

## VIII. Environmental Ethics

### A Critical Approach to the Japanese Collective Idea of “Nature”

Akitsu Taki

#### 1. Introduction

The Japanese words for love and nature, each *ai* 愛 and *shizen* 自然, both colloquial in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, were brought into use in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century as translations from the European languages. Despite the historical fact, most of the Japanese people today, working at office or factory isolated from “nature”, if asked whether they love nature, will probably say definitely yes, without thinking over what the *yes* implies. They will often go to hardly approachable places on holidays and enjoy amazing landscapes there. They are well aware, however, that the access to those places has been provided owing to the development of the land *en route*, that is, the highways, bridges and tunnels through which to approach there. One can take many other examples like this. People living in Japan are more or less aware of their direct and indirect commitment to “modifying”, if not “destroying” or “degrading”, “nature” and yet most of them will not deny that they “love” “nature”. That is also the case more or less with workers in the other industrialized countries. Too much civilization, convenience and artificiality in their daily life may arouse a kind of nostalgia. This might well explain the present collective psychology but how has such mentality been socially formed? Truly, it is often said that Japanese people are collectively a nation who ‘love’ ‘nature’. Even so, why could they have fostered such a mixture of personally “loving” but collectively radically modifying “nature”? My answer, apart from its generalizability to people in the other industrialized countries, is that Japanese people, living in a proper tradition in which the sensible insentient things such as mountains, rivers and trees are idealized or deified, have been collectively committed *both* to assimilating their individual *egos* to their family or country as an idealized totality *and* to exploiting the concrete sensible world for the protection of such totality. This collective commitment, to whatever extent under the pressure of social conformity

in each historical age, has involved an ethical egoism: utilizing other lives as a means for one's own existence. One who is living in a local community in the Japanese archipelago, therefore, should deliberately in quest for extra-communal distributive equity disengage oneself from this collective commitment of the Japanese previous generations'. I will argue for these contentions.

## 2. Methodological Preliminary Remarks

A social group's collective, or a single person's, mostly a literary author's or work's, idea of nature is comparatively a favorite topic in the Japanese modern literature. National Diet Library Online Public Access Catalog lists among the items printed from the late 19<sup>th</sup> century on nearly 1400 books or articles including in their title or subtitle "Idea of Nature" *shizen-kan* 自然観 or "Concept of Nature" *shizen-gainen* 自然概念, as is the same with "Idea of Life and Death" *shi-sei-kan* 死生観 and "Idea of Human" *ningen-kan* 人間観, and especially nearly 130 books or articles entitled "A/The Idea of Nature the Japanese People Hold" *Nihon-jin no shizen-kan* 日本人の自然観.

However, the approach to the subject matter concerned, that is, how a or the collective idea of "nature" attributed to the Japanese people can be justifiably deduced, is problematic. (1) People have lived and formed a society in the geographical area in and around the islands the 21<sup>st</sup> century nation state Japan governed under its administration but the time when the ruling class used the title "Japan" 日本 to call to the Chinese dynasty the area they governed is not earlier than the late seventh century CE. The hypothesis that all the people living in the Japanese archipelago were conscious of living in Japan all the time in history is clearly wrong. (2) Some people living in the Japanese archipelago have expressed in literary prose or verse their attachment to, or praise of, the sensible things around them, such as mountains, rivers, climate, air, flowers, trees and familiar animals. However, how could one justifiably deduce from those limited resources a collective idea attributed to all the "Japanese" people? (3) It is a logical fallacy to deduce from someone's discourse on those sensible things his or her concept of nature. The deduction doubly begs the question<sup>3</sup>. One who tries thus already presupposes what it is to be nature and what the Japanese people presupposed it

---

<sup>3</sup> For such deduction, see Tsuda (1916) 393.

was to be nature. (4) At least before the word *shizen* 自然 began in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century to be used as a translation from the word for nature in the European languages, the word for nature in the European languages was not in use among the ordinary people living in the Japanese archipelago. Even after that, it has been polysemous<sup>4</sup>. (5) The discourse concerned with ‘nature’ in the past, even if collected without committing logical fallacies, would be limited, not universal. Some literary people among the ruling class in the past might have spent their leisure time composing discourse on what seems to modern literary people related to ‘nature’ but there used to be non-literary and even illiterate many. A literary few’s praise of ‘nature’ is perhaps a kind of detachment, but not disengagement, from the community’s collective commitment. (6) Some Buddhists or Shintoists also literarily worked on what modern literary people call ‘nature’. Under the influence of a Chinese Buddhism, the Tendai School<sup>5</sup>, they advocated that even the insentient such as mountains, rivers, trees, grasses, rocks etc., had the same potency of deciding to, and doing successfully, go beyond the sensible world (or become a Buddha in Buddhism) as human beings had<sup>6</sup>. They practiced such

<sup>4</sup> Yanabu (1977); Soper (1995).

<sup>5</sup> In Buddhism, Buddha-nature, *Buddha-dhātu* 仏性, also called buddha-embryo (*tathagatagarbha* 如来藏) or thusness (*tathata* 真如), is what inheres in a thing and makes it what it is to be a Buddha. Buddha-nature liberates the things in which it inheres from the world where they are annoyed with being in or out of agony and delivers them into *nirvana* Buddha enters, where the state of being in or out of agony expires. What kind of thing finds in itself Buddha-nature, starts to train itself to be what it is to be a Buddha, and perfects itself in realizing the Buddha-nature varies among schools. In China, whereas Fazang, known as Hozo in Japan, 法藏 (643-712), from the Huayan school 華嚴宗, denied trees and plants Buddhahood for the reason that the insentient were not open to awakening (Akao (1984) 407), Jizang, known as Kichizo in Japan, 吉藏 (549-623), extending Buddhahood to the insentient for the reason that things in the phenomenal world are not out of the Middle Way, Buddhahood (一色一香皆為顯道(T45.94c)('T' is an abbreviation for *Taisho Tripitaka*)) (Okuno (1998) 93-96.), that under the aspect seen by the perfect wisdom (理内) the insentient are of Buddhahood (草木亦有仏性 此是对理外無仏性 以弃理内有仏性) ('On Buddha-nature' *The Principle of Mahayana Buddhism* 『仏性義』 『大乘玄論』) (T45.40b) (Shirato (1998) 19) and that direct and indirect causation are not different (以依正不二故、衆生有仏性則草木有仏性 (ibid., T45.40b-c)), yet finally deny trees and plants the Buddhahood open to awakening (Miyamoto (1961) 683-6). However, earlier in the Tendai order, Zhiyi 智顛 (538-597) in his lecture entitled *Great Meditation* in 594 (摩訶止観) already proposed that things in the phenomenal world are not out of the Middle Way 一色一香無非中道 (T46.1c) (『円頓者、初縁実相造境即中無不真实、繫縁法界一念法界 一色一香無非中道』 'The perfect and instant attainment of Buddhahood means recognizing that the actuality is in the chain of causation from the beginning of practice; and that the object is the middle, not out of the truth. All the beings and phenomena are interdependent and an ideation at an instant include the whole of the universe. Neither a twig of flower nor a twist of incense is out of the Middle Way.' (tr. by A. Taki)). Based on this proposition of Zhiyi's, Zhanran, known as Tanzen in Japan, 湛然 (711-782), extended Buddha-nature to the insentient in his exegesis of Zhiyi's lecture (『摩訶止観輔行傳弘決』). He disputed with those who denied Buddha-nature to the insentient in his book entitled *Disputation by Dint of the Sharp Scalpel* 『金剛鐮論』, saying that Buddha-nature inheres in "one grass, one tree, one pebble, and one dust", for the reason that the awareness of the truth inherence and the practice contributing to the awareness as well as the truth intrinsic to the sentient also inhere in those insentient ("That is to say, one Buddha-nature and one chain of causation inheres in one grass, one tree, one pebble and one dust each and they are equipped with causation by intellect and practice" (tr. by A. Taki) 乃謂一草一木一礫一塵。各一佛性各一因果具足縁了(T1932, 784b)). For some intellectual receptacle through which some Japanese Buddhists were to extend Buddha-nature beyond animals into plants, see Miyamoto (1961) 673; Imamichi (1983) 4-6.

