (i.e., reference to an antecedent expression in context) is different from the spatially deictic use of “this” (i.e., reference to a physically proximate object), but I doubt that Plato is clear about this subtle grammatical difference (and indeed there often occur ambiguous uses of demonstratives in modern languages). Therefore, we could (and I actually do) interpret the sentence at 49d4-7 as follows: We must not, by “fire”, refer to what we always observe becoming different—for example, fire—at different times, namely, *this* (pretending to point to the space in front of us), but *what is such on each occasion*.

Receptacle,⁵⁶ even though the Receptacle has not officially been introduced yet.⁵⁷

As a result of this, I do not consider the relative clause in (a)—“what we invariably observe becoming different at different times”—to be in apposition to “fire, for example”, as both T and A-readers seem to have interpreted, but take “fire” to be an example of “different” in the clause, and translate the whole clause as follows: “what we invariably observe becoming different—for example, fire—at different times”.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ I have received comments on this interpretation from several people that it is not the Receptacle, but the phenomena that become (γίγνεσθαι). That is true indeed (cf. 50c7-d2). The clause (a), however, only says, “What we always observe becoming ...” (ἀεὶ ὁ καθορώμεν ... γιγνόμενον), and when Timaeus explicitly explains the Receptacle at 51a1-b6, he says “the part of it [the Receptacle] that gets ignited appears on each occasion as fire” (πῦρ μὲν ἐκάστοτε αὐτοῦ τὸ πεπυρωμένον μέρος φαίνεσθαι). If it is acceptable for Timaeus to attribute “to appear as fire” to part of the Receptacle, it seems to be perfectly acceptable to attribute the clause “(which) we observe becoming fire” to it, too.

⁵⁷ In this sense, I think that the sentences with “touto” in the safest answer passage are meant by Plato to be *de re*, and making successful references to the Receptacle *even if one doesn’t know anything about the Receptacle and means to refer to a phenomenal thing by “touto”*. Harte 2007 persuasively argues that the prisoners in the cave analogy of the *Republic* VII succeed in referring to real things (e.g., a real ox outside the cave) by their use of the terms (e.g., “ox”) even though they have never learned about real things outside the cave and believe their terms refer to what are in fact shadows. I think that this also holds true for the use of “touto” in the safest answer passage.

⁵⁸ I received a comment from an anonymous referee that, if it is in apposition to ὡς πῦρ, ἄλλη is strange, and we would rather expect, “ἀεὶ ὁ καθορώμεν ἄλλοτε ἄλλο γιγνόμενον ὡς πῦρ”, as we see “φαίνεται ... δι’ ἐκεῖνα ἄλλοτε ἄλλοιόν” at 50c4-5. However, if this is strange, almost all the other translations that take ἄλλη to be a complement to γιγνόμενον (i.e., “becoming different”) would be strange, too. The only exception to this among the existing translations is the one which takes ἄλλη as “in different places” (cf. Cherniss 1954b, 114; Strobel 2007, 312). But, as I argued in n. 46, it is more natural to take it as, “becoming *different* at different times”, as most translators do, because the other translation (“coming to be at different times *in different places*”) does not pick up the qualitative change through time (e.g., the change from fire to water) as a problem, although it is clearly the central issue here.

Regarding (b), I propose *not* to take it to depend upon ἄλλο μηδὲν (49d7), as most translators do, but to construe this relative clause (b) *alone* as an object of the supplied προσαγορεύειν, and ἄλλο μηδὲν as its complement. Thus, my translation is: “Nor must we speak of that to which we point and use the expressions ‘that’ and ‘this’ and so think we are designating something, as any other thing [air, earth, etc.], as though it has any stability”.⁵⁹

If this interpretation is on the right track, N1 makes a pair with N3, as we saw above, and they mean that we should not call the Receptacle “fire” or “water”, but only “this” or “that”.

