2017年
Impossibility of the Provable Security of the Schnorr Signature from the One-More DL Assumption in the Non-programmable Random Oracle Model
Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
- ,
- 巻
- 10592
- 号
- 開始ページ
- 201
- 終了ページ
- 218
- 記述言語
- 英語
- 掲載種別
- 研究論文(国際会議プロシーディングス)
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-3-319-68637-0_12
- 出版者・発行元
- Springer Verlag
The security of the Schnorr signature was widely discussed. In the random oracle model (ROM), it is provable from the DL assumption, whereas there is a negative circumstantial evidence in the standard model. Fleischhacker, Jager and Schröder showed that the tight security of the Schnorr signature is unprovable from a strong cryptographic assumption, such as the One-more DL (OM-DL) assumption and the computational and decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, in the ROM via a generic reduction as long as the underlying cryptographic assumption holds. However, it remains open whether or not the impossibility of the provable security of the Schnorr signature from a strong assumption via a non-tight and reasonable reduction. In this paper, we show that the security of the Schnorr signature is unprovable from the OM-DL assumption in the non-programmable ROM as long as the OM-DL assumption holds. Our impossibility result is proven via a non-tight and non-restricted Turing reduction.
- ID情報
-
- DOI : 10.1007/978-3-319-68637-0_12
- ISSN : 1611-3349
- ISSN : 0302-9743
- SCOPUS ID : 85032665126