<sup>6</sup> Saicho, 最澄 (767-822), founder of the Japanese Tendai school, already mentioned the insentient's Buddha-nature in his exegesis

going-beyond on “mountains”, meaning at their temples and shrines on a hill or a mountain. Japanese lay people might have partaken of such an idealized conceptual scheme but in practice did not renounce their worldly existence. Hence, like a literary few’s, a religious few’s self-unification to ‘nature’ is collusive with the community’s collective commitment.

For these reasons I will make a detour around these faults often found in the previous work and focus on both the rulers’ policies over people’s life conditions and people’s commitment to the policies. To be specific, instead of discussing the so-called Japanese collective idea of ‘nature’, I will enquire through the rulers’ policies how people in the Japanese archipelago have dealt with their own life conditions. This approach requires much historical evidence in the detail but in order to show a methodological contrast with the previous approaches I will in the main body below prefer to concentrate on my central argument while leaving some specific supports for further enquiry.

---

on Zhanran’s *Disputation by Dint of the Sharp Scalpel* (『註金剛鐮論』)(『伝教大師全集』3, 314 (Fuchida (2003) 60)) and in his book entitled *Questions of the Tendai Order* 『天台宗未決』 (‘Under the aspect of an instant ideation shedding over the three thousand realms there is no difference between the sentient and the insentient. . . the essence of the entities is identical with, not different from, Buddha-nature’ 三千一念中 心悉皆具足 情与非情 本来不二、 . . . 法性即仏性不異也) (Shirato (1998) 23). An’nen 安然 (841?-915?) was the first to propose a theory of the attainment of Buddhahood by trees and plants and admitted in his *An Exegesis of the Attainment of Buddhahood* 『樹定草木成佛私記』 and *An Exegesis of the Rise for Awakening* 『菩提心義抄』 that trees and plants, although insentient, spontaneously decide and train themselves for the attainment of Buddhahood, thus perfecting themselves into Buddhahood. Ryogen 良源 (912-985), according to a later edition of biographies of Japanese Buddhists, the *Genko-Shakusho* 『元亨釈書』 3.4 and the *Taihei-ki*, vol. 24 『太平記』, in dispute with Chuzan 仲算, from Hosso-shu, on the universalizability of the Buddhahood attainment 一切衆生皆成仏 at the *Owa Doctrinal Dispute* in 963, contended against Chuzan’s denial of practicing Buddha-nature. In the writing transmitted under Ryogen’s authorship, entitled *Trees’ and Plants’ Determination, Training and Buddhahood Attainment* 『草木発心修行成仏記』, it was categorically stated that trees and plants determine, train and attain Buddhahood. Genshin 源信 (942-1017), a disciple of Ryogen, in his book entitled *An Exegesis on the Three Ways of Buddha-Body* 『三身義私記』, admitted the insentient’s Buddhahood attainment but denied the spontaneity in determination, practice and Buddhahood attainment. His reason was that the sentient was to be distinguished from the insentient and that there was no documentary evidence for the spontaneity (Fuchida (2003) 61). However, Genshin described a flower with which he honoured and worshipped Buddha as mediator to the attainment of Buddhahood in saying, “When I honoured and worshipped Buddha, dedicating a petal of flower and burning a twist of incense, then since ‘the phenomenal world are not out of the Middle Way’ a Buddha is the whole truth, and therefore a Buddha is the whole Buddha; and therefore, innumerable Buddhas in the ten realms of the universe are at the same time honoured and worshipped” (*On the Idea of Thusness (tathata)* 『真如觀』, quoted in Watanabe, Y. (2000) 4-5). Among the later Buddhists of the Tendai school, however, it was open to question whether determination and training were admitted to trees and plants. They raised the questions of why insentient entities could determine or practice and why it is not a sin to kill trees and plants if they are sentient. Among several works of the vocal parts of the *Noh* theatre 能, *yokyoku* 謡曲, in the 14<sup>th</sup> century, trees’ and plants’ Buddhahood attainment is referred to as the venerable teaching of Buddha but in the *Sumizome-zakura*, *Ink-dyed cherry-blossom*, under the source of *Intermediate-State Sutra*, 中陰經 (Miyamoto (1961): 674.). However, in the sutra entitled *Intermediate-State Sutra*, 中陰經, a story of Buddha’s preaches in the period after *nirvana*, translated by Chu Fo-nien 竺佛念 in the era of Late Qin (384-417), trees’ and plants’ Buddhahood attainment is not mentioned. Therefore Miyamoto concluded that trees’ and plants’ Buddhahood attainment was invented in Japan (Miyamoto (1961) 264; see also Shirato (1998) 17-18).

First of all, during the 70 years' political economy of Japan under the 1946 constitution after the defeat in the Second World War, almost all the Japanese political leaders have professed that the country Japan is small in area and short in resources, food and energy, and advocated from this presupposition that Japanese people can hardly realize their full self-sufficiency in food and energy.

In what follows I will propose two hypotheses of mine, one factual and another evaluative. The first one is that the attitude of belittling one's own country mentioned above, although at least admitting of a historically practicable alternative, has been continuous in the past rulers' policies in the Japanese archipelago, perhaps since the storage economy started during the age of hunting and gathering. The second is that the policy of partly or wholly both inter-communalizing and intra-communalizing some other communities cannot be justified until realizing the equity in distribution among all the other communities is in parallel envisaged within the limits of the global total self-sufficiency.

### **3. A Theory on the Belittling of One's Own Territory**

Saying simply that a country is small involves *secundum quid*. The proposition is not meaningful unless the speaker determines by what measure it is small. Even if it is meant to be "small in area" as usually supposed, it is still not absolutely small. A given area is surely absolute in quantity. For example, the area the present administration of Japan claims to govern is about 380,000 square kilometers. However, whether or not one should value the given area relatively low depends on how one should measure the quantity. Three square meters is sometimes too small and sometimes too large. Furthermore, a country relatively low in some quantity can be relatively high by another measure. A "small" country is not always low by any other measure. Furthermore, an increase in area does not necessarily entail an increase by any other measure. Bigger does not necessarily entail better by any measure. Repeating "Japan is small" is, therefore, not a rational attitude.

### **4. A Practical Alternative to the Self-Belittling of Japan**

A country at one time can be becoming smaller in area for its population increase. It can also be becoming shorter in a resource for the population increase. However, since the rate of self-sufficiency in a resource is a quotient of the total amount of the resource divided by the population, neither enlarging the resident area nor acquiring the resource from the outside will be the only solution. Decreasing the population in absolute quantity is an alternative in theory. No member of a community, however, would agree to choose this alternative. However, decreasing the population increase rate is an alternative collectively more practicable. Furthermore, a higher rate of self-sufficiency will be a good alternative. Likewise, even if the highest possible efficiency in the use of the resource concerned does not meet the full self-sufficiency, developing some alternative resource will be a third alternative. Eventually, the time may come when all the possible alternatives are not going to redeem the full self-sufficiency. However, it does not follow that filling the shortage by enlarging the territory is collectively preferable to depopulation.

A practical alternative used to be collectively chosen in history in the Japanese archipelago. The local and national administrators in the Tokugawa regime, although potentially not without the high spirits of economic growth, constrained themselves from enlarging their territory beyond their boundaries. Reliable statistics show that net agricultural product supported the full self-sufficiency in food<sup>7</sup>. Also people lived without having to import raw materials from overseas. Even after a large-scale international trade started in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, as reliable statistics suggest, the net agricultural product did not decrease. After the defeat in the Second World War some political leaders<sup>8</sup> and agronomists<sup>9</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup> See Crawcour (1979); Saito (2013) 246-248; 「石高」 ‘*Kokudaka*’, *Wikipedia*. Townsend Harris, U.S. merchant and first consul general in Japan suggested Japan’s self-sufficiency at that time (Consenza (1959<sup>2</sup>) 330; 485).