Next, let us see what τοιοῦτον represents. As I claimed above, I interpret τοιοῦτον to represent *each* distinct phenomenon such as a phenomenon of fire or water, contrary to Cherniss’ and Lee’s interpretation (i.e. the “self-identical” and “recurrent” character of fire or water). Thus, I interpret N2 as forming a pair with N4, with them meaning that we should not call τοιοῦτον (each phenomenon) “this” or “that”, but “fire” or “water”.

Immediately after proposing the safest answer for describing the phenomenal world in flux, Timaeus gives us a reason for this proposal:

(5) φεύγει γὰρ οὐχ ὑπομένον τὴν τοῦ τόδε καὶ τοῦτο καὶ τὴν τῶδε καὶ πᾶσαν ὅση μόνιμα ὡς

ὄντα αὐτὰ ἐνδείκνυται φάσις. (49e2–4)

⁵⁹ By this construction and translation, I can avoid the serious grammatical problem that arises for the existing translations of A-readers. See n. 50 above.

For it flees, without abiding, the expressions “this”, “that”, “here”, or any other expressions that exhibits them as being stable.

In the existing interpretations (whether drawn from A or T readings), the omitted subject of the verb “φεύγει” (flees) has been regarded as a persisting phenomenal thing that keeps changing its qualities. That is, scholars have interpreted this sentence to mean that a persisting thing gets away from those expressions that define it as being of this or that quality, and that it keeps changing its qualities.⁶⁰ However, I propose that the omitted subject is actually τὸ τοιοῦτον, which appears three and four lines earlier (49d5, 6), and to interpret the sentence to mean that “what is such” (i.e., each phenomenon, e.g., a phenomenon of fire) gets away from the demonstratives that define it as staying in *this* place or *that* place, and it does not keep staying in one place. I have two reasons for this. First, if we take into account the insights that are revealed later, as we did above, we can say that demonstratives such as “this” or “that” are supposed to indicate only specific parts of the Receptacle, rather than to specify this quality or that quality. Second, the most reasonable interpretation of the dative-case demonstrative “τῷδε”, as underlined in the citation above, is to regard it as indicating a certain place (or a thing in which each phenomenon appears), and as meaning “here”, “in this thing”, or “in this part of the Receptacle”. In fact, scholars have had great

⁶⁰ Both T and A readers seem to interpret the sentence generally in this way, although there is some disagreement as to the grammatical subject of φεύγει. See Taylor 1928, 316; Cherniss 1954b, 117; Lee 1967, 6; Zeyl 1975, 137. However, despite the difference, all interpreters agree on the general point that the subject is a phenomenal *thing* that keeps changing its qualities.

difficulty interpreting this word.⁶¹ However, if we interpret the whole sentence to mean that *each* particular phenomenon (not a persisting phenomenal thing), for instance, a phenomenon of fire, gets away from such labels as “this”, “that”, or “here” that attempt to assign each phenomenon to a certain place (a certain part of the Receptacle), then, we can deal with the “τῷδε” properly.

The significant consequence that follows from the differences between the existing interpretations and mine is that, in the latter, it is possible to take *what is such* (τὸ τοιοῦτον) to represent a phenomenon, since I do not take *this* (τοῦτο) and other demonstratives at 49d5-e4 to represent phenomena, but (some parts of) the Receptacle. In Cherniss’ and Lee’s interpretations, in contrast, *this* (τοῦτο) and other demonstratives there represent phenomena (transient phases of phenomenal flux, or persisting phenomenal things), and *what is such* (τὸ τοιοῦτον) represents self-identical, recurrent characters. It seems that part of the reason why Cherniss and Lee have to introduce the fourth item (“recurrent characters”) here, which they clearly distinguish from phenomena, is that they interpret *this* (τοῦτο) at 49d5, 6 to be a phenomenon, and therefore, cannot interpret *what is such* (τὸ τοιοῦτον) to be a phenomenon. On the other hand, in my interpretation, *this* (τοῦτο) there represents a certain part of the Receptacle. Therefore, I can interpret *what is such* (τὸ τοιοῦτον) to simply be the phenomena that we perceive. Thus, in my interpretation, it is possible to make

