1. Bcological Psychology (J.J. Gibson) and Enaction Theory (F.J. Varela and others) both require a new ontology and a new epistemology: the ontology that avoids the dichotomy Realism/Idealism, the epistemology that avoids the dichotomy Objectivism/Subjectivism. In the respect, these two theories coincide with the philosophy of M. Merleau-Ponty.
2. Therefore, we can provide a good philosophical basis to Third-Generation Cognitive Sciences (of which Ecological Psychology and Enaction Theory are two major contributions) by following Merleau-Ponty. On the other hand, we can re-estimate the scope of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy in the light of recent studies in cognitive sciences. For example, we may construe Gibson's and Merleau-Ponty's ontology as "Realism of disposition" (KONO).
3. Cognition is not performed by a brain, but by brain-body-environment system. Even form a connectionist point of view, we can refute the Identity Theory of Mind, if we admit this (NOBUHARA). Anti-representationalism, purported by both Gibson and Varela, could be compatible with connectionism, if we construe the latter in the context of brain-body-environment system (NOGAWA).
4. Cognitive Semantics (G. Lakoff, M. Johnson, and others) have failed to acknowledge the intersubjectivity of linguistic meaning construction. On the basis of the recent researches in Developmental Psychology, especially studies on "theory of mind", this deficiency can be removed (NAKAMURA). And we may reconceptualize communication from the perspective of "behavior", not that of "representation", by reinterpreting Relevance Theory (D. Sperber and D. Wilson) as a meat-theory of mind.