<sup>8</sup> Prime Minister Tetsu Katayama (1887-1978), graduated from the Imperial University of Tokyo, a lawyer and the first Chairman of the Japan Socialist Party, discussed on 1st July 1947 in his statement of his cabinet’s policy in the first Diet session under the 1946 Constitution after the Second World War Japan’s economic reality at that time and its ultimate cause (Katayama (1947)) but did not mention as a possible cause that Japan had been, or originally was, small and poor in resources and food. Nor did Prime Minister Hitoshi Ashida (1887-1959), DLL (graduated from the Imperial University of Tokyo, diplomat and the First President of the Japan Liberal Party) in his statement of his cabinet’s policy on 20th March 1948, but rather avowed to seek for a collective self-sufficiency in the middle of the hardships immediately after the war (Ashida (1948)). See also the Economy Stabilization Headquarter (1947), *Summary, A Report on the Reality of Economy*.

<sup>9</sup> A few years after the end of the war, around the time when the pre-war assumption of Japan’s deficiency in land and resources appeared in public again, there were some agronomists who did not state or even suggest that it was theoretically or practically impossible that Japan was self-sufficient in food. For example, see Kimbei Toi, 東井金平, Director of Foreign Affairs, General Institute of Agriculture, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 農林省農業総合研究所海外部長, (1951) 8-9 (graduated from the University of Keio, member of the journal *Shakai Shiso* (Social Thoughts), local government officer of Kobe City, in the pre-war time

claimed that the full self-sufficiency in food was not impracticable. With machines and chemicals, the national net rice product in 1980's rose up to 10 million tons, that is, nearly 6.6 million *kokus*, the amount equal to the annual food consumption by nearly 6.6 million people<sup>10</sup>. Surely the net rice product has not been far enough to feed the total population living in the Japanese archipelago but the extents of ordinary or abrupt annual shortage have not been so much as to justify the policy of collective expansionism for future food security (see *Appendix*).

## 5. The Japanese Post-War Political Discourse of Self-Belittling

After the defeat in the total warfare Japanese policy-makers and policy-drafters<sup>11</sup> under the democracy of the 1946 constitution have continued mentioning in public that their country is small in area and short in resources<sup>12</sup>. So have Japanese business leaders<sup>13</sup>. Forced by the allied forces' occupation

---

(Umeda (1998) 48). Some others stated that Japan's food deficiency was due to political failure (S. Iwamatsu, later Professor of Economy at the University of Nagasaki and President, the Japan Congress against A- and H-Bombs (1950) esp. 38-39; Yasuo Kondo, pre-war Professor of Agronomy, Imperial University of Tokyo (1951) 66). With reference to England's early 19<sup>th</sup>-century policy of free trade against its domestic agriculture and/or to the advisor for the Supreme Commander for the Allied Power, William J. Logan's 1949 instruction of resource importation priority against the background of the surplus cereal products in America, they argued that the Japanese small-scale land management adaptable to the cultivation of rice and wheat did not agree with the policy that the national economy will become better in the international division of labour if a nation imports low-priced agricultural products and offers them to the workers in the division of manufacture, thus forcing the agricultural management to be rationalized and shifting an excess of domestic workforce from the division of agriculture to the division of manufacture. Even among some present agronomists Japan's pre-war political failure in the self-sufficiency in food is suggested (see Inoue (1973); Iinuma (1979); Hayashi (1996). For England's early 19<sup>th</sup>-century policy of free trade against its domestic agriculture, see D. Ricardo (1817) *contra* Malthus (1815). Malthus (1815) argues that the importation of low-priced corn would damage the home agriculture, saying 'I think it must be allowed further, that no loss, in proportion to its amount, affects the interest of the nation so deeply, and vitally, and is so difficult to recover, as the loss of agricultural capital and produce (7).' He also argues that international free trade is impracticable, saying, '...; in short, that it must be allowed that a free trade in corn would, in all ordinary cases, not only secure a cheaper, but a more steady, supply of grain. / In expressing this distinct opinion on the effects of a free trade in corn, I certainly meant to refer to a trade really free—that is, a trade by which a nation would be entitled to its share of the produce of the commercial world, according to its means of purchasing, whether that produce were plentiful or scanty. In this sense I adhere strictly to the opinion I then gave; but, since that period, an event has occurred which has shewn, in the clearest manner, that it is entirely out of our power, even in time of peace, to obtain a free trade in corn, or an approximation towards it, whatever may be our wishes on the subject.' (10-11) The ultimate reason is that intra-communal trade is not everlastingly secured beyond a nation state's sovereignty (17-18).

<sup>10</sup> Yano Tsuneta Memorial Foundation (ed.) (1981) 177-178.

<sup>11</sup> For the bureaucrats under the 1946 constitution as policy-drafters, see Shiroyama et al. (1999); Nishio (2003<sup>2</sup>) esp. 98-108.

<sup>12</sup> The Economy Stabilization Headquarter (ed.) (1947) *Summary* 10; *ibid.*, 'The People's Living'; Aoki (1949); The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (1949) "Our National Economy's Dependency on the Overseas Products"; *ibid* (1949) *Preface* (see also Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, General McArthur's letter to Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, purporting to notify *the Nine Principles of Economic Stabilization* (General Headquarters, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (1948))); The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (1974) *Conclusion, White Paper*; *id.* (1980) *Conclusion, White Paper*; *id.* (1990) 1.3.3; *id.* (2003) 4.1.3.1; The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (2009) 3.1.1; *id.* (2011) 2.3. Business and political leaders have not explained how the Japanese industrial structure have highly depended on import from overseas for energy.

<sup>13</sup> The Industry Planning Commission, a private think tank presided by Yasuzaemon Matsunaga, a founder of nine electric companies, and constituted of some leading heavy chemical industry company executives and some influential Liberal Democratic Party members, issued in 1958 the sixth recommendation entitled "A Wrong Energy Policy", purporting that because it was high-priced domestic coal products that raised the cost of highly competitive export products in Japan and because an excessive quantity of oil was supplied at a

administration to be disengaged from the pre-war military expansionism and participate in international division of labour<sup>14</sup>, Japanese people have been collectively committed to developing heavy chemical industries and trading their products internationally, in order to secure their own food and resources in the international division of labour. Under that collective commitment, their land resources have been exhaustively exploited for higher transport and communication efficiency in land and sea<sup>15</sup>. Thus the self-belittling attitude or growth-supremacy has led Japanese people to commit themselves to heightening material international interdependency, thus seeking for the self-sufficiency in food and energy among more than one country. However, at least the leaders' mentality whether conscious or subconscious, especially in the post-war first few decades, is not very different from the forefathers<sup>16</sup>.

## 6. The Japanese Pre-War Political Discourse of Self-Belittling

The political leaders of the newly established Meiji regime, who, born of the lower or middle military class from some powerful local feuds, had revolted against,

---

much lower price by Arab countries, the government should lift the protection of domestic coal production and import oil from overseas without tariff. The recommenders were trying to make a rational decision, considering the world economic situation after the Second World War. Their recommendation was politically influential on the Japanese energy transition from coal to oil. While labelling the government's protectionism as "isolationism" 「孤立主義」 and "claim to self-sufficiency" 「自給政策」 (5), they argued from the proposal that modern industry and social life were run by mass energy consumption and that their quantitative development was not without more of the consumption (18). They were not committing their proposal to further analysis. This attitude suggests that the government and most of the policy makers at that time would have shared the assumption. See also the Industry Planning Commission (ed.) (1958), *Appendix* 'The Basic Problems of Our Country's Energy Policy'. Also, the fundamental policy of securing energy resources in conjunction with the development of industries was already suggested in the beginning of Japan's nuclear energy policy in the 1950's (see Article 1, Basic Atomic Energy Act, (1955); see also Atomic Energy Commission (1956)). The top objective for the civil utilization of nuclear energy, decided by leaders in the political, business and academic world in 1954, was to secure energy supply in the future (see The Atomic Energy Utilization Research and Preparation Committee (1954)).