⁶¹ It is simply omitted by many interpreters, including Cornford 1935, 179 with n. 3; Lee 1967, 5; Gill 1987, 35, n. 1; Zeyl 2000, lvii, 39. Cherniss 1954b, 118 omits it, because “it is absent from Simplicius’ quotation of this passage (*Phys.*, p. 224, 4-5)”. Others suggest emendations, e.g., Taylor 1928, 317–8.

references to the phenomenal world, although those references are to fleeting phenomena, but not to persisting physical “things”. In addition, I do not have to, as Cherniss and Lee do, squeeze the mysterious fourth item into Timaeus’ ontology, which he explicitly declares to consist of only three kinds: Forms, sensible images of Forms, and the Receptacle (48e sqq.). For, in my interpretation, each distinct phenomenon, represented by “τοιοῦτον”, surely corresponds to sensible images of Forms. This is one of the biggest advantages of my interpretation over Cherniss’ and Lee’s, because many commentators on the Receptacle passage either reject or question their reading due to the strangeness of the fourth item.⁶²

However, I must emphasize again that Cherniss’ and Lee’s phenomena (i.e., the indistinguishable phases of phenomenal flux, and the phenomenal thing that persists over qualitative changes, respectively), represented by “this” (τοῦτο) at 49d5, are not the same as each phenomenon, represented by *what is such* (τὸ τοιοῦτον), in my interpretation. For, while the former is a thing that retains its identity through qualitative changes (Lee), or an indistinguishable phase of phenomenal flux (Cherniss), the latter is each distinct phenomenon (e.g., a phenomenon of fire) that comes to be in and perishes from a certain part of the Receptacle.⁶³

⁶² Gulley 1960, 64; Zeyl 1975, 134–5; Gill 1987, 41; Gregory 2000, 190; Johansen 2004, 120, n. 5; Mason 2016, 130–1.

⁶³ As Cherniss and Lee persistently emphasize, τὸ τοιοῦτον of 49c7–50a4, in every occurrence, seems to accompany expressions indicating permanence (τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐκάστοτε, d5–6; τὸ τοιοῦτον αἰεί, d6–7; τὸ τοιοῦτον αἰεί περιφερόμενον ὅμοιον, e5; τὸ διὰ παντὸς τοιοῦτον, e6–7). Based on these expressions, Cherniss and Lee seem to construe them as universal (i.e. “recurrent”, “self-identical”) characters. Cornford 1935, 179, n. 5, on the other hand, tries to construe these τὸ

Among the proposals to solve the problem for the A-reading of inviting the fourth item, the most plausible and influential is the one proposed by Silverman.⁶⁴ He attempts to solve this problem for A-readers (“reconstructionist” in his words) by introducing the following schema⁶⁵:

(1) Forms

(2) Phenomenon = (2a) a region of the Receptacle + (2b) self-identical, recurrent characteristics.

Whereas the critics mistakenly count in all the items in this schema and criticize the