<sup>14</sup> The US occupation policy under Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) in effect changed from the de-industrialization, to the economic reconstruction, of Japan, in so far as Japan participated in the international division of labour (see Article 14, San Francisco Peace Treaty 1951 and Prime Minister Yoshida's speech at San Francisco Peace Conference on 7th September 1951). General McArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, sent to Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida on 19<sup>th</sup> December 1948 a letter on the principles of the Japanese economic stabilization. His text on behalf of the United States of Government, quite politically influential in leaving the government and the nation no room of the right to self-determination and in effect leading Prime Minister Yoshida to dismiss the Diet session the next day for the overall renewal of the government's policies, showed the directive addressed to the Government and the nation of Japan, saying in a threatening tone "If [the objectives herein stated are] not [accomplished], Japan shall fall into ruin." However, in requiring for the economic independence, not termed 'self-sufficiency', by increasing production and promoting exportation, McArthur presupposed, whether in the sense of a short or long term, that Japan was in shortage of food and resources, which retrospectively seems to me to have authorized Japanese policy makers' public reference thereafter, unlike the two preceding prime ministers, to a negative and belittling view of Japan's land and resources, implying a negative view of collective self-sufficiency.

<sup>15</sup> The Economic Planning Agency (1962); Tanaka (1972); Shoji and Miyamoto (1964); id. (1975); Hanayama (1978) 1-52.

<sup>16</sup> As Prime Minister Yoshida's speech at San Francisco Peace Conference on 7<sup>th</sup> September 1951 did not avoid implying, the government of Japan in the post-war restoration did not abandon the go-beyond policy but acquiesced in mitigating the policy under the de-militarization of the 1946 Constitution or pursuing it within the limits of the frame of "world democracy and world freedom" (Yoshida, S. (1951)).

and defeated, the Tokugawa military regime, could not find any motivation to continue to stop pursuing nationally a military expansionism formerly long reticent in the local military feuds<sup>17</sup>. Through the two wars against a single nation, the Sino-Japanese war and the Russo-Japanese war, a self-belittling attitude was deeply rooted in the politico-military leaders but it gained more moment after the First World War as they became more aware that they had to prepare for total warfare. This attitude permeated many other people in society too<sup>18</sup>.

The cause of expansionism, as always, was “defence”<sup>19</sup> but in the primary sense, not of individual community members but of “country” *kuni* 国 or “country-family” or “state-as-family” *kokka* 国家, both ideas, although usually used as the translation for a country, a nation, or a state, yet in this context totality in the abstract. For that cause the political and military leaders and the subordinates planned to mobilize every human and material resource available merely as means<sup>20</sup>, and specifically to seek for the full self-sufficiency by

---

<sup>17</sup> Some revolutionary militant leaders already proposed an expedition to the Korean Peninsula, Sakhalin, and Taiwan even before the revolutionary war ended (Ohyama (1978)). See also the reports drafted by Aritomo Yamagata (1838-1922), field marshal and twice prime minister, most influential in forming the political administration and military force of the Empire of Japan: Yamagata (1871; 1880; 1882; 1890); for Lorenz von Stein’s theory, influential over Yamagata (1890), see Kato (2002) 82-97; for the 1907 national defence guideline of the Empire 「帝国国防方針」, earlier drafted by Giichi Tanaka and revised by Yamagata (quoted by Shimanuki (1973)): “Article 1: The Imperial policies have been conducted in accordance with the country’s principle enacted at the beginning of the Meiji era, “Open the country and make progress” [開国進取], and, no doubt, never in disaccord; so that more in accord from now on shall the country’s proper claim [国権] be urged to be to more interests and the national welfare, to be higher; hence, if the country’s claim be willed to more interests, and the national welfare, higher, then, whereas many regions of the world are to be managed, *both* the concessions at Manchuria and Korea, which, in the war waged in the 37<sup>th</sup> and 38<sup>th</sup> years of the Meiji era [the Russo-Japan War], had been gained at the sacrifice of tens of thousands of live spirits and an enormous amount of goods, *and* the development of civilian powers in South Asia and on the other side of the Pacific Sea, shall, among all other regions, be protected, not least, enlarged; that is what must be the greatest of the Imperial policies; therefore the national defense by the Imperial force shall be designed on the basis of the fundamentals of the country’s policies; in other words, another country if it intends to infringe on our country’s proper claim, and if it is placed at least in East Asia, shall need be committed to our aggression; ... Article 3: Considering the Imperial military history, the principle of retrogression has, from the ancient times to date, been devoted to only by the Tokugawa regime; no others have refused progress [進取]; that is, recently, in the wars waged in the 27<sup>th</sup> and 28<sup>th</sup> years [the Sino-Japanese War] and in the 33<sup>th</sup> year and in the 37<sup>th</sup> and 38<sup>th</sup> years of the Meiji era, a great victory was won by electing the policy of aggression; this history obviously demonstrates the Japanese collective characteristic; hence, if the time should come when there is no choice but to take arms, this characteristic of ours could not but be relied on; on balance, the chances are slim that any tactics disagreeable to a nation’s characteristic has gained much.”; see also Kurono (2002) 26-38.

<sup>18</sup> In the middle of the Sino-Japanese War (1894), Soho Tokutomi 徳富蘇峰 (1863-1957), converted from a democratic pacifist, already proposed that the go-beyond policy was originated from the opening of the country 開国 in the final decades of the Tokugawa regime (Tokutomi (1894) 84-85).

<sup>19</sup> The government administrators, when they decided to invade Taiwan, had intended to *defend* Japan (*The Protocol on the Action against the Indigenous Tribe in Taiwan* (1874)).

<sup>20</sup> As early as in 1874, seven years after the Meiji Revolution, the nation’s need for coal, iron and oil was made clear by K. Otori (1879), a former Tokugawa shogunate military strategist and later a Meiji regime governor of Hokkaido Development Bureau, in his handbook on the utilization of coal. The text implies that a policy maker understood that the primary energy for the nation’s economy had shifted from rice, wheat, cotton, hemp, wood and rock to coal, iron and oil and that because of the wants in coal, iron, and oil, the region the newly-established government ruled was to be developed by their exportation. The specified scientific arts in that handbook also imply that the government was intending to develop their nation by transforming the phenomenal world materially and

unilaterally expanding the territory and intra-communalizing some other communities<sup>21</sup> (see Graph 2 in *Appendix*). This mentality had been fostered not only in the newly-established modern education for the civil and military high-rank officers<sup>22</sup> but also in the tradition of Buddhism and Shintoism. Japanese intellectuals, policy-makers and policy-drafters, mentally committed to the Japanese Buddhism or Shintoism or their mixture under the influence of the Tendai School might have tended to idealize things in the sensible world, following the indiscrimination in Buddhahood in the super-sensible world<sup>23</sup> but at the same time, because of such idealism, also might have ignored the effect of their real and concrete degeneration they committed<sup>24</sup>.

## 7. The Potential Self-Belittling in the Tokugawa Era

As argued before, people were totally self-sufficient in food and energy inside the area the Tokugawa regime governed in the Japanese archipelago but as the ruling military non-producer class forced the hamlet producers in trades called *hyakusho* 百姓, mainly composed of the farmers, to tribute, in the total of each hamlet, not individually, their products and resources, so the hamlet elders led the community members to exploit their own land resources as much as possible<sup>25</sup>. Hence, although the earlier ideologists attributed the legitimacy of the Tokugawa regime to ‘natural order’, an unalterable and uninvented law behind the sensible world<sup>26</sup>, the ruled farmers as well as the ruling militants were committed to

---

spatio-temporally by means of the Western science and technology. See also a policy maker’s explanation for public infrastructure improvement work national bond, 1878 (quoted in Sakano (2009) 35).

<sup>21</sup> E.g. Kuniaki Koiso (1917), *The Imperial Defense Resources* 『帝國国防資源』 (quoted by Kuzuhara (2001) 37): “Our country’s best policy in between wars is to gain superiority in raising the most necessary resources for the independent war-conducting economy both by developing domestic industry and by utilizing and exhausting the resources in China.”

<sup>22</sup> For the education for the civilian high-rank officers, see The Commission of the Study on the Pre-War Bureaucracy (ed.) and Hata (1981) 447-657; Hata (2004); Ushioji (1984) 12-14; 126-141; Shimizu (2013) 189-201; for the education for the military high-rank officers, see Hata (1991); Kurono (2004).

<sup>23</sup> Nichiren in his short dissertation entitled *Disputation on Trees’ and Plants’ Attainment of Buddhahood* 『草木成仏口訣』 explores through discussing the presuppositions in the Chinese and Japanese predecessors’ theories of trees’ and plants’ attainment of Buddhahood a fundamental principle underlying the phenomenal world, that is, the ultimate de-differentiating interactivity structurally to precondition our phenomenal distinction between the sentient and the insentient and the activity and the passivity in our practice (Nichiren (1272), *Disputation on Trees’ and Plants’ Attainment of Buddhahood*). Dogen is primarily concerned as Nichiren is, not merely with extending Buddha-nature to trees and plants but with exploring the structure of the ultimate de-differentiating interactivity preconditioning the contradistinction in the phenomenal world between the subject and its objects.

<sup>24</sup> Buddhist moral philosophers have repeatedly argued about human beings’ ordinary destruction of trees’ and plants’ life (see, e.g., Maeda (1996) 36-39; Watanabe, Y. (2000) 14-15).

<sup>25</sup> Watanabe, T. (2013) 53-92; 209-258.

<sup>26</sup> Maruyama (1952), *Postscript*, 369. See also *ibid.* 208.

expanding their given limits in their technological and feudal conditions in order to secure the continuity of their idealized family<sup>27</sup>.

## 8. The Expansionism in and before the Inter-Local-Powers Warring Era

The Tokugawa nationwide regime succeeded the previous Hideyoshi nationwide regime's demilitarization of hamlet farmers but local militant powers before had been warring against their neighbours for nearly a hundred years. The military and political leaders exploited and mobilized, for the security of their idealized family, the resources and manpower in the area they governed<sup>28</sup>. This policy can be traced back to the Shogunate commissioned military collector's management of the local community and further back to the tenth century locally deployed military commander-in-chiefs' transaction with local soldier-and-farmers<sup>29</sup>. Perhaps, the potency to expand the given limits for food and energy security germinated in the storage economy in the age of hunting and gathering<sup>30</sup>.

## 9. Ethical Implications of the Collective Self-Belittling Attitude

On the historical sketches proposed above, I hypothesize that in the Japanese archipelago the political and/or military leaders and the ordinary people following them have been committed to belittling their given life conditions (thereby mistaken in their true self-sufficiency) and expanding their limits for the cause of their security. Since the idea of self-belittling is illusory, the moral principles from that idea are also illusory. Hence, the policy of unilaterally intra-communalizing some other communities beyond one's own boundaries may increase the total benefit of one's community members or secure the community's

---

<sup>27</sup> Watanabe, T. (2013) 98-102; 263-265; Nishikawa (1977-78). See also Joshin (Shigemasa) Miura 'Of the tiding that gold miners have been found in countries', *Keicho Era Tidings*, vol. 7 三浦浄心 (茂正) 「諸国に金山あること」『慶長見聞集』(富山房 袖珍名著文庫 巻25) 巻7; *ibid.*, 'Of the tiding that His Excellency has built the town of Edo by burying the sea in the south' 「南海を埋め江戸町立て給ふ事」.

<sup>28</sup> Toshikage Asakura's *Seventeen Codes*, 16th century; Article 30, *The Imagawas' Formularies in Syllabary Characters*, (16th century); Article 17, *Announcement of the Codes in Kai Country*, in: *Koyo Gunkan (Militaristic Instructions in Kai Country)*. *Jin-Kai Shu (Dust and Dirt Collection or A Collection of Codes)* 塵芥集 (1537), 222 (see Text 44); 'The Codes Promulgated on the Venerable Shrine Kaito' *The Will of Suenaga Takezaki* (1293), 374; *The Will of Seishin Hayaki*, 378.

<sup>29</sup> Article 3, *the Adjudication Codes* 御成敗式目, promulgated in 1232; *Codes over Local Wrongdoings*, promulgated in 1346; Article 36, Article 38, and Article 43, *the Adjudication Codes* 御成敗式目.

<sup>30</sup> Testart (1982).

continuity. Bilateral intra-communalization between two communities based on all the individual members' agreement or some inter-agreed collective decision process such as referendum may be ideally preferable for the total self-sufficiency the two communities enjoy; and resultant discriminations in some aspects such as economy may be committed to further democratic revision. However, a practical bilateral or multilateral economic interdependency through the mechanism of the market economy in the real international politics is still problematic for the reason that (1) the existent economic discrimination both international and domestic remains and perhaps, as a result, degenerates; (2) the policy decision process is not necessarily fully known or open to the vulnerable. Surely, the bilateral international agreement may undergo revisions and modifications in the practical democratic process. However, the bilateralism or multilateralism, however realistic in the real international political negotiations, could only secure the self-sufficiency limited to the people concerned. Such a limited self-sufficiency policy, if distributive inequity were left outside the newly-created community, would be morally a kind of collective egoism. Hence, if the distributive equity every individual of humankind benefits from were to be pursued, a limited self-sufficiency policy should be added to by the practical process for the realization of such a global distributive equity. Therefore, one who is living in a local community in the Japanese archipelago should pursue a democratic process conducive to such global justice by disengaging oneself from the collective commitment to the belittling of the country Japan. Otherwise one could not disengage oneself from exploiting the community resources and humanity for the idealized totalitarian idea of country or nation and in truth deteriorating one's own life conditions.

## **Bibliography**

- The Adjudication Codes, Goseibaisikimoku*, 御成敗式目, in: Ishii et al. (eds.)(1972). Akao, Y. (1984), 赤尾栄慶「法蔵にみえる草木成仏について」[‘On Trees’ and Plants’ Attainment of Buddhahood in Fazang’], *Indian and Buddhist Studies*, 64, 404-407.
- Announcement of the Codes in Kai Country*, in: *Koyo Gunkan* 『甲陽軍艦』 (*Militaristic Instructions in Kai Country*).
- Aoki, T., 青木孝義, (1949), the Statement of Economic Policies at the House of Councillors, 4th April 1949.

*Asahi Shimbun* (Asahi Newspaper Company) (1930), *The Statistical Conspectus of Japan's Economy in the Meiji and Taisho Eras*, 2 vols 『明治・大正期 日本経済統計総観』 2 卷 (reproduced in 1999).

Ashida, H., 芦田均, (1948), Prime Minister Hitoshi Ashida's statement of his cabinet's policy on 20th March 1948.

Atomic Energy Commission, *The Basic Plans of the Development and Utilization of Atomic Energy*, 1956.

The Atomic Energy Utilization Research and Preparation Committee (1954).

Basic Atomic Energy Act (1955).

*Codes over Local Wrongdoings*, in: Ishii et al. (eds.)(1972) 160.

'The Codes Promulgated on the Venerable Shrine Kaito' *The Will of Suenaga Takezaki* [commissioned contractor village-resident-warrior in Higo Country] (1293), Ishii et al. (eds.)(1972), 374.