τοιούτων expressions in a collective way: “There is *at all times* (διὰ παντός) a certain amount of stuff that is fiery. This quality is sufficiently ‘alike’ (ὅμοιον) to be recognised and named, though it is not an enduring substance, and is perpetually varying” (italics his). In my interpretation, τὸ τοιούτων as each phenomenon (e.g., a phenomenon of fire), is a sensible entity, unlike Cherniss’ or Lee’s τὸ τοιούτων. However, I leave it open as to whether my sensible τοιούτων is universal or particular. Buckels 2018 curiously translates “τοιούτων” as “this-such” and argues that “τοιαῦτα” represents, not immanent universals, but property-instances (e.g. this-fieriness) or tropes in the terminology of contemporary metaphysics. So, he takes the contrast between τοῦτο and τοιούτων in our passage to be that between “this” and “this-such” (17). This proposal is very unlikely. First, obviously enough, we cannot translate τοιούτων as “this-such” in any way, but only as “such”. Second, Buckels connects his translation of τοιούτων as “this-such” to the terminology in contemporary metaphysics, saying that “Timaeus’ τὰ τοιαῦτα are ... tropes, which metaphysicians [E.g. Schaffer 2001, 247] still call this-suches”. Actually, the use of “this-such” in contemporary metaphysics is clearly derived from Aristotle’s usage of “τόδε τοιόνδε” (cf. Wiggins 2001, 210). However, as I have argued at the end of section 3 above, there is no room in Timaeus’ ontology for Aristotle’s “τόδε τοιόνδε” even under Zeyl’s T-reading, let alone under the A-reading (including mine). Although, as I have just said above, I am open to either option—taking τοιαῦτα as repeatable, universal properties, or as particular, non-repeatable property-instances, I believe his move of interpreting τοιαῦτα as “this-suches” in order to arrive at the latter option is very bad.

⁶⁴ Silverman 1992.

⁶⁵ Silverman 1992, 92. I have modified the schema a little for the sake of the argument.

A-reading for inviting four items in Timaeus' ontology, Silverman argues that the phenomenon actually consists of a region of the Receptacle and self-identical, recurrent characteristics; therefore, there need to be only three basic kinds: Forms, the Receptacle, and self-identical, recurrent characteristics (Form copies). This is an ingenious approach, but I cannot accept this proposal for the following reasons: First, while one of the three Timaeian basic kinds is the Form copy, which must correspond to (2b) in his schema (because, if it corresponds to (2) itself, there will be four basic kinds, after all), these "self-identical and recurrent characteristics" seem to be interpreted as non-sensible in his interpretation,⁶⁶ as well as in Cherniss' and Lee's. Timaeus, however, explicitly argues that the Form copy, as one of his three basic kinds, is sensible (52a), and that is why I have repeatedly insisted that the Form copy in my interpretation (τὸ τοιοῦτον) is sensible. Second, one of the main reasons Silverman argues that phenomenon in the Receptacle passage is a compound (as shown in his scheme) is that he interprets Timaeus' remark at 48bc, that the traditional four elements do not qualify even as syllables (συλλαβαί), let alone primitive elements (στοιχεῖα), as being dealt with in the Receptacle passage (49a sqq.). However, since Timaeus' remark at 48bc is properly answered in the geometrical particle theory (i.e., the four elements consist of more fundamental triangles⁶⁷), I think we do not have to expect it to be answered in the Receptacle passage. I agree with Silverman that the

⁶⁶ Later in his argument, Silverman 1992, 94 argues that the recurrent characteristics are, like their originals (the Forms), logically distinct, but non-spatial. It is obvious from this that he understands the recurrent characteristics to be non-sensible, as Cherniss and Lee did.

⁶⁷ Timaeus even suggests that there could be more fundamental elements than the triangles (53d).

concept of phenomenal particulars (phenomenal things) is revised after the introduction of the Receptacle, but I would rather propose the following schema instead of his:

(1') Forms

(2') Phenomenal things = (2'a) a region of the Receptacle + (2'b) each perceptible phenomenon (i.e., *toiouton*).

I also have to add that these compounds (i.e., (2')) exist only in the unenlightened minds of ordinary people, and that each phenomenon that we can directly refer to (i.e., (2'b)) does not involve (consist of) a region of the Receptacle.

Lastly, I would also like to mention another possible objection to my proposal that *τοῦτο* at 49d5, 6 represents the Receptacle even before its official introduction at 49e7-50a2. Some people might say that this proposal does not necessarily conflict with the existing interpretation of A-readers that *τοῦτο* at 49d5, 6 represents phenomena. For, this existing interpretation could, in theory, mean that *τοῦτο* here represents phenomena *in our unenlightened minds*, but at the same time represents the Receptacle *in the enlightened mind of the speaker, Timaeus*.