The Commission of the Study on the Pre-War Bureaucracy (ed.) and Ikuhiko Hata (1981), *The System, Organization and Personnel of the Pre-War Bureaucracy of Japan*, Tokyo: Tokyo University Press. 戦前期官僚制研究会編/秦郁彦著 (1981) 『戦前期日本官僚制の制度・組織・人事』 東京大学出版会.

Consenza, M.E. (1959<sup>2</sup>), *The Complete Journal of Townsend Harris*, Vermont and Tokyo.

Crawcour, E.S. (1979), 'Nihon-Keizai iko no arikata: kinnsei kara kinndai e' ['the Way of Transmission in the Japanese Economy: from the Pre-Modern to the Modern Times'] in: Y. Yasuba and H. Shimbo (ed.) (1979), *Kindai-iko-ki no Nihon Keizai* [*The Japanese Economy in the Modern Transition Age*], Tokyo, Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 15-28.

Dogen, 道元, *Shobogenzo*, 『正法眼蔵』.

The Economic Planning Agency (1962) *Summary, National Total Development Plan*.

The Economy Stabilization Headquarter (1947) *Summary, A Report on the Reality of Economy*.

The Economy Stabilization Headquarter (ed.)(1947) *Summary 10, A Report on the Reality of Economy* 経済安定本部(1947) 「総説」 『経済実相報告書』.

Fuchida, U., 澗田雲溪, (2003), 「『真言本母集』における草木成仏について」 ('Trees' and Plants' Attainment of Buddhahood in Shingon-Hombo-shu) 『密教文化』 210, 57-81.

General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Government section, Public Administration Section, Public Administration Division (1946), 'Memorandum to Chief, Government Section, dated 12 February 1946, signed by all but three of those participating in drafting of Constitution. Persons not signing, 1st Lt. Milton J. Esmon, Mr. Philip O. Keeney, and Miss Beate Sirota -- Inclosure, Mimeographed Copy No. 4 of draft presented to Japanese Government', National Diet Library, Japan (Ref: Alfred Hussey Papers; Constitution File No. 1, Doc. No. 12).

General Headquarters, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (1948), *The Nine Principles of Economic Stabilization*, tentatively tr. into Japanese by the Headquarter of

- Economic Stabilization (<http://www.archives.go.jp/ayumi>) .
- Hanayama, Y., 華山謙, (1978), *Kankyo-Seisaku wo Kangaeru* [*Thinking over Environmental Policies*], Tokyo: Iwanami 『環境政策を考える』 .
- Hata, I., 秦郁彦, (ed.) (1991), *A Total Encyclopedia of the Army and Navy of Japan*, Tokyo: The University of Tokyo Press 『日本陸海軍総合事典』 .
- (2004), *Kyusei Koko Monogatari* [*A History of the High Schools under the Pre-War System of Education*], Tokyo: Bungei Shunju.
- Hayashi, Y., 林宥一, (1996), chapp. 3-4, in: Shuzo Teruoka (ed.), *Nihon Nogyo Hyakunen no Ayumi: Shihonshugi no Tenkai to Nogyo Mondai* [*One Hundred Years of Japan's Agriculture: the Development of Capitalism and Agricultural Problems*], Tokyo: Yuhikaku 『日本農業 100 年のあゆみ—資本主義の展開と農業問題』 有斐閣
- Iinuma, J., 飯沼二郎, (1979), 'Nihon no Hudo kara Mita Shokuryo-Seisan' ('The Food Production in terms of the Japanese Climate and Culture') *Nogyo to Keizai (Agriculture and Economy)*, 45, 64-70.
- The Imagawas' *Formularies in Syllabary Characters* (16th century).
- Imamichi, T., 今道友信, (1983), 'Nihon-Shiso no Taikesei ni tsuite' ['The Systematicity of Japanese Thoughts'] in: Monthly 1, *Koza Nihon Shiso (The Lecture Series of Japanese Thoughts)*: 4-6.
- The Industry Planning Commission (1958), *Wrong Energy Policies, The Industry Planning Commission Sixth Recommendation*, Tokyo: Toyo Keizai, 産業計画会議編(1958) 『あやまれるエネルギー政策』 (産業計画会議第 6 次レコメンデーション) 東洋経済新報.
- The Industry Planning Commission (ed.) (1958), *Appendix "The Basic Problems of Our Country's Energy Policy"* in: id. *Wrong Energy Policies, The Industry Planning Commission Sixth Recommendation*, Tokyo: Toyo Keizai, 18.
- Inoue, T., 井上竜夫, (1973), 'Shokuryo Jikyu-Ron no Kiten' ['With What to Begin a Theory of Self-Sufficiency in Food'] *Nogyo to Keizai [Agriculture and Economy]* 39, 64-70.
- Ishii, S. et al., 石井進ほか, (eds.)(1972), *Chusei Seiji-Shakai Shiso 1 [Medieval Socio-Political Thoughts, vol. 1]*, Tokyo: Iwanami.
- Iwamatsu, S., 岩松繁俊, (1950), 'Waga-Kuni Shokuryo-Seisan-Kozo no Shorai' ['The Future Food Production Structure of Our Nation'] *Nogyo to Keizai [Agriculture and Economy]* 「我が國食糧生産構造の将来」 『農業と経済』 16, 35-40.
- Kato, Y., 加藤陽子, (2002), *Senso no Nihon Kindai-shi [Japanese Modern History of War]*, Tokyo: Kodansha 『戦争の日本近代史』 .
- Jin-Kai Shu (Dust and Dirt Collection or A Collection of Codes) 塵芥集 1537 (222)* in: S. Ishii et al. (eds.)(1972), *Chusei Seiji-Shakai Shiso 1 (Medieval Socio-Political Thoughts, vol. 1)*, Tokyo: Iwanami.
- Katayama, T., 片山哲, (1947), Prime Minister Tetsu Katayama's statement of his cabinet's policy in the first Diet session under the 1946 Constitution after the Second World War on

1st July 1947.

Koiso, K., 小磯国昭, (1917), *The Imperial Defense Resources* 『帝国国防資源』 (quoted by Kuzuhara (2001) 37) Kondo, Y., 近藤康男, (1951), 'Shokuryo-Jikyū to sono Zentei' [Self-Sufficiency in Food and Its Conditions] *Chuo Koron*, 58-66 「食糧自給と前提」 『中央公論』.

「石高」 'Kokudaka', *Wikipedia*: <http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E7%9F%B3%E9%AB%98> (access: 7<sup>th</sup> January 2015)

Kurono, T., 黒野耐, (2002), *Nihon wo Horoboshita Kokubou-Houshin* [*National Defence Guidelines Resulting in the Downfall of Japan*], Tokyo: Bungei-Shunju 『日本を滅ぼした国防方針』

---- (2004), *Sanbo-Hombu to Rikugun-Daigakko* [*The General Staff Headquarter and the Army Staff College*], Tokyo: Kodan-sha 『参謀本部と陸軍大学校』.

Kuzuhara, K. (2001) 葛原和三, 「帝国陸軍の第一次世界大戦史研究—戦史研究の用兵思想への反映について」 [The Imperial Army's Research on the History of the First World War: on the Influence of War History Research on a Tactical Theory] *Senshi-Kenkyū Nempo*, 『戦史研究年報』 [*The National Institute for Defense Studies*] 4, 34-50

The *Lotus Sutra* 妙法蓮華經

Maeda, J., 前田順子, (1996), 「草木成仏について」 [On Trees' and Plants' Attainment of Buddhahood] 『仏教学会報』 [*Journal of the Association of Buddhist Studies*] 20, 35-40.

Malthus, R. (1815), *The Grounds of an Opinion on the Policy of Restricting the Importation of Foreign Corn: intended as an Appendix to "Observations on the Corn Law"*, London.

Maruyama, M., 丸山真男, (1952), *A Study on the History of Japanese Political Thoughts*, Tokyo: Tokyo University Press (the included articles originally published in the mid-war time, 1940-44).

The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (2003), *International Trade and Industry White Paper*.

---- (2009), *International Trade and Industry White Paper*.

---- (2011), *International Trade and Industry White Paper*.

The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (1949), "Our National Economy's Dependency on the Overseas Products", *International Trade and Industry White Paper* (「わが国経済の海外依存度」 『通商白書』 1949)

---- (1974), *Conclusion, White Paper*.

---- (1980), *Conclusion, White Paper*.

---- (1990), *International Trade and Industry White Paper*.

Miura, Joshin (Shigemasa), 三浦浄心 (茂正), *Keicho Era Tidings*, vol. 7 『慶長見聞集』 (富山房 袖珍名著文庫 巻25) 巻7.

Miyamoto, S., 宮本正尊, (1961), 「草木國土悉皆成佛」の佛性論的意義とその作者」 [The Attainment of Buddhahood by Trees, Plants, Land, and Any One thing in the World: Its Significance in the Buddha-Nature Theory and Its Author], *Indian and Buddhist Studies*, 18, 672-701.

- Nichiren, 日蓮 (1272), *Disputation on Trees' and Plants' Attainment of Buddhahood*.
- Nishikawa, S., 西川俊作, (1977-78) 'Nihon Keizai-Seisaku no Genryu' [The Origins of the Japanese Economic Policy], 6 articles, *Keizai Semina* ((1): 264(1977): 48-56; (2): 266(1977) 47-55; (3): 273 (1977) 42-51; (4): 278 (1978) 26-34; (5): 282 (1978) 48-56; (6): 285 (1978) 40-47.
- Nishio, M., 西尾勝, (2003?), *Public Administration* 『行政学』, Tokyo: Yuhikaku.
- Ohyama, A., 大山梓, (1978), 「征韓論争と樺太問題」 [The Dispute over the Expedition to Korean Peninsula and the Sakhalin Issue], *Gunji-Shi-Gaku* [The Military History], 14, 2-17.
- Okuno, K., 奥野光賢, (1998), 「吉蔵と草木成仏説」 [Jizang and the Theory of Trees' and Plants' Attainment of Buddhahood] *Indian and Buddhist Studies*, 93, 93-96.
- Otori, K., 大鳥圭介, (1879), *The 1874 Report on Coal*, Hokkaido Development Bureau 『石炭編』.
- The Protocol on the Action against the Indigenous Tribe in Taiwan* (1874), The 7th year of the Meiji era, in: the Okubos (1927), *the Documents of Toshimichi Okubo*, vol. 5, Nihon Shiseki Kyokai, 500 (侯爵大久保家蔵版『大久保利通文書』第5巻(1927)日本史籍協会 500)
- Ricardo, D. (1817), 'On Foreign Trade' in: *On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation*, London: Chap. 6.
- Saito, O., 斎藤修, (2013), *Puroto-Kogyoka no Jidai* [The Age of Proto-Industrialization], 『プロト工業化の時代』, Tokyo: Iwanami.
- Sakano, J., 坂野潤司, (2009), *The Conception of State in Modern Japan, 1871-1936*, 『近代日本の国家構想 一八七一—一九三六』, Tokyo: Iwanami (1878年(明治11年)内務省の起業公債に関する説明:35).
- San Francisco Peace Treaty (1951).
- Shimanuki, T., 島貫武治 (1973), “*Nichiro-Senso igoniokeru Kokubou-houshin, Shoyou-heiryoku, Youhei-koryo no Hensen, (Jo)*” [The Post-Russo-Japanese-War Transition in National Defence Guidelines, Required Military Force, and Tactical Principles], *Gunji-Shi-Gaku* [The Military History], 8-4, 2-16 「日露戦争以後における国防方針、所要兵力、用兵綱領の変遷(上)」 『軍事史学』
- Shimizu, Y., 清水唯一郎, (2013), *Kindai Nihon no Kanryo* (The Modern Japanese Bureaucrats), Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha.
- Shirato, W., 白土わか, (1998), 'Somoku-jobutu-setu ni tsuite – sono keisei to tenkai' [On Buddha-Becoming of Grasses and Trees: Its Rise and Development] *Bukkyogaku Semina* 68, 14-32.
- Shiroyama, H. et al., 城山英明ほか, (1999) *Inside the Japanese Bureaucracy* 『中央省庁の政策形成過程—日本官僚制の解剖』 Tokyo: Chuo UP.
- Shoji, H. and Miyamoto, K., 庄司光, 宮本憲一, (1964), *Osorubeki Kogai* [Horrible Public Nuisances], 『恐るべき公害』, Tokyo: Iwanami.
- (1975), *Nihon no Kogai* [Public Nuisances in Japan], 『日本の公害』, Tokyo: Iwanami.

- Soper, K. (1995), *What is Nature?*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Tanaka, K., 田中角栄, (1972), Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka's Speech on his Cabinet's Policy at the House of Representatives, 28th October 1972.
- The Statistics Agency, Bank of Japan (1966) *Our Country's Primary Economic Statistics Since the Meiji Era* 『明治以降 本邦主要経済統計』 (reproduced in 1999)
- Testart, A. (1982), "The Significance of Food Storage among Hunter-Gatherers: Residence, Partners, Population Destinies and Social Inequalities", *Current Anthropology*, 23, 532-537
- Toi, K., 東井金平, (1951), 'Kokusaitekini mita Nihon no Shokuryo-Jikyusei' ['Japan's Self-Sufficiency in Food in International Terms'] *Nogyo to Keizai* [Agriculture and Economy], 17, 2-9.
- Tokutomi, S., 徳富蘇峰, (1894), *On the Expansion of Great Japan*, 『大日本膨張論』 Tokyo: Min-yu-sha.
- Toshikage Asakura's *Seventeen Codes*, 16th century, in: S. Ishii et al. (eds.)(1972), *Chusei Seiji-Shakai Shiso* 1 (Medieval Socio-Political Thoughts, vol. 1), Tokyo: Iwanami, 350-352.
- Tsuda, S., 津田左右吉, (1916), *Bungaku ni Arawaretaru Kokumin-Shiso no Kenkyu*, 『文學に現はれたる國民思想の研究』[A Study on the Nation's Ideas Found in Literary Works], Vol. 1, Iwanami.
- Umeda, T., 梅田俊英, (1998) 「社会思想社の一側面—田中九一と東大新人会 OB の動向」上 『大原社会問題研究雑誌』 479, 39-53))
- Ushioji, M., 潮木守一, (1984), *Kyoto Teikoku Daigaku no Chosen: Teikoku Daigaku Shi no Hitokoma* [The Challenge by the Imperial University of Kyoto: a Highlight in the History of Imperial Universities], Nagoya: Nagoya University Press.
- Watanabe, T., 渡辺尚志 (2013), *The Potentiality of Modern Hermit Workers in Trades: The Edo Era as Seen with Respect to the Hermit Life* [Kinsei Hyakusho no Soko-jikara: Mura kara Mita Edo-jidai], Tokyo: Keibunsha 『近世百姓の底力—村から見た江戸時代』
- Watanabe, Y. (2000), 「草木成仏論の形成と意義」 ('The Formation and significance of the Theory of Trees' and Plants' Attainment of Buddhahood') 『論集』 *Ronshu*, 27, 1-19.
- The Will of Seishin Hayaki*, Ishii et al. (eds.)(1972), 378.
- Yamagata, Aritomo, 山縣有朋 (1871), *Opinion on Armament*, co-authored by Sumiyoshi Kawamura and Tsugumich Saigo
- (1880), *Report to the Throne on the Outline of Neighbouring Countries' Armaments* 「進隣邦兵備略表」
- (1882), *Rescript to Local Governors on the Expansion of Armaments* 「兵備拡張のため地方長官召命」
- (1888), *Military Report to Prime Minister* [H. Ito] 「軍事意見書」
- (1890), *Foreign Affairs Policy* 「外交政略論」
- Yamashita, M., 山下政信, (1956), 「戦前、戦後における農家の食糧需要構造の変化と原因」 ('The Change and Cause of the Structure of Food Demand in the Farmers' Households in the Pre-War and Post-War Time') 『食糧管理月報』 (*Food Control Monthly*)8: 68-71.