I willingly admit that Plato himself seems to have set up this double context for this passage. This is because this passage (or the entire dialogue) is spoken by Timaeus, the enlightened one, although, at the same time, in the two relative clauses, *ἀεὶ ὁ καθορῶμεν ἄλλοτε ἄλλη γινόμενον* (49d4-5), and *ὅσα δεικνύντες τῷ ῥήματι τῷ τόδε καὶ τοῦτο προσχρώμενοι δηλοῦν ἡγοούμεθά τι* (49d7-e2), the subjects of the verbs are “we”, the unenlightened ones. However, it is clear that Cherniss and Lee do not adopt

this option, and that they interpret τοῦτο at 49d5, 6 to simply represent phenomena, because they do not suggest any such option.⁶⁸ As I have just argued, their understanding that τοῦτο at 49d5, 6 simply represents phenomena seems to lead to their understanding that τοιοῦτον, in contrast, represents something different from phenomena (i.e., “self-identical”, “recurrent” characters).

In this connection, an interpretation that appears somewhat similar to the double context option is proposed by R. Mohr, who adopts the A-reading, but interprets the contrast between τοῦτο and τοιοῦτον as that between the phenomena in flux and the phenomena as images of Forms.⁶⁹ Therefore, in his version of the A-reading, we should not call the phenomena in flux (τοῦτο) “fire” or “water”, but the phenomena as images of Forms (τοιοῦτον) “fire” or “water”.⁷⁰ However, this strategy of attributing a “double aspect” to Plato’s phenomena invites the natural criticism that it attributes to Plato contradictory views about the phenomena.⁷¹

⁶⁸ Indeed, in the summary of his arguments, Cherniss 1954b, 128, says “If at any time anywhere one tries to distinguish any phase of the phenomenal flux from any other by saying ‘this,’ one *always in fact* points to the permanent, unchanging, and characterless receptacle...” (italics mine). However, Cherniss here clearly summarizes Timaeus’ argument after the introduction of the Receptacle (49e7ff.), and he does not seem to say that “τοῦτο” *even at 49d5, 6* is meant by Timaeus to represent some part of the Receptacle.

⁶⁹ Mohr 1980, 142, says “The phenomena, then, have a double aspect. On the one hand, they are in flux; on the other hand, they are images of Ideas.”

⁷⁰ Mohr 1980, 144, says “As in flux, the phenomena cannot be identified according to kind. The mutability of the phenomena draws into doubt their intelligibility and even their very existence. On the other hand, as images of Ideas, the phenomena are subject to the predication τοιοῦτον, are saved from utter non-existence, and can be identified according to kind.”

⁷¹ Gill 1987, 43, n. 22, says “Mohr, who attributes to Plato a doctrine that phenomena have a

In contrast, my extended proposal of the double context option is immune from such criticism. For, in this option, we do not have to attribute to Plato contradictory views about the phenomena. Rather, we interpret Plato as revising our unenlightened view of the phenomena that there exist the persisting phenomenal things which we can call “this” in the natural world, into the enlightened view that there only exists each distinct, but fleeting phenomenon (without the *substratum*) called “such” in each part of the Receptacle in the natural world. Thus, at this final stage, I would like to modify my position to this double context option, because this option does justice to our intuitive interpretation that “touto” at 49d5, 6 (before the official introduction of the Receptacle) refers to phenomena, but at the same time, admits my interpretation that Plato cautiously hints that “touto” at 49d5, 6 actually refers to part of the Receptacle.⁷² It is clear that this extended proposal of the double context option is made possible only by the explicit awareness that τοῦτο at 49d5, 6 represents the Receptacle, at least in the enlightened mind. The lack of this very awareness seems to

double aspect, as *this*, and as *such*, has Plato both affirming and denying that we can call phenomenal fire ‘fire.’ [...] Such a theory does fuse the extra realm with the realm of γινόμενα, and it does of course allow Plato to say contradictory things about the phenomena”.