Yanabu, A., 柳父章, (1977), *Honyaku no Shiso: Shizen to Nature* [*The Implications in Translation: Shizen and Nature*] 『翻訳の思想—「自然」とNATURE』, Tokyo: Heibonsha.  
 Yano Tsuneta Memorial Foundation (ed.) (1981), *Japan's One Hundred Years as Figures Show It: The Chartered Statistics of Japan in the Long-Range Statistics Edition* 『数字でみる 日本の百年 日本国政図会 長期統計版』  
 Yoshida, S., 吉田茂, (1951), Prime Minister Yoshida's speech at San Francisco Peace Conference on 7<sup>th</sup> September 1951.

***Appendix: Tables and Graphs on Japan's Pre-War Time Self-Sufficiency in Resources***

Table 1: The Pre-War Cereal Production and Population

Year	population (1000 people)	rice (1000 koku)	barley (1000 koku)	wheat (1000 koku)	rye (1000 koku)	barley, wheat and rye (1000 koku)	Cereals (1000koku) (rice,barley, wheat and rye)
1880	36649	31434	5824	2266	4413	12503	43937
1890	39902	43038	5420	2460	2843	10723	53761
1900	43847	41466	8667	4256	7433	20356	61822
1910	49184	46633	9291	4602	6718	20611	67244
1920	55473	63209	8290	5891	8297	22478	85687
1930	64450	66875	5141	5589	5631	16361	83236
1940	71933	60874	5451	11948	5797	23196	84070

Note 1: All the statistics are those of the Japanese Islands, and do not include those of the area the pre-war regime ruled, Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, or Manchuria.

Note 2: The statistics of the population is quoted from Yano Tsuneta Memorial Foundation (ed.) (1981), *Japan's One Hundred Years as Figures Show It: The Chartered Statistics of Japan in the Long-Range Statistics Edition* 『数字でみる 日本の百年 日本国政図会 長期統計版』

Note 2: Of the production of the cereals, rice, barley, wheat and rye, measured by the koku, the statistics from 1880 to 1920 is quoted from Asahi Shibun (Asahi Newspaper Company) (1930), *The Statistical Conspectus of Japan's Economy in the Meiji and Taisho Eras*, 2 vols 『明治・大正期 日本経済統計総観』 2巻 (reproduced in 1999); the statistics from 1930 to 1940 are calculated from the statistics by the ton in The Statistics Agency, Bank of Japan (1966) *Our Country's Primary Economic Statistics Since the Meiji Era* 『明治以降 本邦主要経済統計』 (reproduced in 1999).

Table 2: The Annual Cereal Consumption per Person by the koku

	rice (koku)	barley and rye (koku)	wheat (koku)	total (koku)
1912-1916	1.060	0.343	0.105	1.508
1917-1921	1.133	0.302	0.143	1.578
1921-1926	1.127	0.256	0.151	1.534
1927-1931	1.106	0.223	0.145	1.474
1932-1936	1.067	0.187	0.127	1.381
1937-1941	1.074	0.179	0.124	1.377
1942-1945	0.950	0.131	0.116	1.197

Note 1: The statistics are quoted from Table 1, Masanobu Yamashita (1956) 「戦前、戦後における農家の食糧需要構造の変化と原因」 (‘The Change and Cause of the Structure of Food Demand in the Farmers’ Households in the Pre-War and Post-War Time’) 『食糧管理月報』 (*Food Control Monthly*)8: 68-71.

Graph 1: Self-Sufficiency in Food as Approximatel Measured by the koku worth the Annual Food Consumption of an Adult




Table 3: Self-Sufficiency of Rice

Financial Year	Domestic Production	Import	Domestic Consumption	Self-Sufficiency
1911-1915	7376	526	7836	0.94
1921-1925	8535	1212	9612	0.89
1930	8704	1259	10073	0.86
1935	7759	1953	10566	0.73
1939	9863	1471	11884	0.83

Note 1: The statistics of Tables 3-6 are made from the data in Tables 5.19-22, Yano Tsuneta Memorial Foundation (ed.) (1981). The original tables, the editor notes, are made from The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery, *Table of Food Demand and Supply*.

Note 2: The domestic production, import, domestic consumption in Tables 1-4 is calculated by the thousand ton.

Note 3: The figures of the financial year period 1911-1915 and 1921-1925 in Tables 1-4, although the editor makes no notes, are the average figures per year, I conjecture.

Note 4: The self-sufficiency of the items in Tables 2-5 is a quotient resulted from the division of domestic consumption by domestic production.

Table 4: Self-Sufficiency of Wheat

Fiscal Year	Domestic Production	Import	Domestic Consumption	Self-Sufficiency
1911-1915	663	103	743	0.89
1921-1925	743	519	1193	0.62
1930	838	693	1247	0.67
1935	1321	421	1375	0.96
1939	1657	171	1283	1.29

Table 5: Self-Sufficiency of Beans

Fiscal Year	Domestic Production	Import	Domestic Consumption	Self-Sufficiency
1911-1915	437	312	746	0.59
1921-1925	483	553	1029	0.47
1930	340	612	949	0.36
1935	275	650	921	0.3
1939	343	779	1118	0.31

Table 6: Self-Sufficiency of Potato

Fiscal Year	Domestic Production	Import	Domestic Consumption	Self-Sufficiency
1911-1915	786	0	775	1.01
1921-1925	939	0	931	1.01
1930	1037	0	1017	1.02
1935	1250	0	1202	1.04
1939	1883	0	1846	1.02

Table 7: Self-Sufficiency of Petroleum

	Domestic Production	Import	Dependency on Import	Self-Sufficiency
1888	13	no data	no data	no data
1920	352	no data	no data	no data
1930	317	570	64.3	0.36
1935	351	1332	79.1	0.21
1940	331	2292	87.4	0.13

Note 1: The statistics of Table 7 are made from Table 4.25, Yano Tsuneta Memorial Foundation (ed.) 1981, op. cit. The editor notes that the original data are quoted from The Ministry of International Trade and Industry, *Annual Petroleum Statistics Report*; id., *Annual Energy Statistics Report*; id., *Annual Energy Production and Demand Statistics Report*.

Note 2: The domestic production and the import are calculated by the kilolitre.

Note 3: The dependency on the import is indicated by the percentage of the import to the domestic product and the import.

Note 4: The self-sufficiency is a quotient resulted from the division of the domestic product by the domestic production and the import.

Table 8: Self-Sufficiency of Coal


	Domestic Production	Import	Demand	Self-Sufficiency
1926	31424	2414	34230	0.92
1930	31374	2946	34277	0.92
1935	37762	5249	43315	0.87
1940	57318	9896	67207	0.85

Note 1: The statistics of Table 8 are made from Table 4.19, Yano Tsuneta Memorial Foundation (ed.) 1981, op. cit. The editor notes that the original data are quoted from The Ministry of International Trade and Industry, *Annual Coal and Cokes Statistics Report*; id., *Annual Energy Statistics Report*; id., *Annual Energy Production and Demand Statistics Report*.

Note 2: The domestic production, the import and the demand is calculated by the kiloton.

Note 3: The self-sufficiency is a quotient resulted from the division of the domestic production by the domestic product and the import.

Graph 2: The Pre-War Time Military Power Growth and Oil Self-Sufficiency Decline



Note 1: The statistics in this table are calculated on the basis of the data given in Table 10.1, the Yano Tsuneta Memorial Foundation (ed.) 1981, op. cit. The editor notes that the original data is quoted from The Cabinet Secretariat (ed.), *The Seventy Years' History of the Cabinet System*.