⁷² Notomi 1998, 28, n.8, also says that “whereas they [Cherniss and Lee] take ‘τοῦτο’ to refer to the ‘phenomena’ presented immediately before, I take it as an anticipation of calling the Receptacle ‘τοῦτο’ below at 49e7-50a4”. However, he follows Cherniss and Lee in separating the sensible phenomena (appearances) from Form copies (τοιούτων) and, therefore, does not regard Form copies as the sensible phenomena, as I have consistently argued. Rather, Notomi (21) seems to think that the phenomenon (this appearance) is a compound of a specific region of the Receptacle and non-sensible Form copies (τοιούτων), and this is basically the same as Silverman’s schema, which I have refuted above (p. 34-5).

cause trouble to the interpretations of other A-readers (Cherniss, Lee, and Mohr).

6 Conclusion

I have argued thus far that, as to the controversial passage (49c–50a) of the Receptacle, there are significant problems in Zeyl’s reading, both in grammatical and interpretative aspects. According to Zeyl’s highly influential interpretation, “this” (touto) in the passage represents identifying expressions, while “such” (toiouton) represents predicative expressions. In section 3, however, I have shown that this interpretation is not only grammatically unpersuasive, but also incompatible with his own reading of the passage. In sections 4 and 5, I have proposed a hybrid reading, which combines the traditional reading with Cherniss’ and Lee’s alternative reading, although it follows the alternative reading in the most important sentences. However, I have accompanied this hybrid reading with the new interpretation of “this” (touto) even at 49d5-6 representing the Receptacle, at least in the enlightened mind, and “such” (toiouton) representing *each phenomenon* (e.g., a phenomenon of fire) which does not survive qualitative changes, by arguing against the existing alternative interpretation that “this” (touto) at 49d5-6 represents this phase of phenomenal flux (Cherniss) or this phenomenal thing (Lee), and that “such” (toiouton) represents a “self-identical”, “recurrent” character (e.g. the lasting character of fire) which they distinguish from perceivable phenomena.

It is a great advantage of my interpretation over Cherniss’ and Lee’s that it does not have to introduce this mysterious fourth item into Timaeus’ tripartite ontology,

since it is almost generally agreed recently that this fourth item (the self-identical characters) is the biggest obstacle for interpreters to adopt their reading. Other than this point, my interpretation has implications that are quite different from those of Zeyl's interpretation, as well as of Cherniss' and Lee's. First, it leads to the phenomenalist consequence that Plato envisages such a radical flux in the natural world that it cannot contain "things" or substances, whereas Zeyl's reading was supposed (at least by Zeyl and his followers) to bring about the *substratum* consequence that there is a certain stability in the natural world to the extent that it can contain persisting "things" thanks to the Receptacle (*substratum*). Second, despite this phenomenalist consequence, my interpretation allows us to make direct references to *each* phenomenon (if not a phenomenal thing),⁷³ whereas the existing alternative readers' interpretation does not.⁷⁴

Archer-Hind, R. D. 1888. *The Timaeus of Plato*. London.

⁷³ On this point, my interpretation conflicts with one of Cherniss' original motivations for proposing the A-reading (see n.9 above). However, now that his opponent's (i.e. Owen's) thesis that the *Timaeus* was composed in Plato's middle period seems to have lost its persuasiveness, the implication of the thesis that Plato allows us to make direct references to phenomena in the *Timaeus* has also been changed completely. However, the inquiry into this problem is beyond the scope of this article.

⁷⁴ Earlier versions of this paper benefited greatly from the feedback of many people. I wish to thank especially Professors Masashi Nakahata, Yuji Kurihara, Yahei Kanayama, Satoshi Ogihara and Dr. Toshihiro Wada. I would also like to thank two anonymous referees for *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* for their thoughtful comments. I am solely responsible for any remaining defects.

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